CHAPTER TWO

Philosophical Psychology with Political Intent

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Aristotle's approach to anger pointed the way to a modern, folk-centered, cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion. Indeed, Aristotle could be called the first cognitive theorist of the emotions, and his analysis makes implicit use of the ideas of relationship, appraisal, and action tendency.

RICHARD LAZARUS, *Emotion and Adaptation*

Let us therefore take it that the soul has its principal seat in the small gland located in the middle of the brain. From there it radiates through the rest of the body by means of the animal spirits, the nerves, and even the blood, which can take on the impressions of the spirits and carry them through the arteries to all the limbs.

DESCARTES, *The Passions of the Soul*

INTRODUCTION

Descartes famously speculated that the nexus of the human mind and body centered on the pineal gland. Because our passions formed a crucial link between mind and body, they operated via the soul's influence on and receptivity to the "animal spirits" circulating through the pineal. Of course, we now know that Descartes was wrong in his conjectures about the pineal and the animal spirits. Moreover, few still think that his robust metaphysical dualism provides a satisfactory solution to the mind-body problem. As contemporary scientists, we are apt to look at Descartes's theory of the emotions with a kind of knowing smile of condescension.

I thank Ann Crigler, Michael MacKuen, George Marcus, Eileen McMahon, Russell Neuman, an anonymous reviewer, and especially John Parrish for helpful comments on this chapter.

In his defense, we might note that if we merely substitute the term *bioelectricity* or *hormones* for *animal spirits*, his theory sounds more prescient than silly. We might also add that no one since has provided a particularly compelling solution to the mind-body problem. But such apologetics miss the point. Modern, scientific psychology has demoted the pineal and supplanted talk of animal spirits just as surely as modern chemistry has done away with phlogiston, and physics with the ether.

So why should canonical thinkers, Descartes or Aristotle, for example, be of any more interest to the modern political psychologist than Ptolemy is to the modern astrophysicist? This is a reasonable question. Yet there are decisive disanalogies between the two cases that we ignore at the cost of retarding scientific progress and narrowing the relevance of the progress we do make.

The disanalogy begins with the fact that people can talk, whereas stars cannot. The maxim that every explanation is also an interpretation goes double when we endeavor to explain interpretive phenomena. In much social science, meaning is not merely something that we try to draw *from* an explanation; indeed, the key insight that makes the cognitive theory of the emotions superior to the behaviorist is that interpretations are *part of* any adequate explanation. Yet with regard to the hermeneutic and phenomenological analyses implied by this insight, we modern scholars have not developed anything like the kind of advantage over our predecessors that we enjoy in the realm of statistical and experimental technique. Indeed, we are more likely in relative deficit.

The key reason *why* historical thinkers spent so much time on the social and experiential facets of emotional phenomena is that they thought that they were hunting bigger game. Or, put differently, a philosopher's descriptive psychology had to serve as a logical base for his moral psychology, which served, in turn, to underwrite his ethical theory, and on to his political theory.[1] And moving in the other direction, his descriptive psychology had to be compatible with, and preferably entailed by, his epistemology, and in turn his metaphysics and ontology.[2] In short, these

1. I use the masculine throughout when referring to systematic, canonical philosophers before the twentieth century for accuracy and in order to acknowledge the potential bias that such a gender-exclusive legacy might induce in the context of their political psychologies. Wollstonecraft, de Staël, and dePizan, though not fully systematic or preeminent in the canon, might be partial exceptions.

2. None of this is to suggest that the authors literally worked out such relations in a temporal sequence, though some authors appear to have worked this way, and most present their expositions in this order. The point is that they had to integrate all the components coherently, whatever their order of development.

were *systematic* thinkers whose work spanned the practical, the scientific, and the philosophical. Thus, engaging their psychologies is also valuable because doing so provides a model for integrating modern psychological findings into broader contexts of academic and practical significance.

Thus, it should come as no surprise that Hobbes, for example, develops his psychology of the fear of violent death in the context of claiming that its burden makes anarchy intolerable and its universality makes sovereignty possible. His descriptive and prescriptive theories of politics are founded entirely on this interaction. Unlike much contemporary political psychology, therefore, the idea is not that we start from the concepts and findings of some completely separate, self-contained discipline, psychology, and see how they can be applied to politics. Rather, these historical theories were, from the beginning, *psychologies with political intent.*

Because they theorized in such an integrated way, historical thinkers were attentive to the social construction of emotion.[3] By *social construction* I mean nothing which implies that emotions are unreal or lack for a biological substrate. For the purposes of this argument, to say that the emotions are socially constructed is merely to point out that a cognitive theory of the emotions posits interpretations as intervening variables between stimulus and response.[4] Because human interpretation relies on concepts, and concepts are social products that vary across social position, time and culture, our emotions will depend on such social variation.[5] Thus the triggering conditions for various emotions, at least, are socially

3. I use this phrase with some hesitation, since it means many things to many people, some of them less helpful than others at the philosophical level (Hacking 1999; Griffiths 1997; Harre 1986). Nonetheless, I will be try to be clear about the points I want to make, and if the reader judges the term unhelpful, then it can be disregarded. It may seem comically false to attribute any kind of constructivism to, for example, Aquinas. Many canonical thinkers had a rather robust notion of human nature. Strangely, though, such abstract commitments did not seem to interfere with their highly contextualized first-order analyses.

4. Obviously, this specific point does not apply with the same force to noncognitive theories. For reasons that I cannot develop in this work, I happen to be a cognitivist about both the emotions and normative matters. There was significant variation concerning these matters in the canon, however, and contemporary political psychologists of both persuasions will find rich material on which to draw. Below, I try to develop ideas that apply to cognitive theories of the emotions (Plato and Aristotle) and to noncognitive theories (Hume).

