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**THE CATALYSTS FOR REPEAL**

12 BETWEEN PARTY AND FACTION: THE POLITICS BEHIND THE REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS

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We must . . . presume upon confidence. (Sir Robert Peel)

This chapter has two purposes. The first is historical; it is to explain Prime Minister Peel's leadership in the 1846 Repeal of the Corn Laws, a decision that was ruinous for Peel and his party. The second is theoretical; it is to develop conceptual tools for explaining policy outcomes in a non-institutionalized political arena. Indeed, at stake in the repeal was not only the trade orientation of Britain, but also the relative power of Parliament and Cabinet.

The Historical Puzzle: Peel's Rationality

First, let me recall the main events. Taking advantage of the fear of agricultural deficiency triggered by the Napoleonic blocus, British agrarians had obtained in 1819 protection for corn growing even though the general trend in other sectors was toward openness. In 1838 Lancashire cotton manufacturers organized the Anti-Corn Law League with the goal of repealing such protection. In 1845 during the Irish potato famine, Lord Russell, the leader of the Whig Opposition, endorsed the League's call for full repeal. Peel, the leader of the Conservative government resigned, but as Russell was unable to form a government, Peel was reappointed by the Queen. Back in government Peel preempted events; in May 1846 he moved the Repeal Bill in Parliament [see (Vol. II, 5)] against the overwhelming majority of his party, yet with the support of the Whig and Radical Opposition. One month later (25 June), a fifty-strong group of Conservative agrarian MPs took advantage of a straight partisan fight on a bill unrelated to the Corn Laws to switch sides and put Peel in the minority. Peel did not dissolve the House, but instead resigned, leaving behind him a divided Conservative Party.

The extensive literature on the subject confronts us with a paradox. On the one hand, the literature is unanimous in qualifying the repeal as an eminently rational measure. Historians point out that the repeal of protection for grains was a plausible response not only to the immediate scarcity of foodstuffs, caused by the potato blight, but also to the long-run European deficiency in bread grain supplies, which became known to the Peel government as of 1845. The historical literature also establishes that free trade reflected the sectoral preferences of industry, the class interest of the rising bourgeoisie, and the overall interest of the new trade
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It also seems fairly well accepted that the campaign of the Anti-Corn Law League was instrumental in debunking the old mercantilist paradigm not just among the literate, but among the public at large. Peel himself admitted the superiority of Cobden's arguments over his own in public debate. Even the direct “victims” of the repeal, it has been suggested, found redeeming features in the measure: the repeal induced the modernization of British agriculture, thus consolidating the economic base of the landlords. Repeal also removed an explosive issue from the political agenda which could have hastened the demise of the gentry's political influence.

On the other hand, the passage of the repeal was a political catastrophe. Passed by a Conservative minister against the wishes of the majority of his party, the repeal split the party, led to the termination of the ministry, and ushered in two decades of Whig and Liberal hegemony. Moreover, the repeal interrupted Britain's first relatively successful attempt to cope with the volatility introduced by the limited, but portentous, democratization of 1832. In contrast to the relatively stable, though still embryonic, two-party system of the early 1840s, British politics stumbled into two decades of partisan uncertainty, marked by multipartism, coalition cabinets, and personalistic leadership. If we assume that what drives politics is each politician's desire to maximize tenure, and to reduce political risk for himself and his party, Peel's legislative move appears to have been absolutely irrational. It was a setback for Peel himself, for his party, and for party leadership at large. The existing literature has not squarely dealt with the paradox of Peel's political rationality. Most accounts, following Disraeli, have suggested that Peel acted on values, while rational choice explanations have left the difficulty unaddressed. This chapter offers a conceptualization of the policy process which accounts for Peel's behavior and is compatible with the central tenets of rational choice theory.

The Theoretical Challenge: Policymaking in a Non-institutionalized Arena

The lack of success registered by the literature in characterizing the repeal as a politically rational decision stems in large part from a misunderstanding of the institutional context in which the repeal debate took place. Missing from all these accounts is a reference to what may have been the most important issue of the time: Who decides? The decision rules, which in all policy processes help identify the deciders, fix their respective weight, and set a threshold for the minimum winning coalition, were not fixed but were consistently at stake in the political competition.

To be sure, the basic parliamentary framework was established: laws were passed by a concurring majority of the two houses. But the mechanism by which the Cabinet was expected to muster this majority in the Commons, was uncertain: the Cabinet could resort neither to the Crown's patronage, which no longer was a plausible resource, nor to partisan discipline, which was yet to come. Hence, the repeal of the Corn Laws took place amidst a long-standing dispute between the frontbench and the backbench of the Conservative party on the nature of the party as a policymaking organization. The backbench saw the party as an electoral organization with little policymaking extension and thus limited rights to invoke voting discipline. The party for them was a convenient way of stabilizing logrolling among particular, locally-entrenched interests. In contrast, the frontbench viewed the party as a full-fledged policymaking institution, requiring voting discipline from its members for the passage of measures of a general character, destined to reach the national electorate. This philosophical difference between the frontbench and the backbench reflected a difference in sensitivity to the electoral constraint. Backbenchers were first and foremost concerned about their seats and only secondarily about the party's overall standing in the electorate. As two-thirds of the backbenchers were safe electorally, they were but secondarily interested in the general policies pitched by the leadership to promote the party with the national median voter. In contrast, frontbenchers were not as much concerned about their seat (as they would always manage to find one under almost any circumstances) as to the party's nationwide performance, as this is what decided their future in government. As the party's performance was decided in the swing districts, the frontbench had an incentive not only to use policymaking to appeal to these marginal (unsafe) constituencies, but also, and this was a rather unwelcome development for safely elected backbenchers, to adopt policies that were more representative of the national median voter than of the bulk of the party. The institutional debate focused on the demarcating line between party issues, in which the leader could expect to exercise the right to commit the party, and particularist, local issues, in which individual MPs could expect to be acknowledged the right to pursue an independent course.

