Illegality, National Origin Cues, and Public Opinion on Immigration

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ABSTRACT: The issue of immigration, and illegal immigration in particular, has increased in salience in the past decade. Proponents of restrictive immigration reforms often argue that their concerns are primarily about the rule of law. Their critics worry that such attitudes are driven more by racial prejudice towards Latinos, or Mexican immigrants in particular. Surprisingly, no study has yet isolated the effects of varying legal status on public opinion, and the ways in which national origin cues might interact with legal status. We examine the effects of such cues in this paper, by making use of a survey experiment embedded in the 2007 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. We find that Americans tend to conflate immigrants in general with illegal immigrants, and treat illegal immigrants from Mexico differently than those from other regions of the world. These findings, in addition to others, suggest that American public opinion about immigration is shaped powerfully by the intersection of ethnic stereotypes and worries over the rule of law.

Since its very founding, the United States has been a nation of immigrants. It has also often been a nation with an uneasy relationship towards immigration, with large segments of the population preferring to curtail the number of immigrants coming annually to the United States. In the past two decades, immigration has often erupted as a top policy concern for many American voters, particularly with the problem of the growing numbers of illegal immigrants in the United States.

Scholars have debated whether economic considerations or racial prejudice are responsible for voters' attitudes toward immigration policy, such as support for ballot measures like Proposition 187 in California in 1994, which sought to deny basic public benefits to illegal immigrants, or SB 1070 in Arizona in 2010, which authorized local law enforcement to question the legal status of anyone they suspect to be an illegal immigrant (Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Segura 2006; Schildkraut 2005; Hainmuller and Hiscox 2010; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). The arguments in favor of economic considerations are generally supported by time-series studies, which show that concern about immigration increases during economic downturns. However, cross-sectional studies since the passage of Proposition 187 in California have shown that racial affect, particularly with respect to negative attitudes towards Latinos, also play a significant role in shaping public anxiety over immigration and immigration policy (Lee, Ottati, and Hussain 2001; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Hainmuller and Hiscox 2010; Brader, Valentino, and Jardina 2009; Lazer et. al. 2009; Neblo 2009a; Neblo 2009b).

What is missing in these studies, however, is an attempt to examine the ways in which concerns about legal status may be distinct from attitudes towards particular racial

and ethnic groups, and how the two may interact. Indeed, many claim that their attitudes regarding illegal immigration are rooted in concerns over the rule of law, rather than anything related do with race or ethnicity(Hegeman 2007; So 2006). Organizations such as the Minuteman Project, many Republican party activists, as well as some Democrats opposed attempts at Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR) in 2006 and 2007 because they believed that it would reward those who entered or stayed in the country illegally and that it would not solve the problem of continued illegal immigration into the United States. Concerns about illegal immigration also have spilled over from Congress to states and municipalities throughout the country, as advocates push for policies such as compelling local law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration authorities and requiring local businesses to check the legal status of their employees, regardless of their national origin.

On the other hand, many immigrant advocacy groups see these restrictionist campaigns against illegal immigration as primarily rooted in racial antipathy towards Latinos (Wiegand 2009; Voice of America News 2005; Neblo 2004; Neblo et. al. 2012). Some scholars, too, have noted that political campaigns on ballot propositions and Congressional debate on immigration reform have mostly focused on illegal immigration from Mexico (Ono and Sloop 2002; Espino and Jimeno 2010). Some worry that restrictionist immigration policies will be enforced via racial profiling and implicit associations between "illegal" status and national origins, particularly with respect to Mexican immigrants. Thus, for instance, many businesses opposed a recent law in Arizona that requires everyone to carry valid immigration documents, with an industry spokesman noting that "employers will be wary of hiring anyone who looks foreign for

fear that police may be called" (Riccardi and Powers 2010). Similarly, a recent report by the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security noted several problems with instances of racial profiling of Latino residents in places that were implementing a local-federal cooperative enforcement program known as 287(g) (Office of Inspector General 2010).

Thus, it is important to identify whether legal status cues, national origin cues, or some combination of the two, are shaping American public opinion on immigrants and immigration policy. Studies so far have not tested the role of each type of cue, separately or together. Furthermore, in tests of racial prejudice towards Mexican immigrants, few studies have made comparisons to Arab immigrants in addition to European immigrants or Asian immigrants. Given the racialization and stigmatization of Arab immigrants after 9/11, we would expect some instances where Mexican immigrants may not be the group most associated with negative stereotypes among American voters. Here, we rely on a set of survey experiments conducted in 2007 that allow for variation in legal status cues ("illegal immigrant," "legal immigrant," and "immigrant") combined with ethnic origin cues ("Mexican," "Asian," "European," "Arab," or no label).[1]

Research Questions and Expectations

In this paper, we address the following research questions:

a) Do Americans make a meaningful distinction between *immigrants, legal immigrants,* and *illegal immigrants* when it comes to various attitudes and opinions?