5. Griffiths (1997) argues forcefully against the notion that concepts per se are of interest in the social construction of the emotions, preferring a social roles approach. For purposes of my brief exposition, I try to side-step this issue and fold social roles into *concept* broadly understood, in the sense that one has at least an implicit concept of one's social role and that that will affect one's notion of, say, shameful action for me.

dependent. To take an obvious example, a certain sexual behavior might, according to Victorian mores, may be an occasion for shame, whereas the same behavior in an American high school might trigger shame's inverse, a kind of prideful machismo.

Certain emotions appear to be biologically set "affect programs" (Ekman 1982), so for these only the triggering conditions can be socially constructed.[6] There is considerable evidence however, that the elements in our emotional repertoires beyond this common set actually vary (Harré 1987). That is, certain emotions are made available or unavailable to us depending on cultural forces and, more generally, the way we conceptualize the emotions affects the way we experience them. If the availability half of this claim seems far-fetched, one need only consider that it is merely an extension of the uncontroversial claim that triggering conditions are socially mediated. Presumably, in some cases, the triggering conditions could become so constricted as to eliminate occasion of the emotion.

Modern scientists typically do not attend to the interpretive and phenomenological issues surrounding the emotions with the same vigor as historical thinkers did. And to some extent the shift in emphasis is understandable. The scientific claim that emotions are dependent on antecedent psychological appraisals can be sustained and explored without understanding where those appraisals came from and what they feel like. But resting with this approach is a bit like some rational choice theorists' relegating preferences to the realm of the permanently exogenous. For some purposes it is interesting and justifiable, but past a certain point, it does not satisfy.

Thus we should not be surprised that, unlike Ptolemaic astronomy, the analytic framework of the Aristotelian psychology of the emotions has been revived and proved superior to the modern scientific psychology that reigned a mere twenty years ago. Indeed, despite his praise of Aristotle, Richard Lazarus understates just how much of a return modern cognitive theories represent. Aristotle did not merely make "implicit use of the ideas of relationship, appraisal, and action tendency." He made highly *explicit* use of them, employing Greek words that could be translated with the very same terms, serving nearly identical theoretical purposes, and generating similar predictions. As we shall see, there are many more examples of this phenomenon—that is, modern

6. Some triggering conditions also seem to be set programs—e.g., fear of loud noises. Moreover, all aspects of our emotional repertoires are biologically *delimited*, if not determined.

scientific psychology rediscovering ideas that canonical thinkers had described long ago.

Now, I do not want to push this argument to the point of absurdity by seeming to suggest that we could have forgone the past few decades' worth of justly celebrated research had we only dusted off old volumes of philosophy. Modern statistical and experimental techniques provide vastly more powerful warrants for believing that their systematic data support one theory rather than another. For the most part, canonical thinkers waged evidentiary warfare from their respective armchairs. Yet we are apt to mistakenly suppose that because a thinker's conception of science is pre-modern, his insights into psychology, politics, and the connection between them must also be antiquated. But it is a fallacy to suppose that theories and hypotheses that no one has adequately tested are therefore false or uninteresting. It is true that most such theories were not framed so as to be obvious grist for the operational rigors of contemporary science. Yet there is reason to believe that some of their insights are worthy of the best work today and that efforts to translate them into modern terms will yield greater fruit than doing science as if no one before the twentieth century had interesting thoughts about psychology or politics.[7] Indeed, such recent rediscoveries as the cognitive theory of the emotions warrant the belief that there are important insights that yet lay dormant on the shelves of intellectual history. We might say that canonical thinkers promise to be brilliant interlocutors in the context of discovery, if relatively mute company in the context of confirmation.

Embedding the psychology of the emotions, from the beginning, in a broader scientific and intellectual context also has important consequences for how we go about formulating concepts and the ontology that attends them—that is, what emotional phenomena we regard as real or basic. Consider an analogous example from biology: dolphins were once classified as fish, and in some ordinary language contexts, they still are. As evolutionary biology advanced, we discovered that cows, not sharks, are the dolphin's closest evolutionary cousins. So the category "fish" ceased to function as a useful scientific designation. This change represents a major advance in its field. Yet to some extent it also begs the question regarding the useful scope of that field's categories. Genetic descent is

7. Most people would acknowledge that canonical thinkers had interesting ideas about *normative* matters of politics. And a few scholars even acknowledge that pre-twentieth-century thinkers had interesting thoughts relating to the scientific aspects of psychology and politics. Yet such praise tends to be based on noticing similarity to modern theories after they have been developed.

not the only scientifically relevant way to categorize animal life because evolutionary biology is not the only relevant science. One can imagine ecologists making great use of the concept "marine predator" (sharks, dolphins, killer whales, but not baleen whales) while having no particular use for "marine mammal" (dolphins, all whales, but not sharks). Patterns of predatory behavior are no less real than patterns of genetic variation.[8]

In the same way, a truly *political* political psychology should not automatically presume that concepts that are central to psychologists or neuroscientists merit lexical priority over those that they might develop and deploy themselves. A broader range of explanatory concerns will alter the weight that we assign to different concepts in terms of their analytical cutting power. We should aspire to concepts that mesh as best they can with work from many fields and levels of analysis, but there is no a priori guarantee that they will slide cleanly into place to form a unified mosaic of science.

