

# The Left Divided: Parties, Unions, and the Resolution of Southern Spain's Agrarian Social Question

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*This article challenges dominant explanations in the comparative political economy literature on the origins and purposes of social protection. Far from being a tool of working-class mobilization, social protection in southern Spain was strategically employed by a left party to politically demobilize its supposedly "natural" constituencies. This peculiar outcome is the result of a setting that is common in welfare states outside of northern Europe: the context of a divided left, in which parties and unions are seeking to mobilize different constituencies and in which left parties are themselves divided between moderate and far-left groups. The result in Spain was that social policy became a weapon in parties' efforts to undermine their political competition. This suggests the need to rethink the received wisdom about what the welfare state does to build working-class power in the context of a divided left.*

**Keywords:** *welfare state; left parties; unions; demobilization; social democracy*

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Just what does modernization mean for the peasantry beyond the simple but brutal truth that sooner or later they are its victims?

—Barrington Moore

Despite their status as workers, southern Spain's landless peasantry has not traditionally demanded welfare policies. Rather, for most of the twentieth century, they mobilized around the issue of land reform, demanding a division of the latifundio as a solution to Spain's "Agrarian Social Question"—the widespread problems of rural poverty and unemployment. With Spain's transition to democracy in 1975, after nearly forty years of repression under Franco, it appeared that landless peasants' moment had finally come. However, in the years following the transition, the Spanish socialists aggressively blocked a series of grassroots agrarian reform projects. The left's strategy culminated in the Spanish socialists' "solution" to the Agrarian Social Question: the creation of a large-scale unemployment benefit in 1983 that undercut the power of agrarian unions by transferring leverage in rural labor markets to local party officials and employers.

Dominant explanations in the comparative political economy literature fail to explain the course of welfare state development in southern Spain. Neither working-class mobilization nor employer-interest perspectives can account for the origins or the purposes of rural social protection. Far from being a tool of working-class mobilization, as was often the case in northern European social democracy, social protection in postauthoritarian Spain was a strategic tool in the left's efforts to *demobilize* its supposedly natural constituencies.

This article argues that the unexpected outcome is the result of a setting that is common in welfare states outside of northern Europe: the context of a divided left, in which parties and unions are seeking to mobilize different constituencies and in which left parties are themselves divided between moderate and far-left groups. Unlike the classic cases of northern European social democracy, social policy in southern Spain was not a tool yielded by a monolithic left to promote social democratic class formation. It was, rather, a weapon in left parties' efforts to undermine their political competition. The Spanish experience therefore suggests that we need to rethink our prevailing understanding of social democratic welfare state development—in which social protection is assumed to create mutually reinforcing relationships among left parties, policies, and constituencies, and in which the welfare state plays a necessarily constructive role in building working-class power.

#### I. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL POLICY IN SHAPING PARTY–SOCIETY RELATIONS

The bulk of scholarship on the welfare state focuses on social protection for dependent workers in industry and services, implicitly assuming that industrialization and the commodification of labor are the sources of rising demand for

nonfamily-based forms of welfare. The rural sector, in this view, has little need for welfare, because its survival is not contingent on the sale of its labor power.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the paradigmatic discussion of agriculture's role in shaping welfare state development is the Scandinavian red-green coalition of the 1930s, in which agricultural producers, uninterested in welfare programs per se, were willing to support social protection for the industrial working class in exchange for price supports.<sup>2</sup> Yet the agricultural sector is not an undifferentiated mass. While smallholding peasants may subsist outside the market, this has never been true for landless peasants, especially day laborers who rely on a spot market.

Despite the welfare state literature's general inattention to the rural sector<sup>3</sup> and to land reform more broadly, the issue of social protection for the risk of unemployment *has* received a great deal of attention. There are two major competing perspectives on the origins and functions of social protection found in comparative scholarship on the welfare state, one focusing on the left's power resources, the other on employers. Neither perspective, however, explains the strange twists and turns of the Spanish case.

A first view, associated with the power resources school, sees unemployment systems—and social welfare programs more broadly—as the result of the political mobilization by left parties and their trade union allies.<sup>4</sup> Broadly speaking, the class mobilizational literature takes as its ideal type the social democratic movements that emerged in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Northern Europe. These movements were premised on a set of overlapping constituencies and interests that united both party and unions.<sup>5</sup> For scholars working in this tradition, social policy is fundamentally political in nature: left parties and their associated trade unions fight for the extension of decommodifying welfare policies, which undercut narrow group identities and create a broad coalition in favor of social democracy.<sup>6</sup>

A second major perspective on the origins of social policy focuses on employer interests. Far from reflecting partisan efforts to decommodify labor, the claim here is that the origins of unemployment insurance actually lie in *employer* interests in promoting skill acquisition and hence, in commodifying labor. In this view, exemplified by the work of Peter Swenson, Isabella Mares, and Estevez-Abe et al., among others, the politics of welfare has been characterized by cross-class alliances among parts of the labor movement and some parts of the business community.<sup>7</sup>

Both approaches fail to explain the evolution of rural social protection in Spain. The power resources literature cannot explain why the socialists, when they came to power, designed the unemployment system in such a way as to weaken the mobilizational capacity of rural trade unions. Similarly, with respect to the employer-interest thesis, rural employers had no interest in promoting skill formation among their workers; they were mainly interested in shedding labor. Furthermore, as we will see, the major employers' organizations actively opposed the extension of social protection to the rural sector.

In contrast to these perspectives, this article argues that parties are key actors in shaping patterns of social protection. Yet the links among parties, policies, and constituencies highlighted by the social democratic welfare state literature do not apply to cases characterized by a divided left. Whereas the power resources framework assumes a unified left, I argue that the Spanish left was divided in two critical ways—and that these divisions are crucial in explaining the shifting character of Spain's response to the Agrarian Social Question. A first division was between *left parties and unions*. Left parties and unions, even those within the same ideological family, often represented different constituencies, with unions representing the narrower interests of their specific constituencies while left parties attempted to hold together diverse electoral coalitions. In the Spanish case, as we will see, the result of this split was the demobilization of grassroots demands for agrarian reform in the crucial early years of Spanish democracy.

A second division within the Spanish left, which overlapped with the first, was between *communists and socialists*. Despite sharing the broad goal of constructing a socialist society, both the communist and socialist movements were hoping to carve out a position as the dominant actor on the left, and thus their relationship was one of rivalry and mutual suspicion rather than cooperation. When the Spanish socialist party came to power in the early 1980s, communist–socialist animosities made difficult the formation of any exchange-based “political market” between the Socialist Party and the unions. Instead, the far-left unions in southern Spain organized a vigorous campaign against the policies of the socialist government. The socialists' response was to reform the existing system of social protection with the explicit purpose of undermining the communist class organizations and creating an unmediated link between their party and rural voters.

In its focus on how left parties choose to articulate social protection with trade union organization, this study raises analytic issues that are relevant to the study of social democratic cases of welfare-state development. It does so by suggesting the need to reconsider prevailing understandings of how left parties use the welfare state to build working-class power. The conventional wisdom in comparative political economy is that social democratic parties use the institutions of welfare capitalism in distinctive ways—as a tool for mobilizing political constituencies. However, by failing to problematize divisions within the left, this view ignores the possibility that political mobilization, even by trade unions, can be a double-edged sword for socialist parties. It may provide them with electoral support but may also result in the proliferation of new, unwanted demands. In the context of a divided left, as we shall see, even socialist parties may be willing to resort to “Bismarckian” tactics and to use state policies not just to incorporate new societal groups into their electoral coalitions, but also as a tool of political demobilization.<sup>8</sup>

In the following pages, I elaborate these claims about the centrality of intra-left divisions in shaping the dynamics of rural social protection and working-class political organization in postauthoritarian Spain. A first section outlines the origins of southern Spain's "Agrarian Social Question" and the range of solutions historically offered by the Spanish state. Section II turns to a discussion of the demands of agrarian unions in the postauthoritarian period and analyzes how divisions between left parties and unions mediated trade-union demands regarding rural social protection. Section III describes and analyzes the Socialist Party's use of welfare policy to defuse union mobilization over the Agrarian Social Question. It argues that although social policy remained an important tool in left-party efforts to mediate relations with political constituencies, it was used in ways not predicted by existing literatures: to undermine the organizing capacity of far-left unions and to create stable party-voter links, independent of union support. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications that the Spanish experience with a divided left has for our understanding of the role of parties and politics in the development of the welfare state.