Upon this basic tension between leader and follower hinged the future direction of British parliamentary institutions. The dispute had definite implications for four critical aspects of policymaking. Partisan discipline would sanction the superiority of the Cabinet over Parliament. It would lead to the displacement of local by national politics. It would strengthen the hand of the median voter at the expense of the party insider. It would replace a decisionmaking process producing particularists rents by one producing general, broad-ranging, and class-oriented policies. By contrast, backbencher independence would sanction the superiority of Parliament over the Cabinet, the prevalence of local over central politics, the primacy of insiders over voters, and the consolidation of particularist rent-seeking at the expense of class politics. Hence upon the outcome of the intrapartisan conflict depended the choice between two radically different types of
regimes: the centralized, rigid, dogmatic system of party government which eventually stabilized in late-Victorian Britain, or the decentralized, penetrated, clientelic, graft-ridden system which thrived in the USA. Given the scope of the institutional stakes, it is not unreasonable to imagine that the institutional debate was for the politicians as important as any policy debate, and that the latter were used as proxy in the larger conflict between rival institutional ambitions. The theoretical challenge is to model a policymaking process in which the rules of the games are also the stakes of the game. Very little work has been done in this area. My goal is to map a specific case and bank on its exemplarity to generate general propositions.

The following account begins with a brief survey of the recent literature. I then develop the repeal of the Corn Laws as an example of policymaking in a non-institutionalized setting. Two sections offer a systematic test of some of the hypotheses presented in this study. The conclusion expands on the broader comparative and theoretical significance of the findings.

Survey of the Recent Literature

The recent literature on repeal falls into two groups, with one stressing material interests, the other values.

Material Interests

Britain’s first step in the direction of free trade has received renewed attention by theorists intent on using a rational choice framework to show that repeal conformed to an interest group model. Timothy McKeown draws from the rent-seeking model of the Chicago school of Political Economy. This model features wealth-maximizing individuals and tenure-maximizing politicians exchanging policies (called “rents”) for electoral resources (cash and votes). Dismissing the role of the Anti-Corn Law League, McKeown argues, and statistically shows, that the MPs’ position on the repeal, as well as their partisan affiliation, was correlated to their personal and constituency pecuniary interests. The application of the rent-seeking model to this case raises two questions: first, its goodness-of-fit is limited (a point further developed below in Tables 3 and 5). Second, its theoretical appropriateness is disputable. A rent is by definition a policy whose benefits can be fully appropriated by a group pursuing its selfish interest. Yet, free trade was not a rent, but a public good. Moreover, if there is one interest group which by rent-seeking standards should have prevailed in this debate, it is the protectionist agrarians, who had a particularistic interest in the status quo, were entrenched, controlled most of local patronage, and had their party in power.

Gary Anderson and Robert Tollison first and then Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey have tried to overcome this difficulty by granting a significant role to the electoral arena. Their common argument is that the League mobilized enough electoral support for repeal to convince Peel to make a bid. In essence, they argue that the textilists were an Olsonian “privileged group,” a concentrated interest, with incentives strong enough to justify shouldering the burden of providing for the public good. Anderson and Tollison look for these special incentives outside the repeal issue. They argue that the League served as the generic vehicle for the promotion of two particular policies — lobbying against factory legislation and the repeal of the import duty on raw cotton — thereby providing the textilists with sufficient Olsonian “by-products” to support the League. Schonhardt-Bailey identifies the extra incentives in the recent theoretical findings of the “new growth” literature, which stresses “increasing returns to scale and therefore the dynamic gains resulting from trade liberalization.” In a second step, both studies identify an electoral base receptive to the League’s free trade message and broad enough to tempt Peel. Anderson and Tollison allude to the voters at large, while Schonhardt-Bailey points to the “decentralized interests of the export sector” as the voters to whom the League appealed. Both studies implicitly rely on a spatial voting model privileging the ballot of the median voter; they argue that the League’s electioneering campaign was successful enough with the swing vote to lead Peel to endorse repeal in anticipation of the upcoming election.

In sum, the foregoing studies provide us with two important facts: first, there was a private interest group financing the League’s public campaign; second, the median voter was receptive to the League’s free trade message. Although substantial, these findings are still vastly insufficient to account for the repeal. It is logical to rationalize Peel’s bid for the median voter as the motive for the repeal. However, the political catastrophe that attended his move raises serious questions about the capacity of the median voter model alone to serve as a plausible policy process. No rational choice explanation is conclusive that does not show all the relevant actors, especially the top policymaker, to behave rationally.

Peel’s Values

A second set of studies explain Peel’s break-up of the Conservative party as reflecting personal beliefs. These studies bifurcate into two directions, as they identify different types of values. A first series of studies focuses on Peel’s values with regard to the best economic policy. They basically argue that by 1845 Peel had made up his mind that the Corn Laws were ineffective from an economic point of view. Hence, for Disraeli, Peel was “deficient in self-confidence” and vulnerable to the influence of
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Cobden. 24 Douglas Irwin paints a more charitable portrait: Cobden managed to convince Peel because of Peel's own theoretical reflection. 25

A second line of research emphasizes Peel's institutional values with respect to the best political regime. The Corn Laws, Betty Kemp argues, were a proxy for a dispute on the nature of the regime. For the repealers, the Corn Laws were a pretext for a broad and popular campaign similar to the popular clamor that accompanied the First Reform Act, and with similar constitutional consequences. Peel understood the symbolic nature of the Corn Laws and applied his skills to salvage the power and autonomy of the Crown. He tried and successfully managed, according to Kemp, to keep the issue out of the electoral arena. By repealing the Corn Laws himself and by refusing to dissolve Parliament after he was censored, Peel not only removed an explosive issue which might otherwise have hastened the demise of the Crown, but he also did it, one might say, the "old-fashioned way," without ever showing any concern for electoral pressure and thus not creating a precedent for the notion of popular mandate. Kemp argues that Peel held a "pre-1832 view" of the proper role of the electorate in the constitution: "Parliament, he believed, was sovereign and should decide this as all other questions of policy that arose; the people's function, at general elections, was to choose a House of Commons, not to decide on policy nor to designate a government." 26