By juxtaposing two earlier points, we can appreciate the final reason why we political psychologists should attend to historical thinkers while our colleagues in physics can ignore Ptolemy: we should pay attention to these thinkers because they *continue* to influence the social construction of the emotions in the West via the way their theories of the emotions were sewn into their moral, political, and religious ideas. If the canon's scientific influence has waned, its legacy in normative, ordinary language and in institutional thinking still looms large. Thus, via social construction, the canon is actually part of the current causal story itself. For example, I attended Catholic high school and was taught about human nature, ethics, politics, and religion in a way that was still powerfully suffused with Thomism. Similarly, some contemporary notions of masculinity stubbornly refuse to shed the influence of their origins in Stoic psychology. And the founders of the United States were steeped in the entire Lockean system, so the institutions, rationales, and cultural traditions they initiated reflect conceptions of rights built from the psychological anthropology of his state of nature. Indeed, scientists studying the emotions today presume such a continuing influence when they complain that the weight of the Western tradition's hostility to the

8. This account is somewhat at odds with Griffiths's (1997) detailed discussion of similar issues. Though I cannot go into great detail, I would argue that a more thoroughly pragmatic theory of inquiry would not implicitly privilege molecular genetics over ecology merely because the latter cannot typically deal with closed systems. Indeed, scientific inquiry, though privileged, would not be the only arbiter of conceptual meaningfulness, because it is not the only way in which we go about navigating the world.

emotions impedes a proper understanding of the emotions, thus harming and distorting political practice.[9]

For all these reasons, then, political psychology could do well with a more intimate engagement with its past. Below, I consider three thinkers whose political and psychological theories informed each other in a way that is relevant to contemporary political psychology: Plato, Aristotle, and Hume. A full history of philosophical psychology with political intent is beyond the scope of this chapter. Indeed, a full analysis of these three thinkers is beyond its scope. Nevertheless, I hope to provide insights into all three, as well as illustrations of ways in which the canon and modern political psychology can interact fruitfully. I chose Plato, Aristotle, and Hume because they are relatively well known, represent very different views (for example, cognitive versus noncognitive), and connect well with some of the other contributions to this volume.[10] I try to show how these thinkers anticipated recent moves in contemporary psychology. In addition, though it may prove a fool's errand, I venture a few concrete suggestions about new theoretical moves and empirical hypotheses that might be derived from their ideas. Ultimately, though, it is hoped that they will spark the interest of practicing political psychologists.

PSYCHOLOGIES WITH POLITICAL INTENT

Plato

Isn't it quite necessary for us to agree that the very same forms and dispositions as are in the city are in each of us? *Republic* 435b

Plato's analysis is the archetype of a psychology with political intent in that the whole argumentative trope of his *Republic* is organized around an analogy between the proper relationship among the elements of the human soul and the elements of the city. The soul is divided among the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational. The city is divided among the corresponding classes of producers (farmer, craftsmen, and so on),

9. Elsewhere, I argue that such claims about the canon's hostility to emotion are overstated, though doing so does not affect my point here.

10. A different sample of thinkers from the tradition might have highlighted different substantive issues in contemporary political psychology. But this does not change the main point about fruitful engagement between contemporary science and canonical thinkers. In future work I hope to provide a more thorough history of philosophical psychology with political intent.

the auxiliaries (soldiers), and the guardians (rulers). Plato's psychology and politics are so thoroughly intertwined that he defines regime types in terms of the modal emotional motivations of its rulers (who he thinks, in turn, are influenced by the nature of the regime).

In an aristocracy, Plato's preferred regime type, the rulers' motivations emerge from an erotic striving toward beauty, knowledge, and the good. The rational (but nonetheless emotional) parts of both the soul and the city harness and tutor the spirited and appetitive parts, integrating them into a healthy and cooperative whole. Such rulers tend to be firm but compassionate in their domestic policy and defensive realists in their foreign affairs. In a timocracy, the rulers are themselves ruled by the spirited part of the soul. They tend to be angry, contentious, and prideful in seeking glory and honor in an unreflective way. They are spartan and unsympathetic in their domestic policy and expansionist in their foreign policy. In an oligarchy, the rulers are ruled by the appetitive part of the soul in the service of a single appetite, namely, wealth. Thus, they are characterized by jealousy, vanity, pleasure seeking, and timidity with respect to threats. For Plato, such a commercialist oligarchy is intrinsically unstable and bad. Later thinkers, however, pick up on Plato's analysis to argue that such a regime is not intrinsically unstable and, though not ideal, it is a psychologically astute alternative to reckless timocracy, chaotic democracy, and absolutist tyranny.

In what Plato calls "democracy," the rulers are again ruled by the appetitive part of the soul, but it is in the service of a plethora of appetites, as expressed in their overweening passion for freedom (in the sense of license). Democrats are characterized by envy and resentment, as expressed in a reckless passion for false equality. Otherwise, they are not so much characterized by specific emotions as by a lack of order in emotional expression and object. Plato believed that democracy in this sense naturally degenerates into tyranny. The tyrant's master emotion is fear, in that all of his other emotions and behaviors are ruled by a compulsive desire to stay in power.

Plato's analysis of regime types (and their temporal dynamics) in terms of modal motivating emotions points toward a kind of comparative or historical political psychology. Most political psychology operates within a particular country or regime type (for example, advanced liberal democracies). However, analyzing the differential function of political emotion across different regime types, and between rulers and the ruled, would open up a relatively neglected zone of research. For example, anxiety will obviously take on differential functions in navigating the political landscape of a liberal democracy and an authoritarian theocracy, just as the

modal emotional motivations of their leaders are likely to vary. Similarly, most political psychology investigates the present or the very recent past. But Plato's analysis suggests an approach to the development or decline of various regimes that could inform interesting historical work from a political-psychological perspective. As we shall see, Aristotle picks up on certain features of Plato's political psychology in this respect, but he modifies and extends them in several directions.