[1] For a discussion of the role of emotions in underwriting claims of legitimate public reason, see Neblo (2003), Neblo (2005), and Neblo (2007).

b) Do the cues associated with legal status have stronger effects on American public opinion than those associated with race and national origin?
c) Similarly, do Americans conflate the categories of "illegal immigrant" with those coming from Mexico, or do Americans not associate illegal immigrants with any specific nationality?

Taken together, these questions seek to uncover the implicit assumptions that Americans make in their opinions about immigrants and immigration policy, and the effect those assumptions have in generating aggregate public opinion on immigration. In the literature on public opinion on immigration, there are two standard models that are used to explain why some may hold more restrictive views on immigration than others. One model places emphasis on demographic factors such as the growth of the foreign born population or their characteristics, such as their educational attainment and English proficiency (Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000; Citrin, Green, Muste, and C. Wong 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2011). The other draws attention to the role of political factors and politicized contexts where immigration is framed as a problem, including media coverage of immigrants, the autonomous stances of local bureaucracies, and partisanship at the local level (Jones-Correa 2008; Marrow 2009; Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and T. Wong 2010; Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010). For the sake of convenience, we refer to these, respectively, as *demographic* models and *politicized* models of public opinion formation.

These two models lead to different expectations regarding the types of distinctions that Americans may make among immigrants. For instance, since illegal

immigrants are estimated to be about 12 million out of a total immigrant population of 38 million, a *demographic model* of opinion formation would lead to the expectation that American attitudes about "immigrants" will be closer to those cued to think about "legal immigrants" as opposed to those cued to think about "illegal immigrants." Similarly, we would expect general attitudes about immigrants to be noticeably, although not overwhelmingly, influenced by attitudes towards Mexican immigrants, who constitute 32% of the foreign-born population, or Latinos more generally who comprise 51% of the foreign-born population (Grieco 2010). Finally, we would expect attitudes about *illegal immigrants* to be more strongly related to attitudes about illegal immigrants from Mexico, a country that has accounted for nearly 60 percent of the undocumented population in the United States over the past two decades (Passel and Cohn 2009). Thus, by the demographic model we would expect American voters to express views about immigrants that do not conflate immigration with illegal immigration, but may conflate illegal immigration with illegal immigration from Mexico.

On the other hand, a *politicized model* of opinion formation as shaped by partisan discourse and media reports on immigration may lead to different expectations. Thus, for instance, if most news stories on immigration in 2007 were about illegal immigration, and if many state, local, and national debates on immigration policy centered around the problems posed by illegal immigration, we would expect the default response to immigration-related opinion measures to be closer to those involving the illegal immigrant and Mexican immigrant cues (Dunaway et. al. 2010). Thus, to the extent that Americans learn about immigration through news stories that cover salient policy problems, debates, and legislation, we might expect to find conflation not only between

illegal immigrants and illegal Mexican immigrants, but also between immigrants and illegal immigrants.

Of course, receiving information about policy problems may have different effects on individuals' opinions about immigration, and the extent to which they conflate different types of immigrants. Demographic models of opinion formation would predict that factors such as the race, nativity, and class position of respondents would play important moderating roles. For instance, the race of respondents may play a significant moderating role, with theories of group competition suggesting that whites and blacks may be more likely to conflate immigrants with illegal immigrants compared to Hispanics (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo 1999; Citrin, Green, Muste, and C. Wong 1997). Similarly, one might expect that those with a recent family history of immigration will be more likely to resist the conflation of immigration categories.

At the same time, politicized models of opinion formation would predict that factors such as party identification and issue salience would play important moderating roles. For instance, with party identification, the politicized model would expect that Republicans are least likely to resist the conflation of immigrants with illegal immigrants, compared to Democrats and Independents, as they accept messages that reinforce their prior beliefs (Zaller 1992). For similar reasons, those who rank immigration as a very important problem facing the country would be more likely to conflate immigrants with illegal immigrants than those who rank the issue as unimportant.

Methods and Measures

We examine the effects of legal status and national origin cues using survey experiments embedded in the 2007 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).