The prime mover in these studies is the notion of value. Yet values are problematic tools of explanation. Values are synthetic constructs, that individuals hold to ease their reasoning through social life. As different people may uphold different values, the question of the origins of such values arises. One school of thought holds that values are social constructs, another that they are individual constructs. The debate is largely unsolvable. As the present study adheres to the rational choice side of this debate, it recognizes that values have a constraining character to the extent that politicians need to build reputations for reelection purposes and must thereby act on the values that constitute their reputation, lest they waste their credibility. 27 By such a yardstick, the notion of value is not useful to account for Peel's behavior. Peel's leadership of the Conservative party, a party which was the pillar of his political career, was not built upon his reputation for upholding either free trade or "1832 views," especially if such views called for the destruction of the party. Therefore, Peel's values do not provide a valid starting point for a rational choice account of his behavior.

In sum, whether it emphasizes material interests or values, the recent literature leaves the question of Peel's rationality unanswered. This question becomes tractable only when the debate about the institutions is made part of the explanation. Peel was involved in two simultaneous battles: the policy battle, and the procedural battle. The policy battle was structured by the partisan competition between the Whigs and the Conservatives. The pro-

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cedural battle was encapsulated, as explained above, in the intrapartisan relations between Peel and the Conservative backbenchers. I first develop the Whig-Conservative competition.

Cross-bench Competition

The study of the party system is useful to understand Peel's rationale: why he chose to preempt the repeal issue rather than allowing it to become a full-fledged electoral issue. Peel, it is argued here, foresaw that the repeal issue would be one of those rare issues that would unite the left and therefore threats the survival of his Conservative ministry.

The party system was the offspring of the First Reform Act of 1832. That act directly challenged the ability of existing parties to manage parliamentary majorities by making elections the exclusive site for building a majority in the Commons. Until then, the two-party competition between Whigs and Tories was always cushioned by large groups of "independent" MPs, who preferred to be non-aligned. 28 Usually, though not always, they supported the existing cabinet on the grounds that the King's ministers should receive a fair trial. But by 1833, the debate that preceded over the passage of the Reform Bill had reached such levels of intensity that practically all re-elected or newly elected MPs in the Commons had taken sides. 29 "The hardening of party divisions," Norman Gash wrote, "made it practically impossible to secure a majority by means of maneuvers within Parliament... The decisive shifts of power had to come as a result of elections." 30

Yet, as the parties needed to devote an increasing amount of attention to the electoral contests, they were also losing control over electoral outcomes. The elimination of closed boroughs and the extension of the franchise suddenly made it more difficult for party leaders and pro-leadership local magnates to control the nomination process. The number of contested seats surged in 1832, and the 1833-4 parliaments were noted for their high degree of partisan confusion. 31 The enactment of electoral Reform had caught the parties unprepared.

The Whigs and Tories responded to the challenge differently. The Tories invested in party building, whereas the Whigs turned toward coalition making. The Conservative party adopted modern features such as the Carlton Club and a permanent staff, while consolidating previous practices such as the holding of regular meetings, the whip, and the distribution of letters and circulars to all members of the party. 32 More importantly, the party strengthened its electoral organization, with the formation of a standing election committee at the national level, whose role was "to supply candidates to constituencies and constituencies to candidates." 33 Conservative Associations were created at the district level to gather support and "manage" the list of registered voters, i.e., object and strike off the voters of
the other side while in turn countering the other side’s objections. This was a bizarre practice made possible by the stipulations of the First Reform Act, and requiring the creation of local party organizations in every district. Organization paid off, and in 1841 the Conservatives won an absolute majority of seats in the Commons.

The Whigs could not emulate the Conservatives’ organizational drive. The Whig leadership sought to combine several strands – Whigs, Radicals, Irish Repealers and others on the backbenches. The alliance was split by the Reform issue, which the Whigs had supported in 1832 on the condition that it would be the last one, but which the Radicals saw as the first step toward the secret ballot and triennial parliaments. As Ian Newbold pointed out, this cleavage hampered party building for the Left, for the grass-roots’ activity involved in party building, especially with respect to electoral organization, favored the Radicals at the expense of the Whigs. As a result, “the tendency of the Whig leaders . . . was to eschew party organization.” Also, the registration courts created by the Reform Act worked against the Whigs. As John Prest argues, whereas the Tories, who had favored a restricted franchise, felt no compunction at using the courts to contest and strike off the voters of the other side, the Whigs, by contrast “were at a double disadvantage when they stooped to the same trick, because both the Tory and the Radical press pilloried them as the reducers of the franchise and the enemies of the people.”

With their growth thus stunted at the base, the Whigs sought solace in coalition building among the factions of the Left at the parliamentary level, very much like in a multiparty system. They looked for popular issues that all factions could support. Hence, on two occasions when their government was directly challenged by the Conservatives, the Whig leadership in the person of Lord John Russell engineered first the “Lichfield Compact” in 1834–5 – a coalition of all the parties of the Left around the Irish Church issue – and then a similar coalition in 1839–41 around the reform of the Corn Laws – not the repeal yet, whose turn would come in 1845.