#### SPAIN'S AGRARIAN SOCIAL QUESTION UNDER FRANCO

What to do with the landless peasantry of southern Iberia? This question, known in the Spanish historiography as the "Agrarian Social Question," is fundamentally one of how to address the social problems stemming from extensive land concentration.<sup>9</sup> The roots of *latifundismo* and southern Spain's<sup>10</sup> rural social structure extend back to the thirteenth century, when Catholic monarchs began the reconquest of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors. A series of drastic transformations in property relations in the first part of the nineteenth century, known as the *desamortización*, further exacerbated the problems of the landless peasantry and created a truly proletarianized peasantry, which became known as jornaleros.

Under the Franco regime, migration both to urban centers and abroad was the preferred "solution" to the Agrarian Question. As the regime began to place more emphasis on industrialization in the early 1950s, and as southern agriculture began to mechanize and shed excess agrarian labor, rules on internal and external emigration were liberalized. Hundreds of thousands of day laborers voted with their feet, leaving the countryside for the industrial belts surrounding Madrid and Barcelona, and for northern Europe. Between 1941 and 1980, Andalucía lost 1.9 million people and Extremadura 790,000—32 and 64 percent of their average populations during this period, respectively.<sup>11</sup>

This particular "solution" to the problems of agrarian unemployment came to a screeching halt in the early 1970s, however, as the oil shocks, by raising unemployment rates in northern Europe and Spain's urban areas, cut off emigration as an escape valve. Agrarian unemployment was further exacerbated by three other factors. First, the recession associated with the oil shocks also shrank

the construction and hostelry industries, which had provided jornaleros with off-season employment. A second problem was the changing set of economic incentives facing large landowners beginning in the early 1970s. Confronted with higher input costs and skyrocketing wages, agricultural employers faced a stark choice: machinery or jornaleros? They could either attempt to become “agrarian entrepreneurs” and focus on maximizing the productivity and profitability of their farms, or they could promote agricultural employment by growing more labor-intensive crops.<sup>12</sup> By the early 1970s, most large farmers had already chosen the mechanized, high productivity, profitability route, and there was an attendant rise in agrarian unemployment. Unemployment in Andalucía in 1975 was at 13 percent. To compound the problem further, just as agrarian workers were being expelled from the labor market in ever-greater numbers, deindustrialization limited their ability to find employment in Spain’s cities. As the effects of the oil shocks filtered through to the industrial economy, many southerners who had left the countryside in the 1960s began returning to their native villages, further swelling the ranks of the rural unemployed.<sup>13</sup>

As Ortí observes, agrarian workers had long ago been evicted from the market for land; now they were being excluded from the labor market as well.<sup>14</sup> Thus, despite the hopes of the Franco regime that the problem of rural unemployment would be solved through economic modernization, on the eve of Spain’s transition to democracy, her Agrarian Social Question had once again become politically relevant.

## II. PARTY COMPETITION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE AGRARIAN QUESTION DURING THE TRANSITION

For decades, then, if not for centuries, the key demand of jornaleros and their political representatives had been *reparto*, a division of the latifundia. Following Franco’s death in 1975, hopes ran high in the southern countryside. As the Franquist framework for rural labor relations dissolved, employers fell into disarray. With skyrocketing rural unemployment and new political parties and unions mobilizing, it seemed that the moment for land reform had finally arrived. Parties generally agreed on the need for agrarian reform as part of a broader program of structural modernization.<sup>15</sup> Despite pressure from the left’s social base to push for an agrarian reform, however, in the early years of the transition the socialist and communist unions made no major demands for land reform. Instead, they chose to mobilize around wages and unemployment benefits. This situation changed only seven years later, when the communist union defected from its strategy of moderation.

This section analyzes the evolution of the agrarian question during Spain’s transition to democracy, and is divided into two parts. A first section outlines the divergent demands of left parties and agrarian unions during the transition from

authoritarianism, and shows that the central identifying assumption of the power resources literature—one of a clear, unshakeable link between union and left-party policy positions—did not hold in this period. Left parties, hoping to build cross-class electoral support in a highly competitive environment, generally favored moderate policies while unions expressed more radical preferences. Ultimately, left parties' desire to recruit new voters led to the demobilization of grassroots demands for land reform. Next, I examine the consequences of union acquiescence with parties' reformist positions. Here, I highlight how unions' successful campaign for increased spending on unemployment subsidies led to the emergence of a "virtuous circle" between social policy expansion and far-left unionization. It is this context that frames the argument I pursue in the remainder of the article: that the socialist party used welfare policy to defang the unions politically and to appeal directly to constituencies.

### *Diverging Party-Union Interests and the Demobilization of Grassroots Demands for Land Reform*

In the post-transition period, three agrarian unions achieved a significant organizational presence within the rural sector: the communist-affiliated *Comisiones Obreras* (CC.OO), the socialist-affiliated *Federación de Trabajadores de la Tierra* (FTT-UGT), and the revolutionary *Sindicato de Obreros Campesinos* (SOC).<sup>16</sup> In the early years of the transition, the membership base of these unions<sup>17</sup> was very radical, and this radicalism manifested itself in the form of extensive grassroots demands for land reforms.

The communist movement had the longest history of organizing in the countryside.<sup>18</sup> For years, they had been arguing that the only solution to the problem of rural unemployment was to attack the root of the problem: the uneven concentration of land. With the legalization of trade unions in the mid-1970s came a slew of proposals for agrarian reform. In 1976, the Extremaduran branch of the communist CC.OO proposed a *reforma agraria a fondo*.<sup>19</sup> Likewise, CC.OO activists in Andalucía were also proposing a series of land-reform projects and arguing vociferously with each other about which variant the union should push.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, the socialist FTT members argued that an agrarian reform was "more necessary than ever,"<sup>21</sup> calling for expropriation, state planning, indemnities paid over fifty years, self-management, and worker control.<sup>22</sup> And, as SOC members characterized the problem: "Progress . . . means hunger? We believe that land should be like the air and like water—a gift of nature that no one has the right to use for private enrichment."<sup>23</sup>

Despite these grassroots demands coming from the southern countryside, in the 1976–1982 period, only one of the three unions—the SOC, which was affiliated with the tiny revolutionary left party *Partido del Trabajo* (PTE)—made land reform a priority. SOC linked traditional jornalero claims for land with



forms of activism that mirrored earlier anarchist traditions, organizing hunger strikes, blockages of machinery, and occupations of and lock-ins in local town halls.<sup>24</sup> The other two unions, those affiliated with major political parties, however, downplayed demands for agrarian reform.

The divergent interests of left parties and their affiliated trade unions were critical for explaining why the leadership of the communist and socialist-affiliated unions chose to mute the demands of their social base for land reform. Despite the demands of their constituents, in the transition period, the unions' leadership felt strong pressure from their sister parties to moderate their stance. Although there are any number of reasons why parties may be uninterested in pursuing agrarian reform, there were two particular reasons that the communist and socialist parties were pushing moderation on the unions.

The first reason had to do with the parties' particular strategic needs. The Communist Party was encouraging moderation because it wanted to achieve legalization and entry into the coalition of political elite that would organize Spain's transition. The socialists, already assured such political representation, had more ambitious aspirations: electoral success. If the socialists were to win, however, they needed votes in rural areas. In 1975, the rural sector included more than 20 percent of Spain's economically active population and its political importance was further amplified by the nature of Spain's electoral system, whose D'Hondt system of proportional representation, with a three-seat minimum, favored less-populated areas.<sup>25</sup> Gaining the vote of the rural sector was not as simple as demanding land reform, however, because of Spain's heterogeneous rural structure. In 1975, small peasant proprietors made up 75 percent of Spain's rural population. Rural workers, although they made up approximately 70 percent of *southern* Spain's rural population, comprised only 25 percent of the active agrarian population nationally.<sup>26</sup> Given the dynamics of political competition that the Socialist Party (PSOE) faced and the incentives created by the electoral system, after the 1977 elections, Socialist Party leaders Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra sent down a mandate to local-level party activists: the party was to work on increasing votes among smallholding peasants.<sup>27</sup> Because northern Spain's smallholding peasantry was notoriously conservative, any effort to win their support meant not actively challenging property relations.

