

Description: The course examines the origins of war from rationalist, human nature, political, social, and cultural perspectives as well as a wide range of theories on the causes of conflict and cooperation. Specifically, it explores theories of alliance dynamics, domestic politics, power shifts, the offense-defense balance, and cognitive-psychology. In addition to these theories, various kinds of strategic interaction will be examined, including deterrence, compellence, appeasement, and engagement. Much of what is interesting in the study of international relations does not involve strategies of pure conflict (zero-sum games), so the course focuses on theories of interdependent decision-making in mixed-motive games, which model conflict as a bargaining situation. Given that (1) the essence of international conflict is disagreement over policy choices and/or the allocation of scarce resources and (2) politics is, at its core, a process of bargaining to arrive at a mutual agreement that resolves these political disputes, the course examines and critiques non-cooperative bargaining theories of war.

Requirements: Class participation and a 25-35 page critical analysis of the literature under one of the subheadings or a review essay that uses a recent and important book as a springboard for the paper.

Required Books:

1. Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (Free Press, 1973).
2. Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford UP, 2006).
3. Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation* (Princeton UP, 2010).
4. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism* (University of Chicago Press, 1982).
5. Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails* (Cornell UP, 2010)
6. David Lake and Robert Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton UP, 1999).
7. Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale UP, 1967).
8. Peter Trubowitz, *Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft* (Princeton UP, 2011).
9. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Week 1: Introduction

Week 2. Origins of War: Human Nature or Cultural Invention?

Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (New York: Oxford UP, 2006).

Week 3. Theories of War and Imperialism

Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism* (University of Chicago Press, 1982).

Week 4. Bargaining Theories of War

James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49:3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.

Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,"

American Political Science Review 97:4 (November 2003): 621-32.
 Jonathan Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?" Security Studies 10:1 (Summer 2000): 143-50.
 Erik Gartzke, "War Is in the Error Term," International Organization 53:3 (Summer 1999): 567-87.
 Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, no. 1 (March 2003): 27-43.
 Miles Kahler, "Rationality in International Relations," International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 919-41.
 David Lake and Robert Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), chaps. 1, 3, 7.
 Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 1-24.
 James Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization 52:2 (Spring 1998):269-305.

Supplementary Reading:

Robert Powell, "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 5 (June 2002): 1-30.
 Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Oct., 1985), pp. 58-79.
 Stephen Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," International Security 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), 5-48.
 George Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation," International Organization 50 (Summer 1996):379-406.
 Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40 (April 1988): 317-349.
 Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, egoism, and third images: *The Evolution of Cooperation* in international relations," International Organization, 40, 1 (Winter 1986):167-186.
 Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*, chaps 1-3.
 Alexander George, D. K. Hall, and W. E. Simon, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), chaps. 1, 5.
 Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-60.
 Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics, Vol. 44, April 1992), pp. 466-496.
 Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, chaps., 2, 7.
 Robert Jervis, "Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics," in J. R. Pennock and John W. Chapman, *Coercion* (Chicago and New York: Aldine, 1972), pp. 272-288.
 Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics 49 (April 1997):371-400.

Week 5. Deterrence, the Security Dilemma, and Offense-Defense Balance Theory

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, chaps. 1-3.
 Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation* (Princeton UP, 2010).
 Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31:2 (January 1979): 289-324.
 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30 (January 1978): 317-349.

Supplementary Reading the Security Dilemma and Offense-Defense Theory:

- Randall Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 90-121.
- Charles Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 50 (October 1997): 171-201.
- Kier Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, 25, 1 (Summer 2000): 71-104.
- Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 44-82.
- Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way?: A Review Essay," International Security 24:2 (Fall 1999):166-98.
- Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 660-91.
- Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 5-35.
- Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security 22:4 (Spring 1998): 5-43.
- Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," The Journal of Politics 63 (August 2001):741-77.
- Randall Schweller, "Rational Theory for a Bygone Era," Security Studies, Vol. 20 (September 2011): 460-468.

Supplementary Reading on Deterrence Theory:

- Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, ch. 3, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Perceptions of the Adversary."
- Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36:4 (July 1984): 496-526.
- The following articles are all from a special issue of World Politics 41:2 (January 1989) on the deterrence debate: Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," 143-169; Alexander George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," 170-182; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," 208-224.
- Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers, no. 50 (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, August 1968). A discussion of Schelling's "rationality of irrationality."
- Jonathan Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970*, pp. 5-33.
- Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Concept of Commitment in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 1969): 39-56.
- Charles Glaser, "Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence," in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), ch. 2.
- Special issue of World Politics 41:2 (January 1989) on the deterrence debate: Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," 143-169; Alexander George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," 170-182; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," 208-224.

