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Three-Fifths a Racist: A Typology for Analyzing Public Opinion About Race

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Abstract Is race politics primarily about symbolic racism, principled conservatism, or group conflict? After almost three decades, this debate among some of our best scholars seems scarcely closer to resolution, yet the theoretical, empirical, and normative issues at stake remain enormous. All three parties to the debate falsely assume that the causal structure driving opinion about race policy is homogenous. I reorient and advance the debate by showing how a methodological shift to a data-driven taxonomy of subjects can elucidate how race politics really is complex. I use this taxonomy to run new analyses, and to explain and assess the seemingly contradictory results of previous contributions to the debate. Each of the major parties to the debate is partially right in their account of public opinion about race politics, *but about independently identifiable sub-sets of subjects.*

Keywords Race politics · Public opinion · Symbolic racism

The bedrock assumption motivating modern liberal democracy is that we should expect, and therefore accommodate as best we can, reasonable disagreement between citizens on vital matters.[1] But what are the limits to and consequences of accommodating such disagreement? For example, what are we to make of someone who opposes affirmative action because he or she dislikes blacks? While reasonable people can surely disagree about affirmative action, just as surely we would agree

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[1] At least this is the historical root of liberal democracy, born out of the bloodshed of the wars of religion, and largely confirmed by subsequent experience. "Reasonable disagreement" and "public reason" are terms of art in political philosophy. I intend them in roughly the sense made famous by Rawls (1993).

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that our hypothetical racist is not a reasonable person exercising the public use of reason.

The problem is knowing when a particular opinion manifests commitment to legitimate principles, and when it manifests something we rightly exclude as illegitimate in public debate. Let me be clear from the beginning: we should be very cautious about impugning someone's motives.[2] Nonetheless, important scientific and political questions hinge on motive attribution, including the long and contentious three-way debate over the meaning of public opinion about race policy in the U.S.

Symbolic Racism theorists claim that the presence or absence of a particular fusion of negative racial emotions and harsh individualism is the main determinate of whites' opinions about race policy. Principled Ideology theorists respond that, in the post-civil rights era, racial antipathy has receded as a source of whites' attitudes about racial policy. They claim that one's political ideology is now the main determinant. Group Conflict theorists agree that racial antipathy is not the primary factor. However, they claim that opinion about race policy was never really about antipathy in the first place. Race politics was and is about whites' trying to hold on to their social, political, and economic advantages.[3]

According to Principled Ideology theorists, when whites oppose policies like affirmative action, they do so because they object to the liberal principles that underwrite such policies. One cannot simply dismiss principled political disagreement by slapping a bad name on it. Symbolic Racism and Group Conflict theorists argue that the roots of the disagreement are not so principled, and need to be exposed for what they are. In many ways, the empirical and normative questions seem clear. The real puzzle, then, is why three decades of debate among many of our best researchers, armed with enormous amounts of data, seems stuck in an endless cycle of disagreement.

In concurrent work (Neblo forthcoming), I show that motive attribution cannot be adequately addressed by analyzing only the structure of variables. All three

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[2] Caution is warranted because it can turn into arbitrarily dismissing people, recklessly playing the thought police, or ignoring the merit of arguments of people we don't like. However, even if much caution is warranted in acting on my argument, the conceptual point is still valid. A political theory companion piece, Neblo (n.d.) "Motive Matters: Liberalism & Insincerity," (http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/mneblo/papers.htm) develops the implications of this line of reasoning for contemporary liberal democratic theory with special reference to Rawls's theory of a free-standing political conception.

[3] These descriptions are merely summary tags for more elaborate theories. I discuss their subtleties as necessary below. A large number of terrific scholars have contributed to this debate. However, Sears and Kinder are the central Symbolic Racism theorists. Henry and Sears (2002); Kinder and Sears (1981, 1996); Kinder and Medelberg (2000); Sears (1994); Sears and Henry (2003, 2005); Tarman and Sears (2005). Symbolic Racism has also been called The New Racism and Racial Resentment. While some of the variations are important for some purposes, my argument is more general in form. Therefore, I will use the original name to refer to the genus. Principled Ideology is my own label. Sniderman has been a staunch defender of Principled Ideology theory. Sniderman et al. (2000); Sniderman and Carmines (1997); Sniderman et al. (1997); Sniderman and Piazza (1993); Sniderman and Tetlock (1986); Kuklinski et al. (1997). Bobo developed the Group Conflict model. Bobo (1983, 1998, 2000). Sidanius's Social Dominance Theory is probably most similar to the Group Conflict model, though distinct in certain respects. Sidanius and Pratto (1999); Federico and Sidanius (2002a, b). For a more general discussion see also Hurwitz and Peffley (1998); Sear et al. (2000); Stoker (1996); Wood (1994). Remarkably, this list barely scratches the surface of this literature.

approaches implicitly try to read motive off of a subject's placement in the apparently "complex" space of post-civil rights era opinion about race.[4] I demonstrate that the purported complexity of the issue space is illusory, and thus any attempt to read qualitative differences in motive attribution off of it must fail. In this sense, race politics is *simpler* than we thought. Yet we are still left with a powerful intuition that there *is* something complex about contemporary race politics.

Below, I show how a different approach, using a data-driven taxonomy of perspectives on race politics can elucidate how the topic is *more* complex than we thought.[5] It is this true complexity that will allow me to explain and assess the seemingly contradictory results of three otherwise well-constructed research programs. My approach is in the spirit of Jennifer Hochschild's (2000) recent commentary on this debate, in which she notes that "[T]axonomists of the natural world have been divided into lumpers, who seek to merge a larger number of proposed species or genera into a smaller number, and splitters, who seek to move in the opposite direction. Some of the debate among the three basic approaches on display … has the flavor of this difference in taste (or in epistemological starting point, to be more formal)." (325) While I have much sympathy with Hochschild's view, the three approaches compete more directly than she allows for, and are not easily reconciled as merely differences in flavor. I want to extend her metaphor by arguing that all three approaches *share* a faulty epistemological starting point by focusing exclusively on lumping and splitting *concepts*, rather than on how these concepts take on differential significance in a taxonomy of *subjects*.

My solution is not simply a plea for "everybody to just get along." The parties to the debate make incompatible claims, and so in one sense they cannot all be right. My thesis is that they are all partially right, but *about different sub-sets of subjects*. All three assume that the causal structure driving opinion about race policy is homogenous. While unit homogeneity is a common and often justifiable simplifying assumption in statistical arguments, in the present context it is violated to such an extent as to muddle the whole debate.