Second, the party leaders feared the possible dangers to democracy that could result from questioning property rights in the context of a negotiated transition to democracy. As Antónío Romero, Secretary-General of the agricultural branch of the CC.OO, recounts:

I was in favor of occupying estates and of establishing an agrarian reform. I thought that we should aggressively demand agrarian reform, but Carillo [the Secretary-General of the Spanish Communist Party] neutralized us. He called me up specifically to say, "These people (SOC) are occupying land, but they are few



in number, and they don't disturb the powers that be; but if *we* go out and occupy estates, the military will go out in the street and there will be no transition from dictatorship to democracy."<sup>28</sup>

For both of these reasons, communist and socialist union leaders alike de-emphasized agrarian reform as an objective and land occupations as a strategy. Thus, although they shared many of their members' opinions about the desirability of land reform, the union leadership acceded to the wishes of their respective parties and refused to back land occupations proactively. Indeed, communist trade union officials complained that SOC was engaged in a "propaganda campaign in benefit of . . . one party [the revolutionary-left PTE], to which they have subordinated not only the interests of workers but also the demands of the majority of the country for liberty . . ."<sup>29</sup>

### *Union Strategies and Rising Unemployment*

Although the agrarian unions had moderated their political demands, the Agrarian Social Question did not disappear from the political agenda. Instead, the unions chose a different strategy, organizing first around the fight for salary increases and then around demands for unemployment benefits.<sup>30</sup> In terms of wage demands, union efforts focused on obtaining local regional agreements, which would complement those signed at the provincial level. The aggressive stance of the unions, in the context of general employer disarray, led to doubling in jornalero salaries between 1976 and 1979.

In the face of dramatically escalating wage costs, employers' response was to substitute capital for labor and to shift production toward less labor-intensive crops.<sup>31</sup> A report written by the Andalucian employers' federation *Asociación de Agricultores y Ganaderos* (ASAGA) on the causes of agrarian unemployment in the region neatly summarizes the problem. As Table 1 shows, among the nonirrigated crops, beetroot, cotton, and olive required the greatest amount of labor hours per hectare. During the 1970s, the cultivation of cotton and beetroot (the most labor-intensive crops) suffered an alarming descent.<sup>32</sup> According to ASAGA, between 1976 and 1980, a total of 119,000 hectares of labor-intensive "social crops" (cotton, beetroot, and olive) had been substituted with the easily mechanizable (and more profitable) crops of cereal and sunflower. This, of course, led to a further reduction in employment opportunities for jornaleros. Losses of agricultural employment in Andalucía between 1971 and 1980 were estimated at 264,400 and 80,400 in Extremadura.<sup>33</sup>

This put the unions in a difficult position. On the one hand, given the years of low wages that jornaleros had suffered under the Franco regime, demanding higher wages was clearly understandable; that said, the demand was clearly having negative effects on employment levels. By the late 1970s, the unions,

Table 1  
*Annual Labor Hours per Hectare in the Province of Seville, 1979*

Crop	Labor Hours per Hectare
Wheat	22
Sunflower	93
Beetroot	316
Cotton	258
Olive	222

recognizing the catch-22 situation that their wage-based negotiating strategy was creating, began to participate in national pacts which promoted wage moderation in an effort to limit rural unemployment. In the 1979–1980 harvest, the unions signed a five-year plan with agrarian employers associations in which employers agreed to increase the surface devoted to cotton and to initiate programs to mechanize. The effects of this mechanization on the employment situation of jornaleros were to be countered through the cultivation of alternative “social crops.”<sup>34</sup> Similarly, the 1978 Pact of Moncloa, in the clauses relating to the agrarian sector, contained provisions in which the unions agreed to wage restraint in exchange for government pressure on landowners to cultivate from a “social” perspective.<sup>35</sup>

These series of agreements limited a further rise in agrarian salaries but were not enough to make a serious dent in unemployment rates. By October 1977, the rural unemployment rate in Andalucía and Extremadura was more than 7 percent.<sup>36</sup> Taking only jornaleros into account, unemployment rates were even worse: 24.75 percent in Andalucía and 61 percent in Extremadura.<sup>37</sup> Trapped in the short term by the difficulties in negotiating substantial changes in crops and having abandoned the fight for agrarian reform, the unions decided they had to change strategies. Thus, beginning in the late 1970s, the unions also began pushing for an expansion of unemployment funds. The choice, they claimed, was between “subsidy” and “suicide.”<sup>38</sup>

### *The Expansion and Political Consequences of the Unemployment System: Union Mobilization*

Spain’s center-right *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD) government responded to the unions’ call for unemployment subsidies, and the reason for their sympathetic ear had much to do with political competition. The UCD and the Socialist Party had been neck-and-neck in Andalucía’s 1977 elections. Although the UCD had won Extremadura on the basis of the rural vote, both the socialists and communists had specifically targeted their 1979 electoral campaigns in these UCD rural strongholds.<sup>39</sup> Unions had been legalized in April 1977,<sup>40</sup> and




Figure 1. Evolution of Funds for *Empleo Comunitario* 1972–1983.

Source: Cuadro 7, Antonio Garcia de Blas and Adolfo Poveda Diaz, “La Seguridad Social Agraria y el Empleo Comunitario,” *Papeles de la Economía Española* (1984): 95–104.

the rise of class-based appeals and social unrest threatened to destabilize the UCD’s electoral strength in rural regions.<sup>41</sup>

In the face of this competition, the UCD began to quickly increase spending on rural unemployment benefits, known as *Empleo Comunitario* (EC), which had been inherited from the Franco regime. In 1971, the Franco regime had created a makeshift, seasonal unemployment benefit reminiscent of the public-works programs earlier in the century. This benefit provided municipalities with money to fund public-works projects; the idea was to hire unemployed agrarian workers. As the Figure 1 shows, after the 1977 elections, the UCD government began to vastly expand this program, nearly quadrupling the funds earmarked for the program in two years.<sup>42</sup> Although the official purpose of the funds was, in the government’s words, to “mitigate seasonal unemployment [in agriculture] . . . by giving priority to work of an agricultural nature that requires a greater percentage of labor,” spending on the program followed an electoral logic. After the UCD’s disappointing performance in the 1979 elections, in which they lost ground to the socialist left in the south,<sup>43</sup> they further increased spending. Similarly, before the 1982 general elections, the government promised that it would guarantee four days of *Empleo Comunitario* employment per week to all unemployed jornaleros. By 1982, the government was spending five hundred times the amount of money on EC than it had spent ten years earlier.

After Franco’s death, control over the allocation of EC funds passed to the unions, and their de facto control over the administration of the funds had crucial consequences for subsequent patterns of trade union organization and mobilization. Technically, the employers, unions, and the central government all served on local “unemployment commissions,” but it was the unions who were given the task of preparing the lists of the unemployed who would be eligible

for EC money. Control over these lists, and over the subsequent distribution of public employment, provided the unions with a critical organizational resource. The unions used the *Empleo Comunitario*—funded public works programs to facilitate collective action, gathering workers in one place to work (fixing roads, for example) and to mobilize for more funds.<sup>44</sup>

Because the communist CC.OO had the strongest organizational penetration in the southern countryside,<sup>45</sup> this system especially helped the communist unions, as jornaleros affiliated with them in large numbers.<sup>46</sup> Although some local UCD officials complained about the CC.OO's control of the local labor market, national party leaders were not particularly bothered by this development.<sup>47</sup> Instead, they saw the growth of the communists in the trade union arena as a useful counterweight to the growing electoral strength of the Socialist Party in the south, and continued to increase spending each year they were in power.

### III. THE SOCIALISTS IN POWER: UNION RADICALIZATION AND A DEMOBILIZING WELFARE "REFORM"

If unions' appropriation of the administration of rural unemployment benefits initiated a virtuous cycle—in which they attracted more members, thereby promoting more effective collective action, which resulted in further economic concessions, leading to strengthened union recruitment efforts—this process also exacerbated underlying conflicts between the major unions and left parties that erupted into direct confrontation by the early 1980s. Here, I outline how a second division within the left—one involving conflicts between the communists and socialists that emerged in the wake of the socialist victory in Spain's 1982 elections—influenced the Socialist Party's reform of the existing system of rural unemployment benefits. This reform, I argue, served not to strengthen unions, but rather to weaken them and to create direct linkages between voters and the Socialist Party.

