discern, he claims that "Sidgwick really thought the utilitarian philosophical project had run into the ground, and his integrity as a philosopher would not have permitted him to hide that all-important fact. And, because he was no utilitarian, he could not have accepted that there was any overriding moral reason to do so either" (p. 122). The claim that Sidgwick "was no utilitarian" is as paradoxical as can be. It runs counter not only to the general tenor of *The Methods* but also to the underlying assumption of all Sidgwick's later works. Still, Crisp's claim is a nice contrast to Harrison's, also unsupported, that *The Methods* is really, in the end, "obviously" a "defence of utilitarianism" (p. 116).

Nonetheless, Harrison acutely points to the conclusion of the penultimate chapter of edition 1, where Sidgwick "notes 'the stress which Utilitarians are apt to lay on social and political activity of all kinds, and the tendency which Utilitarian ethics has always shown to pass into politics. . . . A sincere Utilitarian . . . is likely to be an eager politician'" (p. 116). This passage, as Harrison observes, continues unchanged through all the later editions (p. 495 in edition 7), but, to my knowledge, its significance has not hitherto been emphasized. This points to what Harrison calls "the political solution of moral problems" (which he had mentioned earlier on p. 98) and indicates where further research may well lead.

All in all, as these last passages indicate, this book is stimulating reading, even if (or perhaps because) at times it courts paradox. Unfortunately, it lacks an index, and it is hard to imagine a justification for this deficiency.

MARCUS G. SINGER
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Heath, Joseph. *Communicative Action and Rational Choice.*
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. Pp. 375. $42.95 (cloth).

Joseph Heath's *Communicative Action and Rational Choice* is wide ranging in its scope, clear in its exposition, and persuasive in its conclusions. Heath describes the book as a "critical study of Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action," which is surely accurate, but is also, in a certain sense, too modest. The book is also a critical study of rational choice theory, and stands as the most sustained, systematic, and insightful since Elster initiated his internal critique of rational choice. In fact, it adds a layer of precision and technical sophistication that far outstrips Habermas's, Davidson's, or Elster's analyses. For someone already convinced of the fatal shortcoming inherent to rational choice theory, such a critique may seem a marginal contribution—piling on, as it were. But what is so interesting and valuable about Heath's analysis is that (*a*) he does not rest with the rather loose arguments that underwrite such convictions, and (*b*) even as he rejects rational choice's reductionist ambitions, he recovers many of its genuine insights and deploys them creatively.

Given his sympathies for Habermas's variant of the Frankfurt School tradition, he takes rational choice very seriously and confronts it in its most sophisticated, modern form. Thus, when he actually refutes rational choice as a reductive program, it is all the more dramatic because he carries it off exclusively in terms stipulated by rational choice theorists themselves. Indeed, at points

Heath's critique is almost sympathetic, or at the very least, constructive, as when he offhandedly offers up the technical rudiments of a more adequate, generalized formal theory of rational choice (sec. 4.2).

That being said, Heath's major goal really is to reconstruct Habermas's theory in a stronger form, so the book begins by laying out the motivations for and elements of the theory of communicative action. Here, as he is throughout, Heath is admirably clear and concise. (Indeed, this book can be recommended even to those who may not have an interest specifically in the *intersection* of communicative action and rational choice, because Heath's expositions of difficult theories and concepts such as communicative action, Bayesian game theory, inferential semantics, among others are often clearer and better motivated than in the originals.)

Heath shows how Habermas's arguments against the instrumental model are relatively diffuse, and marshals elements of Donald Davidson's similar but more adequate critique of decision theory to reinforce Habermas's position. He then moves beyond decision theory to explain the basic elements of the instrumental model's most sophisticated current theory of social interaction, namely, Bayesian game theory.

Heath's goal here is to sustain the central claim of Habermas's critique of instrumentalism—that speech acts are unintelligible from a strictly strategic perspective—without recourse to questionable elements in Austin's philosophy of language. In a very powerful and clever series of moves, he stitches together various findings from within game theory itself to sustain his claim. Throughout, he demonstrates an impressive command of the technical literature, and, with a few minor exceptions (e.g., describing "defection" as out of equilibrium play; p. 152), his presentation can be taken as authoritative by those unfamiliar with that literature.

Having established the need for a broader theory of practical rationality, Heath now turns to Habermas's attempt to actually build such a theory. He is critical of Habermas's theory of the "three validity claims" (truth, rightness, and truthfulness) and tries to collapse them down into an expansively theorized conception of truth. He goes on to trace out the implications of this move for Habermas's theory of action, and in doing so ends up proposing his own "multi-dimensional" theory of action which, despite Heath's characterization, does more than merely "rearrange" the elements in Habermas's theory. In my view, this is the most fecund portion of the book, with interesting (though often underdeveloped) ideas popping up at several points. I shall return to it in my critical comments below.

In part 2 of the book, Heath moves from Habermas's action theory to his "discourse ethics." He does a good job of showing how the latter flows out of the former—that is, that the sociological problem of order runs parallel to the philosophical problem of moral cognitivism, and that solving one requires (and facilitates) a simultaneous solution to the other. Habermas identifies foundationalist theories of justification as the major source of considerations that make noncognitivism in moral theory seem attractive. Thus, the theory of communicative action provides the resources to dispense with foundationalist theories of justification, but Habermas has to weave in his principle of universalization (U) in order to make it plausible for us to expect any workable degree of moral

agreement once we have forfeited recourse to foundations. Heath criticizes this move and tries to develop an alternative account of moral convergence (to which I shall return below).