Plato's analysis of the soul-city relation has important implications for current debates within mainstream political psychology as well. Take, for example, his analysis of the structure of the emotions. For Plato, the important division was not between reason and emotion but, rather, among the appetitive, spirited, and rational parts of the soul. Now, to modern ears, his famous tripartite division of the soul might sound like a trivial variation on the traditional opposition between reason (the rational) and emotion (the spirited), merely spinning off the appetites from the emotions. Nonetheless, his theory is not so simple. What we would today categorize under the term *emotions* was distributed throughout all three portions of the soul. Indeed, several things that we would categorize under a *single* discreet emotional term, say, erotic love, he distributed throughout all three portions of the soul. For example, he argued that there was a powerfully erotic dimension to the rational part of the soul, informing its attention, motivations, and judgment. This insight alone is enough to refute the idea that Plato had a straightforwardly negative view of the emotions. Moreover, it indicates that he theorized a complex interpenetration of reason and the emotions.

Nor is eros the only example of the same nominal emotion taking on differential significance in different parts of the soul. Plato linked courage emanating from the spirited portion of the soul with mere true opinion. Courage rooted in the rational part of the soul involves "knowledge," which has a reflective aspect that requires a propositional cognitivism. The lower kind of courage only requires nonpropositional cognitivism, that is, accurate detection of signals of manageable danger, though not mindful or theoretically reflective. So animals, which have appetitive and spirited souls, share this lower kind of courage with us. In fact, Plato directly compares the spiritedness of a good dog with that of a virtuous but untutored youth (*Republic* 375b).

This move to contextualize the emotions by their origin in the structure of the soul has important implications for the way political psychologists might measure the emotions. For example, Plato thought that nearly all emotions were a kind of mixture of pleasure and pain. Only a few thinkers afterward followed him in this doctrine. Most substituted a good-evil

or pleasure-pain dichotomy in their taxonomies. Recent psychological research suggests something in between these two views: positive and negative affect are often largely independent in that, for example, one can be both anxious and enthusiastic about the same object at the same time. Yet it is worth pausing to consider Plato's somewhat different point. He quotes Homer in support of his claim about dual valence: "Wrath that spurs on the wisest mind to rage; Sweeter by far than a stream of flowing honey" (*Philebus* 47e). He goes on to point out the combination of sorrow and pleasure we experience in tragic drama and even suggests that "lamentation and longing" both evince this kind of ambivalence. Nor does it seem right to explain away the phenomenon by saying that the situation eliciting the emotion merely has two different aspects that produce two different feelings. There is a sense in which the pleasure and the pain are fused into the same emotion or two distinct emotions that are internally related, as is often the case with hope and fear. Richard Lazarus is one of the few contemporary psychologists who takes a similar view: "It is common in the psychology of the emotions to distinguish sharply between negative and positively toned emotion and to treat them as if they were opposites . . . [but this] obscures their individual substantive qualities and the complex relational meanings inherent in each. . . . Not infrequently, the so-called positively toned emotions involve harms and threats, and even when they have largely positive valences they sometimes originate in frustrating or negative life conditions" (Lazarus 2001, 63).

Even if we believe that emotional bivalence is merely common, rather than ubiquitous, the phenomenon raises potentially important issues. For example, consider the nonlinear relation between fear and hope in their distinctly emotional senses.[11] Without a modicum of fear, there would typically be no occasion for hope. But past a point, overwhelming fear tends to be characterized by a lack of hope. More generally, the modestly negative correlation between negative emotional factors (such as anxiety) and positive ones (such as enthusiasm) could emerge from more complicated relations between subsets of their component items (for example, fear and hope) washing each other out. For some purposes in political psychology, then, standard factor analyses may be confounding our ability to trace out the real connections. Thus Plato's analyses suggest ways of

11. I say "distinctly emotional" because in ordinary language we can also use *fear* to designate probability rather than a powerful evaluative orientation, as in "I fear it might rain later." Similarly, *hope* can designate such slight evaluative orientations as "I hope you can make it to the party" rather than "I hope that the woman I love will accept my proposal of marriage [but fear that she may reject it, leaving me alone and miserable]."

extending the analysis by Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese (chapter 9 in this volume) of the structure of political affect.

Plato's approach to the soul-city metaphor had just as profound an effect on his political theory as it did on his political psychology. The normative superiority of aristocracy flows naturally from the way he sets up the metaphor. Note, however, that Plato's aristocracy is a very peculiar one given the modern connotation of that word. The guardian aristocrats in Plato's republic, though totalitarian in their discretion, have minimal and jointly held property. They live an austere life and receive astonishingly rigorous training. They really are there to serve the city as a whole, rather than to bias the functioning of the polis toward their own gain. Such strictures have led many commentators to suggest that Plato's city is utopian in the pejorative sense and, by association, his moral psychology as well. As we shall see, Aristotle seeks to work more cooperatively with human nature as he finds it in his psychology, and the consequence is that he countenances regimes that strike us as more plausible as well.

Aristotle

Clearly the student of politics must know somehow the facts about the soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or the body; and all the more since politics is more prized and better than medicine. *Nichomachean Ethics* 1102a

Many political psychologists will be surprised to learn that society values them more highly than it does physicians. Nevertheless, Aristotle's claim illustrates how thoroughly his psychology manifests political intent. Moreover, he frames it as a practical, therapeutic endeavor. Psychology is to politics as biology is to medicine. This is statecraft as soulcraft. If such terms seem too remote or lofty for modern purposes, we might substitute "political psychology as a policy science." Yet even with this formulation, we may want to beg off. Should not political psychology function as a basic science rather than risk the confusion of normative entanglements? But Aristotle thought that his normative commitments *advanced* his descriptive political psychology, rather than compromising it. And on this point we can learn something from him.

