Appendix: *Who Wants to Deliberate – and Why?*

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All data necessary to replicate the results in the published paper are available at:
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/mneblo/papers.htm

Question Wording, Response Categories, Variables Names, and Indices for:
2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)

▪**Sunshine Democracy: An index – created by a principal components factor analysis – composed of the following four items:** *(5 point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree)*
1. Openness to other people's views, and a willingness to compromise are important for politics in a country as diverse as ours.
2. It is important for elected officials to discuss and debate things thoroughly before making major policy changes.
3. In a democracy like ours, there are some important differences between how government should be run and how a business should be managed.
4. It is important for the people and their elected representatives to have the final say in running government, rather than leaving it up to unelected experts.

▪**Stealth Democracy: An index – created by a principal components factor analysis – composed of the following four items:** *(5 point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree)*
1. Elected officials would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take action on important problems.
2. What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out one's principles.
3. Our government would run better if decisions were left up to successful business people.
4. Our government would run better if decisions were left up to non-elected, independent experts rather than politicians or the people.

▪**Trust in Government:** A 4-point scale of responses to the following statement:
I trust government officials generally. (1=not at all; 4= always)

▪**Political Interest:** A 5-point scale of responses to the following statement:
"I am interested in politics." (5=strongly agree; 1=strongly disagree)

▪**Conflict Avoidance:** A 5-point scale of responses to the following statement:
"When people argue about politics, I feel uncomfortable." (1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree)

▪**Efficacy:** An Index – created through a principal components factor analysis – composed of the following two items:
"Public officials don't care what people like me think."
"I can't influence government decisions."

▪**Need for Cognition:** An Index – created through a principal components factor analysis – composed of the following two items:

1. Would you say you have opinions about... [almost everything, about many things, about some things, about very few things]?
2. Some people like to have responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of thinking, and other people don't like to have responsibility for situations like that. Do you... [like them a lot, like them somewhat, neither like nor dislike, dislike them somewhat, dislike them a lot]?

▪**Need for judgment:** An Index – created through a principal components factor analysis – composed of the following two items:
1. Please tell us how much the statement below describes you: It is very important to me to hold strong opinions.
2. Please tell us how much the statement below describes you: I often prefer to remain neutral about complex issues.

▪**Strength of Partisanship:** A 7-point party identification scale, folded. (1=independent, 4=strong partisan).

▪**Church Attendance:** Respondents' answers about frequency of church attendance. (1=almost never or never; 4=once a week or more)

▪**Education:** Respondent's level of formal education (6 categories)
▪**Income:** Respondent's family income. (14 categories)

▪**White:** 1=white; 0=non-white; ▪**Age:** Respondent's age; ▪**Male:**1=male; 0=female.

▪**Full Time Employment:** 1=full time employment; 0= non full-time employment.

▪**Treatment Conditions:** "Recently there has been interest in helping regular citizens get more input into the policy process. For example, many organizations run [**one hour/one day**] sessions where citizens [**come together/use the internet**] to discuss [**important issues/immigration policy**] [**none/with their member of Congress/with local officials**]. [**none/participants get $25 as thanks for their involvement**]" 1=one hour; 0=1 day**;** 1=internet; 0=come together (in-person)**;** 1=important issues; 0=immigration policy**;** 1=meet with member of Congress; 0=other two conditions**;** 1=$25 incentive; 0=no incentive

Question Wording, Response Categories, Variables Names, and Indices for:
Knowledge Networks Study (2006)

▪Sunshine Democracy ▪Stealth Democracy ▪Efficacy ▪Need for Cognition ▪Need for Judgment ▪Strength of Partisanship ▪Male *[Same as CCES Above]*

▪Trust in Government: An index – created by a principal components factor analysis – composed of the following four items: (1=not at all; 4= always)
1. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington DC to do what is right?
2. How much of the time do you think you can trust [MOC], your Member of Congress, to do what is right?
3. How much do elections make government pay attention to what the people think?

▪Conflict Avoidance: An index – created by a principal components factor analysis – composed of the following eight items: *(5 point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree)*
1. When people argue about politics, I often feel uncomfortable.
2. If I'm sure I'm right about a political issue, I don't waste time listening to other people's arguments.
3. I usually find it easy to see political issues from other people's point of view.
4. I have no problem revealing my political beliefs, even to someone who would disagree with me.
5. I would rather not justify my political beliefs to someone who disagrees with me.
6. I do not take it personally when someone disagrees with my political views.
7. When I'm in a group, I often go along with what the majority decides is best, even if it is not what I want personally.
8. When I'm in a group, I stand my ground even if everyone else disagrees with me.

▪Civil Society: An additive index – created by a count of the respondent's reported active participation in the following groups: service club or fraternal organizations (e.g., Elks, Rotary); veterans groups; religious groups; senior citizen's centers or groups; women's groups, issue-oriented political organizations; non-partisan civic organizations; school clubs or associations; hobby, sports teams, or youth groups; neighborhood associations or community groups; groups representing racial/ethnic interests.
High scores = high number of groups in which the respondent participates.

▪Attention to Issue (Immigration): Response to the following question:
Recently there has been a lot of reporting about the issue of illegal immigration. Would you say that you have... [Followed reporting on the issue very closely, Followed reporting on the issue somewhat, Heard about the issue, but not followed it, Have not heard much about the issue]?

▪**Education:** Four-category measure of education [less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor's degree or higher], with higher levels of education indicated by higher scores.

▪**Income:** Nineteen-category measure of reported household income, with higher scores indicating higher income.

▪**Children under 12 in Household:** Number of children under 12 years old living in the household of the respondent.

▪**Employment:** Dummy variable based on reported employment status. Respondents assigned a 1 if they responded that they are employed in one of the following ways: I work as a paid employee; I am self-employed; I am an owner/partner in small business, professional practice, farm; or I work at least 15 hrs/wk w/o pay in family business/farm. Those who reported that they were unemployed, laid off, disabled, retired, a homemaker or gave another response were assigned a 0.

▪**Age:** A seven-category scale of the respondent's age. Higher scores indicate higher age.

Figure R1: Three Factor Measurement Model (Stealth, Sunshine, Acquiescence)



Figure R2: The Interaction between the Member of Congress Treatment & Scores on Stealth



Source: 2006 CCES

Table R1: Predicting Two Types of Political Participation, CCES Respondents			
	Model 1**: Turnout** (logistic regression)	Model 2: **Index of Participation** (negative binomial regression)	
	B (SE)	B (SE)	Predicted Counts
Individual Characteristics			
Strength of Partisanship	.241(.082)***	.008 (.014)	
Church Attendance	.117 (.074)	.020 (.011)*	.06
Education	.242 (.069)****	.098 (.011)****	.33
Income	.053 (.026)**	.019 (.004)****	.16
White	.548 (.226)**	-.032 (.044)	
Full Time Employment	.150 (.207)	-.010 (.033)	
Age	.046 (.007)****	.005 (.001)****	.15
Male	.322 (.188)*	-.023 (.029)	
Motivation			
Interest	.632 (.105)****	.382 (.027)****	.72
Conflict Avoidance	-.010 (.080)	-.057 (.012)****	-.16
Efficacy	-.020 (.100)	.061 (.014)****	.15
Need for Cognition	.144 (.109)	.066 (.017)****	.16
Need for Judgment	.062 (.113)	.018 (.017)	
Democratic Practice			
Sunshine Democracy	-.146 (.092)	-.017 (.016)	
Stealth Democracy	-.196 (.103)*	-.095 (.015)****	-.23
Trust in Government	.056 (.157)	.002 (.026)	
Constant	-5.494 (.715)****	-1.589 (.156)****	
Alpha (dispersion parameter)	---	.028 (.013)**	
Number of Observations	2103	2237	
Pseudo R^2	.22	.09	
LR χ^2	257.90 (.000)	810.01 (.000)	

*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<01 ****p<.001
Note: Stealth and Trust have been centered in both models. Predicted Counts are calculated using S-Post, and are calculated from +/- ½ s.d

Turnout is vote in the 2006 midterm election.
Index of Participation is a simple count of reporting the following behaviors in the last two years: Attended a political protest or rally; Contacted a public official; Worked for a campaign; Given money to a campaign; Worked with others in your community to solve a problem; Served on a community board; Written a "letter to the editor"; Held a publicly elected office
[These criteria apply to Table R2, below, as well.]

Table R2: Predictors of Political Participation (Knowledge Networks)				
	Voted in 2004 Election Logit B (S.E.)		Participation Index Negative Binomial B (S.E.)	Predicted Counts (+/- ½ s.d.)
Individual Characteristics				
Strength of Partisanship	.443**** (.085)	[25.76]****	.062** (.030)	.05
Education	.366**** (.099)	[3.39]*	.145*** (.042)	.11
Income	.071**** (.020)	[4.64]**	.005	(.007)
White	.054 (.181)	[0.66]	.180** (.072)	.13
Children (<12) in Household	-.025 (.082)	[0.93]	-.123**** (.035)	-.09
Employment	.008 (.162)	[3.28]*	-.072	(.057)
Age	.329**** (.058)	[20.08]****	.016*** (.006)	.01
Male	-.075 (.177)	[0.02]	.034	(.058)
Motivation				
Conflict Avoidance	.101 (.089)	[2.20]	-.078** (.032)	-.06
Efficacy	.234** (.094)	[0.02]	.180**** (.032)	.13
Civil Society	.278**** (.075)	[5.71]**	.281**** (.017)	.21
Attention to Issue	.389*** (.121)	[0.20]	.242**** (.048)	.18
Need for Cognition	-.019 (.092)	[0.42]	.114*** (.037)	.08
Need for Judgment	.218** (.093)	[0.78]	.076** (.036)	.05
Democratic Practice				
Sunshine Democracy	-.164** (.083)	[8.83]***	.053* (.031)	.04
Stealth Democracy	-.173** (.079)	[3.92]**	-.062** (.028)	-.05
Trust in Government	.103 (.075)	[1.53]	-.008	(.029)
Other Model Variables				
Constant	-3.658**** (.575)		-2.173**** (.230)	
Alpha	---		.248**** (.041)	
Number of Observations	1867		1980	
Cox & Snell R2	.134		.131	
Nagelkerke R2	.243		---	
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<01 ****p<.001				

