On Varieties of Educational Justice

Winston C. Thompson
165C, Ramseyer Hall
The Ohio State University
thompson.3588@osu.edu

Section 1: Introduction

Surprisingly, the concept of educational justice receives relatively little consideration. That statement might seem odd to those who do not directly study education. Indeed, it may also seem odd to quite a few who do.

To clarify, the topic of educational justice receives quite a good deal of attention. In the US and elsewhere, through either explicit or implicit invocations, public discussions of education regularly turn to language of justice. The topic is engaged when public officials issue claims or slogans regarding continued efforts in pursuit of shared educational goals (e.g., promises that “No Child [will be] Left Behind” or that a particular schedule of policies ensures that “Every Student Succeeds”, arguably rest upon a normative foundation that invokes educational justice). Similarly, under the banner of educational justice, researchers often describe the failings of one or another educational program or institution, perhaps even, in some cases, going so far as to provide a sense of what may be required to correct or improve upon the very same. In short, the topic of educational justice is never very far away from discussions of education.

But these efforts provide precious little investigation of the concept of educational justice itself. Instead, they engage the topic as though the underlying concept were plainly,

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straightforwardly, or fully understood by those participating in the efforts described above. However, while a good number of parties endorse educational justice, they may find little else upon which to agree under that banner. For some factions, this work entails engaging questions of adequacy or equality, either in access to education or across a broad range of resources or outcomes. For others, it may require appropriate forms of recognition, diversity, or meaningful reductions of prejudice. Of course, many accounts resist even these general categorizations. Despite these differences in detail, this field of study seems to count the desirability of justice in education as a universally held premise, a unifying point upon which these disparate voices can agree. Again, though they agree upon the importance of the topic of educational justice, some factions hold quite conflicting views of the concept itself, such that they are in general disagreement about what it obliges and/or how best to pursue it in educational projects. Worse still, many who discuss educational justice miss the fact that they are speaking past one another in this way.

On my view, inattention to the concept of educational justice may ultimately result in missing quite a bit more than only the fact of that simple miscommunication.

Strange, then, that attentions have not more fully turned to study the underlying concept of educational justice. In what follows, I will offer a contribution to our understanding of that concept. The essay will describe the popular account of educational justice, present the relationship that supports that account’s status as the default position, and provide reasons for widening our sense of that relationship. In the service of giving those reasons, the essay will introduce a distinctively educational variety of justice, suggesting two ways in which it expands our conception of educational justice, and concluding by briefly noting some possible areas for further work on expanded concerns.
Section 2: The popular variety of educational justice

Scholarship on “educational justice” evidences considerable diversity in usage of that term. Some philosophers and theorists have produced quite engaging work in organizing these approaches and demarcating their foci. Rather than detail that work or rehearse the multiple approaches, in what follows I will offer a relatively unique categorization of these approaches based upon “varieties” of educational justice, arguing that most work on educational justice can be firmly located within the first of the two varieties that I offer. Before continuing in that presentation, it may be wise to provide an overview of the ways in which a good portion of the normative scholarship (explicitly philosophical or otherwise) on educational justice proceeds.

In most contemporary contexts, educational justice is largely understood by studying educational undertakings in reference to an abiding political project. In these contexts, the usual association between the two (the educational and the political project) is likely of the following types.

**Type 1**: Some educational system is unjust because, in pursuing its educational goals, it fails to honor some or another traditionally political standard of justice.

**Type 2**: Some educational system is unjust because it fails to meet its educational goals, which, ultimately, are traditionally political goals. The given expectation is that the aims of this educational system are to be governed by those traditionally political standards.

Type 1 examples might include, inter alia, issues of recognition, equality or adequacy in the distribution of educational resources, or the like. For instance, a project founded upon this type of assessment might conclude with a statement of the following sort: “Though the
proposed policy will result in improved test scores, it execution necessarily runs counter to Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity for those involved and, as such, is unjust”.

Type 2 examples might include, inter alia, those in which education is expected to be working towards a traditionally political outcome. For instance, a project founded upon this type of assessment might conclude with a statement of the following sort: “The recommended curriculum ought to be abandoned because it does not properly prepare students for their political life as citizens in a pluralistic democracy. As such, it fails to appropriately contribute to a just society”.