#### *A Socialist Victory and Communist Radicalization*

Spain had general elections in 1982, from which the Socialist Party emerged the clear victor.<sup>48</sup> The aftermath of these elections witnessed the widespread radicalization of political demands within the southern countryside, as the dominant communist union, *Comisiones Obreras del Campo*, broke from its earlier pattern of moderation. After 1982, strikes, roadblocks, and other forms of political protest became near-daily occurrences in the south and almost all of these actions centered on unions' public demands for land reform.

Why this sudden change in union strategy? Once again, power resources theory fails to identify sources of change. More precisely, by seeing unions and parties as essentially aligned, it cannot account for radical shifts in union

demands that are not in step with party positions. If anything, the 1982 general election's peaceful transfer of power from the conservative UCD to the Socialist Party should have encouraged unions to moderate their demands. The key to the puzzle of union radicalization was the electoral and organizational collapse of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE).<sup>49</sup> Paradoxically, when its sister-party disintegrated, the communist union CC.OO broke with the governing socialist left party. With the PCE falling into factionalism, the significant minority of the communist union leaders who had disagreed with the union's moderate positions in the late 1970s—especially, cooperation with the system of *Empleo Comunitario* and with the general subordination of the needs of agrarian workers to the general needs of the party—regained the upper hand. The communist CC.OO radicalized its program, making public demands for an agrarian reform.

Most importantly, perhaps, the communist union organized a march between Seville and Madrid in support of a *Reforma Agraria Integral*. This march lasted forty-two days, covering 1,300 kilometers as it wound its way through eighty villages, and was a spectacular media success. More to the point, it was humiliating for the newly elected socialists. Agrarian reform and jornalero poverty was a very sensitive theme with the socialists. The Socialist Party had been the linchpin of the Second Republic's coalition government and had been active in championing the rights of southern Spain's landless peasantry. In the post-Franco period, they freely took up the mantle of the republican-era tradition. Now, the party—the historic party of the jornaleros—was in full control of both the regional *and* national governments, and their historic constituency was noisily demanding agrarian reform and a solution to the problem of persistent rural unemployment. As one former trade unionist noted, the socialist slogan of the transition had been that “socialism equals liberty”; what, then, was the PSOE supposed to do—arrest the poor jornaleros and throw them in jail?

Furthermore, from the standpoint of national politics, southern Spain could not be ignored. The region provided PSOE with its largest rank-and-file membership and had consistently given it 35 to 50 percent of its votes.<sup>50</sup> In the early 1980s, moreover, jornaleros constituted more than 20 percent of Andalucía's active population, and public opinion in Andalucía showed overwhelming support for some sort of agrarian reform; in a 1983 survey, for example, 92 percent of those surveyed reported that an agrarian reform was either “absolutely necessary” or “quite necessary” (with 63 percent opting for the first formulation).<sup>51</sup> Thus, there was tremendous pressure on the socialists to take action of some kind.

### *The Socialist Solution to the Agrarian Question: Welfare and the Demobilization of Agrarian Unions*

Soon after taking power, then, the Socialist Party announced with great fanfare that it would be forming a committee to study the problems of rural

unemployment in the south. A year later, after a series of meetings in which they failed to consult either the communist or far-left unions, the Socialist Party introduced a new and “reformed” unemployment benefit, which was their answer to the problems plaguing southern Spain.<sup>52</sup> As we will see, while this program would become Spain’s most generous unemployment program, its strengthening of the Socialist Party at the expense of rural-class organizations would make it a focal point for debates about the socialists’ promotion of clientelist networks.

The unions had repeatedly raised the issue that *Empleo Comunitario* needed to be reformed in two general ways. First, they argued that it needed to be expanded and regularized, so that every unemployed jornalero received a benefit; second, the unions emphasized the need to maintain union participation in any new system.<sup>53</sup> Large-scale agricultural employers, it should be noted, strongly opposed the EC system, which, they argued, distorted the labor market and made for lazy workers.<sup>54</sup> They complained that despite high levels of unemployment, it was often difficult to find workers to do agricultural tasks, let alone those willing to make the seasonal migrations required for harvests, because workers had access to easy money simply by staying at home. Employers wanted social peace, but they also wanted as fluid a labor market as possible.<sup>55</sup>

Although the new benefit proposed by the socialists regularized the old *Empleo Comunitario* funds, it involved a key change: the control of the administration of the benefit passed from the unions to local Socialist Party officials and employers. Thus, the reform of the unemployment system implied a dramatic change in the existing relationship between policy and class formation. Whereas scholars such as Bo Rothstein and Bruce Western have pointed to the institutionalization of the Ghent unemployment insurance system as a mechanism for promoting trade union organization—and hence in creating a virtuous circle among working-class strength, left-party power, and the welfare state<sup>56</sup>—the case discussed here highlights the opposite dynamic. The communist CC.OO had been using the *Empleo Comunitario* to build organized class power in a way reminiscent of the Ghent system. Conflicts within the left, however, kept the “virtuous circle” from emerging, and the socialists’ reform of the unemployment system, by systematically limiting the union’s direct contact with their members, represented an explicit effort to break the earlier dialectical relationship between labor–market institutions and class formation. In southern Spain, then, welfare policy was a handmaiden to political struggles, used not to strengthen union power but to weaken it at the expense of the party.<sup>57</sup>

The replacement for the *Empleo Comunitario* system, passed by the socialist government in 1983, was composed of three parts: a noncontributory rural unemployment subsidy, a public-works program, and an occupational training program. These three parts worked in concert. Workers who were inscribed in the agricultural social security regime and who had worked sixty days in the agrarian sector during the previous year were eligible for an unemployment

benefit equal to 75 percent of the minimum income for six months of the year.<sup>58</sup> Days spent working in the public-works program and in the occupational training programs counted toward the sixty-day minimum. The financial benefit of the new *subsidio agrario* was about the same as the old EC but involved one critical change: the new subsidy required that employers certify that jornaleros had worked a given number of days on their farms, and, similarly, that local party officials certify when they had worked on public-works projects or in occupational training programs. This effectively meant that local (mostly socialist) officials and employers, rather than the unions, assumed control over the labor market.

Why did the socialists create this *particular* form of unemployment system? It was certainly not at the behest of the employers. Although agricultural employers ended up benefiting from this system insofar as they were provided with a steady supply of subsidized labor, at the time they opposed the institution of *any* unemployment system for jornaleros.<sup>59</sup> Nor were the unions happy about it. The socialist FTT, cooperating with its sister party, accepted the new policy, but the communist CC.OO and anarchist SOC, which were the two truly representative unions in the southern countryside, both bitterly opposed it. CC.OO leaders objected to the fact that the unions were excluded from management of the new subsidies, to the low level of the subsidy, and to the fact that workers would receive an unemployment benefit for six months of the year without being required to work—this they regarded as insulting. SOC claimed that the policy was a political tactic aimed at disarming the unions and of distracting jornaleros from their historic fight for land redistribution.<sup>60</sup>

From the government's perspective, however, it was clear that something needed to be done to quell the political turmoil in the southern countryside. However, the old EC formula was "unfortunate" in that it had given a significant degree of influence to the communists over the distribution of funds. The government felt that the nonsocialist unions were trying to take advantage of the grim situation in the countryside for their own political purposes. Internal Socialist Party reports surveying the situation in the countryside noted that the union movement was "strongly dominated by CC.OO, which is nurtured, even economically, by a system which concentrates every morning the entirety of agrarian workers, which permits it to control the labor market, granting it broad possibilities to re-enforce itself as a union."<sup>61</sup> Another report observed that

[t]he mobilizing campaigns of these organizations [CC.OO and SOC], although they have little support in terms of the number of people mobilized, result in a spectacle (highway blockages, occupation of estates, marches, etc.) that receive extensive coverage and which resonate with the media. Thus, it is necessary that the Socialist Party in Andalucía and Extremadura establish a strategy adequate . . . to countermand the strategies of these organizations.<sup>62</sup>



Indeed, the co-sponsor of the bill, José Caballos, later admitted that one of the central purposes of the bill was to “break the spine” of the communist unions.<sup>63</sup>

If the socialists’ goal was to demobilize the southern countryside, they succeeded spectacularly in their goal. By essentially creating a relationship between workers and the bank, rather than between workers and their unions, the socialists managed to atomize the jornaleros politically and to weaken the mobilizational capacity of both the *Comisiones* and SOC in the southern countryside. As the unions found it more difficult to organize jornaleros for collective action, the number of mobilizations declined dramatically after the system’s introduction. Whereas between 1983 and 1985 the CC.OO led 470 actions in Andalucía, between 1986 and 1988 that number fell to 117.<sup>64</sup> The number of participants in union-led mobilizations also declined steadily during the 1980s, from eighty-one thousand participants in 1983 to a mere twenty-nine thousand in 1988.<sup>65</sup> Whereas SOC’s trade-union congresses had attracted participants from more than one hundred villages in the late 1970s, by 1987 only twenty towns sent participants and the union undertook a serious debate about how to reorient itself.