* Bracketed numbers in the first column are SURE Wald tests for equality across coefficients compared to Model 1 of Table 4

Table R3: Participation in Deliberative Session with Expert (Knowledge Networks)		
	Willingness to participate Logit B (S.E)	**Showing Up for Session Logit B (S.E.)**
Individual Characteristics		
Strength of Partisanship	-.206 (.189)	.055 (.258)
Education	-.154 (.260)	-.086 (.373)
Income	.019 (.059)	-.157* (.094)
White	-1.243 (1.184)	-.999 (1.294)
Children (<12) in Household	-.108 (.269)	.198 (.356)
Employment	-.883*** (.412)	-.530 (.534)
Age	-.282 (.173)	-.332 (.239)
Male	.316 (.360)	.227 (.485)
Motivation		
Conflict Avoidance	-.207 (.188)	-.086 (.269)
Efficacy	-.039 (.215)	.508* (.274)
Civil Society	-.031 (.121)	-.082 (.174)
Attention to Issue	.427 (.293)	.430 (.417)
Need for Cognition	.592*** (.209)	.231 (.314)
Need for Judgment	.156 (.207)	.112 (.306)
Democratic Practice		
Sunshine Democracy	.286 (.180)	-.395 (.304)
Stealth Democracy	-.093 (.181)	-.198 (.216)
Trust in Government	.355** (.180)	-.070 (.231)
Constant	3.255 (2.056)	3.818 (2.556)
Model Characteristics		
Number of Observations	192	108
Cox & Snell R2	.123	.155
Nagelkerke R2	.168	.208
Percent Correct	67.2%	68.5%
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<01 ****p<.001		

SPSS code for reproducing Table 1 in Neblo et al. (2010):

Note: data management was done with SPSS v.17. Code for raw variable transformation and case selection directly below.

Model estimation was done with Stata 10. Code for model estimation follows the SPSS code.

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*/ Recoding to eliminate missing values of -2 and -1 from data. -- BAS 20 & 21, FOL 20 & 21, all NOV vars. not in dataset.

RECODE CONS CONS2 BAS1_1 BAS1_2 BAS1_3 BAS1_4 BAS11A BAS11B BAS11C BAS11D BAS11E BAS11F BAS11G
BAS11H BAS11I BAS11J BAS10A BAS10B BAS10C BAS10D BAS10E BAS10F BAS10G BAS12 BAS13 BAS14 BAS15 BAS16
BAS17 BAS18 BAS19 BAS19C BAS19D BAS19A BAS19B BAS22 BAS25 BAS26 BAS27A BAS27B BAS27C
BAS28 BAS29 BAS30 BAS30A BAS30B BAS31A BAS32 BAS32B BAS32C BAS32A BAS33 BAS33B BAS33C BAS33A BAS34
BASL34_1 BASL34_2 BASL34_3 BASL34_4 BASL34_5 BASL34_6 BASL34_7 BASL34_8 BASL34_9 BASL3410 BAS31
BAS35_1 BAS35_2 BAS35_3 BAS35_4 BAS35_5 BAS35_6 BAS49_1 BAS49_2 BAS41_1 BAS41_2 BAS41_3 BAS41_4
BAS5 BAS6 BAS7 BAS8 BAS9 BAS45 BAS46 BAS47 BAS48 TAB BGM26 BGM27A BGM27B BGM30A BGM30B BGM32 BGM32B
BGM32C BGM33 BGM33B BGM33C BGM34 BGML34_1 BGML34_2 BGML34_3 BGML34_4 BGML34_5 PST1 PST2 PST3 PST4
PST5 PST6 PST7 PST8 PST9 PST9A_1 PST9A_2 PST9A_3 PST9A_4 PST9A_5 PST11 PST12 PST13_1 PST13_2
PST13_3 PST13_4 PST13_5 PST13_6 PST13_7 PST13_8 PST13_9 PST13_10 PST13_11 PST14_1 PST14_2 PST14_3
PST14_4 PST14_5 PST14_6 PST14_7 PST14_8 PST14_9 FOL1_1 FOL1_2 FOL1_3 FOL1_4 FOL53 FOL11A FOL11B
FOL11C FOL11D FOL11E FOL11F FOL11G FOL11H FOL11I FOL11J FOL10A FOL10B FOL10C FOL10D FOL10E FOL10F
FOL10G FOL13 FOL14 FOL15 FOL15B FOL15C FOL15D FOL15E FOL16 FOL17 FOL19 FOL19C FOL19D FOL52
FOL22 FOL25 FOL50 FOL28 FOL29 FOL30A FOL30B FOL31A FOL32 FOL32B FOL32C FOL32A D_FOL54D