Though distinct, these types (which represent much of the breadth of normative attention to education and justice) both share a feature. Namely, the justice of the educational activities and structures is assessed relative to what are seen as traditionally political standards or aims. In this regard, the justice to be pursued in educational issues is presumably understood as political, in the traditional senses.

But, what might be said of educational structures or activities that do not run afoul of traditionally political standards (such that, measured by those standards, they do qualify as just), yet still seem to irritate some sense of justice in the observer? Asked differently, might it be possible that Type 1 and Type 2 assessments cannot capture another variety of educational justice?

Towards considering that possibility, we might entertain an example (to be introduced here and more fully explored in Section 5.1) that challenges the exhaustiveness of Type 1 and Type 2 assessments.

**The Just Yet Unjust Educational System (JYUES)**

One might imagine, say, an ideally distributively just educational system in which, say, Rawlsian standards are met such that no child is unfairly advantaged relative to any other.
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Let us further imagine that the quality of education is uniformly poor in a very particular way that does not conflict with one’s status as a holder of any political rights. A student who has matriculated and progressed within that system has, in a manner identical to that of her colleagues, not developed any particular passion for the subjects of her study nor any expertise relative to the fields in which she previously evidenced “natural talent”. Even if this system appears to be just by Type 1 and Type 2 standards, we can rightly expect that many observers might regard these circumstances as: “a shame”, “a waste”, or “an injustice”. These descriptions contain a normative dimension that acknowledges a real ethical (and/or educational) failing in the student’s education.

Taking seriously the sentiment expressed in declaring this situation an “injustice” suggests an account of educational justice that cannot be collapsed or simply consolidated into the usual political theories. In short, it is of another variety.

In order to directly consider that variety of educational justice and the way in which it is distinct from the variety described above (consisting of Type 1 and Type 2 assessments), we will, in the next section, more fully turn our attentions to the presumed default relationship between educational and political concerns. Before doing so, two quick points ought to be noted regarding the possibility of another variety of educational justice (beyond that of Type 1 and Type 2 assessments) as suggested by the JYUES example.

Firstly, I acknowledge that a fully just educational system might have undesirable outcomes that are not injustices. Though there is important work to be done on that conceptual distinction, given issues of space and focus, I can only identify that the concept of “educational misfortune” is distinct from “educational injustice” and ask that my audience grant that the latter category is not an empty set. The intuitive force of the example above need not be softened by the
admission that some outcomes are educational misfortunes rather than educational injustices. I do not take the undesirable outcomes of the example to be educational misfortunes and ask my audience to withhold placing those outcomes in that category at this time.

Secondly, I acknowledge that there are instances in which one theory of justice does not capture the intuitions nor meet the standards of another theory of justice and that this does not necessarily imply that one is of an entirely different variety than the other; they may simply be two very dissimilar theories within one categorical variety. This fact does not blunt the point of the JYUES example above. In some of these instances, when two theories are of the same categorical variety, both theories or views of in/justice might be attuned to different criteria yet be attuned to those criteria in similar ways (thus, the basis of their shared categorical variety). However, in some of these instances, both theories or views of injustice might be attuned to the same characteristic (say, “unfairness”) yet be attuned to that criterion on wholly different registers, such that it makes sense to categorize the theories into distinct varieties. I assert that the JYUES example is of that sort (i.e., because no person is unfairly disprivileged according to the Rawlsian standards, the educational system is not, on that register, unjust. Similarly, the education that the student experiences can be described as unjust precisely because, on another register, some potential talent or expertise is unfairly disprivileged [and underdeveloped] relative to others). It is not obvious that the simultaneous status of “just” and “unjust” in the JYUES example is simply owed to the invocation of two different theories of the same categorical variety (say, two different political distributive theories of justice). I ask that my reader entertain the notion that standards of justice might be met on one register (according to a theory of one categorical variety), while the very same circumstances simultaneously fall short of the standards present on another register (owed to
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its classification within another categorical variety). My descriptions of varieties of justice in Sections 3 and 4 shall clarify this point.