In other words, the standard analysis of variables is producing diminishing returns because we are constrained to look at each item in relative isolation. To test an alternative approach to the race politics debate, I administered a two part survey to a sample of adults (18+ and U.S. citizens) drawn from the Chicago metropolitan area. The sample was evenly split on gender (51%F, 49%M), reasonably spread on age (min. 18/max. 80, $\mu = 39.8$, $\sigma = 15.1$), though somewhat more educated (27% HS or Less, 51% College or more) than the larger population. Unsurprisingly for Chicago, ideological self-placement is less skewed (53% Lib./47% Con.) than party identification (44%D, 25%R). Though the sample was racially diverse, the analyses

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[4] Because my sample does not contain enough non-white protocols for separate analyses, "opinion about race" refers to the opinions of whites.

[5] Charles Glock and his collaborators (Apostle et al. 1983) also used a typological approach to study attitudes about race. I was unaware of Glock's work when I began this study, so the results are not tightly comparable. However, one can still discern some changes over time. To the extent that the typologies are comparable at such a remove, my sense is that three of Apostle et al.'s (1983) main categories (the Geneticists, Supernaturalists, and Radicals) have become quite marginal, while the Individualists and the Environmentalists are still quite recognizable.

reported here are based on 237 complete white protocols.[6] The survey asked 106 questions about race, including almost all of those used on major national surveys, plus dozens that I adapted or wrote myself.[7]

I propose trying to get greater leverage on the specific meaning, intentions, and causes behind individual survey responses by putting them in the context of a respondent's entire answer profile, which includes a mix of policy attitudes and predictions, personal attitudes and experiences, stereotypes, attributions of responsibility, factual beliefs, and moral judgments. To represent this methodologically, I transposed the matrix of 106 race questions and factored the respondents rather than the items (i.e., Q-factors). While a transposed matrix contains the same information as the original, this does not mean that our perspective on the data cannot be improved and supplemented in crucial ways.

Because Q-factors[8] are naturally related to interpretive methods, they are a particularly appropriate tool for the problem that has bedeviled the race politics debate—namely, distinguishing when a given response signifies racial resentment, sincere ideology, or a desire to hold on to power and privilege. Indeed, it is useful to think of a Q-factor as a Weberian ideal-type constructed from a statistically constrained set of observations. Of course, statistical extraction does not guarantee a theoretically meaningful, nor a practically useful, organization of social reality, so it

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[6] I used a cluster sample approach for recruitment, selecting five cluster sites to reach a diverse range of people in greater Chicago based upon criteria likely to affect their views on race. Given the significant resource constraints, the goal was to get a kind of rough stratification by site proxy so that Q-types linked to ascriptive and associative characteristics would have a chance to express themselves. The geography of greater Chicago is very important for its racial politics. The first cluster surveyed the patrons of a place of business on the southwest side of the city. This site was chosen to sample blue-collar ethnic whites living mostly in urban "border" neighborhoods (i.e., segregated white neighborhoods bordering segregated African-American neighborhoods with a history of racial conflict). The next site surveyed the employees of a business establishment in the southwest suburbs. Subjects here varied a bit more in class, and lived further away from any majority African-American neighborhoods. The third site sampled subjects from patrons of a place of business in a southeast side neighborhood with a long history of (relatively) stable racial integration, and a fairly educated, professional group composition. The fourth site sampled subjects from a social organization on the city's north side consisting mostly of younger professionals. The fifth site sampled subjects from the staff of a high school in the northern suburbs of Chicago. I also made an unsuccessful attempt to get an adequate number of subjects from other regions of the country using acquaintances as proxies, but decided to concentrate on doing a reasonable job of approximating the demographics of Cook county Illinois, rather than doing a very poor job of approximating a national sample. Obviously the lack of a national random sample limits my ability to infer that I have captured the full range of Q types, and their rates in the general population. In future work, I would like to use these data to develop a dramatically shortened survey that could be used on a national probability sample. Subjects were not compensated. The survey was paper and pencil. It was anonymous by default (using a code blinded to the investigator to link pre and post), though there was an option for subjects to identify themselves to the researcher for purposes of doing face to face, semi-structured, follow-up interviews. At each cluster site the researcher made an appeal for respondents, and administered the survey to those present and willing to do it on the spot. There was also an option to take the survey home and return it to the researcher via mail or an intermediary.

[7] For the complete list of race questions see "Race Appendix" accessible at: (http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/mneblo/papers.htm).

[8] I did not use Q-methodology in the narrow sense of having subjects sort stacks of items and such. I merely used Q rather than "R" (standard attitude/trait) factor analysis. See McKeown and Thomas (1988). Thus my analyses do not suffer from some of the problems associated with many Q studies: I have a larger and non "purposeful" sample, use standard questionnaire format, avoid ipsative data, etc.

is necessary to check the factors against other criteria.[9] Toward that end, I conducted follow-up interviews with the highest loading individuals for each type in order to assess the hermeneutic fit of the statistically identified types. These processes complement each other, the Q-factors by imposing discipline on the imagination of the researcher, and the interpretive methods by guarding against fetishizing technique over meaning and utility.

Q-techniques have a fairly long and varied history in political science. The first few applications began to appear in the mid-1960s and remained moderately popular through the 1980s, with fewer applications in the last 15 years or so. There appear to be three basic uses of Q-techniques in political science. The first is simply data reduction of complex phenomena for descriptive purposes. For example, Banks and Gregg (1965) perform Q-factor analysis on 115 countries using sixty-eight variables to cluster the basic political systems into five groups (polyarchy, elitism, centrism, personalism, and traditionalism). Similarly, Russett (1966) describes cohesive voting groups in the United Nations, Parker and Parker (1979) do the same for voting factions in U.S. House committees, and Jillson (1981) for state voting blocks during the U.S. Constitutional convention. Such descriptive applications are quite varied, ranging from sorting states according to their approach toward the public management of urban growth (Savage 1982), to a typology of relationships between legislators and bureaucratic administrators (Cunningham and Olshfski 1986), to kinds of non-violent direct action (Bond 1988), among many others.

A second class of Q studies seek to reconstruct latent perspectival diversity in the mass public, often to contrast with perspectives found among elites or generated out of normative theory. So, for example, Conover and Feldman (1984) use Q-sorts to derive basic political schemas in mass belief systems as an alternative to the failed attempt to find bipolar ideological thinking that tracks elite, left–right discourses. Dryzek and Berejikian (1993) reconstruct latent folk conceptions of democracy and relate them to philosophical and applied elite discourses of the concept, while Reid and Henderson (1976) and Theiss-Morse (1993) do something very similar for notions of political obligation and good citizenship, respectively.

