Logos, Ethos, Pathos:
Mechanisms of Persuasion in a Deliberative Field Experiment

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Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds...Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided...Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile...Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question...[T]hus rhetoric masquerades as political science, and those who practice it as political experts (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*: Book 1, Part 2).

**Introduction**

Elected representatives (e.g., Members of Congress) have a general duty and a strong incentive to enactment policies that will be popular in their districts. However, they typically have better information with which to make policy judgments than most of their constituents do, so they do not simply vote for whatever an uninformed public thinks that it wants at the moment. Representatives generally do not and should not assume either the role of a paternalistic “trustee” or a rubber-stamp “delegate” (Pitkin 1967). An alternative model envisions a cycle of deliberation that allows citizens to formulate and communicate their general interests, legislators to debate and craft policies to advance those interests and persuade their constituents of the (sometimes nonobvious) connection between the two, after which the process repeats itself in a cycle of feedback. This picture portrays a more Madisonian or “republican” model of deliberative representation (Held, 1996).

The Madisonian feedback cycle is implicit in many models of the public-policy process. Citizen engagement is one of the core principles of constitutional democratic government (Bohman and Rehg 1997; Gutmann and Thompson 1997; Habermas 1996, Neblo 2000; Neblo 2005). However, empirical research on deliberation to date has focused almost exclusively on
either deliberation among elites, such as members of Congress (Bessette 1994), or among citizens (Fishkin 1997) rather than between citizens and their representatives. The relative neglect afforded citizen-representative deliberation is due to a narrow definition of the term deliberation — that is, one that confines it to cooperative, symmetric communication in real time among a discrete set of people who are trying to solve a common problem. However, the original theorists of deliberative democracy also had something broader in mind — a kind of deliberative culture that includes, in addition to deliberation in the narrow sense, locally asymmetric communication between elements of civil society and government in the service of a larger, ongoing public dialog (Habermas, 1996). For example, a policy address or letters to a representative or senator could be understood as contributing to the deliberative cycle in this broader sense (Neblo, 2007).

Theories of deliberative democracy understood in this general sense have begun to gain traction. Political theorists are focusing an enormous amount of attention on the normative case for deliberation (Habermas, 1996; Guttmann & Thompson, 2004). Governments and private foundations are sponsoring a proliferating range of applied deliberative forums (Ryfe, 2002; Milner, 2005). And activists and academics alike are calling for ambitious deliberative reforms to politics as usual (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004; Leib, 2004; Gastil, 2000).

The Normative-Empirical Link in Deliberative Democracy

The case for deliberative reform proceeds from two well-supported claims. First, as a theory, deliberative democracy has some very attractive normative properties (Habermas, 1996; Guttmann & Thompson, 2004). Second, in practice, deliberation tends to change things – e.g., opinions, rationales, intensity, attitudes toward opposing views, etc. (Fishkin & Luskin, 1999;
From these two premises, it may seem reasonable to infer that we should move toward encouraging more deliberative practices and institutions. But there is a buried premise here. The conclusion does not follow unless we also assume that deliberation changes opinions primarily via mechanisms specified in the normative theories. Otherwise the argument gives us no warrant for believing that the changes are for the better. For, if the real sources of opinion change are morally inert, deliberation would, at best, waste social resources. (Lupia, 2002) And worse, if those sources include such mechanisms as social power, group conformity, etc., deliberation would magnify social inequality and pervert its own goals. (Sanders, 1997; Neblo 2007; Bachtiger at. al. 2009)

Thus, we must carefully investigate the mechanisms of deliberative opinion change not only because the scientific questions raised are intrinsically interesting, but also because the normative argument for deliberative reform does not go through without it. The injunction to “first, do no harm” surely applies a fortiori to the body politic as well. Moreover, even if we do decide that deliberative institutions deserve our support, we will want to know how to design them so as to further the normative goals of deliberation most effectively.