Section 3: Understanding the relationship(s)

Towards better understanding the conceptual context of varieties of educational justice, in this section, I shall label the popular variety of educational justice and offer some sense of its relationship to the variety of educational justice that I will more fully introduce in Section 4. This will also allow us to reflect upon what might be possible in expanding the scope of educational justice’s reach.

In a 2013 essay, Charles Larmore states that the standard definition of justice, “giving everyone [their] due”, is unhelpful in detailing why work on that concept might differ when engaged under the banner of one or another field of study (Larmore, 2013, p. 377). By focusing on the concept of justice across two domains, Larmore asks whether political philosophy is a branch of moral philosophy, borrowing freely from that larger field’s sense of what one is due, or if it might be an independent field worthy of its own status with unique attentions and approaches to answering that core question of justice. Larmore’s concern, then, is about the relationship between these areas of study, suggesting that clarity about the nature of their association contributes to clarity regarding their respective foci.

Similarly, I’ve argued elsewhere that scholars of education would do well to ask whether investigations into educational justice are part of some larger inquiry into justice or if inquiries of educational justice constitute a distinctive enterprise, independent of some larger field. I have suggested that education may need to better conceive of its relationship to the larger field of study
that often influences its discussions of the topic of educational justice. In short, the relationship between education and politics deserves attention.

As mentioned in the previous section, Type 1 and Type 2 assessments of educational justice constitute the mainstream variety of normative philosophical approaches to scholarship on educational justice. Given the traditionally political attention present in both types (as standards or goals) it may be appropriate to label the variety of educational justice that they represent as the political variety of educational justice.

Again, most treatments of the topic of educational justice proceed as though educational activities are valuable for their instrumental role in realizing larger, traditionally political goals. In itself, this variety of educational justice is, in many ways, compelling. It aligns nicely with popular work on justice in other fields of study and presents a ready access point for many scholars (who may be considering those traditionally political concerns of justice) to include education within their ambit. To be clear, good and important work is conducted within this variety of educational justice. However, despite that fact, I submit that scholars working on education would do well to consider both 1) the basis upon which that variety stands as the default position within discussions of educational justice and 2) what may be obscured as a result of that status.

The popularity of the political variety of educational justice is based in a rather limited view of the relationship between politics and education, namely, the conceptual position that “educational concerns can be enveloped within traditionally political concerns”. I label this position, taken as a whole view, the narrow view of the relationship between politics and education in contexts of educational justice.

Under this narrow view of the relationship between politics and education, the pursuit of justice in education might mean ensuring that educational resources are properly distributed as
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social or political goods (Type 1 assessments), or that education is arranged so as to create free and equal political citizens (Type 2 assessments). Under this exhaustive view, very little else can be attempted or accomplished. In short, traditionally political conceptions of justice direct the normative features of educational theory and focus upon a merely functional view of education. That is to say, they conceive of education only in its contributory role in the task of distributing sociopolitical/economic burdens and benefits upon persons. We can contrast this narrow view with, what I label, the wide view of the relationship between education and politics in contexts of educational justice.

The wide view of the relationship between education and politics in contexts of educational justice encompasses the following three conceptual positions:

A) Educational concerns can be enveloped within traditionally political concerns (i.e., the “Narrow” Position)

B) Educational concerns can be engaged separately from equally regarded traditionally political concerns (i.e., the “Independent” Position)

C) Educational concerns can envelop traditionally political concerns (i.e., the “Inverted” Position).

The wide view builds upon the narrow view of the relationship between education and politics, allowing for an appreciation of two previously obscured possibilities, namely, that education need not rely upon political concepts and concerns (the Independent Position), and that politics might be understood through the unique attentions and approaches of education (i.e., the Inverted Position). To be clear, the wide view does not jettison the Narrow Position (though it does wish to replace the exhaustive narrow view) regarding the relationship between politics and education (nor does it malign all the good work that occurs within that position). It instead seeks
to expand the scope of potential work on educational justice, providing a conceptual context for
the previous modes of engagement alongside new projects.