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[9] My use of exploratory techniques here might make some readers uneasy. I share their general concern about such techniques, so I should explain why I think that they are scientifically justified and practically useful in the present context: (1) my main hypothesis is that unit heterogeneity problems were bedeviling progress in this debate (which can be tested at a general level without specifying the precise form of the heterogeneity a priori); (2) there was a profusion of theoretically plausible factor structures from which I could have specified a secondary hypothesis, but no good empirical or theoretical reasons to choose among them. Therefore, I was faced with either: (a) picking blindly from among them a priori (which would have been incredibly inefficient), or (b) running a long series of confirmatory tests (which destroys their meaning, rendering them effectively exploratory, and less transparently so); (3) my follow-up interviews with high loading subjects for each factor served as a kind of validity check on the empirically derived typology; (4) any deviation from the true structure of unit heterogeneity would bias against the many significant results on the tests I run below to adjudicate between the Symbolic Racism, Principled Ideology, and Group Conflict interpretations of race politics. Thus, those tests simultaneously provide some evidence for the construct and criterion validity of the typology; (5) since the general heterogeneity hypothesis receives considerable support (below), the factor structure derived here can now help generate theoretical reflection and empirical guidance for formulating new and more detailed hypotheses to test in the future.

The final class of Q studies generates typologies to detect theoretically suspected unit heterogeneity in the explanatory structure of a given phenomenon. For example Geller (1987) uses the Banks and Gregg (1965) typology of regime types to predict differential patterns of domestic instability and their structural causes. Similarly, Sullivan et al. (1992) hypothesize that campaign appeals to patriotism will be differentially successful depending on the implicit conception of patriotism that citizens carry in their heads. They hypothesize unit heterogeneity with respect to a single explanatory variable—i.e., that George H. W. Bush's appeals to patriotism in the 1988 election would be effective in altering vote choice only for those with a specific conception of patriotism, which they disaggregate via Q-techniques. They pursue Q-analysis in the hope of developing a typology that makes traditional "R" analysis more precise on its own terms by accounting for unit heterogeneity in the explanatory structure. Without that refinement, they would have falsely inferred that patriotism did not matter, because the standard NES patriotism battery has no detectable plenary effect on vote choice. However, when the results are disaggregated by the subjects' conceptions of patriotism, the effect was quite large (behind only party ID and the incumbent's image), but only for the theoretically predicted subsets of subjects. Their move is very much in the spirit of the present paper.

Accordingly, I factored the transpose of the race-question matrix and extracted five components or "types."[10] The first and largest type I call Racial Progressives (RP's; $n = 113$). Though a highly stable factor with a clear general meaning, this is also a diverse group demographically. Though strongly associated with self-identified liberalism, the RP group also contains a few moderates and conservatives. The factor-scores for most of the items are fairly large, so it is hard to define this group except in contrast to the others.

The second type I call Open Racists (OR's; $n = 22$), and upon inspection I doubt that many (perhaps even within the group itself) would contend with this description.[11] OR's are the only group to openly disagree with Q91: "In a presidential election, I would not hesitate to vote for a black candidate," and to agree that "It would make me angry or upset if a black family moved in next door to me."(Q98) They engage in more negative stereotyping, for example, that blacks are less intelligent (Q66), more violent (Q52) and pushy (Q17). They adopt a fairly

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[10] I experimented with different dimensional solutions and rotation methods to make sure that the five factors that I extracted were reasonably robust and stable. In earlier version of these analyses I had worked with a Varimax rotation because it is the most widely used method in general, but I settled on an Oblimin rotation on theoretical grounds. Varimax stipulates orthogonal factors, whereas Oblimin allows for oblique factors. It certainly seems plausible that the various "ideal types" could share aspects of each other's frames. As it happens, the factor inter-correlations are modest (between −.154 and .308), and the same basic five factors are recognizable when compared with the Varimax rotation. It is worth noting again, in this context, that the regional nature of my sample precludes me from inferring that there would not be additional types were I to have a broader sample.

[11] Q methodology uses a combination of three criteria to determine an item's ability to characterize the different clusters of people: (1) whether the item is distinctively associated with that specific factor; (2) the group's mean level on the item; and (3) the group's mean on the item relative to the other groups'. Such criteria are not typically applied mechanically, but rather are deployed by the researcher qualitatively to build an interpretation.

stark and essentialist "us v. them" attitude arguing that "A majority rules, and whites are the majority in this country,"(Q42) that "God made the races different as part of his divine plan,"(Q102) and that, just as with family, it is natural "to show some preference for those from their own race."(Q106) Though OR's do tend to perceive blacks as threatening, both their survey answer patterns and the interviews suggest that such threat functions at the group level (they are not especially likely to claim personal harm (Q's 26&51), and seems to be predicated on a pre-existing antipathy. For example, they take it as a matter of "common sense" to discourage inter-racial dating (Q96) and to disallow their kids to stay in integrating schools (Q10) or neighborhoods (Q103). OR's tend toward the conservative end of the spectrum, and score higher on authoritarianism than the other groups. They are generally less educated, more male, and score lower on a scale designed to measure socially desirable response sets (SDR).

The third group I call Principled Conservatives (PC's; $n = 35$). A number of considerations warrant this description. First, they are almost all either self-identified or factor-score identified conservatives, and mostly both. They tend to be only slightly above average on authoritarianism (and somewhat lower compared to other conservatives). They also score a bit higher (i.e., "Internal") on a measure of "locus of control," making it more likely that they are performatively consistent in any claims for "rugged individualism." While PC's are just as opposed to most forms of affirmative action as other conservatives, their rationales differ from other conservatives substantially on a number of fronts. They are more likely to emphasize that "In the long run affirmative action ends up hurting the people it is supposed to help," (Q19) that it "perpetuates the idea of black inferiority,"(Q39) and that "the market will punish companies who irrationally discriminate by turning aside customers or talented workers."(Q89)[12] They are less likely to cite reverse discrimination or any lack of merit on the part of blacks as their primary reasons. Indeed, PC's are unique in that they do not assign blame to anyone for various outcome differences between the races. It is not the fault of blacks (Q60, Q90), "the Government" (Q3, Q41), nor whites (Q54, Q95). This pattern seemed paradoxical at first, but when pressed for an explanation of the gap between the races during the interviews, PC's focused on "history" as the main cause, with *current* discrimination by whites, or lack of effort by blacks as decidedly less important. The PC's rejected diversity based arguments for affirmative action even more vehemently than other conservatives. (Q1, Q77) This is consistent with their broadly assimilationist perspective on how blacks can best improve their lot. (Q9, Q38, Q45, Q59) They also differentiate themselves by being more likely to express respect for blacks (Q15), rejecting a zero-sum perspective on race relations (Q25), and by supporting more conservative friendly programs to help blacks such as enterprise zones (Q29), job training (Q8), and educational funding (Q100).