The passage of the agrarian subsidy has had important effects, not only on collective action, but also on class consciousness. In the late 1960s, rural sociologist Juan Martínez Alier pointed to the centrality of a “culture of work” in the jornaleros’ collective identity.<sup>66</sup> Jornaleros, Martínez Alier argued, defined their interests in terms of an antagonistic conflict with landowners and believed that working on the land constituted the only legitimate justification for ownership of the land. *Unión* (norms of solidarity) was their strategy for survival; division of the latifundia and “land to those who work it” (*reparto*) was their goal.<sup>67</sup> Today, as a result of state policies, rural sociologists and anthropologists report that the importance of class conflict, land, and solidarity in the jornaleros’ collective identity is fast disappearing. Where once landowners were regarded as the class enemy, jornaleros now cooperate with local landowners to guarantee their access to the subsidy. And, as they struggle to obtain the required number of ever-decreasing *peonadas* [official working days in agriculture needed to gain access to the subsidy], in place of *unión*, jornaleros report a widespread attitude of “*sálvase quien pueda*”—essentially, save your own skin.<sup>68</sup>

The outcome in the Spanish rural sector is thus akin to the social control thesis put forth by Piven and Cloward.<sup>69</sup> This claim, emerging out of an analysis of the American case, is that public relief serves primarily to demobilize the poor during times of social unrest. This dynamic was certainly present in the Spanish case, but the relationship between protest, policy expansion, and demobilization was more political than a simple social control thesis would imply. To be sure, both the center-right UCD in the late 1970s and the Socialist Party after 1982 were hoping to transform the political climate that was nourishing protest. Taken alone, however, this observation misses the crucial *political* logic underlying the two parties’ strategies—logics that ultimately derived from the organizational

dynamics of party competition. The UCD, for example, was willing to countenance the organizational empowerment of the communist and anarchist unions via the expansion of *Empleo Comunitario* because it saw the unions' presence as a valuable—if pesky—counterweight to the growing electoral strength of the Socialist Party in the region. Similarly, the creation of the *subsidio agrario* by PSOE in 1983 was not only a means to limit social conflict; it also was a relatively cheap way to strengthen the party's connection to voters in the countryside.<sup>70</sup> Thus, although political elites were indeed motivated by a desire to limit social unrest, they were also actively attempting to shape the organizational parameters in which party competition takes place.<sup>71</sup>

Indeed, the growth of the *subsidio agrario* has altered the economic and political landscape in southern Spain. Throughout the 1980s, the socialists continued to expand coverage of the benefit, both by incorporating women into the program<sup>72</sup> and by steadily reducing the number of *peonadas* required to gain access to the subsidy.<sup>73</sup> By the mid-1990s, jornaleros were Spain's most privileged group in terms of access to unemployment benefits. At a time when only 40 percent of the unemployed population was receiving any sort of unemployment benefit (contributory or assistential), the numbers of individuals in receipt of the *subsidio agrario* actually exceeded the number of registered agrarian unemployed in nearly all of the southern provinces—sometimes by as much as 100 percent.<sup>74</sup> In spite of crackdowns on fraud in recent years, in 2006, *subsidio* recipients still received 48 percent of total state expenditures on noncontributory unemployment programs, totaling nearly 900 million euros.<sup>75</sup>

This spending, by limiting the incentives for underemployed jornaleros to migrate to other regions in search of employment, has contributed to the maintenance of a significant rural underclass in southern Spain.<sup>76</sup> Over the past thirty years, Spain has witnessed a drastic reduction in her agrarian population, from 25 to 7 percent of the active population. These aggregate figures, however, hide significant regional variation in patterns of deruralization. Table 2, below, shows rates of growth in the active agrarian population in Spain between 1976 and 2004. One can see that while the agrarian population has steadily declined in most of Spain, after 1984 it declined much more slowly in the two regions of southern Spain: Andalucía and Extremadura. The slow rate of exodus from the rural sector in southern Spain should not be viewed as an indicator that the region is providing stable, full-time jobs. While agriculture in the two regions *is* doing well in terms of rising productivity and its ability to capture European export markets, it does not provide enough full-time work to sustain the large population of workers who still remain tied to the land. Although these two regions generate only 30 percent of agricultural employment, in 2005 they accounted for 84 percent of Spain's agricultural unemployment.

Despite these economic inefficiencies, a felicitous side effect of the program for the socialists has been the formation of a very loyal political constituency.

Table 2  
*Active Agrarian Population: Annual Rates of Growth*

Period	Andalucía and Extremadura (Rate of Growth)	Spain, Excluding Andalucía and Extremadura
1976–1983	–5.51	–3.48
1984–2004	–1.37	–4.01

Source: INE, *Encuesta de Población Activa*, <http://www.ine.es/> (accessed September 2007).

The majority of agricultural workers in Andalucía and Extremadura have, as a whole, remained loyal PSOE voters, even during the late 1980s, a time when the party was losing urban voters. Indeed, both the right and the far-left have accused the socialists of promoting clientelist networks—of requiring electoral support in exchange for approving the payment of the agricultural subsidy (this is known as the “captive vote”).<sup>77</sup> Evidence of direct coercion is hard to come by,<sup>78</sup> but the socialists appear to have successfully created a “captivated” (if not a “captive”) vote. Indeed, the program had become sufficiently politicized that after the center-right *Partido Popular* (PP) government came to power in the late 1990s, it passed legislation limiting its future growth—and, not incidentally, what they saw as a steady source of votes for the socialists in Andalucía and Extremadura. The Spanish Supreme Court subsequently pronounced that legislation unconstitutional and the PSOE, back in power, is under pressure to expand the subsidy to agrarian workers in other regions.<sup>79</sup>

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Typically when thinking about the origins and development of welfare-state policies, we tend to highlight the importance of the cumulative resources available to actors on the left (the “power resources” argument). In the last decade, an alternative view has instead highlighted the interests of firms in securing a labor force suitable to their mode of production (the “employer-interest” argument). This article has argued that neither perspective can explain the evolution of Spain’s response to the Agrarian Social Question—the problems of poverty and unemployment resulting from extensive land concentration. Instead, divisions within the left, both between left parties and between left parties and unions, were the crucial drivers of social protection in southern Spain. We saw, first, that when left parties’ interests diverged from the interests of their allied union brethren, the parties’ desire to mobilize new voters led to the demobilization of grassroots demands for agrarian reform. Second, we saw how welfare became a weapon in left parties’ efforts to reshape the political landscape—and how, when the socialists came to power, they engineered a reform of the rural

unemployment system aimed at demobilizing far-left unions by limiting their access to the resources required for collective action.

In focusing on the demobilizing aspect of social programs, this article thus echoes some of the more critical perspectives on the social democratic paradigm of welfare-state development and class mobilization.<sup>80</sup> While I have not argued that demobilization is a necessary feature of all social programs promoted by the left, the analysis developed here does suggest that the lessons from the northern European cases about how social protection is used as a tool in class mobilization may be unhelpful in understanding cases characterized by a divided left. This is because the assumption of overlapping party–union interests inherent in the social democratic model ignores the implications that political competition *within* the left may have on party strategies for articulating social protection with trade-union organizations. While social programs may sometimes be used to create social democratic class formation, they can also be used as a weapon in left parties' efforts to limit unwanted political mobilization.