**Representative-Constituent Deliberation**

These general concerns over the processes of deliberative opinion change become all the more acute when we move from “horizontal” deliberation (i.e., between citizens or non-elites more generally) to investigate cases of “vertical” deliberation (i.e., between citizens and their representatives or elites more generally). Fenno (1978), for example, suggests that members of Congress typically do not engage constituents in a direct attempt to change their policy positions, but rather to reassure non-supporters that they have no cause to become active opponents, and to
“educate” supporters in a way that enhances their prospects for being mobilized in the future. So persuasion on the merits is relatively rare, and even then, indirect in its goal. Zaller (1992) suggests that citizens react “mechanically” to elite messages, with representatives only able to convert the choir (who do not need to be convinced so much as given marching orders) and those too ignorant to realize that some argument or policy might not serve their interests. Others worry that relatively unmediated mass democracy will induce pandering and demagoguery in a way that does not conduce to sound decisions that protect individual rights and promote the common good (Madison, 1787). Conversely, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) worry that “Politicians Don’t Pander” enough, but rather use their massive informational advantage to avoid deliberative and electoral accountability. So it is especially important to understand the processes of deliberative opinion change in representative-citizen interactions, since they form the “baton hand-off” in representative democracy and their dynamics may well differ from other kinds of deliberative encounters (Esterling et. al. 2011a,b; Lazer et. al. 2009; Lazer et. al. 2011; Neblo et. al. 2010).

Modern deliberative studies (both theoretical and empirical) have given relatively short-shrift to deliberation between elites and non-elites, perhaps because of the strong egalitarian notions built into contemporary theories. Ancient authors, however, were much more comfortable with inegalitarian deliberative arrangements, and indeed, took them as the modal and unavoidably dominant form of deliberation. As the epigraph above indicates, Aristotle went so far as to worry that “rhetoric” (i.e., the art of elites persuading the masses) had become falsely synonymous with “political science.” His *Rhetoric* attempts to analyze such speech from an empirical and conceptual point of view, but also to connect that analysis back to his normative theories of ethics and politics. So he provides a felicitous starting point for a modern democratic theorist who wishes to take the empirical realities of elite-mass communication seriously, while
doing so in a way that provides leverage on normative questions about the deliberative quality of such persuasion processes.

Aristotle famously argued that rhetorical persuasion operated via three primary mechanisms: *logos* (reasoning by arguments suitable to the case in question), *ethos* (appeal to the authority, credibility, and moral character of the speaker), and *pathos* (stirring the emotions of one’s audience). Below we attempt to take some preliminary steps toward reconnecting elite-mass communication to a specifically deliberative conception of normative democratic theory. For the time being, we focus primarily on simply getting clarity on the empirical patterns of deliberation, deferring the more overtly normative analyses to planned work. Drawing on data from a unique deliberative field experiment pairing members of Congress with random samples of their constituents, we attempt to decompose the mechanisms behind the persuasion effects observed in the experiment. More specifically, we analyze three classes of variables as moderators [n.b. – so far it is really just pattern specificity of co-movement in the proposed mechanisms] of the overall treatment effect on attitudes about immigration policy: rationales for and against various immigration policies (logos), trust and other attributions about the member (ethos), and measures of emotional activation (pathos).

**Experimental Design**

In the summer of 2006 we conducted a field experiment giving a sample of U.S. citizens the opportunity to interact with their current member of the House of Representatives on an important and controversial issue, immigration reform, as part of a small deliberative group. The
experimental design was built around online e-townhalls, an application that, to date, is seldom used in Congress but is congruent with Congress’s trend toward increasing use of social media.¹

Twelve House members conducted either one or two online deliberative sessions each with a random sample of their constituents. The number of constituents in each session ranged from eight to thirty.² The topic of each session was immigration and border security policy, and each discussion lasted for thirty-five minutes. Constituents participated by typing comments or questions into the online discussion platform. The questions and comments were posted to a queue visible only to a screener. The screener, in turn, posted them to the whole group in roughly the order they were received.³ The member responded to the questions and comments through a telephone linked to a computer. Constituents listened to the member’s responses over their computer speakers, and also could choose to read the member’s responses via real-time transcription. After thirty-five minutes, the member logged off and constituents were directed to a chat room to have an open-ended discussion about the member’s responses and immigration more generally. The chat lasted twenty-five minutes.

In this experiment, the deliberative “treatment” is the discussion with the member combined with the post-session chat. Allowing constituents to discuss the session with one another lends a greater realism to the experiment and so improves external validity, since it is

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² In a separate study, we replicated the small-group exercises in this article with a large group of 200 citizens interacting with Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) as a means to demonstrate the scalability of the design, with effects very comparable with those we report below.