But, what reason might we have to adopt the two relatively novel positions of the wide
view?

In what follows, I wish to suggest that we might contrast and supplement the well-known
political variety of justice with a lesser-known educational variety of justice, finding reason to
accept the Independent Position. When this variety of justice engages educational issues, an
educational variety of educational justice is achieved (see Section 5.1). After detailing that
variety of educational justice in subsequent sections, I will also offer a sense of what an embrace
of the Inverted Position might allow (Section 5.2).

**Section 4: Another Variety of Justice**

Elsewhere, I have implicitly described the educational variety of educational justice by
way of offering insight into a distinctively educational variety of justice: formative justice.
Building upon the work of Robert McClintock, this conceptualization of formative justice serves
our present goals by detailing a variety of justice that largely relies upon an educational foundation,
rather than traditionally political standards.

Against a backdrop of the political variety of educational justice, McClintock’s account of
formative justice serves as a candidate for a distinctively educational variety of justice. Towards
introducing and articulating that concept, McClintock compares the political concept of
distributive justice (often undergirding efforts within the political variety of educational justice)
with the educational concept of formative justice.
McClintock sharply notes the core distinction between distributive and formative justice in that he casts the former as, perhaps, the regulative principle of politics and the latter as performing the very same role for education. In asserting the shape of a distinctively educational variety of justice, McClintock writes:

Issues of justice arise when a need or desire for something exceeds its supply, forcing deliberation about what each recipient is due. Issues of distributive justice stem from having to allocate a finite supply of public goods among a larger multiplicity of claimants. Issues of [...] [a distinctively educational variety of] justice have to do, not with public goods, but with [...] potentials. In education, possibilities exceed feasible achievement, forcing choices [...]. By exercising[...] [a distinctively educational variety of] justice, a person selects among possibilities and allocates a finite supply of [say...] talent and energy, of motivation and discernment, in pursuing these chosen goals. [...] [A distinctively educational variety of] justice thereby determines the mix of potentials that a person or group will effectively act to achieve.

In this distinction, McClintock gives a general view on justice while also separating political and educational varieties of the concept, defining the concerns of a distinctively educational variety of justice.

That said, though they are distinct, they are not necessarily wholly independent of one another. In one of his most enduring and engaging examples, McClintock contrasts formative justice (educational) with its distributive cousin (political) through the example of a professional sports team:

The front office deals with distributive justice, at least within the tiny universe of the team, in negotiating salaries and other terms of player contracts. The issue of distributive justice
here [...] is to justify differentials in compensation, working with the players and their agents to achieve agreement through judgments about the market, putative skill, drawing power, and other measures of worth [...] If the distribution is astute, the team, its officials, players, and fans all might thrive.

But will it do so?

This question raises the issue of formative justice. By itself, a great collection of talent, richly remunerated, may achieve consistent success [...], but it does not guarantee it. Team members, working with a coaching staff, must use principles of formative justice to help each player reach his [or her] full potential and to integrate them all into a resourceful, winning team. The issue here is to get each player into optimum condition for the roles he [or she] has to play, to build the élan and determination of the group so that each plays with full intensity, and to develop and communicate to the team and to each constituent player an astute game plan that takes into account the [...] unique capacities of key personnel. Finally, formative justice here consists in putting all these activities together, each in its proper measure, so that on the day of the crucial game, the whole team is shrewd together, winning in a commanding performance [...].

This illustration quite powerfully conveys the view that, while the distribution of resources surely has effect upon the formative activity of the team, it would be shortsighted to think that distributive considerations are sufficient for engaging the work of the coaching staff, or that formative activities are solely a portion of distributive efforts. If anything, it may make more sense to invert that relationship and think of formative justice (the educational) as often enveloping distributive concerns (the political) – the formation of a winning team may require fair compensation as the alternative may result in a greater likelihood that team members disengage
from the pursuit of collective goals. It is this idea, about the formation or education of groups that motivates my attentions in the following section.

Before moving on, three issues ought to be noted regarding formative justice as a distinctively educational variety of justice.