Modern political psychologists reasonably worry about maintaining scientific detachment. Ideological commitments certainly can interfere with good science and can do so all the more, because more subtly, in the social sciences. Yet ignoring or shunning the normative is seldom the best way to avoid such problems. Notice that the word *normative*

has three distinct, though nested, meanings. Most generally, *normative* means simply "according to some standard," as in "a normative sample" for test scores. In some cases, standards carry an evaluative valence, as in "logic is the set of norms for valid reasoning." Thus, if my argument is illogical, it is a bad argument. Finally, some evaluative valences connote specifically moral judgment, as in "his normative transgressions make him a bad person."

Medicine is clearly normative in the first two senses that I have sketched and, in a limited way, the third as well. Doctors compare my heart's function to that of normal hearts. Mine might be diseased, and so function poorly. Moreover, we would typically regard this as a bad thing that, all things being equal, should be remedied (for example, via a right to basic medical care). Notice, first, that such normative entanglements do not compromise medical science as a science one whit. Indeed, they facilitate more rapid *scientific* progress on categories of special interest. We still would not understand the immunology of smallpox if we had waited for biology, unguided by medicine's normative conceptual apparatus, to stumble across a vaccine. For that matter, we probably would not have the concept "vaccine." Second, without medical science organizing itself around normative concepts in the first two senses, society would not be in a position to make a normative evaluation in the third sense. Now recall that Aristotle formulated his political psychology on an analogy to medicine. To understand a phenomenon, we must understand its purpose or function (εργον), which leads to an understanding of its excellence (αρετε).

Thus Aristotle considers each emotion *type* (for example, fear or anger) in virtue of the function that it serves and each *instance* of an emotion in terms of whether it conduces to adaptive behavior with respect to that function. Moreover, in the end, he glosses adaptivity as happiness. So far, his theory sounds much like modern accounts of "autonormative" behavior. For Aristotle, however, happiness is not a subjective hedonic state, and its normative standards are sociopolitical, not individual. From the perspective of modern science, there is no reason why sociopolitical standards cannot be rendered just as operationally concrete as autonormative standards. Indeed, in many cases they will be easier to measure because they rely on intersubjective criteria rather than indirect or circular inferences about what is in the subject's head. Moreover, if one is uncomfortable with a distinctively moral interpretation of these sociopolitical criteria, one can bracket it in the same way most rational choice theorists wisely bracket the implicit moral interpretation of their autonormative accounts (that is, ego-centered utilitarianism). Interpreted

thus, Aristotle's notion of "virtue" would be akin to "rational," and "vice" would be like "irrational."

Aristotle thus calls patterns of adaptive behavior virtues and maladaptive behaviors vices. Each emotion has an attendant virtue and typically two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency.[12] So, for example, courage is merely a pattern of fear serving its function well—a tendency to correctly sort appropriate occasions for fight and flight. Cowardice might be understood as a kind of emotional disease. It is an overactive fear response causing us to fly when we should fight, just as rashness is an underactive fear response causing us to fight when we should fly.

It should be obvious from this discussion that Aristotle's normative approach to fear can be rendered just as scientific as modern accounts. He could (and to some extent did) give a scientifically serviceable, operational account of courage, cowardice, and rashness. One need not assent to the distinctly moral connotations of those categories to think that they designate scientifically interesting categories. Indeed, his criteria for cowardice are not all that different from those used for modern psychiatry's diagnosis of an anxiety disorder, especially as they shade into the subclinical realm.

So how might following Aristotle in formulating frankly normative concepts of excellence to accompany an analysis of function play out in the context of modern political psychology? Consider, for example, anxiety, one of the two key emotions for the affective intelligence research program in political psychology. MacKuen et al. (chapter 6 in this volume) do an excellent job of theorizing the function of anxiety (in Aristotle's sense) in political choice: "Increased anxiety tells us when we are entering the geography of uncertainty. Absence of anxiety tells us we are in the realm of the safe and familiar and that we can rely on past actions that will, as they have before, successfully manage our lives. And in such circumstances people display habituated choice as their decision strategy." They go on to provide overwhelming evidence that anxiety is active in the functional realm that they hypothesize for it—that is, anxiety has robust effects on whether habituated dispositions are deployed—and

12. Aristotle is slightly inconsistent about whether every emotion-action combination has an excellence. At 1107a he says, "There are some actions and emotions whose very names connote baseness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy." Yet later (1108b) he says, "Righteous indignation is the mean between envy and spite." But, presumably, righteous indignation and envy are similar in terms of emotional experience and are differentiated via a normative assessment of their appropriateness. Similarly, small conceptual issues surround his discussion of whether there are always two vices for every virtue.

they trace out the myriad behavioral and macrostructural ramifications of that finding. All of this constitutes a major advance.

Yet the affective intelligence research program never moves beyond its functional analysis to the second half of Aristotle's framework: a corresponding analysis of excellence. Stopping at a functional analysis cuts the program off from a huge line of complementary scientific research and greatly limits how it can speak to policy and political theory. MacKuen et al. seem to suggest that a functional analysis implies an analysis of excellence directly: "We resolve the conflict between an attractive normative macro theory—rational choice—and a seemingly more accurate but normatively disappointing micro theory . . . [that] sustains a normative portrait of democracy that is more encouraging than has previously been thought plausible."[13] But what does it mean to say that anxiety, for example, serves the function of managing novelty and threat? In a retrospective, evolutionary context, serving a function and serving it well begin to collapse into each other. If an evolved trait can be accurately explained in terms of some function, that is really just another way of saying that it served that function well enough to enhance survival. The notion of excellence is largely redundant to function.