The CCES formed with 36 teams in 2006 to study congressional elections and representation. The surveys were conducted online through YouGov/Polimetrix. In 2007, seven teams pooled resources to yield a common sample of 10,000 cases, with subjects who were also interviewed in the 2006 study. Interviews for the 2007 survey were conducted over the last two weeks of November 2007.

The sample drawn for the CCES is a stratified national sample, with two geographic strata (state size; competitive and uncompetitive congressional districts) and four demographic strata (registered and unregistered voters; age; race; and gender). The CCES sample is matched to nationally representative samples of the electorate.[2] The characteristics of our weighted sample is fairly well aligned with those of the U.S. adult citizen population (see Table 1, comparing our sample to the 2004 ANES).

*** Table 1 About Here ***

In our CCES module, we randomized 3 cues related to legal status ("immigrants," "illegal immigrants," and "legal immigrants") and combined them with 5 randomized cues related to ethnicity/national origin ("Mexican," "Asian," "Arab," "European," and a control group with no national origin mentioned). Each respondent was randomly assigned a *cue pair* (i.e., Immigrants, Illegal European immigrants, Legal Mexican immigrants, etc.), and received the same pair throughout the survey. Each respondent had an equal probability of receiving each of the 15 possible cue pairs. (See the appendix for full question wordings and randomization patterns.)

In the survey, we first asked respondents to rate different groups on a feeling thermometer scale. We then asked a series of questions containing their randomized

[2] for more on the sample matching method in the CCES, see http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/material/sample_matching.pdf

cues, questions regarding stereotypes about socioeconomic status, language proficiency, and cultural assimilation, and evaluations about the impact of immigrants on the economy and society. Our dependent variables can thus be grouped into three categories: a general feeling thermometer, stereotypes about immigrants on particular socioeconomic and cultural dimensions, and evaluations of how immigrants are affecting American society and the economy.

Our feeling thermometer was a generic 0-100 scale, labeled "very cold" to "very warm," with "neither warm nor cold" at the 50 mark. We asked respondents to evaluate various racial and ethnic groups (randomized for Whites, Hispanics, Blacks, Asians, and Arabs) before asking them to assign a thermometer rating for their assigned cue pair. Our stereotype measures are derived from a battery of questions that asks how strongly respondents disagree or agree (on a five-point Likert scale) with the following statements: "<cue pair> tend to be poor;" "<cue pair> tend to speak English well;" and "<cue pair> tend to be well educated." We also include responses to a separate question (on a five-point scale), of whether "<cue pair> work harder than people born here, less hard, or isn't there much difference?"

Finally, our measures of societal impacts include assessments about whether "<cue pair> are assimilating easily into the United States" and the following two questions:

- "Which comes closer to your point of view? <cue pair>, in the long-run, become productive citizens and pay their fair share of taxes, OR, they cost the taxpayers too much by using government services like public education and medical services.

- "Some people say <cue pair> mostly help the economy by providing low-cost labor. Others say they mostly hurt the economy by [driving wages down for many Americans / increasing unemployment for American citizens]. How about you?"

All of these measures are five-point scales with the middle category as neutral.[3] Since cue pairs were independently randomized, we can test for the separate effects of 1) legal status cues, 2) nationality cues, and 3) combinations of cue pairs.

Findings

What do Americans think about the various types of immigrants living in the United States today? We first determine whether public opinion towards immigration is swayed more by considerations of legal status or national origin. In Figures 1 and 2, we present the differences in means on our public opinion outcomes among those assigned to different legal status cues but the control group for nationality (no nationality label), and among those assigned to different nationality cues but the control group for legal status (no legal status label).[4] As the results indicate, American voters do indeed distinguish between *legal* immigrants and *illegal* immigrants. On virtually all of our measures, with the extent of assimilation a notable exception, respondents rated illegal immigrants much less favorably than they rated legal immigrants. In terms of national origin cues, the most consistent pattern is that Americans rate immigrants from Mexico less favorably than

[3] More details about our question design can be found in the Appendix.
[4] That is, the analysis in Figures 1 and 2 only uses the subset of respondents who received these 7 of the 15 possible cues.

immigrants from other parts of the world.[5] Still, even this national origin difference is apparent only in the various stereotype measures (tend to be poor, speak English well, are well educated), and the uniquely lower rating for Mexican immigrants does not extend to evaluations of how immigrants are affecting American society and the economy. Thus, Americans do indeed seem to be making cleaner distinctions between legal immigrants and illegal immigrants, than they are between Mexican immigrants, Arab immigrants, Asian immigrants, and European immigrants.