³ The screener played no active role in facilitating the discussion, and had no knowledge of the study hypotheses or the content of the surveys. The screener was instructed to screen questions only if they were patently offensive or vulgar, incoherent, or closely duplicated the content of a previous question. Other than duplication, the need to screen did not arise.
rare for citizens to engage in politics in isolation from one another (see Druckman 2004; Druckman and Nelson 2003). 4

The Congressional Management Foundation, a non-profit, non-partisan organization, recruited the members of Congress to participate in the study. 5 There was good variation among the members who participated. There were five Republicans and seven Democrats, spread across all four major geographical regions; two women; an African American; and representatives of both parties leadership. All were running for reelection. And they were diverse ideologically including one member from each party who voted against their party on recent immigration legislation. Knowledge Networks (KN), an online survey research firm, recruited constituent subjects from the corresponding congressional districts and administered the surveys. KN maintains a probability sample panel of survey respondents that is designed to be demographically representative of the U.S. population. 6

Each subject (that is, each constituent) was asked to complete a pretest survey, 7 and then was randomly assigned to one of three groups: an information only (IO) condition, a deliberative-group (DG) condition, or a true-control (TC) condition. 8 Constituents assigned to

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4 Because the session combines the member-to-citizen deliberation with the citizen-to-citizen chat, the experimental treatment consists of both these components. In future research, we hope to disentangle the separate effects of each discussion component.
6 See http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/index.html for details. To meet sample-size requirements in each congressional district, KN subcontracted to two other vendors, Survey Sampling International (SSI) and Global Market Insight (GMI). SSI and GMI strive to maintain diverse panels but to a lesser extent than KN. In the models below, we include a fixed effect to account for any differences between the KN panels and the SSI and GMI panels. Because our population is drawn from Internet survey panels, our inferences can only generalize back to this population, which represents Internet-connected citizens in the study’s congressional districts. The generality of our findings is limited to the extent that Internet survey panels are more politically engaged than the general public. The treatment effects we identify are limited to this subpopulation (Imai, King, and Stuart 2008).
7 Among the panelists who were invited to participate in the study, the study-specific response rate to the baseline survey was 0.76 by AAPOR response rate 6, which is the response rate appropriate to opt-in survey panels (Callegaro and Disogra 2008, p. 1022). This rate does not account for refusals to join the panels themselves.
8 In the baseline survey, prior to assignment, we asked respondents to RSVP their availability for the date and time of the event. Those who expressed an interest in participating in the study but could or would not attend the session were randomized to one of the two control groups. We included this filter question as we had no prior data on the
the information-only condition were asked to read background information on immigration policy based on Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget Office reports, edited for brevity and reading level, and to fill out a short background materials (BGM) survey. Those assigned to the deliberative condition also were asked to read this information and take the BGM survey; the BGM survey was administered one week prior to the deliberative session in each congressional district, to those in both the IO and DG groups. In addition, DG subjects were invited to engage in one deliberative session with their member of Congress and the post-session chat. Those in the true-control group were not exposed to either the background information or a deliberative session. That is, our study design included two qualitatively different control groups: the true-control condition helps assess the effect of providing both background information and a deliberative opportunity, while the information-only condition helps assess the effect of the deliberative session itself (including the citizen-to-citizen chat). A comparison between the DG and IO tests the effects of deliberation beyond the mere provision of information, which might be of special interest to those interested in deliberation as an accountability process.

One week following the deliberative session in each congressional district, KN administered a follow-up survey to subjects in all treatment arms. That is, all constituents in a given congressional district, whether they were assigned to the treatment or to a control condition, received the follow-up survey at the same time. Among other measures, the follow-up survey contained a battery of items measuring immigration policy attitudes, rationales, questions about the MOC, and a battery of emotional activation items. In total, we assigned 2,222 constituents to the three experimental conditions: 437 subjects participated in the online deliberative group (DG); 528 received the information only (IO); and 1,257 were true controls.
(TC).\textsuperscript{9} Below we report differences comparing the full treatment subjects to the true control subjects in terms of the treatment actually received.