D_FOL51D FOL54 FOL54B FOL54C FOL33 FOL33B FOL33C FOL33A FOL51 FOL51B FOL51C FOL34 FOL45_1 FOL45_2
FOL45_3 FOL45_4 FOL45_5 FOL45_6 FOL45_7 FOL45_8 FOL45_9 FOL49 FOL50NEW FOLL34_1 FOLL34_2 FOLL34_3
FOLL34_4 FOLL34_5 FOLL34_6 FOLL34_7 FOLL34_8 FOLL34_9 FOLL3410 FOLL3411 FOLL3412 FOLL3413 FOL41_1
FOL41_2 FOL41_3 FOL41_4 PPAGE PPAGECAT PPAGECT4 PPDUALIN PPEDUC
PPEDUCAT PPETHM PPGENDER PPHHHEAD PPHHSIZE PPHOUSE PPINCIMP PPMARIT PPMSACAT PPNET PPREG4 PPREG9
PPRENT PPSTATEN PPT01 PPT1317 PPT18OV PPT25 PPT612 PPWORK PARTYID7 PARTYID3 PPPA0001 PPPA0002
PPPA0003 PPPA0004 PPPA0005 PPPA0006 PPPA0241 PPPA0242 PPPA0240 PPPA0010 PPPA0012 PPPA0013 PPPA0014
PPPA0015 PPPA0016 PPPA0017 PPPA0018 PPPA0019 PPPA0020 PPPA0021 PPPA0022 PPPA0023 PPPA0024 PPPA0025
PPPA0026 PPPA0042 PPPA0043 PPPA0044 PPPA0045 PPPA0046 PPPA0048 PPPA0049 PPPA0050 PPPA0051 PPPA0052
PPPA0053 PPPA0054 PPPA0055 PPPA0056 PPPA0057 PPPA0058 PPPA0059 PPPA0060 PPPA0061 PPPA0062 PPPA0063
PPPA0064 PPPA0065 PPPA0066 PPPA0067 PPPA0068 PPPA0069 PPPA0070 PPPA0071 PPPA0072 PPPA0073 PPPA0074
PPPA0075 PPPA0076 PPPA0077 PPPA0078 PPPA0079 PPPA0080 PPPA0081 PPPA0082 PPPA0083 PPPA0084 PPPA0085
PPPA0086 PPPA0087 PPPA0088 PPPA0089 PPPA0090 PPPA0091 PPPA0092 PPPA0093 PPPA0094 PPPA0095 PPPA0096
PPPA0098 PPPA0099 PPPA0100 PPPA0101 PPPA0102 PPPA0201 PPPA0202 PPPA0203 PPPA0204 PPPA0205 PPPA0206
PPPA0207 PPPA0208 PPPA0209 PPPA0210 PPPA0211 PPPA0243 PPPA0244 PPPA0245 PPPA0246 PPPA0247 PPPA0248
PPPA0007 PPPA0008 PPPA0031 PPPA0032 PPPA0033 PPPA0103 PPPA0034 PPPA0035 PPPA0036 PPPA0037 PPPA0038
PPPA0039 PPPA0040 PPPA0041 PPPA0200 PPPA0212 PPPA0213 PPPA0214 PPPA0215 PPPA0216 PPPA0217 PPPA0218
PPPA0219 PPPA0220 PPPA0221 PPPA0222 PPPA0223 PPPA0224 PPPA0225 PPPA0226 PPPA0227 PPPA0228 PPPA0229
PPPA0230 PPPA0231 PPPA0232 PPPA0233 PPPA0234 PPPA0027 PPPA0028 PPPA0029 PPPA0030 PPPA0097
(-2=SYSMIS) (-1=SYSMIS).
EXECUTE.

```
*/ Recoding CONS, willing to participate in both sessions, into a dummy variable.

RECODE CONS (1=1) (2=0) INTO ConsDum.
VARIABLE LABELS  ConsDum 'Willing to participate in both sessions, bivariate.'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Recoding CONS2, willing to participate in at least one session, into a dummy variable.

RECODE CONS2 (1=1) (2=1) (3=0) (4=0) INTO Cons2Dum.
VARIABLE LABELS  Cons2Dum 'Bivariate version of willingness to participate in at least one
'+
    'session.'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Recode SysMis to 0 in Cons2Dum so it can be added to ConsDum.

RECODE Cons2Dum (SYSMIS=0).
EXECUTE.

*/ Full variable of willingness to participate in at least 1 session.

COMPUTE Participate=ConsDum+Cons2Dum.
VARIABLE LABELS  Participate 'Is respondent willing to participate in at least 1 session '+
    '(ConsDum+Cons2Dum)'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Factor analysis of Sunshine Democracy questions from Neblo et al.

FACTOR
  /VARIABLES BAS1_1 BAS1_2 BAS1_3 BAS1_4
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /ANALYSIS BAS1_1 BAS1_2 BAS1_3 BAS1_4
  /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION FSCORE
  /PLOT EIGEN
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /SAVE REG(ALL)
  /METHOD=CORRELATION.
```

```
*/ Correction for Sunshine so that higher values reflect higher levels of support for "sunshine" democracy.

COMPUTE Sunshine2=Sunshine * -1.
VARIABLE LABELS  Sunshine2 'Sunshine democracy variable, principle components factor analysis of '+
    'Bas1_1-1_4 * -1'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Factor analysis of Stealth democracy questions.

FACTOR
  /VARIABLES BAS41_1 BAS41_2 BAS41_3 BAS41_4
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /ANALYSIS BAS41_1 BAS41_2 BAS41_3 BAS41_4
  /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION FSCORE
  /PLOT EIGEN
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /SAVE REG(ALL)
  /METHOD=CORRELATION.

*/ Inverse of stealth so that it conforms with an interpretatin of more agreement with stealth questions = higher stealth

COMPUTE Stealth2=Stealth * -1.
VARIABLE LABELS  Stealth2 'Stealth measure * 1 so that higher levels of support for stealth is '+
    'high.'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Factor score for political efficacy.  Whether person thinks they have a voice in government, BAS13 BAS14 BAS15 -- looks like it could be 2 components.

FACTOR
  /VARIABLES BAS13 BAS14 BAS15
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /ANALYSIS BAS13 BAS14 BAS15
  /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION FSCORE
```

```
  /PLOT EIGEN
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /SAVE REG(ALL)
  /METHOD=CORRELATION.

*/ Reformulation of expected income in two years, 1 = better, -1 worse, 0 about the same.

RECODE BAS19A (1=1) (2=-1) (3=0) INTO FutureInc.
VARIABLE LABELS  FutureInc 'Expectation of individual wellbeing in two years.'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Reformulation of expected economic performance in two years, 1 = better, -1 = worse, 0 =
about the same.

RECODE BAS19B (1=1) (2=-1) (3=0) INTO FutureEcon.
VARIABLE LABELS  FutureEcon 'Expectation of how the national economy will perform in
the next '+
    'two years'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Recoding of how much attention respondent has paid to immigration issue in the news, so
high = high.

RECODE BAS26 (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1) INTO IssueAttention.
VARIABLE LABELS  IssueAttention 'How much attention has person payed to immigration in
the news?'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Coding for whether respondent is African American (AfAm)

RECODE PPETHM (1=0) (2=1) (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) INTO AfAm.
VARIABLE LABELS  AfAm 'Is respondent African American?'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Coding for whether respondent if Hispanic (Hisp)

RECODE PPETHM (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=1) (5=0) INTO Hisp.
VARIABLE LABELS  Hisp 'Is respondent Hispanic?'.
```

```
EXECUTE.

*/ Coding for whether respondent has children under 12 yrs. old in household.

COMPUTE Children012=PPT01 + PPT25 + PPT612.
VARIABLE LABELS  Children012 'Presence of Children < 12 yrs. in household'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Coding for whether respondent has traditional employment (wage labor, self-employed,
family farm, owner/partner in small business).

RECODE PPWORK (1 thru 4=1) (5 thru 9=0) INTO TradEmp.
VARIABLE LABELS  TradEmp 'Is the individual involved in traditional employment (not
unemployed, '+
    'houseperson, etc.)'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Recoding gender into dummy variable with 1 = male.

RECODE PPGENDER (1=1) (2=0) INTO male.
VARIABLE LABELS  male 'is respondent male'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Recoding marital status into dummy with 1 = married.

RECODE PPMARIT (1=1) (2 thru Highest=0) INTO married.
VARIABLE LABELS  married 'is respondent currently married?'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Creation of strength of partisanship variable by folding partyID in 7 categories into Partisan
with 4 categoris.

RECODE PARTYID7 (1=4) (7=4) (2=3) (6=3) (3=2) (5=2) (4=1) INTO Partisan.
VARIABLE LABELS  Partisan 'strength of partisanship, folded PartyID scale'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Recoding political interest variable so high interest is reflected in highest number (PolInterest)
-- not as many missing as in Main dataset, can use in analysis.

RECODE PPPA0004 (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1) INTO PolInterest.
```

```
VARIABLE LABELS  PolInterest 'Interest in Politics rated high to low'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Computation of CivSoc variable, measuring the number of different types of civil society
organizations the individual is involved with.

COMPUTE CivSoc=PPPA0049+PPPA0050 + PPPA0051 + PPPA0052 + PPPA0053 +
PPPA0055 + PPPA0056 + PPPA0057
   + PPPA0058 + PPPA0059 + PPPA0060.
VARIABLE LABELS  CivSoc 'Level of membership in civic society organizations.'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Computation of ComAct, measuring the number of community activist activities the
respondent has been involved with in the last year.

COMPUTE ComAct=PPPA0062 + PPPA0063 + PPPA0064 + PPPA0065 + PPPA0066.
VARIABLE LABELS  ComAct 'Reported number of community public activities (PTA, Church
Group, '+
   'etc.) the respondent is involved with.'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Computation of PolAct, measuring the number of political activist activities the respondent
has been involved with in the last year.

COMPUTE PolAct=PPPA0068 + PPPA0069 + PPPA0070 + PPPA0071 + PPPA0072 +
PPPA0073 + PPPA0074 +
   PPPA0075.
VARIABLE LABELS  PolAct 'Number of political activist activities the respondent has
participated '+
   'in in the last year.'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Computation of Civic Responsibility variable.  Standardized 0-1, with 1 indicating a high
degree of civic responsibility. -- missing data problem not present in this data.

COMPUTE CivResponsibility=((PPPA0021/5)+(1-(PPPA0022/5))+(1-(PPPA0023/5))+(1-
(PPPA0024/5))+(
   PPPA0025/5)+(1-(PPPA0026/5)))/6.
VARIABLE LABELS  CivResponsibility 'Strength of civic responsibility - composite of '+
   'PPPA0021-0026.'.
```

```
EXECUTE.

*/ Recoding the selection of experimental group to denote who was selected to participate --
control variable in outcome equation.

RECODE EXP_GRP (0=0) (1=1) (2=1) (3 thru Highest=0) INTO ExpSel.
VARIABLE LABELS  ExpSel 'Randomly selected into one of the two experimental groups'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Recode DISCPART so it is 1 with 1 including partial.

RECODE DISCPART (1=1) (2=1) (0=0) INTO PartDisc.
VARIABLE LABELS  PartDisc 'Did the respondent participate or partially participate in the '+
    'discussion as scheduled?'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Recode missing data in PartDisc to 0 if person was selected to participate in an experimental
group.

DO IF (ExpSel = 1).
RECODE PartDisc (1=1) (SYSMIS=0).
END IF.
EXECUTE.

*/ Recode DISCPART into PartDisc2 so it is 1 with 1 including all participants and partial
participands, 0 is all non-participant, whether by choice or being left out of experiment..

RECODE DISCPART (1=1) (2=1) (0=0) INTO PartDisc2.
VARIABLE LABELS  PartDisc2 'Did the respondent participate or partially participate in the '+
    'discussion as scheduled (from full sample)?'.
EXECUTE.

DO IF (ExpSel = 1).
RECODE PartDisc2 (1=1) (SYSMIS=0).
END IF.
EXECUTE .

DO IF (Participate = 0).
RECODE PartDisc2 (SYSMIS=0).
END IF.
```

```
EXECUTE.

*/ Conflict tolerance variable, factor of BAS35_1-35_6 & BAS49_1-49_2 -- factor analysis
actually suggests that this might be 2 to 3 components.

FACTOR
  /VARIABLES BAS35_1 BAS35_2 BAS35_3 BAS35_4 BAS35_5 BAS35_6 BAS49_1
BAS49_2
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /ANALYSIS BAS35_1 BAS35_2 BAS35_3 BAS35_4 BAS35_5 BAS35_6 BAS49_1
BAS49_2
  /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION FSCORE
  /PLOT EIGEN
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /SAVE REG(ALL)
  /METHOD=CORRELATION.

*/ Conflict avoidance variable, conflict tolerance factor * -1. -- makes factor consistent with
Mutz's concept.

COMPUTE ConflictAvoid=ConflictTolerance * -1.
VARIABLE LABELS  ConflictAvoid 'Measure of conflict avoidance, ConflictTolerance * -1'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Does person know what job Dick Cheney has (assumed that if they did not not know, they
knew).

RECODE BAS5 (1=0) (SYSMIS=1) INTO KnowDick.
VARIABLE LABELS  KnowDick 'Does the person know the position of Dick Cheney in the
government?'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Does person know that supreme court decides on constitutionality?

RECODE BAS6 (3=1) (1=0) (2=0) (4=0) INTO SupCt.
VARIABLE LABELS  SupCt 'Does respondent know that supreme court decides on
constitutionality?'.
EXECUTE.
```

```
*/ Does respondent know how much it takes (2/3) to override a presidential veto?

RECODE BAS7 (3=1) (1=0) (2=0) (4=0) (5=0) (6=0) INTO Override.
VARIABLE LABELS  Override 'Does respondent know how many votes to override a
presidential veto?'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Does respondent know that the Republicans controlled the House of Reps. in 2004?

RECODE BAS8 (1=0) (4=0) (2=1) (3=0) INTO House.
VARIABLE LABELS  House 'Does respondent know who controls the house, 2004?'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Does respondent know that Republicans are considered more conservative?

RECODE BAS9 (1=0) (4=0) (2=1) (3=0) INTO PartyIDeo.
VARIABLE LABELS  PartyIDeo 'Does respondent correctly identify Republicans as being
more '+
    'conservative?'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Number of correct answers to political knowledge questions, BAS5-9.

COMPUTE PolKnow=KnowDick + SupCt + Override + House + PartyIDeo.
VARIABLE LABELS  PolKnow 'Additive index of political knowledge based on correct
answers to '+
    'questions BAS5-9.'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Need for cognition, factor analysis of BAS45-46.

FACTOR
  /VARIABLES BAS45 BAS46
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /ANALYSIS BAS45 BAS46
  /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION FSCORE
  /PLOT EIGEN
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
```

```
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /SAVE REG(ALL)
  /METHOD=CORRELATION.
```

*/ Correction of need for cognition, so that higher levels show greater need for cognition.

```
COMPUTE Cognition2=Cognition * -1.
VARIABLE LABELS  Cognition2 'Need for cognition, factor of BAS45-46 * -1'.
EXECUTE.
```

*/ Need for judgement, factor analysis of BAS47-48.

```
FACTOR
  /VARIABLES BAS47 BAS48
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /ANALYSIS BAS47 BAS48
  /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION FSCORE
  /PLOT EIGEN
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /SAVE REG(ALL)
  /METHOD=CORRELATION.
```

*/ Recode network size from sysmis to zero if individual reported not talking to anyone in BAS27A

```
DO IF (BAS27A = 2).
RECODE NetSize (SYSMIS=0).
END IF.
EXECUTE.
```

