This version of PS 867 is a course in applied game theory with the objective of preparing students for incorporating and understanding formal models in the fields of political economy and positive political science, regardless of substantive subfield. While the class is somewhat Americanist-focused, with a strong emphasis on legislative politics, the applications considered are sufficiently generalizable to be applied to many different areas in political science, and classroom discussion will focus on potential bridges between subfields.

While there is no formal prerequisite for this course, it is assumed that the student would have successfully completed Political Science 788 “Mathematical Theory of Politics” which is currently the introductory course in game theory offered by the Department. Completion of this course is not a requirement, but it is assumed that students entering this class have a solid grasp of fundamental concepts of game theory, such as strategy sets, reaction functions, Nash equilibrium, etc. Knowledge of basic calculus is also helpful. The course requirements will include several problem sets (at least four) and a final examination, administered in class. The examination will represent fifty percent of the course grade, the problem sets forty percent, and class discussion ten percent.

There are no required textbooks for the class, as the course will be primarily paper-driven, but the following books might be of interest (and aid) to class participants, and generally might prove useful to own as future reference sources. The reading list that follows is a tentative collection of papers that will be analyzed over the course of the quarter. The syllabus indicates what days each paper will be covered in class, and students are expected to read the assigned paper(s) prior to attending class on the days they will be analyzed.

**Recommended Texts**


**Course Schedule and Reading List**

**September 22: Organizational Meeting**

**September 27: Models of Agenda Setting (I)**


**September 29: Models of Agenda Setting (II) and Particularistic Legislative Bargaining (II)**


**October 4: Models of Particularistic Legislative Bargaining (II)**

Review Baron and Ferejohn (1989)

**October 6: Models of Particularistic Bargaining with Taxation**


**October 11: Models of Collective Good Provision**


**October 13: Models of Particularistic and Collective Bargaining**

**October 18: Models of Lobbying (I)**


**October 20: Models of Lobbying (II)**


**October 25: Models of Parliamentary Bargaining (I)**


**October 27: Models of Parliamentary Bargaining (II)**

Review Baron (1998)

**November 1: Models of Parliamentary Logrolling**


**November 3: Models of Parliamentary Elections and Lawmaking**


**November 8: Models of Information Transmission in Legislatures (I)**


**November 10: Models of Information Transmission in Legislatures (II)**


**November 15: Models of Information Transmission in Bureaucracies**

**November 17: Models of Information Transmission in Group Settings**


**November 22: Models of Parties and Elections (I)**


**November 24: Thanksgiving—No Class**

**November 29: Models of Parties and Elections (II)**


**December 1: Review, Catchup, Conclusion**