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Political Science 867
Derby 2078
TuTh 11:30-1:18

Causal Mechanisms

Causal mechanisms are at the heart of what we do as political scientists, but we devote remarkably little time to understanding them. If you ask a job candidate what model of the political process is at the heart of his or her work, the answer, likely as not, will be a linear-additive statistical model, a game tree, possibly a highly simplistic causal diagram... or simple evasion. The literature on causal mechanisms, unfortunately, often fails to remedy the problem because it has a way of missing the forest for the trees, leaving students with an intricate understanding of the internal logic and nature of mechanisms but little sense of how they might be applied in practice.

The goal of this course, therefore, is to introduce students to a variety of causal mechanisms from the applied literature in political science. The applications will, per the instructor's predilections, be drawn as often as not from the international relations subfield, though some will not. Many are old, because older work in political science, for better or worse, often reflects a theoretical diversity that is lacking in more recent years. Quite a few will be quantitative in nature, not because of the aesthetic beauty of the Greek alphabet, but because one of the virtues of formalization is that it forces the author to make the mechanism at the heart of the work at least as explicit as the math. That said, students will often find that understanding the math will be superfluous for our purposes given that the authors must also explain themselves in English.

Structure of the class

The class will be run as a seminar. Broadly speaking, you should bear in mind four questions when doing the reading assignments:

- What are the strengths of this particular application of this mechanism?
- What are the weaknesses?
- How might the weaknesses be remedied?
- What new applications could you envision for this mechanism?

Those are, in general, the questions that you will be asked to discuss in seminar each week, so when the time comes you should be prepared to answer them.

Note that, as far as the applications are concerned, there are very few "right" answers, so don't be shy about speaking your mind. Different causal mechanisms represent different ways of boiling down an immensely complex world into a manageable representation, and all such representations will to some extent be wrong; the question, really, is which sorts of techniques are most useful for which purposes, and on that question informed opinion differs, sometimes quite drastically.

Requirements

There will be no midterm and no final exam. The course grade will be based on participation (50%), three response papers that critically and constructively engage the week's readings (30%, 3 page maximum, send to me via email, deadline 24 hours before class), and a final paper that compares the strengths and weaknesses of any two classes of mechanism in more depth (20%, 15 pages maximum, due on the last day of final exams).

Overview of Readings

Week 1	The Nature of a Causal Mechanism
Week 2	Generic Process Mechanisms
Week 3	Equilibration Mechanisms
Week 4	Optimization Mechanisms
Week 5	Learning Mechanisms
Week 6	Interaction Mechanisms I: Strategic Interaction
Week 7	Interaction Mechanisms II: Integration and Aggregation
Week 8	Interaction Mechanisms III: Contagion/Diffusion
Week 9	Interaction Mechanisms IV: Evolution and Complexity
Week 10	Universal, Contextual, and Synthetic Mechanisms

Readings and Class Schedule

Week 1 The Nature of a Causal Mechanism

- Gerring, J. (2007) "The Mechanismic Worldview: Thinking Inside the Box." *British Journal of Political Science* 38 (1): 161-179.
- Checkel, J. T. (2006) "Tracing Causal Mechanisms." *International Studies Review* 8(2): 362-370.
- Beck-Collier-Brady et al. *contretemps on causal process observations from Political Analysis, 2006 and 2010*

Recommended

- Deutsch, K. W. (1966). *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control*. New York, The Free Press, chs. 1-2.
- Zinnes, D. A. (1976). *Contemporary Research in International Relations: A Perspective and a Critical Appraisal*. New York, The Free Press, ch. 1.
- DeNardo, J. (1997) "Complexity, Formal Methods, and Ideology in International Studies," ch. 6 of Doyle, M. W., and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Hedström, P., and R. Swedberg (eds) (1998) *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, chs. 1, 10.
- Braumoeller, B. (2006) "Explaining Variance: Or, Stuck in a Moment We Can't Get Out Of." *Political Analysis* 14 (3): 268-290.