*/ Recode network agreement from sysmis to 3 (half and half) if individual reported not talking to anyone in BAS27A.

```
DO IF (BAS27A = 2).
RECODE NetAgree (SYSMIS=3).
END IF.
EXECUTE.
```

```
*/ Create natural log of NetSize, to bring in outliers.

COMPUTE lnNetSize=LN(NetSize+1).
EXECUTE .



*/ Factor analysis of Trust in Government, using BAS16-18.

FACTOR
  /VARIABLES BAS16 BAS17 BAS18
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /ANALYSIS BAS16 BAS17 BAS18
  /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION
  /PLOT EIGEN
  /CRITERIA FACTORS(1) ITERATE(25)
  /EXTRACTION PC
  /ROTATION NOROTATE
  /SAVE REG(ALL)
  /METHOD=CORRELATION.

*/ Inversion of trust so that higher levels of trust are high.

COMPUTE Trust2=Trust * -1.
VARIABLE LABELS  Trust2 'Trust measure * 1 so that higher levels of trust are high.'.
EXECUTE.

*/ Strength of opinions about immigration.

RECODE BASL34_1 BASL34_2 BASL34_3 BASL34_4 BASL34_5 BASL34_6 BASL34_7
BASL34_8 BASL34_9 BASL3410
    (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1) (5=2) (6=3) (7=4) INTO L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 L10.
EXECUTE.

COMPUTE StrengthOp=(L1+L2+L3+L4+L5+L6+L7+L8+L9+L10)/10.
EXECUTE.

*/ creation of vote variable

RECODE PPPA0241 (2=0) (1=1) INTO DidVote04.
```

```
VARIABLE LABELS  DidVote04 'Dummy variable version of PPPA0241, 1 if person voted in
2004'.
EXECUTE.

*/ creation of white variable

RECODE PPETHM (2=0) (1=1) (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) INTO white.
VARIABLE LABELS  white 'does respondent identify as white, PPETHM'.
EXECUTE.


/* Creation of partisanship variable for MOC, 1 = MOC is Republican

RECODE GEO_GRP (1=0) (2=0) (3=1) (4=1) (5=0) (6=0) (7=1) (8=1) (9=0) (10=0) (11=0)
(12=1) (13=0)
   (14=0) (15=1) (16=1) INTO RepublicanMbr.
VARIABLE LABELS  RepublicanMbr 'Dummy variable coded 1 if MOC is Republican'.
EXECUTE.

/* Creation of partisanship variable for matching with respondent ideology (1=Democrat,
2=Republican)

RECODE RepublicanMbr (1=1) (0=2) INTO MbrPartyCat.
VARIABLE LABELS  MbrPartyCat 'Categorical version of RepublicanMbr for matching with
respondent.'.
EXECUTE.

/* Creation of co-partisanship variable

COMPUTE CoPartisan=MbrPartyCat-PPPA0010.
EXECUTE.

RECODE CoPartisan (0=1) (-5 thru -1=0) (1 thru 5=0).
EXECUTE.

/* Creation of gender variable for MOC, 1 = MOC is Male

RECODE GEO_GRP (1=1) (2=1) (3=1) (4=1) (5=1) (6=1) (7=1) (8=1) (9=1) (10=0) (11=1)
(12=1) (13=1)
   (14=0) (15=0) (16=1) INTO MbrMale.
```

```
VARIABLE LABELS  MbrMale 'Dummy variable coded 1 if MOC is Male'.
EXECUTE.

/* Creation of profile variable for MOC, 1 = MOC has national profile

RECODE GEO_GRP (1=0) (2=1) (3=1) (4=0) (5=1) (6=1) (7=1) (8=0) (9=0) (10=0) (11=1)
(12=1) (13=0)
   (14=0) (15=1) (16=0) INTO MbrImpt.
VARIABLE LABELS  MbrImpt 'Dummy variable coded 1 if MOC has high level committee
assignment or national profile issue sponsorship'.
EXECUTE.

/* Creation of profile variable for MOC, 1 = MOC is top-50 power ranking

RECODE GEO_GRP (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=1) (6=1) (7=0) (8=0) (9=0) (10=0) (11=0)
(12=0) (13=0)
   (14=0) (15=0) (16=0) INTO Mbr50.
VARIABLE LABELS  Mbr50 'Dummy variable coded 1 if MOC is one of the top-50 most
powerful representatives according to Knowlegis'.
EXECUTE.

/* Approval of MOC job in congress BAS22 flipped so strongly approve is high and don't know
is neutral

RECODE BAS22 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (6=3) (7=3) (-1=SYSMIS) (-2=SYSMIS)
INTO MOCApprove.
VARIABLE LABELS MOCApprove 'Approval of MOC job in congress BAS22 flipped so
strongly approve is high and dont know is neutral'.
EXECUTE.

/* Approval of MOC job on immigration issue BAS29 flipped so strongly approve is high and
don't know is neutral

RECODE BAS29 (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1) (6=3) (7=3) (-1=SYSMIS) (-2=SYSMIS)
INTO MOCIssApp.
VARIABLE LABELS MOCIssApp 'Approval of MOC job on immigration issue BAS29 flipped
so strongly approve is high and dont know is neutral'.
EXECUTE.

/* Trust in MOC to do what is right BAS17 flipped so always is high and don't know is 2.5
```

```
RECODE BAS17 (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1) (5=2.5) (-1=SYSMIS) (-2=SYSMIS) INTO
MOCTrust.
VARIABLE LABELS MOCTrust 'Trust in MOC to do what is right BAS17 flipped so always is
high and dont know is 2.5'.
EXECUTE.
```

STATA Code for reproducing Table 1 in Neblo et al. (2010):

Note: data management was done with SPSS v.17. Code for raw variable transformation and case selection directly above.

Model estimation was done with Stata 10.

Syntax for estimating model Stata 10:

regress willing treatcong2 treathour2 treatint treattop treatinc gender2 age_ct conflict_ct needcog_ct sunshine_ct efficacy_ct pidcoll_ct empfull white stealth2_ct needjud_ct educ_ct income_ct interest_ct chur_ct gentrust_ct intxCon conxste
Note: Stata's "lincom" command was used to test the interaction; we also hand-cranked our checks, using the formulas presented in Brambor et al. (2006),.
Note: all covariates, except the level-1 dummies and treatment dummies were centered. The following code was used to center covariates:
summarize variable, meanonly
gen variablemean=r(mean)
gen variable_ct=variable-variablemean

STATA Code for reproducing Table 2 in Neblo et al. (2010):

```
***Begin:

use "mainknaii_edited_.dta", clear

* drop if nonresponse on particpate
keep if participate<.
* this persons said she would not do the discussion but somehow did:
replace participate=1 if partdisc==1
* this person said she would participate but wasn't given any assignment drop if caseid==2567

gen asscontrol= (participate==1 & (exp_grp==0 | exp_grp==3 | exp_grp==4))

gen willing=participate
drop participate
gen participate=0
replace participate=1 if partdisc==1

gen wparticipate=0
replace wparticipate=1 if partdisc==1
replace wparticipate=. if partdisc==0


egen noattitude=rowmiss(bas1_1 bas1_2 bas1_3 bas1_4 bas41_1 bas41_2
bas41_3 bas41_4)
egen nobassurv=rowmiss(bas*)
drop if nobassurv>87

gen missing= bas1_1==. |
bas1_2==.|bas1_3==.|bas1_4==.|bas41_1==.|bas41_2==.|bas41_3==.|bas41_4==.
keep if missing==0

* unwilling=0, willing=1 (column 1)
logit willing partisan ppeducat ppincimp white children012 trademp ppagecat male conflictavoid
efficacy civsoc issueattention cognition2 judgement sunshine2 stealth2 trust2 knpanel ssipanel
cd1 cd2 cd3 cd4 cd5
cd6 cd7 cd8 cd9 cd10 cd11 cd12 cd13 cd14 cd15 est store col1

* column 2:
```

logit partdisc partisan ppeducat ppincimp white children012 trademp ppagecat male conflictavoid efficacy civsoc issueattention cognition2 judgement sunshine2 stealth2 trust2 knpanel ssipanel cd1 cd2 cd3 cd4 cd5
cd6 cd7 cd8 cd9 cd10 cd11 cd12 cd13 cd14 cd15

* unwilling plus did not show up=0, showed up=1 (column 3) logit participate partisan ppeducat ppincimp white children012 trademp ppagecat male conflictavoid efficacy civsoc issueattention cognition2 judgement sunshine2 stealth2 trust2 knpanel ssipanel cd1 cd2 cd3 cd4 cd5
cd6 cd7 cd8 cd9 cd10 cd11 cd12 cd13 cd14 cd15 if asscontrol==0 est store col3

* column 4:
logit wparticipate partisan ppeducat ppincimp white children012 trademp ppagecat male conflictavoid efficacy civsoc issueattention cognition2 judgement sunshine2 stealth2 trust2 knpanel ssipanel cd1 cd2 cd3 cd4 cd5
cd6 cd7 cd8 cd9 cd10 cd11 cd12 cd13 cd14 cd15 if asscontrol==0

End

Supplementary Discussion and Analysis for the Deliberative Question Wording Experiment

As with many experiments, we had good theoretical reasons to include each of the main effect treatments in a model of the basic question wording experiment, but we had few theoretical expectations about interactions among them.[1]

Nevertheless, we ran a simple, fully-factorial ANOVA as a matter of due diligence to see if a mistaken assumption about the interactions would induce mis-specification in our main model. (We also ran an alternative model using dummy variables and a baseline to represent the fully specified experimental conditions. Unsurprisingly, since the mathematics end up being similar to the ANOVA, the results are very similar. However, as the ANOVA's results are easier to read and interpret, we present that table below.) As the table demonstrates, only one of the twenty-six interaction terms even rises to the .05 level of statistical significance, and that is an uninterpretable (to us at least) four-way interaction. Moreover, when we correct for multiple comparisons, the effect disappears entirely. So, the main dimensions on which deliberative forums vary do not seem to *interact* much at all, which is a negative result of some interest in itself (a point we note in the main paper).

Since all of the treatment conditions were randomly assigned, we know that including them as variables in the combined model should not affect the other independent variables, nor should they be affected by those variables. Thus, as expected, nothing changes in the interpretation of

[1] It had occurred to us that perhaps people might especially want to meet their Member of Congress in person, but this was more of a hunch than a theory, per se. It turns out they don't.

the main effects when they are placed in the context of the larger model – the two that were significant in the ANOVA stay so, and the same goes for the three that were not significant.