Firstly, though he has brought the term and concept to contemporary scholarship, McClintock is clear to note that the concept of formative justice has rather ancient roots. In his study of Plato’s Republic, McClintock notes that the text (like many others worthy of our careful review) predates the sharp disciplinary distinctions assumed in a contemporary context and, as such, he avoids the disciplinary determinism that would bind the ideas of the text to specific spheres of knowledge. Though its study has largely been pursued through the disciplines that the academy has come to associate with the political (political philosophy, political theory, etc) McClintock reads this foundational text (and potential others) to contain vital educational notions that can be recovered for our contemporary usage.

Indeed, McClintock’s sports team example might be read to invoke one of the major thrusts of Plato’s text: the notion that justice requires the appropriate balance between (and application of) constituent portions of its subject. For the sports team, this calls attention to the skills of the individual players and the way in which their potentials might unite to create a just outcome. Plato’s description of the classes of the kallipolis is no different, though we ought to recall that the description of the kallipolis serves as analogy for the description of the person. Justice in the person similarly requires the careful balance and appropriate development of constituent skills, dispositions, and desires, “each working with the others, keeping to its proper business, integrated in pursuit of the good⁶⁶.”
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Secondly, on the heels of noting the way in which that ancient text pursues political and educational ideas in one project, one should note that these varieties of justice might best be understood as “accents” within attentions to justice. As suggested above and pursued within the next section, even that which has traditionally been viewed as political may contain decidedly educational components. That the tradition has not labeled and engaged these dimensions need not suggest that they are incompatible with the aims of the standard projects nor that they fall outside of hard limits to their boundaries. Given McClintock’s account of formative justice, a distinctively educational variety of justice can be meaningfully applied to situations of education or politics, as traditionally classified.

Thirdly, while I take McClintock’s work on formative justice to provide grounding for a distinctively educational variety of justice, I do not take McClintock to have provided a particular theory within that variety. I have argued elsewhere that this category (what I am here calling the educational variety of justice) may be as large as the category of the political variety of justice, such that it is capacious and may contain a multitude of theories. Just as one might envision the diverse range of theories within the political variety of justice (e.g., competing theories of distributive justice, etc), so, too, might one begin to envision the scope of theories within the educational variety of justice.

Though remarks within this paper might be understood as invoking portions of particular theories of the educational variety of justice, these are offered as examples in order to make broader points about the types of questions that might be pursued when we refocus our attentions. In this paper, I wish to remain rather inclusive about distinctively educational theories of justice, in order to example the larger issue of how these theories might be leveraged within the standard and expanded domains.
Section 5: New Possibilities

As suggested in Section 1, inattention to the concept of educational justice may result in overlooking far more than only the fact that disagreement exists regarding what it requires. We risk both 1) overlooking the varieties of justice that we can usefully invoke and 2) overlooking the range of issues to which these varieties can speak.

Towards making those issues clear, we might consider the educational variety of justice in application to both traditionally educational and political domains.

5.1: Educational Applications

The most obvious avenues for work built upon the educational variety of justice are those projects which address traditionally educational issues. Given the distinctions of the previous section, we can now turn to the educational variety of educational justice.

Suspecting that many characteristics of inquiries under this variety of educational justice are fairly easily imagined, I will not devote much space to detailing their features. The distinctively educational variety of justice is well suited to the task of capturing the unique and essential features of education that might otherwise be missed. In attending to issues of potential and formation, this variety of educational justice cannot be reduced to traditionally political concerns. As such, we have reason for accepting the Independent Position, the second of the novel “wide view” positions (see Section 3), noting that these educational concerns can be engaged separately from traditionally political concerns, with neither set eclipsing the other.

While the educational variety of educational justice may be the clearest implication of a distinctively educational variety of justice, I do not wish to suggest that this obvious application is not necessarily uncomplicated. As mentioned earlier, this variety of educational justice may contain numerous theories and approaches that deserve careful articulation and consideration. One
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ought not presume that these will be plainly, straightforwardly, or fully understood without serious conceptual work.

That work is beyond the scope of this paper. However, given the explications of the previous section (Section 4), we might begin to glimpse this complexity by recognizing that the core impulses of the educational variety of justice solicits its subject to question the mix of potentials to be achieved. Though multiple parties may agree to that imperative, it would seem that this agreement is merely a precursor to a more extensive set of queries.

