

**Political Science 4315:  
International Security and the Causes of War**

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**Description:** This course examines various issues regarding international conflict and cooperation. It is divided into two parts: theories of strategic interaction and the causes of war. Much of what is interesting in the study of international relations does not involve strategies of pure conflict (zero-sum games). Accordingly, the course begins with a focus on theories of interdependent decision-making in mixed-motive games, which model conflict as a bargaining situation. The second half of the course investigates a wide range of theories on the causes of war, including power shifts, domestic politics, prospect theory and misperception, institutions, and regime type.

**Requirements:** A midterm (50%) and final examination (50%). Both the midterm and final are in-class exams, in which you will be required to answer two out of four essay questions.

**Required Books and Readings:**

1. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1984).
2. M. Brown, S. Lynn-Jones, and S. Miller, *The Perils of Anarchy* (MIT Press, 1995)
3. Readings marked with an (\*) are available on Carmon.

**Part I: Theories of Strategic Interaction**

**1. Introduction: What is War?**

Lecture only. No readings.

**2. Level of Analysis**

\*Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, pp. 16-41, 80-85, 159-65.

\*Robert Jervis, "Perception and the Level of Analysis Problem," in Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1976), chap 1.

\*Patrick James, "Structural Realism and the Causes of War," *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 39 (1995), pp. 181-208.

**3. Coercion, Brute Force, and the Diplomacy of Violence**

\*Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, chaps. 1-2.

**4. Deterrence**

\*Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 289-324.

\*Jack Levy, "When Do Deterrent Threats Work?" *British Journal of Political Science* 18 (October 1988), pp. 485-512.

### **5. The Security Dilemma and War: Offense-Defense Theory**

\*Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.

Charles Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," in *POA*.

### **6. Rationalist Explanations for War**

\*James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No.3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.

\*Jonathan Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?" *Security Studies* 10 (Summer 2000), pp. 143-50.

### **7. Accommodation: Promises of Rewards, Not Threats of Violence**

\*J. David Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," *World Politics* 24 (October 1971):19-38.

### **8. Appeasement and Assurance**

\*Paul Kennedy, "The Study of Appeasement: Methodological Crossroads or Meeting-Place?" *British Journal of International Studies* 6 (October 1980):181-88.

\*Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues* 43 (Winter 1987):5-71.

### **9. Cooperation Under Anarchy: Theories and Strategies**

\*Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40 (1986):1-28.

\*Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics* 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 1-24.

### **10. War Termination**

\*H. E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War* (Princeton University Press, 2000), chapters 1 and 2.

### **11. Review Session and Midterm Examination**

## **Part II: Causes of War**

### **12. Hegemonic War, Power Transitions, and Preventive War**

Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, whole book.

\*Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40

(October 1987), pp. 82-107.

William Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," in *POA*.

### **13. Institutions and Peace?**

\*G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton University Press, 2001), chap 1.

John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in *POA*.

\*Randall Schweller, "The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay," *International Security* 26 (Summer 2001), pp. 161-186.

### **14. Alliances and War**

Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," in *POA*.

Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," in *POA*.

### **15. Domestic Politics and War**

\*Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, chaps. 1, 2.

\*Jack Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," *National Interest* (Spring 2003).

Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," in *POA*

\*Stephen Walt, "Revolution and War," *World Politics* 44, no. 3 (April 1992).

### **16. The Democratic Peace**

\*Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97 (November 2003), pp. 585-602.

Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in *POA*.

### **17. Psychological Approaches to War**

\*Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988), pp. 675-700.

\*Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, "The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 7-40.

\*Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems," *Political Psychology* 13, no. 2 (June 1992): 283-310.

### **18. Ethnic Conflict**

\*David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton University Press, 1998), chapter 1.

### **19. Review Session**

### **20. Final Examination**

## **Important Considerations**

*Academic Honesty.* All of the work you do in this course is expected to be your own. Absolutely no cheating or plagiarism (using someone else's words or ideas without proper citation) will be tolerated. Any cases of cheating or plagiarism will be reported to the university committee on academic misconduct and handled according to university policy.

Students with disabilities that have been certified by the Office for Disability Services will be appropriately accommodated, and should inform the instructor as soon as possible of their needs. The Office for Disability Services is located in 150 Pomerene Hall, 1760 Neil Avenue; telephone 292-3307, TDD 292-0901; <http://www.ods.ohio-state.edu/>.