*** Figures 1 & 2 About Here ***

Still unexamined, however, is the kind of implicit assumptions that Americans make when presented with the generic cue of "immigrant," and whether their evaluations of immigrants conform to the expectations of demographic models or politicized models of opinion formation. As the results in Figure 1 indicate, the feeling thermometer ratings do indeed conform to the expectations of *demographic models* of public opinion formation, with Americans holding a view of immigrants (mean value of 56) that is in-between their views regarding illegal immigrants and legal immigrants (with mean ratings of 68 and 33, respectively).[6]

On the stereotype and societal impact measures of Figure 2, however, a different pattern emerges with respect to public opinion on immigrants of different legal status. Instead of expressing opinions on immigrants that are in-between illegal and legal, Americans tend to conflate immigrants with illegal immigrants, consistent with a

[5] Interestingly, respondents ranked European immigrants highest in only 1 out of the 7 attitude measures (feeling thermometer), and ranked Asians higher than Europeans on the education stereotype and evaluations of whether immigrants are hurting the U.S. economy.

[6] The difference with illegal immigrants is significant at the .01 level, while the difference with legal immigrants is significant only at the .15 level.

politicized view of public opinion on immigration. This is true, both with respect to the stereotype measures as well as the evaluations of how immigrants are affecting American society. For instance, the mean values for the stereotype of immigrants as tending to be poor are statistically indistinguishable between "immigrants" and "illegal immigrants," and are considerably higher than the mean value for legal immigrants. Similar results hold true when looking at evaluations of whether immigrants speak English well, with no significant differences separating those cued to think about illegal immigrants versus immigrants more generally. It is only on evaluations of whether immigrants are well educated that we see the expectations of demographic models borne out, as the mean response for immigrants is between illegal and legal, and statistically distinguishable from both.

Finally, in evaluations of how immigrants are affecting American society and the economy, there are no significant differences between those asked about immigrants and those asked about illegal immigrants. On average, respondents receiving the immigrant and illegal immigrant cues are more likely than those receiving the legal immigrant cue to say that those groups cost too much in terms of government services. The mean position for those receiving the legal immigrant cue is 2.41, compared to 3.39 for illegal immigrants and 3.42 for immigrants without a legal status modifier. The conflation of immigrants and illegal immigrants is also apparent in the question on whether immigrants are helping the economy by providing low-cost labor, or hurting the economy by driving down wages or increasing unemployment. Respondents assigned the "immigrant" cue respond in a near-identical manner to those assigned the "illegal immigrant" cue, believing that immigrants are hurting the U.S. economy. By contrast, those assigned the

"legal immigrant" cue are more likely to believe that immigrants are helping the economy. It is important to note that these differences were apparent even in November 2007, nearly a year prior to the economic collapse of 2008. It is only on the question of whether immigrants are assimilating easily to the United States where we find a more indeterminate result: while the mean value for the immigrant and legal immigrant cues are statistically distinguishable at the .10 level (two-tailed), the differences between illegal immigrants and legal immigrants are not.

Our third question is whether Americans make a meaningful distinction between illegal immigrants and illegal immigrants from Mexico, and illegal immigrants from other countries. The results, presented in Figures 3 and 4, indicate that Americans often conflate illegal immigrants with illegal immigrants from Mexico. On the feeling thermometer, there is no significant difference separating those receiving various national-origin cues on top of the illegal immigrant cue. However, on stereotypes of immigrants as being poor, having low English proficiency, and low levels of education, significant national-origin differences emerge. There is no significant difference between those receiving the general "illegal immigrant" cue and the "illegal Mexican immigrant" cue on stereotypes such as immigrants being poor, not speaking English well, not being well educated, and not assimilating easily into the United States. By contrast, Americans are inclined to view illegal Asian immigrants, illegal European immigrants, and even illegal Arab immigrants more favorably on these stereotype measures.

*** Figures 3 & 4 About Here ***

Finally, evaluations on the social and economic impacts of illegal immigrants reveal no significant differences by national origin cues. Americans do not appear to

differentiate among national origins when considering whether illegal immigrants cost too much in terms of government services, hurt the economy or tend to assimilate easily. Thus it appears that when contemplating stereotypical images of immigrants, Americans appear to think "Mexican" when describing illegal immigrants, but not when they contemplate the practical impacts of immigrants on the economy and society.