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[12] In labeling this group "Principled," I take no position on whether the principles to which they appeal are ultimately adequate or correct. I simply want to argue that PC's are within the bounds of public reason—i.e., that racial liberals cannot simply claim racism to avoid engagement with PC's. For present purposes, I remain agnostic as to which side should or would carry the day in debate conducted according to the constraints of public reason.

The fourth group is similar to what Kinder and Sanders describe as Racial Resenters, so I adopt their label (RR; $n = 27$).[13] They tend to be conservative, somewhat more authoritarian and educated. Racial Resenters tend to perceive blacks as "Other," specifically with reference to their values and culture. Thus, RR's are more likely to believe that blacks tend to be "less patriotic" (Q97), that Afrocentrism is un-American (Q62),[14] that "blacks teach their children different values from those required to be successful in America," (Q101), that blacks' reaction to the O.J. Simpson verdict "proves that they don't have the same values as most Americans" (Q37), and that the relative success of Caribbean and African immigrants proves that "there must be something wrong with African American culture." (Q14) They also blame others for creating this sense of otherness: "People claim they want a color-blind society, but we are becoming a color-obsessed society instead." (Q69) They claim that "You can demand rights, but not respect. Blacks in this country have not earned my respect." (Q15) While RR's do not share many of the more inflammatory views of the OR's, unlike the PC's they show no more enthusiasm for more conservative friendly ways to help blacks than they do for racially liberal programs. They differ most sharply from the PC's in that they do not hesitate to assign blame to blacks themselves. Interestingly, despite their general focus on the symbolic and cultural, RR's were the most likely to claim actual, material, and individual harm from reverse discrimination (Q26, Q51), even more so than the OR's. Though some RR's that I interviewed had specific instances in mind, much of this phenomenon seems to be driven by RR's working in professional and educational environments with more overt affirmative action goals than the more working class OR's.

I label the final group Apoliticals (AP's; $n = 40$). This is the least well-defined group, though, it is still not too hard to discern a recognizable type. For the most part, these are moderately resentful and ambivalent centrists who do not really care much about cultural politics. They react negatively to questions mentioning taxes (Q20, Q29, Q82 from the social welfare agenda), but yet are more willing to countenance limited affirmative action programs (Q53, Q93). Like the RR's, they think the country is becoming problematically obsessed by race (Q16, Q69) and are "sick of walking on egg shells over race" (Q21), but support efforts toward integration. (Q59) They are scornful of Ebonics (Q67) and engage in some mild stereotyping (Q32), but claim "Some of my best friends *really are* black." (Q68) On a whole range of questions they are second only to the RP's in their sympathetic

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[13] Wong and Bowers (1997) found negative results for the Symbolic Racism theorists' specific formulation of racial resentment as subtle anti-black affect fused with harsh individualism. My results on the specific formulation were more equivocal. Though RR's absolute affect toward blacks was not particularly low, they rated them lower than other groups (see below). Similarly, if one thinks that individualism is a value "required to be successful in America," then RR's bluntly attribute blacks lagging fortunes to its absence. Feldman and Huddy (2005) find that SR functions differentially by a subject's ideology. Their results are consistent with mine insofar as ideology is implicated in my typology.

[14] At this point, I want to recognize that my use of the name may seem subject to the same accusations of tendentiousness that the Principled Ideology theorists level against the Symbolic Racism theorists. Many of the items that characterize this group are not demonstrably false, racist, or deserving of the pejorative connotations associated with "resentment." Below, however, I will demonstrate that subjects with this answer pattern hold less defensible attitudes.

attitudes toward blacks, but in the interviews and on a few questions they also demonstrate some resentment toward claims for "special treatment." For example, (Q84): "The best way for blacks to handle discrimination is for each individual to act like any other American—to work hard, get a good education, and mind his own business." Finally, they show some wariness on the SDR scale, and claim "Most of the time, I don't even notice someone's race." (Q81).

Before subjecting these types to independent validity tests, it is worth taking stock of how the exploratory evidence so far bears on the race politics debate. Since theorists of Symbolic Racism, Principled Ideology, and Group Conflict have focused their disagreement on competing explanations for a *lack* of white support for policies designed to help blacks, the Racial Progressive (RP) group is not directly relevant to adjudicating between them. Similarly, no one denies that there are still Open Racists (OR) around. They only claim that their numbers have diminished (and indeed, they are the smallest group in my data.) Since the OR's motives for opposing various policies are over-determined, they are not at the heart of the debate either. Nevertheless, I include the RP's and OR's in the analyses below, both to contrast with the other groups and to validate them as types.

The exploratory evidence suggests that the Racial Resenter (RR) group is resentful in roughly the Symbolic Racism theorists' sense of the term and that the Principled Conservative (PC) group is not. Among other things: (1) their rationales for opposing various policies tend to differ (the PC's comporting more comfortably with the standards of public reason); and (2) the RR's did not distinguish (while PC's did) between "traditional" and more conservative friendly policies for helping blacks (e.g., enterprise zones), suggesting that ideology was not the primary motive behind their attitudes. Thus, the Principled Ideology theorists account well for the PC group, while Symbolic Racism theorists capture the RR's better. The Principled Ideology and Symbolic Racism theorists both have part of the story for the Apoliticals (AP) group, though the AP's ideology is centrist, rather than conservative, and their resentment is mild and domain specific, rather than strong and general.

Sorting out the role of Group Conflict in the exploratory evidence is a bit more difficult. Specifically *group* conflict items distinguished only the PC's, who rejected zero-sum frames. Such items may have failed to differentially characterize the other groups because, precisely to the extent that group conflict is not operating as a proxy for individual or family interest, it begins to look a lot like racism. There may well be an "objective, realistic conflict of interest" (Bobo 2000, p. 141) between blacks and whites, but an individual favoring some white *stranger* over a black stranger in that conflict may well be a "learned attitude" that rests "heavily on fundamentally irrational antiblack feelings and fears," rather than being "realistic" in the sense of obvious or natural fodder for instrumental rationality (like self-interest). That being said, AP's were sensitive to questions that mentioned "taxes" and the RR's were differentially likely to claim that they had been harmed by reverse discrimination (i.e., affirmative action). Both of these construably constitute a partial Group Conflict explanation for these types, though I think that it is more natural to say that self-interest plays a small and delimited role in them.