We did want to test two theoretically motivated hypotheses about interactions with the treatment conditions. But those hypotheses involved interactions between the treatment conditions and individual level characteristics of the subjects, which required embedding the tests in our larger model. Indeed, both of those hypotheses yielded interesting results (i.e., that the internet condition does not ameliorate the effects of conflict avoidance, and that people high on stealth are especially turned off by the Member of Congress condition *in the hypothetical case*).

Table R4: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Interest in Deliberative Participation

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig. (Raw)
Corrected Model	97.490[a]	47	2.074	1.621	.005
Intercept	41419.464	1	41419.464	32362.085	.000
Time (1 hour / 1 day)	.005	1	.005	.004	.952
Mode (f2f / online)	.447	1	.447	.349	.555
Topic (generic / immigration)	.674	1	.674	.527	.468
Congress (Citizens / Local / MOC)	**23.719**	**2**	**11.859**	**9.266**	**.000**
Incentive (None / $25)	**19.792**	**1**	**19.792**	**15.464**	**.000**
Time * Mode	.297	1	.297	.232	.630
Time * Topic	.706	1	.706	.552	.458
Time * Congress	5.089	2	2.545	1.988	.137
Time * Incentive	.379	1	.379	.296	.586
Mode * Topic	4.635	1	4.635	3.622	.057
Mode * Congress	2.482	2	1.241	.970	.379
Mode * Incentive	.120	1	.120	.093	.760
Topic * Congress	.489	2	.244	.191	.826
Topic * Incentive	.095	1	.095	.074	.785
Congress * Incentive	.714	2	.357	.279	.757
Time * Mode * Topic	1.259	1	1.259	.984	.321
Time * Mode * Congress	2.395	2	1.198	.936	.392
Time * Mode * Incentive	.433	1	.433	.338	.561
Time * Topic * Congress	2.600	2	1.300	1.016	.362
Time * Topic * Incentive	.885	1	.885	.692	.406
Time * Congress * Incentive	1.294	2	.647	.505	.603
Mode * Topic * Congress	3.951	2	1.975	1.543	.214
Mode * Topic * Incentive	.527	1	.527	.412	.521
Mode * Congress * Incentive	3.135	2	1.567	1.225	.294
Topic * Congress * Incentive	.816	2	.408	.319	.727
Time * Mode * Topic * Congress	1.411	2	.705	.551	.576
Time * Mode * Topic * Incentive	1.148	1	1.148	.897	.344
Time * Mode * Congress * Incentive	**8.717**	**2**	**4.358**	**3.405**	**.033**
Time * Topic * Congress * Incentive	4.721	2	2.361	1.844	.158
Mode * Topic * Congress * Incentive	4.256	2	2.128	1.663	.190
Time * Mode * Topic * Congress * Incentive	1.203	2	.602	.470	.625
Error	3828.110	2991	1.280		
Total	45757.000	3039			
Corrected Total	3925.600	3038			

a. R Squared = .025 (Adjusted R Squared = .010)

Robustness Checks on Alternate Specification for the Model in Table 1 of the Main Paper

As a more inductive check, we brainstormed about alternative specifications and plausible interactions between the experimental conditions. We will report on some of those below. Here, we list some of the alternative specifications involving interactions with the experimental conditions to further explore the "conditional" portion of our argument. *None of the new terms in this section yielded significant results across the full range of the interaction, nor changed the basic pattern of findings on the other variables materially, adding to our confidence that the results are reasonably robust to alternate specifications.* (Including the results would run to scores of pages, so we have omitted them, but would be happy to provide the output or replication data upon request.)

1) The Congress condition: This is a unique opportunity/aspect of our study. Thus, we consider other theoretically plausible interactions with the Congress condition:

- political interest (are people who are more interested in politics also more enticed by the Congress "carrot"?)
- trust in government. (are the more trusting more likely "to bite?")
- conflict avoidance (if a respondent is conflict avoidant, she/he may not want to face their member of Congress)

2) The material incentives condition: We suspected that incentives (the $25) might be more important for certain individuals, and therefore interact the treatment with:

- age (are incentives more important to younger respondents?)

▪employment status/income (are incentives more important for the unemployed?)

3) Topic**:** We interacted this treatment with the following:

▪In the paper we note that the interaction between race (being Hispanic) and the topic (immigration) yielded nothing significant.

▪respondent's importance of immigration as a problem in US

4) Length of session: We suspected that people with markers for unusually high time constraints might prefer the hour session, and looked for interactions with:

▪full time employment

▪gender (most of these effects should operate through the above factors, but it seemed worth trying)

5) Deliberative Setting (internet vs. in-person). We interacted the meeting place with:

▪full time employment (again, tapping at time constraints / convenience sensitivity)

In sum, the specifications for the models are well rooted in several lines of relevant theory and previous empirical research (as discussed in the main paper), and the results of those specifications are fairly robust to alternative specifications (with more evidence for this last claim to follow below).

Stealth, Sunshine, & Potential Acquiescence Bias

Acquiescence bias is a major potential threat to the validity of the stealth and sunshine indices, as well as the finding that they form separate scales. Indeed, our original motivation for writing the new items was a suspicion that acquiescence bias was greatly inflating Hibbing & Theiss-Morse's (2002) evidence for rampant anti-democratic attitudes in the general population. In addition, we hoped to build a more valid and reliable stealth scale by balancing and increasing the number of items, partialing out the methods bias, and explicitly accounting for the error structure via a measurement model.[2] We followed up-to-date psychometric research on how to deal with these issues. For example: Podsakoff et. al. (2003). "Common Method Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended Remedies." *Journal of Applied Psychology*. 88/5:879-903.

Following advice from the psychometrics literature, we used a combination of two techniques: first, balancing the items with respect to coding direction (hence the new items), and then using structural equation modeling (SEM) to partition the variance in the responses into the latent trait (Stealth), method bias (acquiescence), and random error (non-attitudes). This combination is considered a sophisticated and well accepted approach to the problem in that literature.

When we attempted to construct the improved Stealth scale using these psychometric techniques, however, it became clear that the two sets of items simply did not load on to the same latent trait. At the time, we saw three plausible explanations for the finding that the stealth items and the

[2] We chose not to re-write the questions with construct-specific choices as per Krosnick (2007), or to re-conceptualize the construct from scratch, because doing so would have made our results vastly less comparable to Hibbing & Theiss-Morse's influential research. We discuss our rationale for the later decision at more length below.

sunshine items formed two nearly orthogonal scales: random error/non-attitudes, acquiescence bias, and ambivalence. (We have since identified social desirability as an alternative distinct from acquiescence, which we will discuss in the next sub-section.) Since we believed that the measurement model ruled out the first two explanations, we began to think more seriously about the ambivalence explanation (and acknowledged that it was a post-hoc account).

Above, we present an SEM that shows that the two latent traits (sunshine and stealth) remain intact even after accounting for this methods bias. We believe that the measurement model is well rooted in psychometric theory and practice, and constitutes fairly strong evidence against the acquiescence bias account. That said, we conducted two further analyses, the results of which enhance our confidence in rejecting the acquiescence bias account. The first one is simple. We show that the skew toward agreement on the items taken collectively is not nearly as egregious at it might appear, and thus that acquiescence cannot possibly be the main issue, even without controlling for it via the methods factor in our measurement model.

So, to test directly whether many respondents actually agreed with all the statements, we simply recoded each response to "1" if the respondent either strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement, and "0" otherwise. We then summed across all eight items. The distribution of the resulting agreement rate variable is in Table R5 below:

Table R5: Distribution of respondents agreeing with a count of the stealth and sunshine items

AgreeSum	Percent
0	3%
1	1%
2	2%
3	5%
4	22%
5	**31% (Median and Mode)**
6	24%
7	8%
8	4%

As the table shows, there is some skew to the distribution, but it is fairly modest. Both the median and the mode are only one step off the center of the scale, and very few subjects agree to all of the items. Thus, *even before correcting for methods bias via SEM,* we can directly reject acquiescence as the primary factor behind the (weak) relationship between stealth and sunshine, or the meaning of the scales individually. With the test in the SEM model, we feel like we can reject it rather decisively.

One other possibility occurred to us. For certain types of data, using Pearson correlations in the SEM model can artificially inflate the number of latents necessary to account adequately for the item variance; using polychoric correlations corrects for this problem (Bollen, 1989). We re-estimated our measurement model using polychoric correlations and found that doing so did not materially change our findings.

Treatment of "Neithers"

The value "3" for the indicators for both stealth and sunshine (in both samples) are coded as the middle of a five category ordinal measure. The surveys did not give respondents an option to report "Don't Know/Refuse to Answer," other than to simply skip the question with a nonresponse. So, it is possible that some respondents may have chosen the middle category to indicate a non-attitude rather than to indicate an attitude location in the center of the scale, and that that possibility may be confounding our results.

There are several reasons, however, that as an empirical matter these worries do not appear to be warranted. (From least to most decisive.) First, we should note that we controlled for "Need to Evaluate," a well validated and surprisingly powerful measure of people's tendency to be willing to "state any opinion at all." Second, it was possible for respondents with no opinion on the stealth and sunshine items to simply skip the items if they had no opinion; but these items have among the highest response rates (i.e., some subjects did skip these items, and many more skipped items that seem more difficult or controversial on their face). In the KN baseline survey only 1 percent skipped these items, and on the CCES only three percent skipped these items, indicating there was not an unusually large number of respondents who found it difficult to respond to the questions. Third, very small percentages chose the middle category for all four items of each battery; since the items all measure a similar concept, if a respondent used the middle category to indicate they had no opinion on stealth or sunshine democracy then they would indicate that by choosing the middle category on all four items. On the CCES, only three percent of respondents consistently chose the middle category for the stealth scale and only two

percent for the sunshine scale. On the KN survey, it was five percent for stealth and one percent for sunshine.