Indeed, intra-left divisions offer potential answers to the broader question of the conditions under which left parties might use social-reform legislation to demobilize their traditionally conceived allies. A first possibility, highlighted in this article, is that left parties want to recruit other voters. In the Spanish case, these other voters were the propertied peasants who would have been antagonized by mobilization. Here, the interests of the party-political left were at odds with the interests of the unionized (rural) left. A second possibility is that one part of the left wants to weaken other parts of the left. In southern Spain, as we saw, this pitted socialists against communists. A final possibility—whose dynamics were not present in southern Spain but which we might expect to find in countries undergoing economic liberalization—is that left parties want to restructure the economy in peace; this pits left parties in government against trade unions.

Such demobilizing tactics, of course, raise the possibility that social reform legislation aimed at demobilizing radical working-class movements may, in the long-run, serve to mobilize other, more institutionalized forms of working-class power—for example, through the creation of an ideologically unified labor movement that is willing to work closely with left parties. Such a possibility is plausible since many present-day cases of the social democratic model were cases of a divided left through the early 1950s.

However, the French experiment with industrial-relations reform in the 1980s suggests that the left's demobilizing strategy need not always lead to a long-run accretion of "power resources." In France, a socialist president chose to preside over the overall weakening of the country's trade-union movement rather than strengthen his communist rivals. As originally conceived, the socialists' Aroux laws were measures meant to strengthen trade unions and promote an expansion of collective bargaining.<sup>81</sup> However, having defeated the communists at the ballot box, the socialists were unwilling to give the Communist Party

new sources of leverage on the shop floor. Thus, the firm-level works councils, which were now being charged with collective bargaining, were given few of the legal protections granted to their union brethren. Such a move, the socialists feared, would only serve to empower the communist-controlled *Confédération générale du travail* (CGT) and give the *Parti communiste français* (PCF) resources with which to oppose the government's economic policies.<sup>82</sup> Unsurprisingly, employers soon began to press their advantage, bypassing the unions and promoting firm-level "micro-corporatist" bargains. In the long run, the alternative to state regulation of industrial relations in France was not a resurgent union movement but, rather, employer-led deregulation.

In France, then, as in southern Spain, divisions within the left led left parties to promote policies that contributed to a demobilized and, arguably, weaker working class. As scholars analyze the contemporary dynamics of welfare capitalist restructuring in other settings, these examples suggest the importance of investigating how parties' efforts to negotiate social organization and party competition shape their strategies for connecting the welfare state to society.

#### NOTES

1. See Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

2. Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds*, 30; Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Theda Skocpol and John Ikenberry, "The Political Formation of the American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Social Research*, 6 (1983): 87–148.

3. There are some exceptions here. See Peter Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Isabela Mares, *The Politics of Social Risk* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

4. The foundational texts in the power resources literature are Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Politics Against Markets*; Walter Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle* (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1983); Gosta Esping-Andersen and Walter Korpi, "Social Policy as Class Politics in Post-War Capitalism: Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany," in *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, ed. John H. Goldthorpe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 183–84. Subsequent work applying this logic to Spain includes Carles Boix, *Political Parties, Growth and Equality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

5. Alessandro Pizzorno, "Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict," in *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968*, vol. 2, ed. Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno (London: Macmillan, 1978).

6. To be fair, Walter Korpi's early work (especially in *The Democratic Class Struggle*) acknowledges that ideological cleavages within the labor movement might undermine the organizational strength of the working class. That said, he fails to explicitly theorize how such divisions might shape either patterns of social protection or the way that parties use policy to relate to constituencies.

7. See Isabela Mares, *The Politics of Social Risk*; Peter Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and the Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden," *World Politics*

43 (July 1991): 513–44; Peter Swenson, *Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Margarita Estévez-Abe, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice “Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State,” in *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, ed. Peter Hall and David Soskice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

8. Stephen Erie’s study of nineteenth-century Irish political machines makes this same distinction. See Stephen Erie, *Rainbow’s End* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

9. For reviews of the origins of Spain’s rural social structure and its social and political effects, see R. Tamames, *Cuatro Problemas de la Economía Española* (Madrid: Ediciones Peninsula, 1965); Tomas García, “El Problema de la Tierra en la Revolución Democrática,” *La Evolución de la cuestión agraria bajo el franquismo* (Madrid: MAPA, 1948/1993); chap. 3 of Sevilla Guzmán, *La Evolución del Campesinado en España: elementos para una sociología política del campesinado* (Madrid: Ediciones Peninsula, 1977); Edward Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).

10. When I refer to “southern Spain” in this article, I refer primarily to Andalucía and Extremadura.

11. See Table 74, José A. Pérez Rubio, *Yunteros, braceros y colonos: la política agraria en Extremadura, 1940–1975* (Madrid: MAPA, 1995), 531.

12. J. J. González, “La Patronal Agraria: estrategias de política agraria y de negociación colectiva,” *Agricultura y Sociedad* 31 (April–June 1984): 93–120.

13. “El paro agrícola se ha duplicado en Sevilla en doce meses,” *El País*, October 14, 1979.

14. Alfonso Ortí, “Crisis del modelo neocapitalista y reproducción del proletariado rural (Represión, resurrección, y agonía final de la conciencia jornalera)” in *Sobre Agricultores y Campesinos*, ed. E. Sevilla Guzmán (Madrid: Servicio de Publicaciones Agrarias, 1983).

15. See Los programas agrarios de los partidos políticos españoles (Madrid: Editorial Agrícola Española, SA, 1977); Unión del Centro Democrático, *La Agricultura en el Parlamento* (Madrid: 1980), 90–99; Equipo Agrario del PSOE, *Agricultura y Socialismo* (Madrid: Edicusa, 1977), 54–62; Santiago Alvarez, *El Partido Comunista y El Campo: La evolución del problema agrario y la posición de los comunistas* (serie Problemas del Movimiento Obrero, n. 3). (Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre, 1977).

16. These were actually three quite different unions. SOC had a strong presence in a limited region of western Andalucía (where the anarchists had formerly been strong) and a high mobilizational capacity, but lacked any extensive organization; CC.OO had both a strong penetration among rural workers and a strong organization, but it also had to negotiate with its party; FTT (at least in the latifundia regions) was an organization without a social base.

17. There was one other minority union, HOAC, which I will not discuss here.

18. See A. M. Bernal and R. M. Ruiz, “Sindicalismo Agrario en Andalucía, 1939–1988,” in *Sindicalismo Jornalero y Campesino en España: del franquismo a la democracia (1939–1995)*, ed. A. M. Bernal (Madrid: Biblioteca del Ministerio de Agricultura, 1996 [manuscript]).

19. José Hinojosa Duran, “Orígenes y desarrollo de las CC.OO del Campo en Extremadura,” in A. M. Bernal, ed., *Sindicalismo Jornalero*.

20. Heated debate eventually re-emerged at the CC.OO’s 1979 Congress of Montillo between those favoring a radical agrarian reform, more or less in line with republican-era



postulates; those favoring a “moderate” reform, in line with the 1958 PCE proposal; and advocates of a “integral” agrarian reform. See Sebastian Cuevas, “CC.OO del Campo apoyará la reforma agraria,” *El País*, October 23, 1979; and various documents from Congreso de Montilla, Archivo Regional de CC.OO-Andalucía (Sevilla, 1979).

21. “Reforma Agraria,” pamphlet edited by FTT-UGT, Gráficas Rota. Fundación Largo Caballero, Madrid.

22. Libro de Resoluciones del I Congreso de UGT-Andalucía, (Seville: UGT-A, 1980).

23. SOC. “¿Progresar es no comer?” pamphlet (Seville, 1979).

24. SOC’s refusal to moderate was hardly surprising given that its origins were to be found in discontent with the moderate strategy followed by the PCE in the 1960s and 70s. In the early 70s there emerged a splinter party, the Partido del Trabajo de España (PTE), which began to dispute the hegemony of the PCE. In the spring of 1975, the PTE decided to form their own “jornalero commission.” They argued that while the centralized organizational model used by the CC.OO (in which the center of organization was the firm) worked for industry, it did not suit the specific needs of landless peasants, for whom action needed to be coordinated at the village level.