In sum, the exploratory analyses provide prima facie evidence that when individuals from different groups answer a question in the same way, there tend to be

Table 1 Analysis of variance on feeling thermometer for "Blacks"[a]

Pairwise mean differences (Tukey HSD *p*-values)	RP's & PC's	RR's & AP's	OR's
RP's & PC's	X		
RR's & AP's	4.292 ($p = .281$)	X	
OR's	14.573 ($p = .003$)	10.282 ($p = .074$)	X

[a] I pool groups according to their theoretically predicted differences, and then compare the pooled groups. Doing so greatly conserves statistical power, and simplifies the comparisons from ten to three. However, using this approach, it is possible that some subset of the super-ordinate groups could be driving a given result. To address this concern I confirmed that none of the pooled groups differed significantly from each other (which required one revision I report below). While some may question whether doing so compromises the post-hoc controls, I am not persuaded by the "no-peeking" objection since the super-ordinate groups were constructed a priori

different motives and causes behind the same observed outcome. Each of the parties to the race politics debate seems to have part of the picture, but for different subsets of subjects. To bolster my claims, I want to use the exploratory analyses to generate hypotheses about each of the types and subject them to six[15] direct validity tests.

First, according to Symbolic Racism theorists, relatively sophisticated Racial Resenter's (RR's) are not likely to show open hostility toward blacks as do the Open Racists (OR). Principled Ideology and Group Conflict theorists both claim that affect only functions at the margins—i.e., for Open Racists. Thus, if Symbolic Racism, Principled Ideology, and Group Conflict explanations map on to my typology as claimed, the OR's should express dislike for Blacks on a feeling thermometer, and there should not be large differences between any of the four remaining groups. As Table 1 shows, my data bear out these hypotheses: RR's and AP's feel some less warmth toward blacks than RP's and PC's, but there is not a statistically significant difference.[16] However, the OR's score blacks markedly lower than any of the other groups. Interestingly, this pattern did not hold for a Feeling Thermometer on Colin Powell, whom all groups rated warmly.

Second, to try and test for a more subtle expression of aversion toward blacks, I expressed each subject's "warmth" for blacks as a fraction of their summed warmth for the five minorities included in the survey (Blacks, Hispanics, Jews, Native Americans, and Asian Americans). Since Symbolic Racism theory argues that white's aversive socialization is fairly specific to blacks, I hypothesize that the RR's and AP's will fall below the equality level of .02 relative to the other groups. If Principled Ideology theory applies to the PC's (and in a way to the RP's) those two groups should be at the equality level. Since we do not know whether the OR's racism is specific to blacks, they have no a priori prediction on this test. As you can see from Table 2, the

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[15] I ran a seventh validity test not reported here (but available from the author) because doing so properly would require a substantial digression on developmental theories of moral reasoning. I find that RP's and PC's score somewhat higher (and OR's quite low) on a measure of one's propensity to grasp and deploy principled moral reasoning to concrete moral dilemmas, even controlling for ideology and education.

[16] Because I use a convenience sample, the strong frequentist interpretation of "statistically significant" obviously does not apply. As is common, I use the term as a shorthand for characterizing the relative size of the intra-sample differences.

Table 2 ANOVA on ratio of black FT to summed minority FT's

Pairwise mean differences (Tukey HSD *p*-values)	RP's & PC's	RR's & AP's	OR's
RP's & PC's	X		
RR's & AP's	.009 (*p* = .111)	X	
OR's	−.004 (*p* = .854)	−.013 (*p* = .205)	X

direction of these hypotheses is confirmed, but weakly so. The Racial Resenters (RR's) and the Apoliticals (AP's) were further below the equality level of .2 than the Racial Progressives (RP's) and Principled Conservatives (PC's), though not to a statistically significant degree. However, the Open Racists (OR's) were slightly *above* .02 and higher than the two resenter groups, driven by their particularly strong anti-Semitism, and their otherwise egalitarian dislike of other races.

In a similar move, I reasoned that if dislike of liberal politicians was the sole factor in cooling one's reception toward Jesse Jackson, then the equally liberal Ted Kennedy should not do so well either, since he has no obvious character advantages over Jackson.[17] I simply subtracted the Feeling Thermometer for Jackson from Kennedy as a gauge of the refrigerating role that race might play in driving ratings down. For the resenting groups, Jackson should be an icon for blacks' claims of "special privileges," so if Symbolic Racism and Principled Ideology theory are operating as I claim, they should show larger gaps than the PC and RP groups. The OR's can add overt racism to resentment, and so should show the largest gap. As you can see from Table 3, the resenting groups differed from the RP's and PC's by a substantive and almost statistically significant amount. As expected, the OR's were even more biased against Jackson than the resenters, though not to a statistically significant degree.

The next three validity tests generate the most direct evidence for my arguments, but they require a bit more explanation since they emerge from some of the details of the race politics debate. Kinder and Sanders (1996) show that their racial resentment construct is coherent, stable, distinct from biological racism, and highly predictive of both stereotyping and race policy opinions. However, its predictive power is, paradoxically, where the trouble begins. As one commentator points out, racial resentment's predictive power is so great that it arouses suspicion: "[T]he two types of items labeled 'prejudice' and 'racial policy' are so close in implication that a strong association between them might be thought of as indicating somewhat different aspects of the same general construct…rather than distinguishing cause from effect." (Schuman 2000, 305) Tarman and Sears (2005) attempt to deflect this criticism by purging their symbolic racism scale of items that have a government component built into them. They find that doing so makes little difference, which is reassuring, so far as it goes.

The main problem, though, is that none of the Symbolic Racism theorists have shown directly that their construct and the great majority of the subjects that rate high on it deserve the unmistakably negative connotations carried by racism, resentment, or prejudice. There is a tricky and interesting interpretive question

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[17] The survey was administered in 1998, before Jackson's own sex scandal.