Two examples underscore this point:

A) The earlier JYUES example, which suggests that our dissatisfaction with the described scenario rests in the awareness that one might not have realized an/the appropriate mix of potentials (as a distinctively educational concern), deserves revisit. Of course, the earlier presentation of this example relies on the notion that natural talents and interests may (at least partially) serve as a good guide to what potentials one ought to develop. This is not uncontroversial. In fact, though not labeled as standards for a distinctively educational theory of justice, a broad range of such standards exists within the educational literature. Again, there is good work to be done in re-examining these aim standards (to say nothing of the pedagogical questions of how they are pursued) within the context of a distinctively educational variety of justice.

B) The educational variety of educational justice might also be useful in making sense of traditionally educational experiences that occur outside of the structured institutions of schools. Consider, for example’s sake, issues of identity formation. Many pages have been written about the social educational process of becoming, say, a woman within a gendered society or learning how to inhabit a racial minority identity, or any number of other socially enforced roles. These
might be explored with sharp attention to their educational dimensions, even as they impact political issues.

Indeed, Miranda Fricker works towards this set of concerns in noting that, in some cases of what she calls hermeneutical injustice, characterized by a deficit of shared resources for social interpretation such that a significant area of one’s social experience can be obscured even from one’s self, one “may be prevented from becoming who they are”. Fricker seems to be suggesting something of the closely related injustices impacting self-knowledge and self-development in an epistemological and pedagogical sense. Having one’s potential to appropriately understand and value aspects of one’s identity, alongside the very process of coming to recognize one’s potentials despite that socially constructed identity, might be (among other things) an educational shortcoming or, more pointedly, an educational injustice with far-ranging effects. In this, we might begin to imagine social and political implications.

Though not dependent upon other domains, these inquiries into educational applications of the educational variety of justice may reverberate across other domains of inquiry. Though essentially (or primarily) educational in their attentions, these examples evidence the ways in which a focus on the educational may begin to impact that which has traditionally be considered political. I now turn to consider that option more fully.

5.2: Political Applications

That the educational variety of justice might impact traditionally political concerns suggest that a third variety of educational justice has crept into our view. The educational variety of political justice focuses on that which has traditionally been understood to be political, yet considers those issues with an eye to educational standards and their obligations.
While this variety of educational justice may offer a new view on political questions, it also encompasses some familiar conceptual terrain.

Let us return to the “Type 2” popular work on educational justice mentioned in Section 2. Much of that work might be closely related to potential work done on the educational variety of political justice. For example, inquiries into whether and how persons are formed into the “right” types of person (e.g., a citizen capable of robust forms of civic participation) might be evaluated via political standards (as would be the case in Type 2 assessments) or via educational standards (with attention to their potentials and how best to realize them, broadly construed). Not only is it the case that work of this sort requires only a small shift from Type 2 assessments, some examples of this approach already exist within educational scholarship⁠¹¹.

Turning towards new possibilities, the educational variety of political justice offers a relatively novel question at its core, namely, in political contexts, what is owed to persons and polities as a matter of educational rather than political justice? Answers to this question are well beyond the scope of this essay, but a few thoughts on the form of potential replies might be instructive.

Political life might have educational obligations of various sorts. These educational obligations might manage political processes or their outcomes (or both). For example, following McClintock’s lead (in reading educational ideas in political texts), one might read John Stuart Mill’s directives regarding liberty of thought and discussion, to suggest an educational dimension to free speech standards that drive the processes and achievable potentials of a population. One might also appraise the outcomes of a system of government, taking issue with the educational shortcomings that it perpetuates.
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In the broad sense, John Dewey does a fair bit of this in linking democracy (as a system of government and a way of life) with an enduring educational project. Dewey notes that various educational systems and standards might align more or less well with a given set of political norms\textsuperscript{12}. Following Dewey, one might appraise types of political systems according to educational standards.