**Variables and Operational Definitions**

*Policy Attitudes:* We measured an extensive battery of policy questions related to immigration, including attitudes toward helping or being an illegal immigrant becoming a felony (in language tracking H.R. 4437, which each member had already voted on), birthright citizenship, raising or lowering the amount of *legal* immigration, allowing illegal immigrants to access social services (like schools and hospitals), among many others. Here we focus on creating a so-called “conditional path to citizenship” by which some currently undocumented immigrants could apply for citizenship. Critics sometime refer to any such provision (e.g., the one included in the corresponding Senate bill S.2611) as “amnesty.”\textsuperscript{10}

*[Path to Citizenship]:* Now we’d like to ask about proposals to give some illegal immigrants who have resided in the U.S. for many years the opportunity to eventually become legal citizens. Some argue that providing opportunities for citizenship would reward illegal behavior. Others argue that such opportunities are true to the nation’s heritage as a country of immigrants, and would recognize that illegal immigrants contribute to the economy through hard work. How about you? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against giving some illegal immigrants the opportunity to eventually become legal citizens? *[Branching response questions to create a seven point scale.]*

Respondents were asked this question on each wave of the survey.

*Logos: We included six pairs of items such that agreement or disagreement with the statements therein would naturally count for or against various immigration policies – i.e., if true, most people would regard them as reasons or warrants counting for or against a given policy

\textsuperscript{9} These cell sizes are for the treatments subjects actually received. The IO and DG subjects who did not comply with their assignments received the TC treatment, so the size of this cell is the largest.

\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, in our post-election survey and parallel non-experimental surveys we have included a question wording experiment to test for sensitivity to the label “amnesty” versus “path to citizenship.”
position. For example, the “Rule of Law” pairing asks for levels of agreement or disagreement with the following two statements:

\text{Rule of Law Index}: (a) Allowing some illegal immigrants to eventually become citizens recognizes that most of them are otherwise law-abiding neighbors. (b) Allowing any illegal immigrants to become citizens sets a bad precedent by rewarding people for breaking the law.

In addition to the rule of law, we included pairs tracking beliefs about illegal immigration’s relationship to Jobs, Taxes & Social Services, Crime, Language & Common Culture, and Terrorism & Security. In each case, one question was reverse coded, and the two questions were summed to yield an index. Below, we focus our “Logos” analyses on the “Rule of Law” index.

\text{Ethos}: As Aristotle used the term, “ethos” combined elements of honesty, competence, and various other virtues germane to judging the credence that should be given to elites in situations requiring ambiguity, expertise, or otherwise difficult and asymmetric inferential situations. Adapting work by Fenno (1978) we identify eleven traits (balanced for coding direction) related to “Ethos” as it is likely to play out in the context of modern, mass, representative politics.

\text{Fenno Items}: Thinking about [NAME], in your opinion, how well do each of the following words describe [him/her]: [Arrogant] [Compassionate] [Dishonest] [Fair] [Hardworking] [Knowledgeable] [Reckless] [Weak] [Accessible] [Qualified] [Understands People Like Me]

But perhaps the most straightforward indicator of contemporary ethos tracks a well-worn survey item, also inspired by Fenno, regarding trust:

\text{Trust}: How much of the time do you think you can trust [NAME], your Member of Congress, to do what is right?

Below we focus on our “Ethos” analyses on this “Trust” item.
Pathos: Modern research on the emotions indicates that there are at least three distinct subsystems in the brain that manage the interface between cognition and our emotions. We asked a standard nine item battery designed to measure levels of activation or deactivation of these subsystems vis-à-vis the issue of illegal immigration.

When thinking about the issue of illegal immigration, how strongly would you say that you have felt the following emotions:

- [Enthusiastic] + [Hopeful] + [Proud] = “Disposition”
- [Anxious] + [Worried] + [Afraid] = “Surveillance”
- [Hatred] + [Contempt] + [Bitterness] = “Aversion”

Perhaps more simply and familiarly we measure emotional states relevant to the issue of illegal immigration by asking a feeling thermometer question about Illegal Immigrants [0-100]. Below (for the time being) we focus on our “Pathos” analyses on this “FT-IllegalImmig” item.11

Seven Theories/Patterns of Representative-Constituent Persuasion

Deliberative democrats do not talk much about political parties and partisanship. Indeed, for both theorists and regular citizens alike, part of the attraction of deliberative conceptions is that they offer at least a partial alternative to the status quo of partisan politics and interest-group liberalism (Neblo et. al., 2011). That said, nearly everyone agrees that deliberative conceptions of democracy cannot dispense with much of the machinery of modern representative democracy, most would agree that it should not, and many would include political parties as a major element of that indispensable structure. So in analyzing the persuasive processes in our deliberative experiment, it would obtuse to ignore the potential for major conditioning based on patterns of partisan interaction. Thus, in addition to estimating plenary treatment effects, we also