The Conservatives did not respond in kind to the ideological buildups which sporadically animated the Left. The organizational drive on the Right was not accompanied by a comparable doctrinal élán. Conservative candidates were left to base their appeal to local constituents on the most diverse issues. In 1841, for instance, some Conservative MPs were elected because they promised to defend the Corn Laws, others because they opposed the new Poor Law or supported factory legislation, still others because of their stand on the Catholic question, or because they criticized the Whig Administration’s budget deficit. The only unifying element was their common claim to be “Sir Robert Peel’s man.” This is not to say that Tories were ideologically indistinguishable from Whigs. On the contrary, leader and followers were bound by the same historic beliefs inherited from past generations: extreme patriotism, the insistence upon social harmony, the defense of the Church, the Crown, the aristocracy, and, above all, the repression of radicalism. But these principles were broad and their policy implications were left unspecified.

The Conservative leadership did not impose a joint program on the rank and file because the partisan dynamic made doctrinal pragmatism the obvious winning tactic. One could make the hypothesis, though not prove it, that the First Reform Act had made the Left the dominant coalition in the electorate, but that its divisions kept the Right in government. Enjoying an organizational advantage over the Whigs, the Tories would maximize tenure if the various factions of the Left were kept unable to join in a common front on a credible and substantive platform. Peel sought to prevent this from happening by pursuing a two-pronged strategy: (1) he would bring to the fore policies that estranged the Whigs from the Radicals, and (2) he would simultaneously pursue a policy of moderation designed to preempt issues that might otherwise rally them against an uniplurality Right. While in opposition, from 1835 until 1841, Peel regularly proffered the Whig government the votes they needed to be saved from defeat at the hands of their own supporters. As a result, the Whig leaders could remain in power, while postponing the ideological realignment otherwise essential to federate the Radicals. Once in government, Peel maintained the same centrist course, preempting all popular issues which the Whig leaders could have used to overcome the Whig–Radical rift over Reform. In 1842 he took the heart out of Russell’s 1841 promises of corn duty reduction by implementing the reduction himself. He also steered a moderate course both in the religious and Irish areas.

The 1845 Irish potato famine triggered a succession of political moves that exemplify the issue promotion–issue preemption dynamic which drove partisan competition. The famine led the Whig leader, Russell, to endorse the League’s call for full repeal for two reasons. First, the famine made repeal the prominent issue, knocking reform off the soapbox, and thus providing Russell with an issue that he could use to rally the Radicals without losing the median voter; indeed, it is probable that the median voter was already won to full repeal, but not at the price of further reform, which the Radicals until then demanded. Second, the famine lumped the Irish and the Corn Law issue and seasoned the whole with a sense of emergency. The Irish issue had been the touchstone of the alliance between Whigs, Radicals, and Irish in 1835. As shown in Table 1, the famine brought to the side of the Radicals an Irish contingent which until then had abstained on the Corn issue – Irish corn growers had a vested interest in the British protected market. Full repeal of the Corn Laws had finally become, thanks to the potato famine and the threat of civilian unrest in Ireland, one of those rare issues on which all factions of the Left could agree and which did not frighten the median voter.

Peel responded with a classic preemptive move which was aimed at
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Table 1 Irish Repealers’ Votes on Corn Law repeal, House of Commons, 1842–1846

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Against Corn Laws n (%)</th>
<th>For Corn Laws n (%)</th>
<th>Not Voting n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16/2/1842</td>
<td>8 42</td>
<td>1 5</td>
<td>10 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/4/1842</td>
<td>5 26</td>
<td>1 5</td>
<td>13 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/7/1842 Villiers’ motion for repeal</td>
<td>5 28</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td>12 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/5/1843 adjournment of debate</td>
<td>2 11</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>16 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/5/1843 Villiers’ motion for repeal</td>
<td>2 11</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td>15 83</td>
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<td>4 20</td>
<td>2 10</td>
<td>14 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/6/1845 Villiers’ motion for repeal</td>
<td>1 5</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>20 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/5/1846 Repeal Bill, 3rd reading</td>
<td>15 65</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>8 35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: William O. Aydelotte, British House of Commons, 1841–1847 (Ann Arbor: InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research); the exact number of repealers in the House for each vote was found in Brian M. Walker, Parliamentary Results in Ireland, 1801–1922 (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 1978).

preventing Russell from uniting the Left. Soon after Russell declared for full repeal, Peel resigned. The Queen logically sent for Russell to form a Whig ministry, which he failed to do, mostly because Peel refused to promise his support for a Whig repeal bill. (Recall that without Conservative support, Russell was in the minority.) The Queen again sent for Peel, who then formed a new Conservative ministry committed to a full repeal.35

In sum, the two-party dynamic of the post-Reform years was very different from its modern equivalent. Constitutional uncertainty made organization for the Liberals more difficult than for the Conservatives. The two parties ended up being two rather distinct creatures; to put it briefly, the Conservatives were a party without a program, whereas the Liberals every now and then had a program without a party. This unfinished state of the mid-Victorian party system provided the framework for the peculiar issue dynamic of the party system, featuring a Whig leadership promoting reformist issues and Peel implementing them.

Frontbench–Backbench Struggle in the Conservative Party

Partisan competition, we saw, mandated that Peel preempt the Liberal rhetoric. But Peel’s tactic of preemption implied, indeed required, that once in government, he enjoy sufficient latitude within his party to lay claim to any issue he deemed to be tactically effective, including those of which the content, until then, had been solely determined by the interests or values held by individual MPs and constituencies. Yet, while Peel was asking for greater partisan discipline, individual MPs were also in greater need of independence from the leadership.