Subgroup Analysis

In the aggregate, it appears that Americans tend to conflate immigrants with illegal immigrants, and illegal immigrants with illegal Mexican immigrants, particularly on our stereotype measures. These aggregate results, however, might mask interesting variation among subgroups' responses to our survey cues. For example, by the demographic model, those closer to immigrant communities such as Hispanic Americans (11 percent of the sample) or those who have recently immigrated (38 percent), might be less vulnerable to conflating across legal status and nationality cues. By the politicized model, perhaps those who are politically conservative (Republicans are 30 percent of the sample) or those for whom illegal immigration is more salient (66 percent) may be more receptive (Zaller 1992) to media discourse that focuses strongly on the illegal immigrant population, or on illegal immigration from Mexico We re-ran the analyses allowing the means to differ across these four subgroups, testing the difference in subgroup means individually in four separate models. Table 2 summarizes the results. The table indicates two components for each comparison. First, the sign indicates the direction of movement when comparing the baseline category to the subgroup represented in the column heading. For example, in the row labeled "Low Education," the minus sign in the Hispanics indicate that Hispanics are less likely to hold this stereotype than other

Americans. Second, once accounting for this difference, we indicate whether the group represented in the column conflates the cues (C, implying the baseline group does not conflate), does not conflate across the cues (NC, implying the baseline group does conflate) or if neither baseline nor the subgroup conflate (D, implying that both groups differentiate the cues, but from opposite directions). We only show results that reach statistical significance at $p < 0.10$.

*** Table 2 About Here ***

Table 2A summarizes the analysis regarding subgroups differences in tendencies to conflate immigrant with illegal immigrant. As expected, the Hispanic subgroup is distinctly less likely to conflate across most of our measures. Those who rank illegal immigration with high issue salience differ in their tendencies (compared to those who rank the topic as low salience) as do those native born (compared to those with recent immigration in their family history), but none of these differences are in any consistent direction. Noticeably, Republicans do not appear to be more vulnerable to conflating across cues for either the stereotype or the impact measures. Even more noticeably, in Table 3B, none of the four subgroups appear to differentiate illegal immigrant from illegal Mexican immigrant cues. The fact that there are very few consistent moderating effects suggests that all types of American citizens tend to conflate across these legal status and nationality categories, and this in turn may indicate the phenomenon we uncover is more deeply culturally embedded.

Conclusions

This paper seeks to build on the existing scholarship on American public opinion towards immigrants by adding cues related to legal status in addition to those related to national origin. In doing so, we are able to answer the question of whether public opinion on immigrants is driven primarily by opinions about illegal immigrants, and furthermore, whether public opinion on illegal immigrants is driven primarily by opinions about Mexican immigrants.

Our results indicate that public opinion on economic evaluations and cultural stereotypes regarding immigrants is indeed driven by considerations of illegal immigration, as those given the "illegal immigrant" cue on these questions respond no differently than those given the "immigrant" cue. Furthermore, when it comes to opinions about illegal immigrants, we find that on stereotypes such as being poor, speaking English badly, and exhibiting low levels of education, Americans respond to the "illegal immigrant" cue as if they were responding to the "illegal Mexican immigrant" cue, as distinct from other national origin cues that interact with the term illegal. However, these distinctions are less relevant for economic evaluations.

When we probe deeper, we find that, outside of Hispanics, all Americans tend to share these biases, in that all subgroups tend to conflate our cues in equal measure. This suggests that the associations we uncover may stem from more deeply held cultural views rather than simply deriving from any particular venue for discourse. The extent to which these associations are culturally embedded, outside of conscious reflection, we might be especially cautious in enacting governmental programs that invite racial profiling in enforcement.

Tables and Figures

Table 1. Respondent Characteristics

	2007 CCES	2004 ANES
White	72.0%	71.9%
Black	10.7%	15.9%
Hispanic	11.3%	7.5%
Other	6.0%	4.9%
Asian		
Native Am		
Mixed		
Middle Eastern		
Other		
Male	48%	48.5%
Female	52%	51.5%
No High School	3.8%	14.4%
HS Grad	41.1%	31.4%
Some College	29.2%	28.5%
College Degree	25.7%	29.9%
Age 18-29	15.5%	20.7%
30-49	40.6%	38.1%
50-59	22.9%	17.5%
60+	21.1%	23.7%
Total N	1,000	

Note: We present weighted tabulations here, to match the weighting used in our subsequent analyses.
ANES marginals taken from:
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/2006pilot/2006pilot_MethodologyRpt.pdf
(last accessed February 28, 2011).