Outside of a retrospective evolutionary context, however, some capacity can utterly fail to serve the function to which it is put. And making the leap from a neurobiological, evolutionary account of anxiety's function to the function it serves in a modern political context makes the question of excellence anything but redundant. An evolved trait's adaptivity for genomic reproduction in evolutionary time says almost nothing about its normative relevance for contemporary politics. Through a lack of anxiety, we *tell* ourselves that we are safe and can rely on familiar patterns. Whether, in fact, we *are* safe and can properly rely on the familiar is quite another thing. I see no direct evidence for the idea that the emotional mechanisms in question are even approximately utility-maximizing for the individuals involved, never mind for the macropolity.

Thus, we could think about anxiety's excellence from at least three distinct perspectives. First, the autonormative—is anxiety serving the

13. MacKuen et al. (chap. 6 in this volume) are relying on the normative analysis found in Marcus (2002). In my view, Marcus *does* establish an important normative claim, but the argument only works if we formulate it in conditional form. That is, *if* our emotional subsystems serve their information processing functions well, *then* some of the normative problems of low-information democracy will be attenuated. Yet we still need a normative conceptual analysis of what it would mean to serve those functions well, along with an empirical demonstration that they do.

individual citizen's immediate preferences, however she may see them? Second, the eudaimonistic—is anxiety serving the citizen's larger interests, free from psychopathology, manipulation, false consciousness, or akrasia? And third, the social—is anxiety advancing the citizen's responsibilities to the public and conducing to the health of the polity?

With such criteria in view, signally important questions for scientific political psychology, policy studies, and political theory begin to emerge that were not even formulable without them. With the rise of scientifically precise political communication strategies, it is truly an open question as to whether anxiety's function has become more a convenient lever of political manipulation than an adaptive mode for managing our political environment. It is not hard to imagine politicians inducing overwhelming amounts of systematic type I and II error in the public's surveillance systems. Indeed, Aristotle anticipated this general problem in the *Rhetoric* and the *Politics* (if not the scope it has come to occupy in applying modern scientific psychology to mass communication).

At first glance, it might seem strange that Aristotle's primary analysis of the emotions comes in the *Rhetoric*. However, rhetoric is about persuasion, and because Aristotle has rendered the emotions in cognitive terms, they are now subject to persuasion. He sharply distinguishes them from the appetites in that one cannot reason another out of being hungry in the same way that one might reason her out of being angry. If beliefs constitute an intrinsic component of emotions, and changing or inducing beliefs is the function of rhetoric, then changing or inducing emotions is also a function of rhetoric. And because the main object of rhetoric is political, the emotions play an enormous role in Aristotle's politics. For conceptions of the emotions as noncognitive, inducing or changing emotions is necessarily a kind of brute manipulation that could bear no relation to reasoned persuasion. For Aristotle, however, political rhetoric is at once emotional persuasion and rational persuasion—the two are internally related.

This internal relation may not be obvious at first. Aristotle sets up a seemingly stark distinction: "One element in the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle." But the Greek is ambiguous as to whether the first part of the soul is "irrational" or "arational." The former is used because it is a normal word in English. The latter is closer to Aristotle's meaning, however, because he thought that whether the two would be in conflict would be a contingent matter. Indeed, in the virtuous man, the two speak "on all matters, with the same voice" (1102b). Moreover, it is not clear whether they are able to be fully opposed even as a matter of contingency. He writes: "Whether these [two parts of the soul] are

separated as the parts of the body . . . or are distinct by definition but by nature inseparable, like convex and concave in the circumference of a circle, does not affect the present question" (1102a). Thus, at the very least, they are like parts of the body, which may be divisible but which cooperate in symbiotic ways. And he countenances the idea that the two are only separable in a completely abstract sense—that is, they are merely two different facets of the very same phenomenon, as the idea of convex without concave is not really the idea of convex.

This strong connection between the emotional and the rational portions of the soul generates a crucial political ethics of rhetoric on both the sending end and the receiving end. Rhetoricians must practice their art in a way that respects the sense in which their attempts at persuasion aim to rationally motivate assent and action, even if the means are based in the emotions. And the virtuous listeners must have their sensibilities educated in such a way as to be persuaded and moved to action by the right kind of appeals whether they are aimed at prompting explicit rational consideration or the implicit rationality of a virtuous emotional disposition. Unlike Plato, with his unidirectional totalitarian aristocracy, then, Aristotle preferred a mixed regime that, like his theory of the soul, relied on communication and mutual influence between the various parts of the polity. Both Plato and Aristotle thus have a rather intra-individual analysis of the soul. Neither does much to explore how our political emotions interact with our political institutions. For that analysis, I turn to David Hume's unified account of the psychological, moral, and political sciences.

Hume

There is no question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences. *Treatise of Human Nature*

Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have ever been observed among mankind.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Hume's entire philosophical system seems to have been motivated by a strangely genial hostility to religious dogmatism. Because God cannot

underwrite our moral, political, or knowledge claims, we are thrown back on an analysis of how it is that we humans seem nonetheless to get about our business reasonably well. Psychology becomes the post-skeptical epistemology in both the theoretical realm and the practical realm. All the other domains of inquiry are based on it. Keep in mind, however, that this move to make psychology fundamental emerges from an even more fundamental act of theological-political protest against the dual dangers of superstition and what Hume came to call enthusiasm.