The 1832 Reform Act reinforced the private MPs’ traditional craving for political independence from the party leadership, because it increased their dependence on their constituency. The extension of the franchise made individual MPs more responsive to their constituents’ wishes.46 To be elected, candidates had to make some allowances for the workings of public opinion. In certain cases, this implied no more than electoral corruption on a grander scale or greater control over the distribution of local patronage.48 In the great majority of cases, however, it also implied a new campaign style, one that relied less on contacts and more on status and public appearances, less on virtual representation and more on pledges to the defense of locally popular causes.49

More importantly, the First Reform Act created electoral districts that were homogeneous in political interests. The authors of the 1832 Reform redrew the franchise in order to make districts better reflect the economic interests of the nation, so that the counties were for land and the boroughs for trade.50 The counties’ electorate (the Tory stronghold) was purged of urban influence. Conversely, boroughs on average took on a greater urban and industrial tone.51 This greater homogeneity within each district offered private MPs the possibility to adjust to the convulsion of 1832, and to reduce uncertainty by switching allegiance from the party leadership to their electorate. Very soon, the number of electoral contests dropped, and a majority of seats, county seats especially, grew safe (see Table 2). The so-called “golden age of the private MP” inaugurated by the First Reform Act was but the golden age of constituency influence.52

In sum, the partisan dynamic of the post-Reform era imposed antagonistic constraints on the Conservative party. The leadership’s request for flexibility collided with the private MPs’ pledges to their constituents. Moderation may have been astute as a tactic to maximize tenure at the national level, but at the local level it left those Tory MPs who had been elected in highly Conservative districts with only the option of reversing themselves, and facing retribution from their electorate.

The dispute focused on the demarcating line between, in Gladstone’s terms, matters of “principle,” in which the leader could expect to exercise the right to commit the party, and “matter(s) of mere detail,” in which individual MPs could expect to be acknowledged the right to pursue an independent course.53 In the pre-Reform House, according to Beales, party voting was reserved to “motions devoid of policy content: Speaker’s elections, on amendments to the Address, on explicit votes of no-confidence.”54 Fraser concurs with this assessment, adding to the list “issues of general principle in the peripheral areas of government, scandals, cases of maladministration, on questions of reform where public policy was dormant.” All other issues – including finance, trade, the Corn
Laws, agricultural relief, commercial and labor regulation, slavery, and the Catholic question—were recognized as non-party questions.\(^55\) On all these questions, the Conservatives, if not the whole House, were aligned “in terms of interest groups.”\(^56\)

In the post-Reform era, however, Peel sought a deliberate extension of voting discipline in these very areas. On issues such as the Malt duties, the Ten Hours Bill in 1844, the sugar duties in 1844, the Irish Catholic Church in 1845, the corn duties in 1843 and 1846, and, lastly, the Irish Coercion Bill in May 1846, Peel wielded the dreaded threat of collective resignation to whip the rank and file of the party into line, each time causing a crisis between the leader and some party faction, and endless recrimination against the executive’s encroachments on the individual MP’s independence.\(^57\)

The upshot was a succession of intra-party crises. Under the determined leadership of Peel, the leader–follower relationship assumed the traits of a struggle, with the followers trying to force upon Peel measures to which they were pledged, while Peel would seek to talk them out of making pledges in the first place. Peel’s tactic was twofold. First, he would never compromise with the “rebels,” forcing instead the very measures they were pledged against through the Commons, often with the support of the Opposition. On two occasions where Peel was put in the minority, he asked for and got enough Conservative defectors to reverse their vote.\(^58\) In one case, he acknowledged the triviality of the matter at issue, but refused to yield lest yielding create a precedent.\(^59\) Peel’s second weapon was to threaten the backbenchers with the prospect of resignation and thus indefinite opposition, with its attending loss of access to law-making and whatever patronage was still available. Not only was this threat explicitly delivered whenever the government was put in the minority in the Commons, but as criticisms grew louder on the backbenches, Peel began to behave as if he had lost interest in carrying on with his job.\(^60\) Whether affected or real, Peel’s weariness had a chilling effect on his backbenchers.

Peel has been widely criticized for his overbearing style of leadership.\(^61\) Yet, it is hard to think of another way for the leader of a party without a program to shore up partisan discipline. Consultation on a one-to-one basis with disaffected MPs was unmanageable. Instead, as Peel argued, “We must ... presume upon confidence.”\(^62\) Moreover, a concession to one MP would, in Peel’s own words, “engender the necessity of systematic concession,” and sooner than later the leadership would be unable to govern.\(^63\) Finally, there was the need for the government to show resolve in order to deter dissidence. Conciliation would establish a precedent for future indiscipline.\(^64\) The leadership would not enjoy programmatic flexibility unless the troops were broken to the practice of passive obedience. Arrogance was the logical response in the absence of a caucus, a committee system, a program, or any informal mechanism able to prevent or resolve differences between the leadership of the party and the rank and file.

Peel won as long as the threat of resignation carried with it the prospect of an indefinite stay in opposition. However, were a plausible counterleadership among the Conservatives to emerge, opposition would be only temporary. More likely, the Queen would call on another Conservative to form the new government. The split of the party on the Corn Law issue in March–April 1846 and the maneuvering of the Peel government into a minority position and subsequent resignation of the Irish Coercion Bill in June must be seen in this light. The growing disaffection of a majority of the Conservative rank and file with the policies of the Peel government made it possible for a plausible counter-leadership in the persons of Lord Stanley and George Bentinck to emerge and to remove a large number of MPs’ inhibitions about withdrawing support from Peel.

Could Peel have anticipated the emergence of this alternative leadership? In the short run, Peel’s tactic was impeccable. Peel’s winning tactic within his party was the opposite of his winning tactic toward the Whig party. Winning over the Whigs, as we saw earlier, implied rapprochement and the full intelligence of Whig political preferences. Winning over the Tories, by contrast, implied distance and the actual ignorance of Tory preferences.
With the Tories, Peel could claim undivided control over legislation by “presuming upon” – that is, being ignorant of – the extent of their confidence. Only by severing all contacts with the rank and file, could he confront them with all-or-nothing choices – to pass his bills or turn him out. The tactic of unilateral signalling would work only as long as these choices would be theirs, not his.