Fourth, we conducted two sets of tests to see whether the results in our models were robust to different assumptions regarding the coding of those who tended to choose the middle category on each scale. First, we created two new dummy variables, one indicating those who responded in the middle category for all items in the sunshine scale, and one indicating those who responded in the middle category for all items in the stealth scale. We then re-ran the models, and found that 1) none of the coefficients for these new variables were statistically significant, and 2) that none of the coefficients between the new models and the corresponding models reported in the paper were statistically significant (using seemingly unrelated regression methods to test coefficients across models). Second, we conducted a series of sensitivity tests in which we re-ran the models, but dropping respondents who tended to choose the middle category from the estimation sample. We statistically compared the coefficients reported in the paper with coefficients from models estimated using three different samples: 1) where we dropped any respondent who chose the middle category for any item on either the sunshine or stealth battery, 2) were we dropped any respondent who chose the middle category for more than one item on either battery, and 3) where we dropped any respondent who chose the middle category for more than two items on either battery. In no case were the coefficients from these different estimation samples statistically significantly different for either the sunshine or the stealth variables.

Taking all of these considerations together, we believe that it is appropriate to treat the middle category as reporting a true attitude for all respondents. And even if a few respondents used the

middle category to report a non-attitude, the existence of this behavior does not materially affect any reported findings. We would be happy to provide the output from all of these checks upon request.

Ambivalence v. "Complexity" of Attitudes About Democracy

In early drafts of our paper we argued that the surprising findings of high rates of agreement with both corresponding items on the Stealth and Sunshine scales indicated "ambivalence" about democratic processes. In talking of "ambivalence," we mistakenly used what should have been reserved as a technical term in a looser, ordinary language sense. We agree that the items are not quite opposites, so the response patterns that we observe are not quite evincing ambivalence in the exact sense that it is used in the literature. That said, we do have large numbers of subjects who agree, for example, that compromise in politics is both important to democracy and typically just selling out one's principles. Similarly, that thorough debate and discussion are important, but that politicians should stop talking and just take action, etc. So some cousin to ambivalence does seem to be at work.

We believe that the two sets of items are expressing attitudes about democracy as an aspiration or ideal (Sunshine) and democracy in practice under status quo conditions (Stealth). This interpretation follows the principle of charity in rendering seemingly irrational attitudes entirely sensible. Moreover, it can explain one of our most specific, dramatic, and non-obvious findings. Recall that we observed that those who score high on stealth are much less likely to express intent to participate in the hypothetical case, and much more likely in the actual invitation. The actual invitation signals that their member of Congress is not as corrupt or out of touch as they had presumed, and based on this signal they update their beliefs about the state of the world – i.e., that the gap between their ideals and what is practically achievable is not as big as they had supposed. Prior to receiving this signal, those who score high on the stealth scale appear to be less motivated to deliberate with their member. Upon receiving the signal that the member

actually cares to engage them, those high on stealth are more likely to deliberate. Those high on stealth display "ambivalence" (we now refer to it as "complex" or "conditional" attitudes) in the sense that they appear to be most likely to have skeptical beliefs regarding members' motives but are willing to reconsider those motives in light of the costly signal the member sends. (Note that almost everyone who agrees with the stealth items "complex or conditional" attitudes in this sense since nearly everyone agrees with the sunshine items. That is, given the low variability of sunshine, those who score high on stealth are "ambivalent" about deliberative democracy in this ordinary language sense of worrying about its practicability while acknowledging its attractions in principle.) Under this interpretation, the idea is not that "ambivalence" drives willingness to deliberate, but rather that attitudes about democracy in theory and in practice affect interest in deliberation separately, and differently depending on the perceived gap between the ideal and the real. So it is not clear that the four scale suggestion really captures what we were trying (clumsily) to argue.

However we need to rule out the possibility that those who hold a strong opinion regarding democracy (high and low stealth, high and low sunshine) are the ones who are more likely to be willing to deliberate. As we noted above, in the original models of Table 1 and Table 2, we tried to control for this tendency by including the need to evaluate index. And titrating out the "Neithers" as noted above also speaks to this question. That said, it is stronger to deploy multiple tests for whether strong opinions on stealth and/or sunshine predict participation.

Thus we attempted regressions creating indicators for high (exceeding the 75th percentile) and low (lower than the 25th percentile) on each scale. The point estimates for the models in

columns one and four for all four variables indicate a linear relationship, with negative or zero values for those low and positive values for those high; none of these results, however, are statistically significant (as we might expect if creating four variables in the presence of a true linear relationship induces large amounts of multi-colinearity). This is not the strongest test, since dichotomizing a continuous variable discards much of the information in the variable. Instead, a better test that retains the continuity of the two scales examines whether the relationship between each scale and the propensity to deliberate is linear (as we assume) or if it is concave (which would be the case if high and low on both scales predicted deliberation). If having strong attitudes on either sunshine or stealth alone predicted an interest in deliberating, this would predict a concave (or inverse-U) relationship between each scale and the propensity to deliberate, where the coefficient on the first order term for each scale should be negative and the coefficient on the second order term should be positive. To test this, we squared each scale and re-ran the regressions of table 4. None of these models shows a concave relationship. Instead, the results confirm our original assumption of a linear relationship between each scale and the propensity to deliberate.

As an additional test, instead of using a second order term for each scale, we created a folded stealth variable that folds the original stealth scale at its center (note that creating a folded sunshine scale does not make sense since, as we note above, very few people disagree with the sunshine items in both samples). This variable was uncorrelated with the need to evaluate variable in the CCES sample ($r = 0.01$, not significant) and was correlated with need to evaluate in the KN sample only at $r = 0.06$ (though significant). Given these low correlations, we included the new folded stealth scale in the models of Table 1 and Table 2 and tested the

difference in coefficients across the models using seemingly unrelated regression methods. None of the coefficients in any of the new models are statistically different from their corresponding coefficients in the original models of Table 2 (using the KN sample). There were a handful of coefficients that differed significantly for Table 1 model (the CCES sample was somewhat larger than the KN sample), but the largest estimated difference in coefficients was 0.005, and the main results regarding stealth and sunshine democracy (and the interaction of stealth with the Congress condition) did not change at all. The coefficient on the folded stealth variable is positive and significant in the CCES sample (with a coefficient of 0.09) and not significant in the KN sample. Taken together, these results demonstrate that the linear specification we use is correct, and that increasing values on both scales increases the propensity to deliberate.

Supplemental Analyses on the Role of Education in Willingness to Deliberate

Given the presence of variables that are likely to be correlated with education, such as "need for cognition," it is possible that the surprisingly weak role for education is misleading. Below we demonstrate that: (1) the relationship between education and the motivation variables is fairly weak; (2) the relationship between education and the motivation variables is not strong enough to justify excluding them, nor is collinearity even close to levels that would cause concern (i.e., if education, in itself, has an impact on propensity to participate, it should have more than enough independent variance to produce a statistically significant correlation in our models); (3) while education does become statistically significant when some motivation variables are removed, they do not form a consistent pattern – the ones that are necessary vary between the Knowledge Networks (i.e., the invitation to actual deliberation) and CCES survey (i.e., the hypothetical deliberation question wording experiment), as well as the various models we present from theses data; (4) even with the other variables excluded, the substantive effects for education are modest; (5) neither need for cognition nor issue attention have a substantial intervening effect on the relationship between education and participation in the Knowledge Networks data; (6) the relevant variables in the Knowledge Networks data are civil society participation and political efficacy, while the main one in the CCES survey is interest in politics; (7) given the relatively large direct effects of these variables, and their relatively small mitigation of education's impact, we cannot justify excluding them from the models; and (8) previous literature on these motivation variables provides little justification for giving causal priority to education.

Table 6a-1 shows the correlation between education and the various attitudinal variables in both the Knowledge Networks and CCES data. Several patterns stand out: (1) none of these

relationships are particularly strong (r < .3 for all of them), suggesting that education is not linked to these attitudes on a conceptual level; (2) in the KN data the strongest relationships are with civil society and political efficacy, consistent with the findings of scholars in these areas (see Putnam 2000, p. 46; Finkel 1985), but even these relationships are weak; (3) in the CCES data the strongest relationship is with interest in politics, but this is still a relatively weak correlation; and (3) need for cognition, consistent with the preference for educational programming and problem solving in the original 45 point cognition scales (Cacioppo and Petty 1982, p. 120-121), is significantly related with education but the effects are not large. In fact, the correlation between need for cognition and education is lower in these surveys than in Bizer et al.'s (1998) study (p=.25). These relatively weak correlations give no justification for assuming that motivation is tightly yoked to education.

6a-1. Correlations with education (Knowledge Networks)

	Education *r*
conflict avoidance	-.017
political efficacy	.255****
attention to immigration	.085****
civil society	.200****
need for cognition	.198****
need for judgment	.092****
sunshine democracy	-.014
stealth democracy	-.220****
trust in government	.077****

CCES/Polimetrix

	Education r
conflict avoidance	-0.116****
political efficacy	0.129****
political interest	0.263****
church attendance	0.056***
need for cognition	0.155****
need for judgment	0.096****
sunshine democracy	0.124****
stealth democracy	-0.269****
trust in government	0.047**

Of course, problems of colinearity are not bivariate. Table 4a-2 gives the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for the other variables in the model. Gujarati notes "As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a variable exceeds 10...that variable is said to be highly collinear" (362). Thus, VIF scores above 10 usually indicate a situation where relationships between individual independent variables and the dependent variable cannot be determined. In both samples, all of the variables for this analysis are far below that threshold, including education. Thus, there is no justification for assuming that including the attitudinal variables is artificially negating the effect of education. If education, in itself, has an impact on propensity to participate, it should have more than enough independent variance to produce a statistically significant coefficient.