Week 6. Misperception and Cognitive Processes: Does It Make a Difference How the Brain Works?

- Jack S. Levy "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," World Politics 36:1 (October 1983): 76-99.
- Arthur Stein, "When Misperception Matters," World Politics, 4 (July 1982):

505-26.

Jennifer Mitzen and Randall L. Schweller, "Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War," Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan-March 2011), pp. 2-35.

Jack Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, 2 (1994): 279-312.

Robert Jervis, "Political Implications of Loss Aversion," Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (June 1992): 187-204.

Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems," Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (June 1992): 283-310.

Week 7: Motivated Biases and Emotion: Intelligence, Organizational Culture, and Decision-Making

Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails* (Cornell UP, 2010).

Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, "The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 7-40.

Emanuele Castano and Roger Giner-Sorolla, "Not Quite Human: Infrahumanization in Response to Collective Responsibility for Intergroup Killing," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90 (5) (2006), pp. 804-18.

Jonathan Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," *International Organization*, Vol. 64 (Winter 2010), pp.1-31.

Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 59, no. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 39-75.

This piece deals with emotions at the group level, and so provides counterintuitive insights on the problem of aggregation:

5) Smith, Eliot R., Charles R. Seger, and Diane M. Mackie. 2007. "Can Emotions Be Truly Group Level? Evidence Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93 (3):431-46.

Week 8. Alliance Dynamics

Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36 (July 1984): 461-496.

Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War," International Organization 48:1 (Winter 1994): 39-75.

Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, vol. 44: 2 (Spring 1990): 137-168.

James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," International Organization 47, no 2 (Spring 1993): 207-34.

Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43:2 (January 1991): 233-56.

Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of

Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227-262.

Supplementary Reading on Appeasement:

J. L. Richardson, "New Perspectives on Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 40:3 (April 1988): 289-316.

Paul Kennedy, "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1939," in Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).

John Herz, "The Relevancy and Irrelevancy of Appeasement," *Social Research* 31 (Autumn 1964):296-320.

Amitai Etzioni, "The Kennedy Experiment," *Western Political Quarterly* (June 1967).

Supplementary Readings on Alliances and War:

Robert Jervis, *System Effects* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997), chaps. 5 and 6.

Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," *World Politics* 46:4 (July 1994), 490-526.

Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict," *International Organization* 53, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 343-77.

G. Murphy, "On Satellitship," *Journal of Economic History* 21, No. 4 (Dec. 1961):641-51.

Randall Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (Columbia UP, 1998), chap. 3.

Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," in Francis A. Beer, ed., *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 121-140.

Week 9. Domestic Politics and War

Peter Trubowitz, *Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft* (Princeton UP, 2011).

Stephen Walt, "Revolution and War," *World Politics* 44, no. 3 (April 1992).

Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *The Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004).

Jack L. Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," *The National Interest* (Spring 2003).

Supplementary Reading:

Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1991), chaps. 1, 2.

Jack A. Goldstone, Kurt Dassel, and Stephen Walt, "Forum on Revolution and War" in *Security Studies* 6, no. 2 (Winter 1996/97):127-196.

Week 10: Power Shifts, and War

Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40 (October 1987): 82-107.

Randall Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *World Politics* 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 235-69.

David Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics 24:1 (October 1971): 19-38.

Robert Powell, "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement," American Political Science Review 90:4 (December 1996): 749-64.

Supplementary Reading of Power Shifts and Preventive War:

Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., *Engaging China: Managing a Rising Power* (Routledge, 1999), ch. 1.

James Morrow, "The Logic of Overtaking," in Jacek Kugler and D. Lemke, eds., Parity and War (University of Michigan Press, 1996).

Jack S. Levy, "Preventive War and the Bush Doctrine: Theoretical Logic and Historical Roots," in *The Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in the Age of Terrorism*, eds. Stanley A. Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (London: Routledge, 2007).

Jack S. Levy and Joseph R. Gochel, "Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai Campaign," Security Studies 11, no. 4 (Winter 2001/02): 1-49.