Heath closes the book with a refreshing defense of the strategy of transcendental argumentation in general, and specifically Habermas's argument for the "quasi-transcendental" status of the assumptions that underwrite discourse ethics. He shows that rejecting Habermas's rather unfashionable transcendental argument in favor of cultural relativism involves embracing an even more unfashionable (and less defensible) Cartesianism.

Though the book is highly sympathetic to the overall Habermasian project, Heath ends up dispensing with two of Habermas's most important concepts. First, Heath replaces communicative action with his multidimensional theory of rational action, and, second, he dumps the principle of universalization in favor of his own pragmatic account of convergence. In both cases, Heath's critique of Habermas's concepts is more thorough than his attempt to replace them. There are several potential problems, but for reasons of space, I will confine myself to briefly mentioning one for each.

First, Heath's theory of normatively regulated action relies on the idea that "only the priority of the norm-conformative orientation is instilled through socialization, not the disposition to conform to any particular pattern [of behavior]" (p. 161). However, he admits that "the details of [his] account are . . . ultimately empirical questions to be settled by research in developmental psychology" (p. 160). The problem here is that research in developmental psychology contradicts a major premise, not merely the details, of his account: socialization instills both a general orientation to conform to norms *and* specific norms themselves. Sanctions are directed at either or both depending on the circumstances, and so they introduce a significant "element of facticity into the agent's motive for conforming" (p. 168).

Turning to his reconstruction of discourse ethics, Heath tries to replace Habermas's principle of universalization (U) with a more pragmatic (in both senses) account of discursive convergence. In effect, he claims that degrees of discursive convergence are driven by the intensity of our practical need to coordinate action. "The reason that we work so hard to achieve agreement in our beliefs about the physical world is that we need to for practical purposes. The reason that we do not strive as hard to achieve agreement in our desires is that we can get along just fine without it" (p. 267).

Heath's criticisms of Habermas and the principle of universalization make a good case that we need to search for an alternative hedge against relativism. However, despite ingenious arguments for the plausibility of his "intersubjective generalization of the Peircean account of belief formation" (p. 267), his proposal is largely unpersuasive. There is surely a valuable insight here, in that at least some of the variation that we see in degrees of convergence can be explained by how hard we work to reach agreement. Some of this effort, in turn, can undoubtedly be explained by the costs of failing to reach agreement.

However, the idea that costs mediated by effort are the primary determinant of levels of convergence is only plausible if we restrict ourselves to the level of classes of judgments (about the physical world vs. valid norms, vs. aesthetic value). The logic of the argument, however, implies that we should be able to

explain "within-world" variation as well, and here the evidence is not so strong. On the one hand, there are simply too many examples of archeologists or historians or cosmologists expending enormous effort to achieve convergence on questions for which the costs of failure to converge are minimal, with just as many examples of gaining complete convergence with relatively little effort through a decisive experiment or some fortuitous discovery. On the other hand, the enormous pragmatic pressures to reach a minimal normative consensus, say between Jews and Arabs, has had a millennium to provide a level of convergence far beyond the utter lack that we observe. Thus, the cost of failure to reach agreement is clearly not the only, or even primary, determinant of degrees of convergence, and so Heath's alternative to (U) can do only a portion of the work for which it was intended.

Despite these and other residual concerns, *Communicative Action and Rational Choice* makes major advances on many fronts, and can be enthusiastically recommended, even to those who do not have a specific interest in the intersection of the theories represented in its title.

<div align="right">

MICHAEL NEBLO
Ohio State University

</div>

Helm, Bennett. *Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. 261. $60.00 (cloth).

Emotional Reason presents an account of the moral psychology of valuing and of the reasons that stem from personal values. The book can be read as an attempt to do the hard work of explicating the moral psychology presupposed by those who, like McDowell, Wiggins, and Taylor, reject any claim of ontological priority between the value things have and our evaluative sensibilities.

The book is structured around two problems: (1) the motivational problem, or the problem of how agents can exert rational control over their action through evaluative judgment; and (2) the deliberative problem, or the problem of how personal values can be matters of choice (and so occasions for the exercise of autonomy) yet also matters of discovery (and so responsive to considerations that would justify those choices). Helm argues that a satisfactory resolution to these problems requires abandoning the orthodoxy that psychological states can be divided into two kinds—cognitive and conative—according to whether they have mind-to-world direction of fit and thus must change to conform to the world, or world-to-mind direction of fit and thus such that the world must be changed to conform to them. I will confine myself to discussing the first of these two problems. But first a brief overview.

The first section of the book (chaps. 2–4) defends an account of emotions as felt evaluations, unified states that are both evaluative and motivating and hence bridge the cognitive-conative divide. The second section of the book stirs evaluative judgment into the emerging picture of an agent's evaluative sensibility (chap. 5) and, with the resources so assembled, returns to the two structuring problems (chaps. 6 and 7) before concluding (chap. 8) with some suggestions about how the account might be extended to cover shared and moral values.