Table 3 ANOVA on the difference between Kennedy & Jackson FT's

Pairwise mean differences (Tukey HSD *p*-values)	RP's & PC's	RR's & AP's	OR's
RP's & PC's ($\mu = 47.939 - 47.081 = .858$)[a]	X		
RR's & AP's ($\mu = 43.806 - 33.716 = 10.090$)	9.231 ($p = .060$)	X	
OR's ($\mu = 47.500 - 32.045 = 15.455$)	14.596 ($p = .005$)	5.365 ($p = .536$)	X

[a] Though it is a bit tricky to follow, I have included the pre-differenced means so that interested readers can check to see exactly how the difference in differences emerged. For example, the mean difference between the principled groups (RP's and PC's) and the resenting groups (RR's and AP's) here is 9.231. The calculation for this quantity runs as follows: the resenting groups' FT mean for Kennedy (43.806) minus their mean FT for Jackson (33.716) yields their mean difference on these two items (10.090). We do the same for the principled groups' FT mean for Kennedy (47.939) minus their mean FT for Jackson (47.081) yields their mean difference on these two items (.858). We then take the difference between these two means ($10.090 - .858$) to get the difference in the table cell that we test for statistical significance (9.231).

implicit here. On the one hand, SR theorists have been careful not to use the symbolic racism scale as an individual level diagnostic tool.[18] So it is unfair to suggest that SR theorists have been running around recklessly pinning scarlet R's to the chests of their fellow citizens. Rather, the literature consists mostly of aggregate analyses, and merely shows that subjects who rate high on the scale *tend* to have negative racial attitudes.

On the other hand, demonstrating this connection is undertaken in the service of validating symbolic racism and racial resentment as constructs in their own right. As the scales' names indicate, the point is not that they happen, as a matter of contingency, to correlate with negative racial attitudes. Rather such connections are taken as evidence that these scales directly measure something that deserves the label racism, resentment, or prejudice. Thus, even though SR theorists genuinely refrain from using these scales as diagnostic tools, it is hard to see why, as a theoretical matter, the diagnosis is not entailed. If one could *not* accurately and reliably describe subjects scoring high on the symbolic racism scale as racists, that would seem to indicate a prima facie problem with the scale. None of this is a critique of SR theory in that the entailment might be appropriate. It is only to re-emphasize that the stakes are high.

Thus, I think that it is important to reflect on the interpretation of the scales carefully. Is it truly obvious that nearly everyone who thinks that, "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough," is expressing racism? One strategy would be to show that these attitudes are beyond the realm of reasonable disagreement. To rely on the face validity of the items, we would have to show for each that: (1) the empirical premises warranting them are false; and (2) the evidence for their falsity is such that subjects would have to be negligent to be unaware or unconvinced by it. Alternatively, we could grant empirical ambiguity, and argue that the trade-off function for the values involved (e.g., between egalitarianism and negative liberty) is such that most reasonable people would recognize the politically

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[18] I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pushing me on this point, and helpfully complicating my thinking on it.

fair choice. Neither is an easy burden to meet. However, we should certainly not assume ex ante that they are impossible either. Finally, we could opt for a weaker interpretation, and simply argue that the only burden is to show (1) above—i.e., that the premises are false. In that case, though, we are merely showing that people are mistaken, in which case a softer label like "racial bias" or "symbolic bias" would seem more appropriate than the much more pejorative terms "resentment" and "racism."

In one of the most interesting and underappreciated moments in this whole debate, Kinder and Sanders seem to recognize this issue. They begin a very promising translation of Gordon Allport's ordinary language analysis of prejudice into operational terms. Unfortunately, this discussion gets cut off after less than two pages, just as it is getting to the heart of the issue.[19] In this paper, I pursue a different strategy to resolving the "is it really racism" question. The first step is to establish *plausible* face and construct validity for my types. The second is to subject the prima facie case for them to less ambiguous criterion related validity tests. In addition to providing further evidence, the first step prevents the second step from degenerating into a theoretically blind search for correlates of unambiguous racism. What we need, then, is a relatively unambiguous example of the group I am calling Racial Resenters (RR) expressing views that are objectionable with respect to public reason.

Principled Ideology theorists have based part of their argument against Symbolic Racism theory on just such direct tests. For example, they have run experiments comparing subjects' reaction to "women" and "blacks" with respect to government help to check for double standards. In a similar move, I varied the NES equal opportunity and racial resentment scale questions by using "Native Americans" instead of PI theorists' use of "women" as the contrastive group to blacks:

NA28: While equal opportunity for Native Americans [ALT: to succeed][20] is important, it's not really the government's job to guarantee it.
NA61: Generations of mistreatment have created conditions that make it difficult for Native Americans to work their way out of the lower class.

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[19] In "Motive Matters: Liberalism and Insincerity" (http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/mneblo/papers.htm) I try to pick up where they leave off and assess whether subjects who score high on racial resentment are necessarily expressing "an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization." (108). A detailed conceptual analysis of the kind that Kinder and Sanders begin, but do not carry through, is *the* most important next step in further resolving this debate. Doing so would involve integrating overt normative arguments, which all parties de-emphasize because of an accusation that Symbolic Racism theorists were allowing their political commitments to interfere with their scholarly judgment. See Tetlock (1994) and Sears (1994). Whatever one's view on that particular accusation, this debate has clear normative content, and trying to sweep it under the rug is counter-productive, even from a strictly scientific point of view, and certainly from a broader intellectual perspective. I develop these ideas as a scholarly contribution to discussions in political theory, but also to make any influences on my scientific judgment subject to transparent critique.

[20] The original item contains the "to succeed" phrase. Doing so introduces an ambiguity in whether the question should be read as an equal opportunity or outcome question. While I decided to test this independently, Schuman (315) has since made the same point and calls for assessing whether it affects response patterns. The results for this variation and the dependability variation in the worker experiment are somewhat complex, so for purposes of space in this paper, I had to cut their presentation. However, I hope to discuss them in an empirical piece focusing on reasoning processes about race.

NA48: Most Native Americans who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried.

NA24: Over the last few years, Native Americans have gotten less than they deserve.

NA104: Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a Native American than from a white person.

NA11: Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Native Americans should do the same without any special favors.

NA90: It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Native Americans would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

The use of Native Americans in place of women is useful for a few reasons. First, the nature of their historical oppression is more similar to blacks than is women's. Second, all white people know and have close attachments to women, while most do not have such attachments to Native Americans and blacks. Third, there is no plausible sense in which Native Americans pose a material threat to the whites in my sample. Therefore, this comparison can illuminate the role of real and perceived threat in driving racial animosity, which is central to evaluating the Group Conflict approach to the race politics debate. Moreover, my analysis is a well-disguised within-subjects comparison.