Many previous philosophical psychologies had emphasized reason more than emotion on quasi-religious grounds. In the great chain of being, humans were located between the divine (associated with reason) and the animal realm (associated with emotion). When Hume dispenses with the divine, he ends up ruthlessly inverting this traditional emphasis in psychology. Thus his famous dictum: "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions" (Hume 2000/[1739], 415) Hume's newly naturalized account of psychology will have nothing of teleology. Rather than divine spark, reason is merely manual labor. Indeed, much of what goes under the name of reason is actually rooted in our emotional life. For example, when it appears that the mild voice of reason gets us to act from justice rather than our passionate personal desires, we are really only following the promptings of a different part of our emotional nature. To see how this is so, we need to consider Hume's innovative psychology in greater detail.

Hume reaches back to the Stoic theory of the emotions by starting with three basic taxonomic dimensions: positive versus negative, actual versus potential, and basic versus compounded. So, for example, fear is a basic emotion that arises in reaction to the potential of a negative event. Then he introduces two new dimensions. The first is calm versus violent emotions. He calls the latter the "passions" proper. The distinction is not merely dichotomizing a continuum for the sake of convenience. Contrary to most other interpreters, Hume intends the distinction to be one of kind, rather than merely degree: "We must, therefore, distinguish between a calm and weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one" (2000/[1739], 419). Each pair tends to track the other, but they are distinguishable in principle. Moreover, the violent passions are neither bad nor overwhelming with respect to deliberation and action: " 'Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence . . . but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action . . . it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation" (418). Powerful passions can become embedded as habits, at which point they continue to powerfully influence behavior without being experienced as powerful feelings.

Hume does not give the calm emotions names but rather describes them as having a kind of generalized aesthetic function that judges congruence, proportion, and the like. Yet they are of great interest to modern theorists of the emotions because in them we can see Hume anticipating the modern claim that there is a tremendous amount of background emotional processing that influences reason in ways that we often do not notice. Thus, according to Hume, we may not perceive the calm emotions as emotions: "Now 'tis certain there are certain calm desires and tendencies which though they be real passions produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known for their effect than by the immediate feeling or sensation" (2000/[1739], 417). He has in mind the kind of mild anxiety and enthusiasm that, modern research has shown, directs attention and influences our judgments in ways that are not obvious unless we are asked to thematize them. Moreover, we do not merely pass over these calm emotions without notice; rather, we mistake them for the operation of practical reason: "Reason, for instance, exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion. . . . Hence every action of the mind which operates with the same calmness and tranquility is confounded with reason" (ibid.). Yet for Hume, "'Tis impossible that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions" (416). So we are led to the conclusion that emotions play the decisive role in what we are accustomed to calling practical reason. We would do better, however, to rename this process "practical decision making" because its ubiquitous and decisive emotional content overshadows its specifically rational content. "Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The *rules* of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason" (457). Thus, Hume urges an even more radical reclassification of emotional versus rational phenomena than contemporary psychologists have been willing to countenance.

In an important respect, Hume is merely extending an insight developed earlier by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes rather radically reinterpreted the relations among reason, the emotions, deliberation, and the will. He inverted the long tradition that culminated in Thomism, declaring, "The definition of the will given commonly by the Schooles, that it is rational appetite, is not good" (Hobbes 1991/[1651], 44). Indeed, Hobbes does not merely give the emotions *priority* in deliberation and in determining the will. He makes emotions constitutive of deliberation and the will, as a pattern and species of the emotions, respectively: "Appetites, and aversions, hopes and fears concerning one and the same thing arise alternately. And diverse good and evil consequences of the doing or omitting the thing propounded come successively into our thoughts. . . . The whole sum of

desires, aversions, hopes, and fears . . . is that [which] we call deliberation. . . . [And] in deliberation, the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that [which] we call the will" (ibid.). Deliberation is no longer conceived of as carefully weighing evidence but, rather, merely a stir of the pot for our passions.

For Hobbes, this analysis of the emotive character of practical deliberation issues in a pessimistic political psychology, which in turn famously underwrites uncompromising absolutism in his political theory. Unconstrained sovereignty is the only way to end the war of all against all and therefore to secure commodious living. But Hume does not follow Hobbes down this road from emotivism to pessimism and finally to absolutism. Hume ends up with a much more optimistic analysis that comports more comfortably with the political sensibilities of modern democracies. To see why he is more optimistic, we need to link the previous discussion to Hume's second novel distinction in the classification of the emotions—that between direct and indirect passions.

The direct passions arise from pleasure and pain and map directly onto the four basic Stoic emotions: joy for actual good, hope for potential good, sorrow for actual evil, and fear for potential evil.[14] As with the direct passions, there are four fundamental indirect passions: pride and humility, love and hatred. They are indirect because they are not predicated on unmediated pleasure and pain. Rather, pride is a kind of positive feeling toward the self that is mediated by a correlative positive association with some object or action:

> If I compare, therefore, these two established properties of the passions, viz. their object, which is self, and their sensation, which is either pleasant or painful, to the two supposed properties of the causes, viz. their relation to self, and their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion; I immediately find that . . . the true system breaks in upon me with an irresistible evidence. That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is derived. The one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it. (2000/[1739], 418)

14. Hume actually divides the direct passions further along a third distinction, which we might call the hedonic and the instinctive. Though interesting, the distinction is not particularly relevant for present purposes.