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11 For a more general discussion of the role of emotion in deliberation see Neblo (2003), Neblo (2005), and Neblo (2007). For a discussion of persuasion via social networks see Lazer et. al. (2010).
decompose our analyses into four sub-groups: (1) members of Congress who supported restrictionist immigration policy (“anti-immigration”) interacting with constituents of the same party, (2) restrictionist members interacting with constituents of the opposing party, (3) members supporting expansionist policies (“pro-immigration”) interacting with their co-partisans, and (4) expansionist members interacting with constituents of the opposing party. As a rough rule these groups mapped into Republican constituents meeting with Republican members (1), Democratic constituents meeting with Republican members (2), Democratic constituents meeting with Democratic members (3), and Democratic constituents meeting with Republican members.12

[We use the prefixes “pro” and “anti” in a local sense and purely for convenience; we especially do not mean to suggest that restrictionist members are hostile to legal immigrants or even illegal immigrants in any way that goes beyond the policy questions here.]

Recalling our brief discussion of extent accounts of representative-constituent persuasion above, we can sketch seven basic patterns of persuasion among these four groups. See Table 1 below. First, if a stylized version of Fenno (1978) is right, we should not expect too much direct persuasion on the merits, and whatever modicum of efforts are made are likely to be distributed more or less evenly across the four conditions, since on this account members cast their persuasive nets widely when they do at all. So findings that show “much ado about nothing” would support this general view. Since there is not much variation in this case, we exclude this pattern from the table.

12 We coded PID “leaners” with declared partisans. As in other opinion surveys, there are relatively few true independents, and they tend to be relatively unengaged with politics. The sample is sufficiently small in our case that they do not afford separate analysis, and so we drop them for the time being. Similarly, we had one member of Congress from each party who voted against their party on H.R. 4437. These cases are actually quite interesting from a theoretical point of view, but the analyses involve complications that will have to wait for a fuller treatment in a future draft.
Second, more tradition theories of partisan cueing (e.g., Popkin, 1991) suggest that constituents will put a heavy emphasis on the partisan match or mismatch with their member of Congress, and thus we might expect movement toward the member’s view in the case of co-partisans, and movement away in the case of anti-partisans (a). Similarly, members of Congress may be rhetorically adept at signaling to their co-partisans in a way that does not raise the hackles of those from the other party. Such “dog whistle” theories of politics (Unger, 2007) suggest that we might see movement toward the members’ views in the case of co-partisans, with null results in the case of anti-partisans (b). One looming worry is that members of Congress will be so rhetorically sophisticated and have such a massive advantage in expertise that they will effectively dominate non-elites that they encounter (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). Rather than pandering, they engage in “crafted talk” designed to persuade even those who otherwise might otherwise be inclined to disagree with them (c). If so, we should see members moving constituents toward them in all four conditions.