6a-2. VIF Scores (Knowledge Networks Data – Paper Table 2)

Partisanship	1.07
Education	1.35
Income	1.23
White	1.08
Children <12	1.11
Employment	1.12
Age	1.09
Male	1.11
Conflict Avoid	1.49
Efficacy	1.52
Civil Society	1.12
Issue Attention	1.32
Need4Cognition	1.69
Need4Judgment	1.71
Sunshine	1.07
Stealth	1.16
Trust	1.08

CCES Data (Paper Table 1)

Congress	1.02	Employment	1.29
Time	1.01	White	1.04
Mode	1.01	Stealth	1.74
Topic	1.01	Need4Judge	1.52
Incentive	1.01	Education	1.32
Gender	1.12	Income	1.19
Age	1.29	Pol. Interest	1.45
ConflictAvoid	2.18	Church	1.08
Need 4 Cog.	1.48	Trust	1.12
Sunshine	1.24	Mode x CA	1.98
Efficacy	1.19	CongrXStealth	1.48
Partisanship	1.09		

Nevertheless, as Table 6a-3i points out, when all of the motivation variables are excluded, education becomes statistically significant. Table 6a-3ii looks at the KN data without any of the motivational variables. An individual who has some college is about 4.1% more likely to agree to participate in a deliberative session with his/her congressperson than an individual with a high school education. Similarly, an individual with some college is 3.2% more likely to both agree and show up to the sessions than an individual with a high school education. This suggests that despite the low correlation between attitudes and education, they are decreasing the education variable's coefficient. As we will see in more detail below, the main variable involved is the measure of involvement in civil society. When this variable alone is excluded, education becomes marginally statistically significant ($p < .1$). Political efficacy has the second largest effect, but its exclusion, in itself, is not enough for education to become statistically significant. Table 6b looks at the CCES data. In this case, the variable most closely responsible for deflating education's impact is interest in politics. Indeed, all other motivation variables can be removed from the model, and education will still not become statistically significant if political interest is included. The model, however, yields prima-facie evidence against dropping the political

interest variable. Exclusion of the political interest variable drops the R^2 by about 3 points, or 22%. It is critical to note that the fact that the education variable becomes statistically significant when some variables are excluded is not in itself a justification for excluding these variables. For this to happen: (1) a substantial portion of the motivation variables direct effect should be explained by the indirect impact of education; (2) education must have clear causal priority; and (3) we must have some fundamental reason for wanting an estimated effect on education that does not include these other characteristics. We address each of these in turn.

6a-3i. Regression without attitude variables. Knowledge Networks

	Agree to Participate B S.E.	Show Up B S.E.	Agree and Show Up B S.E.
Partisan	.074 (.052)	-.021 (.073)	.027 (.064)
PPEDUCAT	.179*** (.066)	.147 (.097)	.222*** (.085)
PPINCIMP	-.025* (.013)	.020 (.018)	.001 (.016)
white	-.228* (.127)	.406** (.172)	.299* (.157)
Children012	.128** (.060)	.036 (.078)	.070 (.071)
TradEmp	-.591**** (.105)	-.171 (.143)	-.424*** (.124)
PPAGECAT	-.004 (.015)	-.008 (.024)	-.002 (.019)
male	.133 (.107)	.072 (.151)	.152 (.131)
Panel	2 Controls	2 Controls	2 Controls
District	12 Controls	12 Controls	12 Controls
Constant	.090 (.333)	-1.162* (.600)	-2.878 (.465)
Observations CS R2 N R2	2302 .119 .166	1070 .081 .111	1629 .075 .114

6-b. CCES

	Full Model	Without Political Interest	Without Need for Cognition
Partisanship	-0.025 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.027 (0.022)
Church	-0.015 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)
Education	0.019 (0.018)	0.035** (0.018)	0.028 (0.018)
Income	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.013* (0.007)
White	-0.201*** (0.071)	-0.170** (0.072)	-0.212*** (0.071)
Employ	0.045 (0.053)	0.036 (0.054)	0.041 (0.053)
Age	-0.008**** (0.002)	-0.007**** (0.002)	-0.008**** (0.002)
Male	-0.005 (0.047)	0.040 (0.047)	0.007 (0.047)
P Interest	0.296**** (0.033)		0.318**** (0.033)
Conflict A	-0.051* (0.027)	-0.079*** (0.027)	-0.061** (0.027)
Efficacy	-0.016 (0.024)	-0.000 (0.024)	-0.020 (0.024)
Need4Cog	0.136**** (0.027)	0.165**** (0.027)	
Need4Jud	0.048* (0.027)	0.087*** (0.028)	0.112**** (0.024)
Sunshine	0.021 (0.025)	0.075*** (0.024)	0.026 (0.025)
Stealth	0.026 (0.029)	0.015 (0.029)	0.035 (0.029)
Trust	0.040 (0.042)	0.035 (0.042)	0.046 (0.042)
Congress	0.144*** (0.047)	0.137*** (0.048)	0.148*** (0.047)
Time	0.013 (0.044)	0.013 (0.045)	0.009 (0.044)
Mode	0.010 (0.044)	0.007 (0.045)	0.015 (0.044)
Topic	0.038 (0.044)	0.044 (0.045)	0.033 (0.044)
Incentive	0.124*** (0.044)	0.132*** (0.045)	0.124*** (0.044)
Mode/CA	-0.024 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.037)	-0.021 (0.036)
Cong/Stealth	-0.131*** (0.047)	-0.151*** (0.048)	-0.132*** (0.048)
Constant	3.737**** (0.093)	3.699**** (0.094)	3.742**** (0.093)
N R2 Adj. R2	2242 0.135 0.126	2244 0.104 0.095	2252 0.127 0.118
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 **** p<0.001			

▪*The indirect impact of education*

Table 6a-4 looks for the first justification and finds little to support the contention that a large portion of the motivation variables' main effects are due to education. Tables 6a-6i and 6a-6ii look at columns 1 and 3 from Table 6a-3i above, utilizing the KN data. Values in the first column are the beta coefficients of education with the respective attitudinal variable, controlling for the other variables in the full model (stars indicate statistical significance); they represent the impact of a 1 point change in the education variable (from high school to some college, 3 to 4). Values in the second column are the predicted increase or decrease in the probability of agreeing to participate based on a 1 point increase above the mean (or median for ordinal variables) in the respective variable in the full logit model. The first row is the direct effect of a one point increase in education on the probability of agreeing to participate, estimated from the full model. The third column shows the indirect effect of a 1 point increase in the education variable. This is calculated by subtracting the probability of agreement at the mean of the attitudinal variable from the probability when the attitudinal variable is increased by the amount corresponding to a 1 point increase in the education variable. Thus, the third column can be interpreted as the indirect increase/decrease in probability associated with a 1 point increase in the education variable. The results confirm that efficacy and civil society are the main attitudinal variables of concern for agreeing to participate in the KN data, with a 1 point increase in the education variable resulting in a .004 percent increase in likelihood of agreeing to participate through its effect on political efficacy, and a .008 increase through its effect on civil society participation. Similarly, the indirect effect of education on the joint probability of agreeing and showing up is .004 through efficacy, .002 through civil society, and .002 through need for cognition. *These indirect effects for education are miniscule compared to the direct effects of the motivation variables.* All of the

direct effects are at least 3 times larger than the indirect effect of education, and even that magnitude is artificially low due to the weak (and statistically insignificant) impact of civil society on the probability of showing up. At least in the KN data, this gives little justification for these variables' exclusion.

The CCES data produces similar results in Table 6a-4ii. This table is estimated using more traditional path analysis, with the indirect effects estimated by multiplying the effect of education on the motivation variable by the direct effect of the motivation variable on willingness to participate. Even for the two strongest intervening variables, the results present little support for their exclusion in the interest of preserving the statistical significance of the education variable. For both political interest and need for cognition, the main effects of these motivation variables is seventeen times larger than the indirect effect through education. This is again not surprising, given the relatively weak correlations demonstrated above.

Table 6a-4i. Path Analysis for Education and Motivation (Knowledge Networks)

Variable (Agree to Participate)	b	$p(y=1\|x=\bar{x}+1) - p(y=1\|x=\bar{x})$	$p(y=1\|x=\bar{x}+b) - p(y=1\|x=\bar{x})$
Education		.019	
Conflict Avoidance	.116****	-.032	-.003
Efficacy	.144****	.023	.004
Civil Society	.310****	.023	.008
Attention to Issue	-.023	.031	-.001
Need for Cognition	.095****	.010	.001
Need for Judgment	-.006	.019	-.0001
Sunshine Democracy	-.027	.026	-.001
Stealth Democracy	-.190****	.028	-.006
Trust in Government	.006	.032	.0008

Variable (Agree and Show Up)	b	p(y=1|x=$\bar{x}+1$) - p(y=1|x=$\bar{x}$)	p(y=1|x=$\bar{x}+b$) - p(y=1|x=$\bar{x}$)
Education		.017	
Conflict Avoidance	.116****	-.012	-.002
Efficacy	.143****	.045	.004
Civil Society	.310****	.006	.002
Attention to Issue	-.023	.049	-.005
Need for Cognition	.095****	.016	.002
Need for Judgment	-.006	.016	-.001
Sunshine Democracy	-.027	.035	-.001
Stealth Democracy	-.190****	.010	-.002
Trust in Government	.006	.008	.000

Table 6a-4ii. Path Analysis for Education and Motivation (CCES)

DV: (Interest in Deliberation)	b	E(y|x=$\bar{x}+1$) - E(y|x=$\bar{x}$)	E(y|x=$\bar{x}+b$) -E(y|x=$\bar{x}$)
Education		.019	
Conflict Avoidance	.002	-.051	-.000
Efficacy	.028*	-.016	-.000
Church Attendance	.069***	-.015	-.001
Political Interest	.057****	.296	.017
Need for Cognition	.062****	.136	.008
Need for Judgment	-.027**	.048	-.001
Sunshine Democracy	-.000	.021	-.000
Stealth Democracy	-.128****	.026	-.003
Trust in Government	-.004	.040	-.000

▪ *The causal priority of education*

Next we address the justification that education has causal priority to the motivation variables. With the possible exception of political efficacy (whose removal is not sufficient for education to become statistically significant in the models) and political interest, there is not a clear indication in the literature of education's causal primacy. For example, the relationship between education and need for cognition is more complicated than a straightforward causal arrow from education to need for cognition. While, as educators, we all hope that we are successful in increasing student curiosity, the psychology literature usually implies that the causal arrow runs the other direction – that those with high need for cognition (HNC) are more likely to pursue higher education. There is certainly some linkage between the two variables. The earliest replicable

attempt at establishing a measure of need for cognition began by comparing subjects in two groups, university professors versus assembly line workers (Cacioppo and Petty 1982). Since then, however, most of the psychology research has utilized experiments among relatively homogenous groups, such as college undergraduates (Cacioppo and Petty 1982; Kam 2005; Cacioppo et al. 1983; Haughtvedt and Petty 1992). This suggests that there is plenty of variation within individual educational categories for analysis to take place with both variables (as is further demonstrated by the correlation and VIF statistics presented above).