In the longer run, however, the backbenchers were not completely helpless. They would take advantage of parliamentary votes to break through their confinement, and signal loud and clear their respective wishes to the leadership. Negative votes on bills important to Peel could be used to repay Peel in kind for past legislation, or to deter him with respect to future legislation. Conversely, positive votes could be used to reward or entice. Together these votes informed the leadership of the extent of its support. For instance, there is anecdotal evidence that the agrarians voted against Peel on the Irish Catholic Church issue in 1845 – the Maynooth Grant – to signal their resolve to play tough were he move to repeal the Corn Laws. As shown below, the practice was actually widespread.

In theory, therefore, Peel could not ignore that his winning streak would some day come to an end, as there was a positive correlation between the number of aggrieved backbenchers and the probability that an enterprising rival would make a bid for the leadership. In practice, however, the date of such an occurrence was unforeseeable. Even though Peel antagonized a large number of Conservatives, those were not united by any common purpose other than their hatred for Peel. For instance, George Bentinck’s bid to federate the anti-Peelites in 1846 was hindered by his lack of soundness on the Maynooth issue, another big issue that severely shook the party in 1845. In sum, Peel was confronted with the following choice: either give in to the backbenchers and face sure defeat at the polls, or stand firm and risk a probabilistic overthrow. He rationally picked the latter.

Testing: The Political Model

The foregoing argument lends itself to a first test. The repeal of the Corn Laws reflected a divergence of appreciation between Peel and a majority of the Conservative rank and file over the best response to oppose to the Whigs, once the Whigs endorsed full repeal. Peel had the continuation of his government at heart, while the rank and file had their own reection as sole concern. The rank and file divided into two camps, a minority siding with Peel, the majority siding against him. On Peel’s side were those whose seats were unsafe and contested by Liberals, the very seats that Peel’s strategy of moderation was meant to save. These were the urban boroughs, especially the very large ones. These MPs’ personal electoral ambitions converged with Peel’s general policy of denying the Whigs control over the median voter by checking their attempt at building a coalition of the

Left. If the voters perceived Russell’s attempt at federating the Left as a failure, they would maintain their support for the incumbent Tory MP. Also on Peel’s side were the ministerial MPs, all those who occupied or had occupied a seat in Peel’s government and who, like Peel, fully identified their fate with that of the party. Against Peel were MPs from districts that were safe, uncontested by Liberals, and so because predominantly Conservative. In those districts, reappointment as Tory candidate required that the incumbent MP conform to the dominant local interests, with no mandatory regard for the greater good of the party.

This setup yields three testable hypotheses: (1) Conservative MPs in contested districts voted for repeal; (2) Conservative MPs in districts in which voters split their vote between a Conservative and a Liberal (most districts were plural) voted for repeal; and (3) Conservative MPs who were, or had taken part, in government voted for repeal. In contrast, Conservative MPs’ in uncontested and homogeneously Conservative districts, and who had taken no part in the government voted against repeal. The three variables “contest,” “split,” and “office” constitute what might be called the “political model,” in contrast to the “economic model” put forward by McKeown, which makes the vote a reflection of the constituency’s economic interests. The variables included in McKeown’s economic model are corn production (corn), the number of sheep per acre (sheep), head of cattle (cattle), cotton manufacture (cotton), and iron works (iron). I did not include “civil disturbances,” a proxy for riots recorded in 1842, irrelevant to the present test, nor the MPs’ personal wealth variables, as the unit of analysis in this test is the district. The results are reported in Table 3. A look at the R-squared for the three equations and the F-tests suggest that the political model is stronger than the economic model.

Note that the political model tested here, though stronger than the economic model, is not necessarily incompatible with the latter. Indeed, unsafe seats were mostly found in urban constituencies, whereas uncontested seats were found in agrarian constituencies. The decisive test between the two models revolves around a second hypothesis directly derived from the cumulated grievances dynamic: the vote on repeal was a vote of confidence.

Further Testing: The Vote of Confidence Hypothesis

From Peel’s tactic of systematically presuming upon confidence from the backbenchers, and from their tendency to use roll-calls as a roundabout way of signalling lack of confidence in Peel, it follows that the vote on the repeal of the Corn Laws should be more than a vote on protection for corn growers, and should also express the multi-dimensional quality of a vote of confidence in the Peel administration at large. The vote should articulate the Conservative opposition to Peel’s general policy of moderation.
Table 3 OLS Regression of Conservative MPs’ vote on Corn Law repeal on Economic Variables and Political Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Model</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>corn</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>(-1.89)</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>(-2.19)*</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>(-1.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sheep</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>(-1.13)</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>(-1.35)</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>(-1.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cattle</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>(-0.29)</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>(-0.41)</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>(-0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cotton</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iron</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>(-1.53)</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>(-1.75)</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>(-1.75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Model</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>contest</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>(2.03)*</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>(2.73)*</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>(2.73)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>split</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>office</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>(7.25)*</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>(6.74)*</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>(6.74)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant         | 0.63 | (2.91)*| 0.54 | (2.57)*| 0.55| (2.57)* |

n                | 254  |       | 254  |       | 254  |       |
R-squared        | 0.05 |       | 0.23 |       | 0.18 |       |
Stand. Err.      | 0.44 |       | 0.40 |       | 0.41 |       |

* significant at the 0.025 level

Dependent variable: Conservative MPs’ vote on Corn Law repeal (15 May 1846)
F(1,24): 9.08 with 3 degrees of freedom; prob < 0.01
F(1,23): 1.41 with 5 degrees of freedom; prob > 0.05
Variables are scaled so as to vary from 0 to 1. Variables are described in the Appendix.