25. See José María Maravall, “Transición a la democracia, alienamientos políticos y elecciones en España,” *Sistema* 36 (May 1980).

26. Jesús Lopez Sanchez-Cantalejo, “Panorama Sindical en el campo: Clases sociales, organizaciones campesinas,” pamphlet (Iberagro) located in the archives of Fundación Largo Caballero, Madrid.

27. See Alfonso Guerra, “Estrategia de poder,” *Leviátan* no. 1 (1978): 52–53. See also Richard Gunther interviews with local party activists, 1978. Interview transcripts available at the Centro de Estudios Avanzados en las Ciencias Sociales, Fundación Juan March, Madrid.

28. Emphasis added. Cited in Rafael Ruiz, “Aproximación de la Historia del Sindicato de Obreros del Campo de Andalucía,” in *La Historia de Andalucía: A Debate*, ed. Manuel González de Molina (Granada: Anthropos, 2000), 179–206.

29. *Realidad*, “Extra Campo,” August 1, 1978.

30. SOC also took part in making these types of demands, but their main focus was in organizing land occupations.

31. Furthermore, many large farmers preferred crops which did not give them labor problems (i.e., those which were easily mechanized and with guaranteed prices). See J. Sumpsi, “Evolución tecnológica y racionalidad económica en las grandes explotaciones de la campiña andaluza,” *Agricultura y Sociedad* (May 1980): 79–126.

32. Grupo Estudios Rurales Andaluces, *Las Agriculturas Andaluzas* (Madrid: MAPA, 1980): 440–62.

33. “Andalucía Amarga: el paro en el campo y la expropiación de las fincas,” *El País*, October 14, 1979.

34. “Las maquinas de la discordia,” *El País*, November 14, 1982.

35. The mechanism through which the government was to pressure landowners was actually the threat of land expropriation. The *Ley de Fincas Manifestablemente Mejorables*, which came out of the Parliament in 1979, was never implemented but the very fact that a center-right government insisted on cultivating from a “social” perspective was a sign of the urgency with which the administration regarded social unrest in the south. That said, although the government claimed that rural unemployment was a serious problem, it was still willing to heavily subsidize cereals (which are not labor-intensive) through its system of price supports. See “El Gobierno expropiará el uso de las fincas andaluzas y extremeñas infrautilizadas,” *El País*, September 27, 1979; Carlos



Gómez, "La reivindicación de la reforma agraria sigue viva en el Sur," *El País*, October 17, 1979; and Carlos Tío, "Marinaleda: el precio del trigo y la lucha contral el paro," *El País*, August 28, 1980.

36. Consejería Ejecutiva de Trabajo de la Junta de Andalucía. "Análisis sobre el paro agrícola en Andalucía," 1979. Mimeograph found in archives of Fundación Largo Caballero, Madrid.

37. Numbers from 1978. "La Federación de Trabajadores de la Tierra Contra el Paro," *El Trabajador de la Tierra*, IIIa. Época, no. 11 (March 1978): 2.

38. José G. Gordo, "Desempleo: Subsidio o Suicidio," *Iberagro* (May 1978). Fundación Largo Caballero, Madrid.

39. J. M. Maravall, "Transición Política," 93.

40. The organization of these groups varied from region to region. The socialists organized jornaleros and the small peasantry into the same *campesino* organization: the FTT. In Andalucía and Extremadura, the communist-affiliated peasant leagues were put under the umbrella organization COAG while *Comisiones Jornaleras* organized rural workers. In CLM, the communists organized both groups within the *Comisiones Campesinas*. This variation in organizing strategies highlights the relative fluidity of the boundary between jornalero and small peasant in these regions. Differences existed, of course, but many small peasants were so poor that, although they owned a parcel of land, they also hired themselves out as day laborers. This meant that they were also affected by the declining demand for rural labor.

41. See Eduardo Moyano Estrada, "Ideologías y sindicalismo agrario en la transición democrática," *Agricultural y Sociedad*, no. 31 (April–June 1984): 33–58.

42. See "Gobierno y Oposición tratan de evitar el estallido del campo," *El País*, March 8, 1979; "Creciente tensión en Sevilla por la falta de fondos para el empleo comunitario," *El País*, April 12, 1981; "El polvorín andaluz," *El País*, September 22, 1981; "'Paraos' . . . pero no 'quietos,'" *El País*, May 2, 1982.

43. The UCD gained votes in Castilla-La Mancha in 1979, but lost votes in Extremadura and Andalucía.

44. SOC, "El Sindicato de Obreras del Campo: Informa," (Seville: SOC-MR, 2002); José Aguilar, "El gobernador civil de Sevilla denuncia el sistema del empleo comunitario," *El País*, March 6, 1981.

45. Unfortunately, no official numbers on sectoral rates of union affiliation are available for the late 1970s, but both contemporary sources, including the Civil Governor of Seville and the socialist FTT, and secondary sources support this assessment. See statements by José María Sanz Pastor reported in "Polémico informe del gobernador de Sevilla: El Empleo Comunitario Levanta Ampollas," *El Trabajador de la Tierra*, IIIa. Época, no. 31 (June/July 1981): 2; Comisión Ejecutiva Federal de FTT, "Base de un Plan de Trabajo," internal document (November 30, 1983), Fundación Largo Caballero, Madrid. Additional sources making this claim include José Hinojosa Duran, "Orígenes y desarrollo de las CC.OO."; Ruiz, "Aproximación de la Historia."

46. It should be noted that although SOC's ability to administrate the EC funds was never as extensive as CC.OO's, it was not insignificant. SOC's access to power at the municipal level ended before the 1982 elections, when many PT-A party leaders shifted to PSOE. See Ruiz, "Aproximación de la Historia," 190–92.

47. After Spain's first elections, the UCD and Spanish Communist Party (PCE) came to the conclusion that they shared a clear interest in undermining their common nemesis—the Socialist Party—and thus engineered what became known as the "pincer" strategy. In concrete terms, this pincer strategy resulted in government support for communist trade-union organizing.

48. In the 1982 general elections, Spain experienced an electoral earthquake. Spain's party system experienced a dramatic reorientation. The governing UCD's vote share plunged from 35 percent to 6 percent, and the Communist Party's vote share went from 9 percent to 3 percent. The Socialist Party and the liberal party, Alianza Popular (AP), were the main beneficiaries. The socialists gained control of 202 out of a total of 350 parliamentary seats and the AP became the main party of the opposition.

49. The PCE, having received 9 percent of the vote in Spain's 1979 elections, received 3 percent of the vote in the 1982 elections, and disintegrated. The political crisis that the PCE experienced was linked in part to party–union conflicts, as union conflicts were being carried out within the party, and vice-versa. See Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, *Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

50. See Luis Moreno and Carlos Trelles, "Decentralization and Welfare Reforms in Andalusia," *Unidad de Políticas Comparadas* (Madrid: CSIC Working Paper 04-10, 2004).

51. Fundación Friedrich Ebert, *La Reconversión Industrial y La Reforma Agraria* (Madrid: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1984), 114–15.

52. They also introduced an agrarian reform bill, to be implemented at the regional level (the Spanish constitution had granted the autonomous regions rather than the central government competency over the issue of land reform). This new agrarian reform, however, had little to do with the sociopolitical nature of the jornalero demands for land; rather, it was a series of measures designed to create incentives for increasing productivity in agriculture. Indeed, despite the opposition of the landowners to this agrarian reform policy, it is clear that the socialists never had any real intentions of truly challenging property relations. The agrarian reform law required that landowners provide a minimum level of employment to avoid expropriation, but employers were able to count days that jornaleros had spent working on public-works projects funded by the state toward this minimum employment requirement. See J. Sumpsi, "La Reforma Agraria en Andalucía," in *Cuadernos y Debates: la Reforma Agraria*, ed. José María Sumpsi (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1988); Igorario Moreno, "Desarrollo del capitalismo agrario y mercado de trabajo en Andalucía," *Revista de Estudios Regionales* (September–December 1991).