Table 1  Directional Hypotheses for Attitude Change Based on Six Theories of Persuasion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Conditions</th>
<th>Copartisan Constituent</th>
<th>Antipartisan Constituent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberation with “Pro-immigration” Member of Congress</td>
<td>(a) Full Party Cueing +</td>
<td>(a) Full Party Cueing −</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Asymmetric Party Cueing +</td>
<td>(b) Asymmetric Party Cueing 0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Elite Domination +</td>
<td>(c) Elite Domination +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Full Deliberative Attraction +</td>
<td>(d) Full Deliberative Attraction +</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(e) Asymmetric Deliberative Attraction +</td>
<td>(e) Asymmetric Deliberative Attraction +</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(f) Deliberative Attraction via Party Cues +</td>
<td>(f) Deliberative Attraction via Party Cues 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberation with “Anti-immigration” Member of Congress</td>
<td>(a) Full Party Cueing −</td>
<td>(a) Full Party Cueing +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Asymmetric Party Cueing −</td>
<td>(b) Asymmetric Party Cueing 0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Elite Domination −</td>
<td>(c) Elite Domination −</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(d) Full Deliberative Attraction +</td>
<td>(d) Full Deliberative Attraction +</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(e) Asymmetric Deliberative Attraction 0</td>
<td>(e) Asymmetric Deliberative Attraction 0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(f) Deliberative Attraction via Party Cues 0</td>
<td>(f) Deliberative Attraction via Party Cues 0</td>
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Notes: Each cell of the table presents predicted directions of attitude change for a constituent who meets with a Member of Congress. See the text for a detailed description of the theories and variables.
Alternatively, it may be that deliberation focuses cognitive attention and brings augmented informational resources to bear in a way that makes one or the other side of an issue seems more “attractive,” more or less across the board. The TV personality Stephen Colbert has joked that “The truth has a well-known liberal bias.” We do not endorse the specific valence of this view, but it seems plausible to think that, on any given issue, close attention to an otherwise vague issue might create a plenary shift relative to the thinner forms of deliberation in the ambient political culture. (With significant complications and caveats, one might read Habermas (1996) as endorsing something like this view, at least for the operational issues here.) In such cases we would expect positive (as in Table 1 here, by convenience given the results below, but just as likely negative in any other case) movement on the issue in all four conditions (d). Combining across the earlier partisan mechanism and this “attraction” idea, we might also suspect that the attraction will only work under specific conditions. For example, it is possible that the attractions will be apparent when the “attractive” view is articulated by a member of Congress, but that members who take the opposite view can at least “jam” the attractive arguments on the other side – i.e., they will not be persuasive toward their view, but they can block the latent attractions from becoming manifest to their constituents ((e), Minozzi, 2011). Similarly, it may be the case that such attractions will only be persuasive to co-partisans, limiting the positive effects to just one quadrant – i.e., situations where there is a valence, articulated by the member, to his or her co-partisans.13

Results

13 Though we do not include it in the table, it also seems possible that there might be the possibility for asymmetric jamming – i.e., a situation wherein a member working against the latent deliberative “attractions” can only jam them for co-partisans. We need to think more about this possibility.
Our field experiment yielded exceptionally complicated data, in that we had a complex set of treatments to begin with, accompanied by non-trivial non-compliance, non-response, and other data issues. So we have analyzed our data many different ways to ensure that we can make credible causal inferences about treatment effects (i.e., that are not fragile to the many plausible ways that one might set up the comparisons). Below we report difference-in-differences (DID) estimates between treatment (i.e., deliberative) and true control subjects, with additional control variables known to affect selection into and compliance with the deliberative assignment, as reported in Neblo et al. (2011). See Figure 1 (below) for a visual representation of the results.

We begin by discussing the pattern among the effects on attitudes toward creating a path to citizenship (i.e., the “A”s at the bottom of each quadrant). The estimates in the top two quadrants (deliberation with Pro-Immigration members) are positive and significant for both partisans and co-partisans, whereas they are mixed and insignificant for the lower two quadrants (deliberation with the Anti-Immigration members). In terms of the theory sketches presented in Table 1, this pattern fits the Asymmetric Deliberative Attraction pattern (with a “pro” immigration view as the latent valence for this particular case, and even still only in a revealed and relative sense). Relative to the ambient political discourse, close attention to the issue seems to favor creating a path to citizenship, with pro-immigration members able to persuade both their co-partisan and anti-partisan constituents. Anti-immigration members, conversely, are not able to move either group of their constituents much either way; but, if there is such a plenary deliberative attraction, they are able to “jam” the signal (Minozzi, 2011).

Turning to the results on the attending measures of Logos, Ethos, and Pathos, the first thing to note is that Ethos (at least as measured with this preliminary item) does not seem to go hand in hand with persuasion on the policy attitude. Indeed, there is very little causally robust
movement on Trust in any of the four conditions. In contrast, the Logos index here (Rule of Law) tracks the movement on the attitudes changes in the upper panels, with comparably positive and significant effects in both cases, and correspondingly oblique and insignificant effects in the lower panels. Perhaps most intriguing, the results on the Pathos item suggests (n.b., we admit that this is only suggestive for now) the means (or catalytic conditions?) by which pro-immigration members were able to persuade their anti-partisan constituents (i.e., by producing a sizable affective movement in favor of illegal immigrants) and by which anti-immigrant members were able to “jam” their co-partisan constituents (i.e., by producing an offsetting affective move).

[To come: more detailed analyses on more variables with a more elaborate discussion, and an attempt to begin connecting the pattern of results back to democratic theory.]
References