Hume illustrates his theory with the example of a man who feels pride in his house. The beauty of the house, especially relative to other houses, produces the direct passion of joy in that it is good and that he has attained it. The indirect passion of pride, however, operates on a principle of association that creates a reflected admiration with the self as the object and the self-owned house as the cause, or subject. In addition to causation as a principle of association, Hume also lists resemblance and contiguity as prime principles facilitating the leap into an indirect passion. Note that Hume is going beyond the idea of appraisal in emotion to theorizing the mechanisms that link the appraisals in the case of indirect passions.

The indirect emotions only take on their full social and political significance via sympathy, Hume's key emotional disposition. He writes: "No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own" (2000/[1739], 419). Hume argues that Hobbes's pessimism about human nature is simply unjustified because sympathy naturally stirs up distinctly moral sentiments beyond what can be *initiated* by education and custom. Self-interest is not the ultimate source of all our deliberations, and nor are "all moral distinctions as the effect of artifice and education, when skilful politicians endeavored to restrain the turbulent passions of men, and make them operate to the public good, by the notions of honor and shame." Hume points out that this analysis "is not consistent with experience . . . [for] had not men a natural sentiment of approbation and blame, it could never be excited by politicians" (420).

Despite this effort to establish sympathy as natural and irreducible, Hume does not want to argue that all of our moral sentiments are natural. Indeed, the distinctly political sentiments, such as a sense of justice, he explicitly deems artificial. It is important for him to establish the moral sentiments in two stages because he is trying to steer a course between Hobbesian pessimism and religious dogmatism. That is, he does not want to rely on God for the foundations of his political psychology. He sets up his politics in opposition to "two species of false religion," namely, superstition and enthusiasm. He thinks it implausible that nature has endowed us with something so specific as a natural sense for political justice (especially because most humans have not lived in large political communities until recently). But he also wants to be able to claim some basic natural moral sentiment because without it, Hobbes's undesirable political theory would follow. So Hume begins from a more modest and more plausibly natural disposition: sympathy. Humans just happen to be

endowed with a propensity to vibrate in tune with the basic emotions of their fellow creatures. And from sympathy, via his theory of the indirect passions, Hume can build up more remote and complex political sentiments without recourse to anything extraordinary or mysterious: "Where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person. Nor is resemblance the only relation, which has this effect, but receives new force from other relations, that may accompany it. The sentiments of others have little influence, when far removed from us, and require the relation of contiguity, to make them communicate themselves entirely" (420).

The natural virtues underwrite moral behavior in relatively small social units: in the family, among friends, and perhaps at the level of the tribe. Once we move beyond small, local political communities into a necessarily abstract conception of justice, however, we find ourselves confronting the "artificial" virtues. Here our acts of political justice originally rely on enlightened self-interest—that is, the observation that small social units need each other in order to survive in a hostile world. As the principles of enlightened self-interest get set down and associated with sentiments of moral judgment, however, those sentiments become internalized in a way that begins to reflect back on our own behavior:

> We are to consider this distinction betwixt justice and injustice, as having two different foundations, viz., that of interest, when men observe, that it is impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules; and that of morality, when this interest is once observed and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. . . . After that interest is once established and acknowledged, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally, and . . . is also augmented by a new artifice, and [it is] that the public instructions of politicians, and the private education of parents, contribute to . . . giving us a sense of honor and duty. (421)

From the point of view of contemporary political psychology, Hume's distinction between the direct and the indirect passions resonates with the distinction between the emotions generated immediately from the affect programs and those that are mediated by more complex sociocog-

nitive mechanisms. More generally, Hume's approach points toward a focus on *developmental* and *historical* political psychologies of the emotions. Current developmental theories of moral reasoning and socialization have a very thin account of the emotions. Hume conceived of moral and political education as an education of the sentiments, and his account of our socialization into justice relies on the interaction of our emotions with our political institutions. Hume's account also suggests developmental research at the level of political societies, for example, historical accounts of political development in which the emotions are implicated or of societies making the transition out of authoritarianism (postwar Germany or the post-Communist countries).

With this more optimistic political psychology, Hume could move beyond Hobbes into a cautiously progressive liberalism based on proto-utilitarian principles. Hume saw the politics of his day as dominated by two opposing views, both rooted in false religious beliefs. The first, superstition, attracted people of a conservative temperament, and the second, enthusiasm, led liberally disposed people to ill-advised radicalism. Hume wanted to co-opt both. Thus Hume's thoroughgoing psychological naturalism, along with his attack on religious dogmatism, were in themselves part of his political theory. They undercut the rationales for superstition and enthusiasm. In their place, we are given an account of the moral sentiments that prefigures later utilitarian thinking but with an institutional twist. This proto-utilitarian element of Hume's psychology pushes him in a liberal direction by loosening distinctions based on rank and divine right and by appealing to universal moral sentiments. On the other hand, his psychological account of the origins of justice relies on our emotions' interacting with stable institutions that slowly transform prudential considerations into politico-moral sentiments. Thus, there is also a conservative check on the liberal impulses emerging from the more direct moral sentiments. So we end up with a cautiously progressive, deeply humanistic politics rooted in a deeply humanistic psychology.

CONCLUSION

Some things are ancient in the sense of being antiquated. In other cases *ancient* properly implies durability. Ptolemaic astronomy is a historical curiosity, not a living means for orienting ourselves in the universe. Aristotle's biology is also ancient in this antiquated sense, a mere historical curiosity. His psychology and his politics, however, can still startle with their vibrancy and insight. Modern political psychologists can and should dispense with what is antiquated in the historical tradition. We

need no longer concern ourselves with the pineal gland or the divine right of kings. But it would be a mistake to throw away the durable with the antiquated. The impulse to theorize in systematic ways, to do psychology with political intent, serves to advance both the science of psychology and the political goals that it might serve.