In a more focused sense, a particular political system might be evaluated according to the educational injustices present (perhaps, especially, if they are recurrent) within it. Here, one might return to the political dimensions of gender or race in, for instance, the contemporary US context, investigating these issues through educational standards\textsuperscript{13}. Or perhaps, one might take issue with the educational injustices present within a democratic political system that has embraced an increasingly blurred distinction between facts and falsehoods or otherwise spurned practices that contribute to joint processes of public problem solving as an act of shared study. In short, possibilities abound.

The educational implications of these and other political circumstances are plentiful\textsuperscript{14}. As such, we have reason for accepting the Inverted Position, the third of the novel wide view positions (see Section 3), noting that these educational concerns can engage traditionally political concerns, evaluating them according to educational standards.

To be sure, this variety of educational justice attunes one to the uniquely educational challenges of forming, and continually reforming, a political body – especially one comprised of persons who have emerged from dissimilar histories, hold seemingly incommensurate values, and endeavor to construct seemingly divergent outcomes. Recalling the definition of the distinctively educational variety of justice offered in Section 4, politics (especially in a democratic context) can
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be understood as an essentially educational project; it is the process by which a group forms itself while attempting to do justice to its many potentials.

Section 6: Conclusion

By pressing our attentions beyond only the topic of educational justice, this essay has clarified ways in which that concept might be utilized. Contrasting popular accounts of educational justice (political varieties of educational justice) with varieties that depend upon a distinctively educational variety of justice, this essay has offered two additional varieties of educational justice. Both the educational variety of educational justice and the educational variety of political justice might be invoked when engaging, as scholars or concerned laypersons, the topic of educational justice.

On the basis of that demonstration, the essay has also shown that one has reason to adopt the wide view of the relationship between politics and education. Replacing the narrow view with the wide view allows for greater dexterity in addressing educational and political issues well beyond the scope of the popular variety of educational justice. By de-prioritizing the narrow view of the relationship between politics and education in contexts of educational justice and adopting a ‘wide view’ of the range of this relationship, I suggest that we can ask new educational questions of phenomena and circumstances that traditionally have been solely political.

In closing, I would briefly observe that this exercise has both clarified and complicated the concept of educational justice such that it might be more deftly employed. Given the nuance offered by this essay, we might better describe and address issues of educational justice within educational and political contexts. Our focus on the presumed “simple” concept of educational justice has opened a range of generative questions and attentions for further work.
Footnotes

1 I use the term “traditionally political” aims to cover a broad range of aims that populate various enduring political theoretical schemas and systems of thought. My reasons for doing do will become clearer in Section 4.

2 Attending to those goods that Rawls marks as salient, we might also need to stipulate that the same is true for employees in the school and the larger ensconcing school district, etc. Of course, an unstated condition of this example is that one accepts the notion that properly met Rawlsian standards achieve all that they claim.

3 McClintock does not use terms such as the “political variety of education justice”. Nonetheless, his work can be read to employ sufficiently similar concepts.

4 McClintock, 2012
5 McClintock 2012
6 McClintock 2016
7 For one especially bold and coherent example, the reader might consider de Ruyter’s perfectionist account of optimal development. See, de Ruyter, D. J. (2012), On Optimal Development and Becoming an Optimiser. Journal of Philosophy of Education., 46: 25–41. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9752.2011.00833.x
8 Stirring examples might include diverse philosophical or autobiographical work by writers such as Simone de Beauvoir and Ta-Nehisi Coates, respectively.
9 Fricker, 168
10 A fitting example might be found in the title and content of Carter G. Woodson’s classic, The Mis-Education of the Negro.
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11 Though not named as such, some sections of Eamonn Callan’s *Creating Citizens* fit this description (though the text is largely a fine example of a Type 2 project). Sigal Ben-Porath’s compelling work on structured paternalism in her *Tough Choices*, is another example.

12 See Democracy and Education Chapter 7: The Democratic Conception of Education.

13 I explore related ideas in my article, “Rawls, Race, and Education” (2015)

14 Moreover, on a theoretical level, one might hold that a theory of (political) justice that does not adequately address the educational dimensions of political life offers an incomplete normative account. Again, much good work might be done on just such an issue.
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