53. See "Medidas Contra el Paro Firmados por CCOO-UGT y ASAGA-UAGA," (n.d.), Caja 529, Archivo Histórico COAN, Seville. See also Comité Ejecutivo Provincial of the FTT, untitled document (minutes from a meeting between the FTT-UGT and PSOE on how to reform the EC system) (Jaén: February 17, 1983), archives of Fundación Largo Caballero.

54. Small peasant proprietors, many of whom worked part-time on their own plots and then hired themselves out as day laborers, supported the policy.

55. See José Aguilar, "Los empresarios andaluces quieren modificar la estructura de los fondos del empleo comunitario," *El País*, June 14, 1980; and "Un falso paro agrario," *ABC*, June 19, 1981.

56. Bo Rothstein, "Labor Markets and Working Class Strength," in *Structuring Politics*, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Ann Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Bruce Western, *Between Class and Market: Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist Democracies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

57. See José Cazorla, "El clientelismo de partido en España ante la opinión pública. El medio rural, la Administración y las empresas," 86 (Barcelona: ICPS Working Paper, 1994). Interview with Candelo, Mérida, Extremadura, summer 2004.

58. It should be noted that eligibility for the program was limited to rural workers in Andalucía and Extremadura. Rural workers in Castilla-La Mancha were excluded from the benefit. Instead, the government sent extraordinary funds to the region. Local union leaders suggested that CLM's exclusion was because of the limited union implantation in the region, which Antonio Palacios (head of the CC.OO's Federación del Campo in the region) estimated was 2.5 percent.

59. See *Diario 16* (1-VII-82). It is interesting that, twenty years later, agricultural employers are now less concerned about maintaining the fluidity of the labor market than they are about maintaining labor costs. For this reason, they were staunchly opposed to the Conservative Party's efforts to create a contributory unemployment system for rural workers.

60. See "Empleo Comunitario: La Alternativa del Campo. Posición ante la sustitución proyectada por el gobierno," Sindicato Provincial Sevilla, Federación Andaluza de CCOO-Campo (December 1983). Caja 529, Folder 3, Archivo Regional, CC.OO-Andalucía, Seville; and SOC (2002).

61. Report referenced in Bernal and Ruiz, "Sindicalismo Agrario," 179–92.

62. Comisión Electoral Federal del PSOE, *Documento de Estrategia* (October 1983): 31–32. Available in the archives of the Fundación Pablo Iglesias.

63. Interview, José Caballos, courtesy of Rafael Ruiz, University of Córdoba. See also Ruiz, "Aproximación de la Historia."

64. See p. 396 and Table 4 on p. 401, Miguel Gómez Oliver, "Jornaleros andaluces, ¿una clase en extinción?" in *Ecología, Campesinado, e Historia*, ed. Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán y Manuel González de Molina (Córdoba: Ediciones de la Piqueta, 1993), 375–408.

65. Table 3, Miguel Gómez Oliver, "Jornaleros andaluces," 399. In the late 1980s, the number of mobilizations led by SOC remained approximately the same (232 in each period) but most of these were related to court cases involving SOC activists, including its Secretary-General Diego Cañamero, who were being prosecuted for illegal activities (lock-ins, highway blockages) undertaken years before.

66. See Juan Martínez Alier, *La estabilidad del latifundismo: análisis de la interdependencia entre relaciones de producción y conciencia social en la agricultura latifundista de la Campiña de Córdoba* (Paris: Ediciones Ruedo Ibérico, 1968); Isidoro Moreno Navarro, "Cultura de trabajo e ideología," in *Ecología, Campesinado, e Historia*, 335–56.

67. More specifically, Martínez Alier described the jornaleros' ideological universe in terms of three key ideas: *unión* (norms of solidarity), *reparto* (division of the latifundio), and *cumplir* (fulfilling the obligation to do one's job with the required degree of diligence, absent a binding legal obligation). See Martínez Alier, chapters 3–5. In addition to the demise of the norms of *unión* and *reparto*, many jornaleros today report that *cumplir* has been replaced by a culture of work evasion, as individuals do only the minimum of work required to qualify for the subsidy.

68. González discusses the generalized loss of class consciousness among the jornalero class. See Artemio Baigorri, *El Paro Agrario* (Badajoz: TESYT, 1994), 223; J. J. González, "El discurso jornalero: Desarticulación de la conciencia de clase y pérdida de identidad," *Agricultura y Sociedad* 50 (January–March 1989): 33–73.

69. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: the Functions of Public Welfare*, updated edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

70. Despite their seeming electoral hegemony at the national level after 1982, the socialists soon faced a resurgent Communist Party in the south, and hence had good

reason to keep the communist unions at bay. The PCE/PCA rebounded by the 1986 elections, taking 17.6 percent of the vote in the referendum on the *autonomías*, and by the early 1990s the reformulated far-left, the Izquierda Unida, was taking nearly 20 percent of the vote. I thank Robert Fishman for pointing this out to me.

71. Interestingly, this dynamic is not dissimilar to the Great Society programs described by Piven and Cloward in *Regulating the Poor*. There, the Democratic Party used these programs to create links directly between the party and black voters, circumventing the existing party infrastructure (state governments and city machines), who would have objected to the diversion of resources away from their pre-existing constituencies.

72. Between 1984 and 2000, there was a 557 percent increase in the number of women receiving rural unemployment benefits. The large increase in *jornalera* beneficiaries was because of the socialist mayors' granting previously economically "inactive" women access to the public works programs and thus the agrarian subsidy. See Rocío Román Collado, "Cambios en el perfil del beneficiario del subsidio agrario," *Revista del Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales* 51 (2004): 139–55.

73. Originally, a *jornalero* needed to have worked in agriculture sixty-five days in the previous year. This number was subsequently reduced to forty-five, and then thirty-five days.

74. In 1996, the provinces of Cáceres, Granada, and Córdoba had *subsidio* benefit "coverage" rates as high as 200, 199.5, and 192.5 percent, respectively. The average for Andalucía was 140 percent, and for Extremadura, 151 percent. See José Cansino and Rocío Roman Collado, "Incidencia del Subsidio Agrario en el Déficit Financiero del Régimen Especial Agrario de la Seguridad Social," comunicación presented at *I Congreso de Ciencia Regional de Andalucía*, Sevilla (1997), 69.

75. And this despite the fact that they comprised only 17 percent of the unemployed population not eligible for contributory unemployment benefits. See CES, *Memoria del Consejo Económico y Social* (Madrid: MTSS, 2006): 245–49, 317–19.

76. See for example Samuel Bentolila and Juan F. Jimeno, "Regional Unemployment Persistence (Spain, 1976–1994)," *Labour Economics* 5 (1): 25–51.

77. For a discussion of political clientelism in the southern countryside, see José Cazorla, "El clientelismo de partido"; Jonathan Hopkin, "A 'Southern Model' of Electoral Mobilization? Clientelism and Electoral Politics in Post-Franco Spain," *West European Politics* 24 (1): 115–36; and Ruiz, "Aproximación de la Historia."

78. In a 1992 survey of 400 *jornaleros*, only 16 percent of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that "he who fails to get along with the mayor does not receive *peonadas*" [*peonadas* are official working days counted toward eligibility for the unemployment subsidy]. This finding was further corroborated by communist trade union leader Antonio José Crespo ("Candelo"), who pointed out that even in those instances in which the conservative party PP has had control of local municipalities, *jornaleros* still receive state assistance. See Baigorri, *El Paro Agrario*, 222.

79. See "El Tribunal Constitucional anula el 'Decretazo' de la reforma laboral de 2002," *El País*, March 30, 2007. The rise of intensive agriculture in Catalunya and Murcia has resulted in a rising number of temporary workers in agriculture in those regions.

80. Offe and Weisenthal, for example, view reformist (or "opportunist") patterns of working-class associationalism as a rational if unstable response to the dilemmas of working-class collective action. Piven and Cloward, in contrast, argue that political elites use social policy as an instrument of social control, to demobilize social movement agitation for social and political change. Claus Offe and Helmut Weisenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form," *Political Power and Social Theory* 1 (1980): 67–115; Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*.

81. Chris Howell, *Regulating Labor: The State and Industrial Relations Reform in Postwar France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

82. See Jonah Levy, *Tocqueville's Revenge: State, Economy and Society in Contemporary France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 234–40.

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