Symbolic Racism theory predicts that resentment is fairly black specific. Thus, if the theories are operating as I claim in my typology, the resenting groups (RR's and AP's) should favor the Native Americans over blacks relative to the Principled Conservatives (PC) and Racial Progressives (RP), though the effect may be smaller because of similar stereotypes for the two groups. Since Native Americans do not pose nearly the same material threat to whites that blacks do, Group Conflict theory predicts that the OR's, RR's, and AP's will all show large and unambiguous differences with the PC's and RP's. While the theoretical prediction that the PC's would be the closest group to the RP's on this measure holds, the PC's favor the Native Americans enough such that pooling the two groups would lead to misleading inferences. Therefore, I analyze them separately in Table 4 below.

The two resenting groups judge blacks much more harshly than Native Americans. Interestingly, the gap is smaller for OR's (almost as small as for the

Table 4 ANOVA: difference between black and NA resentment scale

Pairwise mean differences (Tukey HSD p-values)	RP's	PC's	RR's & AP's	OR's
RP's ($\mu = -7.637 - (-5.584) = -2.053$)	X			
PC's ($\mu = 3.800 - .086 = 3.714$)	5.767 ($p = .000$)	X		
RR's & AP's ($\mu = 5.045 - (-3.418) = 8.463$)	10.516 ($p = .000$)	4.749 ($p = .001$)	X	
OR's ($\mu = 6.409 - 2.091 = 4.318$)	6.371 ($p = .001$)	.604 ($p = .983$)	-4.145 ($p = .029$)	X

* Each question scored with seven response categories

PC's), who apparently have little more affection for Native Americans than for blacks. This suggests that their xenophobia is not driven by realistic threat, or that they have wildly distorted processes for assessing threat. As a corollary, the RR's and AP's either have a special dislike for blacks or base their responses on a more plausible perception of threat to jobs and other social goods than do the OR's. These findings are consistent with both Symbolic Racism and Group Conflict theory. Given that both racial groups have similarly negative stereotypes with respect to substance abuse and welfare, however, it does not seem plausible that a principled judgment about merit underwrites the difference. (On the other hand, the resenting groups had relatively high regard for Asians on the feeling thermometers which could signal a principled judgment (PI) or prejudicial stereotyping (SR), depending on one's view, but does not seem consistent with a threat interpretation (GC).)

In a similar direct test of resentment, I replicated the PI theorists' laid off worker experiment, which asks subjects how much help a person should receive while looking for a new job if that person were "laid off because the company where he or she worked had to reduce its staff." The original experiment then goes on to describe the laid-off worker, but uses a computer to randomize several character-istics—a technique that for many purposes has tremendous power and is undoubtedly an important methodological innovation. The randomly assigned treatments relevant to our discussion here are race (black OR white), gender (male OR female) and dependability ("is a dependable worker" OR "is not a dependable worker"). The authors find that, contrary to Symbolic Racism theory, conservatives are consistent in their attitudes toward blacks and whites. Indeed, they are *more* likely to help a black described as dependable than are liberals, and they do not "take the bait," when offered the undependability excuse, to stick it to blacks. (Sniderman and Piazza 1993, pp. 69–78).

In my view there are two problems with this experiment. The first is that it includes the dependable/∼dependable treatment. Symbolic Racism theorists have a strong case in arguing that making a hasty generalization about someone's reliability solely on the basis of race is itself a major component of prejudice, and thus it is invalid to remove the opportunity for a subject to make this generalization, and then find that racial resentment does not function as predicted. More problematic, however, is a lack of sensitivity to reactivity problems: "Three such questions were asked, each time about a person with different randomized characteristics." (Sniderman and Piazza 1993, p. 190) That is, the RAPS survey asked a respondent: "How much help would you give a white woman…?" which could be *immediately followed by* "How much help would you give a black man…?" Here, the power of CATI randomization is of little help, because it is the juxtaposition of similar questions in itself that might induce consistency.[21]

To try to overcome these and related problems in other experiments, I embedded a small number of "pretest" race questions into an election survey (subjects thought that it was *unrelated* to the main race survey), and then administered the full race

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[21] To test for both fatigue and "overload reactivity" in my own data, half the sample was given the reverse question order. Comparisons of the early and late questions for each split half look very similar, suggesting that fatigue did not cause greater randomness, nor increased structuration from overload/reactivity.

survey described above *six weeks* later. For example, the *posttest* contained the original wordings for the "laid-off worker" and "college admission" experiments, but the pretest included variations:

> A worker in Appalachia [ALT: who has been dependable] has been laid-off because the company where he worked had to reduce its staff. How much government help, if any, should that person receive while looking for a new job?

> "Some people say that because of poverty and isolation in Appalachia it is sometimes necessary for colleges and universities to give students from there some extra consideration in admission. Others think that would be unfair. How much extra consideration do you think that these students should get?"

This comparison has several advantages over previous tests. First, it is a more powerful within-subjects design, which allows us to identify which subjects discriminate, rather than just inferring that there is or is not discrimination at the level of some subgroup. Yet subjects had 6 weeks and contextual distractions to forget that they were asked racially different versions of the same questions. Second, by including the "dependable worker/no stipulation" treatment, I am able to test for prejudicial generalizations. Third, unlike a Principled Ideology variation in another experiment using "new immigrants" as the contrastive group, "Appalachians" cannot be interpreted as "simply expand[ing] the target of the item from blacks to minorities more generally," because Appalachians are white Americans. Thus, it answers Howard Schuman's (2000, p. 315) call "to try to think of ways to distinguish between the two quite different interpretations" of the original PI experiment—i.e., that whites do not discriminate between blacks and new immigrants because they are principled, or because they are prejudiced against both.

Finally, and most important, placing the students and workers in Appalachia bears an important, but non-obvious, analogy to making ecological inferences about blacks: note that I did not specify that this specific student from Appalachia was poor and isolated. The child's actual net disadvantage is ambiguous: he or she could be the wealthy and advantaged child of the coal mine *owner*, rather than a poor and disadvantaged child of a coal mine worker. Similarly, a black student could enjoy the net advantages of being Michael Jordan's son or daughter, just as he or she could be a highly disadvantaged inner city youth. As with race-based affirmative action, the respondent cannot redress disadvantage directly, but is called upon to make an ecological inference about likelihoods—a difference at the heart of principled conservative objections to affirmative action. While one might claim that Appalachians are worse off than blacks, the difference is hardly clear enough to overcome a principled objection to government involvement with group-based preferences.