Moreover, when it has been utilized in survey research, need for cognition does not appear to have any adverse impact on the effect of education (e.g. Holbrook 2006). *This is demonstrated in our own results, particularly in Table R2, where education has a very strong relationship with the probability of voting and standard forms of political participation, despite the presence of need for cognition.* Even if we accept that education and need for cognition are too closely linked, the psychology literature would seem to suggest that the causal arrow runs the opposite direction. Need for cognition is usually treated as a personality trait and is compared with other personality measures (Haughtvedt and Petty 1992). Personality traits are enduring patterns that remain relatively stable over time. The sources of personality are many, but to the extent that they are shaped by the environment, they tend to be shaped early in life and are largely fixed by adulthood (Baker et. al. 1981; Inglehart 1997). This means that, at most, the 2.5 percent of the survey which reports having less than high school education would be systematically different on need for cognition. Moreover, this would require the heroic assumption that influences of the education process itself are as strong or stronger in shaping personality and attitudes than

genetics, parents, and early peers. It is simply more likely those with a high need for cognition have a greater interest in pursuing higher education.

▪*Education versus other covariates*

We address three covariates of interest: involvement in civil society, political interest, and political efficacy.

Civil society: We cannot simply say that education causes greater civil society engagement. Putnam (2000, p. 283) cites pressures of time and money, suburbanization, electronic entertainment, and generational turnover as the main causes of decreased civic engagement. While he notes that better educated individuals are more engaged (p. 46), he also notes that civic engagement has decreased dramatically among highly educated individuals and in society in general; this is despite increasing access to education, especially post-secondary (e.g. Baker and Velez 1996).

Of course, it is also not uncommon for major participation studies to use both civil society and education in the same models (e.g. Verba et al. 1995). Moreover, as demonstrated in our Table R2, including both items in models of voting and other forms of political participation does not attenuate the effects of either variable. From a practitioner's perspective, the distinction between education's impact and the impact of civil society participation may be important – with respect to increasing turnout at events, the results suggest that recruiting from civic groups may be even more effective than recruiting from schools. Likewise, for those interested in promoting balance in deliberative session, recruitment from traditionally lower education civic environments (e.g.

some unions) may increase turnout, but may increase other biases. Again, there seems to be little theoretical, statistical, or practical grounds for excluding civil society and focusing solely on education.

Political Interest: Political interest may be heightened by education. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that we can assume interest to automatically negate, or to be part of the same concept as, level of education. As with the other motivation variables, it is quite common to utilize both political interest and education in the same models, especially in predicting political participation (e.g. Bizer et al. 2004; Goldstein and Ridout 2002; Kaplan 2004). And in our own reviewer appendices, political interest does not attenuate education's impact on propensity to vote or participate in other forms of political participation (tables R1 and R2) in either the CCES of KN data. Thus, this weak intervening impact seems to be distinctive to deliberation.

Political Efficacy: Finally, with political efficacy, it makes sense to argue that someone with a larger skill-set – which may be developed through education – may be more confident in their ability to exercise influence (Verba et al. 1995, p. 305). Nevertheless, education is rarely seen as the only factor leading to political efficacy. The relationship between efficacy and education is indirect through acquisition of civic skills (speaking and writing skills), which may also be developed in a familiar or other organizational environment. Here again, it is not uncommon to see efficacy and education included together in prominent models of political participation (Verba et al. 1995; Goldstein and Ridout 2002; Kaplan 2004).

In sum, practitioners of deliberative democracy should expect that more educated individuals will be marginally more likely to agree to participate in deliberative activities like those presented in this experiment. This modest relationship, however, is almost entirely mediated by an individual's participation in voluntary groups, their political efficacy, and their interest in politics.

Supplementary Discussion on Potential Member of Congress Effects

We did uncover some evidence that the particular Member of Congress (MOC) might matter, but there is no indication that these characteristics can be extrapolated to higher-order characteristics like co-partisanship, national public figure, or even the respondent's personal feelings about the MOC. Moreover, the member variables are effectively also district dummies, so they conflate variance associated with the member and undifferentiated characteristics of the district, which is why we only noted that we included such controls, rather than trying to make much of their theoretical meaning.

Table R7-1 lists the MOCs involved in the study, their political affiliation, gender, whether they have held a high profile committee appointment or high profile issue advocacy, and their ranking on the 2008 *Knowlegis* power ranking scale (based on measures of legislative success, committee appointment, ability to pass legislation, length in office, etc.). Note that none of the participants have unusually high national profiles. The highest ranking members at the time of the study were Rep. Clyburn (vice-chairman of the Democratic conference), but his *Knowlegis* ranking is primarily the result of his long tenure and committee appointments; he ranks relatively low in influence. Rep. Kingston was also vice-chairman of his party's conference at the time of the study, but stepped down after the 2006 midterms. A variable for gender of the MOC and a dummy variable for national profile positions fell out of the models in which they were tried due to collinearity with the district dummies. To further discuss the effect of particular MOC's characteristics, we summarize the results of several models which include co-partisanship and MOC-specific trust and approval variables – none of these contribute significantly to the prediction of either willingness to participate or actual participation.

Table R7-1. Participating MOCs

Congressperson	**(Party-State)**	**Gender**	**National Profile Position**	**Knowlegis Power Ranking**
Earl Blumenauer	(D-OR)	Male		82
Michael Capuano	(D-MA)	Male		78
Jack Kingston	(R-GA)	Male	9 terms, Appropriations and Defense committees; vice-chairman of House R conference (in 2006)	178
James Clyburn	(D-SC)	Male	Majority Whip (current); vice-chairman of House D conference (in 2006)	30
David Weldon	(R-FL)	Male	Appropriations committee	303
George Radanovich	(R-CA)	Male		300
Zoe Lofgren	(D-CA)	Female		242
David Price	(D-NC)	Male	Appropriations committee, Chair of Homeland Security Appropriations	270
Mike Conaway	(R-TX)	Male	Deputy Republican Whip (current)	351
Jim Matheson	(D-UT)	Male		86
Anna Eshoo	(D-CA)	Female		61
Marilyn Musgrave	(R-CO)	Female	Sponsor of Federal Marriage Amendment	391
Donald Manzullo	(R-IL)	Male		248

**Knowlegis* rankings available at: http://congressorg.capwiz.com/congressorg/power_rankings/overall.tt (Last accessed 10/24/2009.)

Table R7-2, which looks takes a closer look at the district dummies from the article's models, shows that some MOCs have more respondents who agree to participate. Blumenauer, Radanovich, Price, and Eshoo are particularly high in the number of constituents that agree to participate. Three of these four are Democrats, but there are few other commonalities among them. Three out of four are also from Western states (California and Oregon), but there is little theory to inform any implications from this. The models analyzing whether a respondent assigned to a group actually shows up produce almost no statistically significant relationships between the particular MOC and whether individuals attend. Finally, the probability of both

agreeing to participate and showing up produces only a few statistically significant results: Price and Eshoo. Again, these results point to no clear characteristics of the two. Price is a "blue dog" Democrat from North Carolina, while Eshoo is a liberal Democrat from California. Overall, while we cannot rule out representatives' characteristics making a difference, at least in our sample, being a MOC seems more important than the particular characteristics of the MOC.

Table R7- 2. Results of District Dummies from Table 4 with MOC Identified.

	Agree to Participate B (S.E.)	Show Up B (S.E.)	Agree and Show Up B (S.E.)
Earl Blumenauer	1.284**** (.244)	-.994* (.534)	-.273 (.406)
Michael Capuano	.796*** (.255)	-.392 (.506)	.584 (.365)
Jack Kingston	.623** (.249)	-.163 (.501)	.697 (.361)
James Clyburn	.346 (.432)	.344 (.756)	.892* (.542)
David Weldon	.351 (.248)	.218 (.500)	.843** (.357)
George Radanovich	1.104**** (.260)	-.705 (.517)	.158 (.392)
Zoe Lofgren	.790*** (.289)	-.503 (.514)	.554 (.395)
David Price	1.527**** (.281)	-.259 (.492)	1.062*** (.357)
Mike Conaway	.836**** (.237)	-.470 (.501)	.348 (.362)
Jim Matheson	.725** (.354)	-.501 (.584)	.478 (.457)
Anna Eshoo	1.102**** (.301)	.275 (.501)	1.265*** (.377)
Marilyn Musgrave	.379 (.368)	.080 (.627)	.586 (.467)
Donald Manzullo	Base	Base	Base

The individual MOCs are included in the article's models as dummy variables for district. While some of these are statistically significant, there is no apparent generalized pattern to this significance. Nevertheless, we present below tests of two further hypotheses. If the MOC and

the respondent share the same partisanship, this may encourage participation. Similarly, if the respondent has greater trust or agreement with the MOC, this may also make a difference. To test this, we added four variables into the article's models one at a time. They are co-partisanship (1 = shared partisan ID), approval of MOC's job in Congress (5 =strongly approve, 1=strongly disapprove), approval of MOC's handling of immigration issue (5 =strongly approve, 1=strongly disapprove), and trust in MOC to do what is right (4 =always, 1=never). The results are presented in Table R7-3. None of these variables reach standard levels of statistical significance in any of the models. Thus, beyond levels of general trust in government, MOC-specific trust or agreement does not seem to have an independent impact on deliberation.

Table R7-3. Effect of MOC Characteristics Relational to Respondent.

	Agree to Participate B (S.E.)	Show Up B (S.E.)	Agree and Show Up B (S.E.)
Co-Partisan	-.108 (.142)	.151 (.184)	.119 (.166)
Approve of MOC	.000 (.063)	.105 (.080)	.070 (.071)
Approve of MOC on Immigration	-.055 (.075)	.007 (.092)	-.005 (.084)
Trust MOC	-.063 (.105)	.023 (.137)	-.029 (.123)

We suspect that none of these effects were significant because most people knew very little about their MOC's ex ante. For example, the vast majority of people cannot name a candidate for a US House seat and their party affiliations (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997). Since none of the MOCs selected for this study were unusually well-known in the media, it is not surprising that co-partisanship, etc., had no detectable impact.

A Brief Note on Race & Representation

One leading hypothesis might be that the race effect we observe in Table 2 of the paper would not show up under conditions of descriptive representation or is being driven by an extreme case involving descriptive representation. To check for this possibility, we reran our analyses dropping Rep. Clyburn's constituents, and the coefficients on race were not significantly different using a Wald test in a SURE framework (and were nearly identical by inspection as well – i.e., we do not appear to be under-powered here). So the effect does not appear to be driven by the majority-minority district in the sample, nor differential dynamics with a black representative.