The motion of confidence hypothesis lends itself to two testable propositions. First, the Peelite–anti-Peelite cleavage should not be issue-specific but multi-dimensional. The same cleavage should be observable on issues other than Corn Law repeal. Second, the 1846 opposition to Peel leadership should not be time-specific, but should span several years, becoming systematic as the leadership alienated, or threatened to alienate, more MPs. Conversely, support for Peel should become more explicit and deliberate over time, turning into personal loyalty to Peel, as supporters grew uneasy at the backbenchers’ threat of systematic opposition.

A preliminary test is presented in Table 4. Using William Aydelotte’s dataset, including the 186 most significant divisions taken in the 1842–1846 House of Commons, I constructed a yearly index of confidence (“confid42,” “confid43,”... “confid46”) in the Peel Ministry. I used all the votes rather than merely those which the leadership cared about, because of the practical impossibility of isolating the latter. For each year, the index for each MP is the sum of positive votes (coded +1), negative votes (coded −1), and absent and abstentions (coded 0), divided by the total number of votes, which in a given year is the same for all MPs. Correlation coefficients are calculated between each index and the vote on the Repeal Bill (15 May 1846). The two hypothesized propositions are observable: not only is a correlation observable, but it increases over time. Table 4 also shows the mean for each index of confidence: it tends to decline over time, in accordance with the cumulated grievance scenario.

Table 4 Pearson Correlation Coefficient Between Confidence Index and Corn Law Repeal Vote; Mean of Confidence Index, 1842–1846

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pearson</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>confid42</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confid43</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confid44</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confid45</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confid46</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables are described in the Appendix.

The findings are presented in Table 4 call for some refinement. Indeed, one could object that the results are also compatible with the converse hypothesis: that the vote was issue-specific, and thus the pure reflection of material interests. According to that second explanation, the observed correlation would stem from the fact that each yearly index picks up roll-calls on issues materially (as opposed to ideologically) related to Corn Law repeal – land and tariff, or all issues bearing on material interests. To control for the problem of overlap between the material interest hypothesis and ours, the confidence index was reconstructed on a universe of roll-calls excluding votes bearing on land or the tariff as well as any issue bearing some relation to material interests – currency, income tax, and also the Factory Acts which Anderson and Tollison found to be related to Corn Law repeal. One is left with a pool of votes cast on issues of a strictly political or ethical nature: political Reform, foreign policy, flogging in the army, contested elections, religion, Ireland, Poor Law, Health of Towns, etc. Six new yearly confidence indexes were computed – “confid42,” “confid43,”... “confid46.” (Table 5)

While purging the index of confidence from imaginable material interest influence, I included in the regression all the MP and constituency material interest variables of McKeown’s economic model. Finally, I threw in the roll-call on the March 17 1845 Miles’ motion favoring tax relief for agriculture (“relief?”); of all pre-1846 roll-calls on economic issues (and non-economic as well), this vote has the distinction of being the best single predictor of the vote on Corn Law repeal. All of the most performing material-interest variables available were thus included in the regression. The dependent variable is unchanged.

Again, the results are more than encouraging for the vote of confidence hypothesis (see Table 5). “Confid” meets all expectations: (1) despite the fact that it does not aggregate roll-calls on economic issues, it is significantly
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal interests</th>
<th>Constituency interests</th>
<th>Other economic control</th>
<th>Confidence Index</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>Stand. Err.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land</strong></td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business</strong></td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiber in bus.</strong></td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crop</strong></td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cotton</strong></td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iron</strong></td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the 0.05 level.

n = 115 (variables: 114 M.P.s, vote on Corn Law repeal (May 1846)). Variables are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. Variables are described in the Appendix.
correlated with Corn Law repeal; (2) its predictive power grows over time, thus behaving in accordance with the cumulated grievance scenario; (3) in 1845, it outperforms all the material interest variables. These results strengthen the motion of confidence hypothesis: a majority of the votes cast for or against the repeal had no direct substantive relationship with the Corn laws.

Summary and Generalization

This chapter first raised a specific problem. Why did Peel make a decision that was ruinous to his career and his party? The chapter offered a specific solution. It argued that there is no need to invoke goals other than the parsimonious goal of vote-maximization to account for Peel's behavior. Peel could neither entice nor extract support from the Conservative majority; nor could he do without it. He adopted a policy rule which he consistently used to maximize his leverage. He would, in his words, "presume upon confidence" – a euphemism for a tactic of unilateral signalling. This rule kept him in power for five years, an impressive performance, given the political odds and the policy achievements of the Peel cabinet. For sure, the equilibrium was unstable. Instead of preventing or defusing grievances contracted by fellow Conservatives, Peel's rule cumulated and channeled those grievances into votes of defiance against the leadership. Still, his decision to move the repeal made perfect political sense. He was faced with two options. Either do nothing and offer the Irish, the Radicals, and the median voter to Russell, or preempt and risk Tory backbenchers' resentment. In the absence of any threat to his leadership, the latter choice was the less undesirable of the two. Certainly, there was the danger that the backbenchers' row would beget a counter-leadership, as it eventually did, but such an outcome was probabilistic, as Peel had managed to ride out all previous crises.

This chapter also raised a general problem. How to model a policy process in which the rules of the games are also the stakes of the game, that is, in which policymaking occurs in a non-institutionalized setting? A "non-institutionalized setting" can be defined as a competitive political arena in which the means of competition, the political resources, are left undefined. More precisely, a non-institutionalized political arena is one in which it is unclear whether success requires the organization of a small group of individuals with a concentrated, material interest, or the ideological mobilization of rationally ignorant voters; whether policies are adjudicated based on each side's capacity to get access to a selected group of insiders, or on each side's capacity to muster broad support among the masses of voting outsiders; whether policymakers are more sensitive to campaign funds than to votes, or vice versa; whether funds can buy votes, or whether funds flow to the side with the greater voting appeal; in sum,
its opposite: the weakening of the party caucus and the creation in its stead of a committee system in Congress, a system which has been correctly described as the institutionalization of logrolling among parochial interests. As today’s political debate is being drained from its class content, local disparities are likely to resurface. For as districts are more politically dissimilar, seats grow safe, tensions between leaders and followers increase, and politics becomes more parochial and interest-based.