The laid-off worker and college admission experiments generate the same pattern of hypotheses as for the Native American comparison. As you can see from Table 5 below, relative to the RP's and PC's, the resenting groups favor the Appalachian student over the black student, but showed no difference on the black versus Appalachian worker. The conflicting results may be because a worker must already

Table 5 ANOVA on the difference between help for black and Appalachian worker (lower diagonal) and black and Appalachian student (upper diagonal)

Pairwise mean differences (Tukey HSD p-values)	RP's & PC's ($\mu = 2.209 - 2.216 = -.007$)	RR's & AP's ($\mu = 2.552 - 2.403 = .149$)	OR's ($\mu = 2.864 - 2.636 = .227$)
RP's & PC's ($\mu = 1.932 - 1.905 = .027$)	X	.156 ($p = .026$)	.234 ($p = .033$)
RR's & AP's ($\mu = 2.149 - 2.104 = .045$)	.018 ($p = .953$)	X	.078 ($p = .719$)
OR's ($\mu = 2.273 - 2.000 = .273$)	.246 ($p = .023$)	.228 ($p = .060$)	X

have had a job in order to be laid-off from it. In the case of blacks, this already defies part of the stereotype that may drive resentment. Interestingly, this interpretation is ambiguous with respect to Allport's definition of prejudice as being "based on a faulty and inflexible generalization." (Kinder and Sanders 1996, p. 108) To the extent that we think that the stereotype is faulty, the subject exhibits prejudice. But to the extent that he or she is responsive to the implicit new information in the worker experiment, the generalization is not inflexible.[22] This analysis is consistent with Reyna et al.'s (2006) finding that conservative attitudes toward affirmative action are mediated by group-based stereotypes (which in this case are being contradicted by stipulation). The OR's demonstrate no such nuance however. They favor both the Appalachian student and worker, and exhibit an even larger gap, presumably because the comparison group is white in these cases.

Taken together, these six tests largely support the validity of the group descriptions discussed above, and my claims about how Symbolic Racism, Principled Ideology, and Group Conflict theory map onto them. See Table 6 for a visual summary of the results. My data show how each camp has part of the picture: the Symbolic Racism theorists' questions are tapping something that looks like racial resentment *for many subjects*, but they are also confounding it with sincere ideological differences in evaluation and perception for Principled Conservatives. The scale is clearly not tapping group threat for the OR's, though it remains plausible that group conflict is part of the story for the RR's and AP's.[23] (Again, however, I think that one may be able to assimilate specifically *group* conflict, as opposed to a proxy for individual interest, to an expanded version of the Symbolic Racism view).

Notice that there is a crucial difference between looking at the race policy debate from the point of view of groups of subjects versus pooling the subjects to look at only the variables. In the latter case, one either has confounds (and hence a problematic construct) or not. In the former case, we can come to a more differentiated conclusion about the quality and applicability of the construct. Indeed, many of the smaller points within this debate may also be muddled by washed-out effects from conflating the types. For example, as the Symbolic Racism theorists

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[22] Thus, they might try to defend themselves by shifting the argument to one of fact, claiming that their generalization is not so faulty understood ceteris paribus.

[23] I plan on trying to disentangle these effects more thoroughly in future work.

Table 6 Summary of findings

	Feeling Th. Blacks	Feeling Th. (Blacks ÷ Others)	Feeling Th. (Kennedy − Jackson)	Resentment (Blacks − Nat Am's)	Help Worker (Blacks − Appalachians)	Help student (Blacks − Appalachians)
Principled vs. Resenting groups	<u>Ø</u>	*Ø*	*	**(RP)** **** **(PC)** ***	*Ø*	**
Principled groups vs. Open racists	**	Ø	***	(RP)*** (PC) Ø	**	**
Resenting groups vs. Open racists	*	Ø	Ø	**	*	Ø

* = a significant difference at $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$; **** $p < .001$; Ø = no significant difference

Bold/Underline = theoretically predicted, Bold/Italics = failed theoretical prediction

No Formatting = no theoretical prediction either way

have argued, education is positively associated with Racial Resentment as distinct from old-fashioned racism. But education's positive association with Principled Conservatives and, in the opposite direction, with Open Racists is even greater. Thus, as the Principled Ideology theorists have shown, the *net* effect is for education to promote positive attitudes toward blacks. Once again, both sides may be right while taking up apparently contradictory positions.

Conclusion

By looking at the data from a different angle (literally), we can gain leverage on the central question that has vexed progress on the race politics debate. Principled Ideology theorists appear to have been hasty in their unqualified pronouncement that symbolic racism was false. They were surely right to argue that it had to be distinguished from conservatism, and that it was unsound, in terms of both social science and political discourse, to imply that there is not room for reasonable disagreement on some legitimately controversial matters.

However, there is also the question of confronting racial resentment as illegitimate, or at the very least as unacceptable in public debate. For four out of five of the groups in my typology, racial resentment functions roughly[24] as advertised (though, again, the fifth was and is an important exception). I hope to have established the necessity and utility of loosening the unit homogeneity

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[24] Note that, PI theorists can still sustain their claim that many resenters' opposition to racially progressive policies is over-determined, which is normatively important. See Neblo (n.d.) "Motive Matters: Liberalism and Insincerity." http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/mneblo/papers.htm

assumption, and using new techniques to gain leverage on how context and meaning shape our understanding of what otherwise appears to be the same causal structure leading to the same observed behavior. Doing so goes a long way toward resolving one of the most puzzling and intractable debates in contemporary political science.

Future work in the race politics debate could resume standard "R" type analyses, either running separate analyses on the five types, or perhaps use them as dummy variables in regression equations. I plan to develop a short form questionnaire to identify the types, and use it to get a better estimate of the distribution of the types in the general population.[25]

I also hope to have provided insights into live questions of democratic politics. Ironically, it is only in contemporary liberal societies that the problem of masking unreasonable disagreement with putatively public reasons even arises. Traditional societies and authoritarian regimes need not accommodate the fact of reasonable disagreement because they will not experience it as a fact. Without that need, they do not generate the same incentives to dissemble and rationalize. However, liberal democracy does face this problem, and most acutely in its deliberative variety. Mass survey research has become a crucial vehicle for expressing public opinion in large complex democracies. With enhanced tools of understanding, it may even model a limited form of public deliberation. (Sanders 1999) It can help us to project ourselves into the perspective of our fellow citizens, to understand the principles at stake in our controversies, knowing when to make accommodations for reasonable disagreement. Just as important, it can help us to make the difficult decision to dig in our heels, when we worry about how history will judge us if we do not.

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[25] A general population sample might also uncover further types, which would be especially plausible with the addition of Southern whites.

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