Figure 1. Differences in feeling thermometer ratings, by legal status and national origin cue (90 percent confidence intervals)



Figure 2. Differences in immigrant-related attitudes, by legal status and national origin (90 percent confidence intervals)



Figure 3. Differences in feeling thermometer ratings, by national origin among respondents with illegal immigrant cue (90% confidence intervals)



Figure 4. Differences by national origin among respondents with illegal immigrant cue (90% confidence intervals)

Table 2. Moderating Effects of Demographic and Political Factors

A. Conflation of "Immigrant" and "Illegal Immigrant"

	Demographic Models		Politicized Models	
	Hispanic	Native Born	Republican Party Identification	High Issue Salience
Feeling Thermometer	+ C		- NC	- NC
Stereotypes				
- Poor		- C		
- Bad English	- NC	- NC		+ NC
- Low Education				+ NC
Evaluations				
- Immigrants Cost too Much	- NC			
- Hurt Economy				+ C
- Not Assimilating	- NC	+ C		+ C

B. Conflation of "Illegal Immigrant" and "Illegal Mexican immigrant"

	Demographic Models		Politicized Models	
	Hispanic	Native Born	Republican Party Identification	High Issue Salience
Feeling Thermometer				
Stereotypes				
- Poor				
- Bad English				+ D
- Low Education		- C		+ C
Evaluations				
- Immigrants Cost too Much				
- Hurt Economy				+ D
- Not Assimilating				

Key: C = Group is more likely to conflate than the baseline group
NC = Group is less likely to conflate than the baseline group
D = Group and baseline group equally likely to conflate, but from different sides
+ Group responds significantly higher on outcome
- Group responds significantly lower on outcome

Appendix

Survey Wording

IMRAND1: <none>; Illegal; Legal
IMRAND2: <none>; Mexican; Asian; Arab; European

IMRAND3: <none>; Mexican; Asian; Arab; European; Illegal; Illegal Mexican; Illegal Asian; Illegal Arab; Illegal European; Legal; Legal Mexican; Legal Asian; Legal Arab; Legal European

****

We'd like to get your feelings toward some groups and people who are in the news these days using something called a feeling thermometer.

You can choose any point on the thermometer. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel towards that group; the lower the number, the colder or less favorable. You would rate a group at the 50 degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold towards them.

[ftwhites]	Whites
[fthisp]	Hispanics
[ftblacks]	Blacks
[ftasians]	Asians
[ftarabs]	Arabs
[ftimrand]	[IMRAND3] I/immigrants

****

Thinking about [IMRAND3] immigrants, please indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with the following statements:

[stereo1] {IMRAND3} I/immigrants tend to be poor
[stereo2] {IMRAND3} I/immigrants tend to speak English well
[stereo3] {IMRAND3} I/immigrants tend to be well educated
[stereo4] {IMRAND3} I/immigrants are assimilating easily into the United States.

<1/Strongly agree>	Strongly agree
<2/Somewhat agree>	Somewhat agree
<3/Neither>	Neither agree nor disagree
<4/Somewhat disagree >	Somewhat disagree
<5/Strongly disagree >	Strongly disagree

****

[hardwork] Generally, do today's [IMRAND3] immigrants work harder than people born here, less hard, or isn't there much difference?

<1/muchharder>	Much harder
<2/somehard>	Somewhat harder
<3/nodif>	Not Much Difference
<4/someless>	Somewhat less hard
<5/muchless>	Much less hard

****

[wagemp] Some people say [IMRAND3] immigrants mostly help the economy by providing low-cost labor. Others say they mostly hurt the economy by [driving wages down for many Americans / increasing unemployment for American citizens]?

How about you? Do you think, on balance, [IMRAND3] immigrants:

<1/dhelpe>	Definitely help the economy
<2/phelpe>	Probably help the economy
<3/even>	About even
<4/phurte>	Probably hurt the economy
<5/dhurte>	Definitely hurt the economy

****

[hospitals] [IMRAND3] [I/i]mmigrants should not be allowed to use public hospitals in America [<nothing>, until they become citizens].

<1/Strongly agree>	Strongly agree
<2/Somewhat agree>	Somewhat agree
<3/Neither>	Neither agree nor disagree
<4/Somewhat disagree >	Somewhat disagree
<5/Strongly disagree >	Strongly disagree

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