Appendix

The variables used in Tables, 3, 4, and 5 are described and their sources identified. Dependent Variable: scored −1, 0, +1 respectively for Conservatives’ vote against Peel, absent or abstention, and vote for Peel on the third reading of the Corn Law repeal bill, May 15 1846 (Aydelotte’s variable V223).

Independent Variables


CONFID46: same as CONFID42, including Aydelotte’s variables V293, V243, V244, V386, V271, V385, V324 and V276; three Corn Law repeal votes (one of them being the dependent variable, the other two bearing on the same issue but at a different stage of the legislative procedure) were not included.


CONFID46*: same as CONFID42, including Aydelotte’s variables V243, V244, V386, V271, V385, V324 and V276.

LAND: scored 0–1; whether MP was related to landed class (Aydelotte’s variable V69).

BUSINESS: scored 0–1; whether MP had any non-agricultural business interest (Aydelotte’s variable V119, with “minor business interest” lumped together with “business interest”).

FATHER IN BUSINESS: scored 0–1; whether father of MP had non-agricultural interest (Aydelotte’s variable V120, treated as V119 above).

CORN: percentage of acreage of MP’s county planted in corn, 1866.

SHEEP: sheep per acreage in MP’s county, 1866.

CATTLE: head of cattle per 100 acres in MP’s county, 1866.

COTTON: ratio of cotton employment, 1839, to registered voters in constituency, 1849.

IRON: ratio of iron production in MP’s county, 1843, to registered voters in constituency, 1846.

RIOT: scored 0–1; whether civil disturbances had occurred in MP’s county in 1842.

DISTRICT: scored 0–1, whether MP’s district was a county or a borough in May 1846; with university lumped together with county.
I am grateful to Chris Achen, Henry Brady, John Conley, Hong-Gu Nam, and David Landon for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank William A. Niskanen and Timothy McCarthy for providing a data set available for this research. The research was supported by the University of Sydney. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian Research Council. The research was supported by the University of Sydney. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian Research Council. The research was supported by the University of Sydney. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian Research Council.

REFERENCES


NOTES

FREE TRADE REAPPRAISED


Unlike protection, free trade has no negative externalities.


Anderson and Tollison, 202; Schonhardt-Bailey, “Linking Constituency Interests,” 42.

Anderson and Tollison, 202.


Irwin, “Political Economy and Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws.”

Kemp, “Reflections,” 201.


THE CATALYSTS FOR REPEAL

33 The committee played the role of a broker between potential candidates and powerful local magnates.


36 Prest, 49–50.


41 Right after the 1941 general election but before the Queen sent for him, Peel said at a banquet: “I am constantly asked what is it I mean to propose, supposing I am called to the administration of affairs; I will answer that question when I am placed in that position.” Cf. by Henry Jephson, *The Platform: Its Rise and Progress* Vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1892), 308.

42 Newbould, “Dilemma of Reform,” 233 passim.

43 The 1841–2 events were a dress rehearsal of the 1845 drama. In order to recoup a loss of parliamentary support, the Whig government had in 1841 decided to go to the voters after failing their flag to the cause of freer trade in the form of Russell’s proposal to reduce the corn duties. They hoped that the proposal would do more than “offset their losses in the counties by gains in the boroughs and especially in Radical support.” The strategy failed, mostly because Peel declined to take up the challenge and champion the cause of the Corn Laws. Not only did he make sure to bring the Whig government down on an issue other than their Corn Law proposal, but he personally refused to endorse any specific course with regard to the Corn Laws. He was so deft at defusing the Whigs’ electoral offensive that the trade issue assumed a backseat and substantial Radical support actually went to Tory candidates. Many Radicals even felt that a liberal trade policy might more likely come from Peel than from Russell. Betty Kemp, “The General Election of 1841,” *History New ser.* 37 (June 1952), 151–54; G. Kitson Clark, *Peel and the Conservative Party* (London: Bell, 1929), 474; William Harris, *The History of the Radical Party in Parliament* (London: Kegan & Trench, 1885), 310–11.

44 Donald Grove Barnes, *A History of the English Corn Laws from 1660–1846*
FREE TRADE REAPPRAISED


46 Cox 1987, 56.

47 William B. Gwyn, Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain (London: Athlone Press, 1962), Ch. 3.


51 Moore, Politics of Deference.

52 The importance of local influence has not received due attention. Even Aydelotte, who pointed to the uniquely high statistical correlation between the districts' electoral and demographic characters on the one hand and voting in the 1842–1847 Parliament on the other, paradoxically found no indication that this correlation reflected constituents' pressure; the reelection of incumbents showed no relation to policy output (Aydelotte, "Constituency and legislature"), while three of MPs resigning their seat because of a divergence with their constituency or some local magnate abroad: the Maynooth controversy in 1945, and especially the Corn Law crisis in 1846. About seven MPs voluntarily resigned in the months preceding the repeal, because they could not reconcile their allegiance to Peel with their constituents' interests (Donald Read, Peel and the Victorians (London: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 181). This explains why these cases were not picked up by Aydelotte's statistical setup.


56 Fraser, "Party Voting," 777.


58 Stewart, "Ten Hours and Sugar Crises of 1844."
FREE TRADE REAPPRAISED

Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets,”

77 This trend has already been noted in the USA; see David W. Brady, *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). As for Britain, note an interesting comparison of British Premier John Major's plight on the European issue with Peel's dilemma in *The Economist*, 10 October 1992, p. 44.

II

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REPEAL