Week 2 Generic Process Mechanisms

- Axelrod, R. (1973). "Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition." *American Political Science Review* 67(4): 1248-1266.
- Gamson, W. A., and A. Modigliani. (1966). "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions: Some Models for Consideration." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 30 (2): 187-199.
- Johnston, A. I. (1996). "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China." In Katzenstein, P. J., Ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Choucri, N. and R. C. North (1989). *Lateral Pressure in International Relations: Concept and Theory*. Handbook of War Studies. M. I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
- Pevehouse, J. C., and J. S. Goldstein. (1999.) "Serbian Compliance or Defiance in Kosovo? Statistical Analysis and Real-Time Predictions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(4): 538-546.
- Fortna, V. P. (2004) "International Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects." *World Politics* 56 (July): 481-519.

Recommended

- Kadera, K. M. (1998). "Transmission, Barriers, and Constraints: A Dynamic Model of the Spread of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(3): 367-387.
- Geller, D. S. (1987). "The Impact of Political System Structure on Probability Patterns of Internal Disorder." *American Journal of Political Science* 31(2): 217-235.
- Axelrod, R. (1976). *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, chs. 3-4, 9-10, and Appendix 1.
- Satterfield, J. M. (1998). "Cognitive-Affective States Predict Military and Political Aggression and Risk Taking: A Content Analysis of Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt, and Stalin." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(6): 667-690.
- Hoover, D., and D. Kowalewski. (1992). "Dynamic Models of Dissent and Repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(1): 150-182.
- Cohen, M. D. (1984). "Conflict and Complexity: Goal Diversity and Organizational Search Effectiveness." *American Political Science Review* 78(2): 435-451.
- Levi, A. S., and G. Whyte. (1997). "A Cross-Cultural Exploration of the Reference Dependence of Crucial Group Decisions under Risk: Japan's 1941 Decision for War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(6): 792-813.
- Suedfeld, P., and S. Bluck. (1988). "Changes in Integrative Complexity Prior to Surprise Attacks." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32(4): 626-635.
- Guttieri, K., M. D. Wallace, and P. Suedfeld. (1995). "The Integrative Complexity of American Decision Makers in the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39(4): 595-621.
- Haas, M. (1974). *International Conflict*. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974, ch. 5.
- Young, M. D. (1996). "Cognitive Mapping Meets Semantic Networks." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(3): 395-414.
- Cioffi-Revilla, C. (1998). *Politics and Uncertainty: Theory, Models and Applications*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

- Ragin, C. C. (1987). *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Blankenship, G. L. (1977). "An Input-Output Model of Human Population Dynamics," in Gillespie, J. V. and D. A. Zinnes, Eds., *Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research*. New York, Praeger Publisher.
- Chittick, W. O., K. R. Billingsley, et al. (1995). "A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs." *International Studies Quarterly* 39: 313-331.
- Holmes, J. E. (1985). *The Mood/Interest Theory of American Foreign Policy*. Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky.
- Hoole, F. W., and C. Huang. (1989). "The Global Conflict Process." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33(1): 142-163.
- Goldstein, J. S. (1987). "Long Waves in War, Production, Prices, and Wages: New Empirical Evidence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(4), 573-600.
- Pollins, B. M., and R. L. Schweller. (1999). "Linking the Levels: The Long Wave and Shifts in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1790-1993." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(2): 431-464.
- Merritt, R. L., R. G. Muncaster, et al., Eds. (1993). *International Event-Data Developments: DDIR Phase II*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, chs. 1, 2, 7.
- Rosenau, J. N. (1966). "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Farrell, R. B., Ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*. Evanston, Northwestern University Press.
- Axelrod, R. (1979). "The Rational Timing of Surprise." *World Politics* 31(2): 228-246.
- Gurian, P.-H. (1993). "Candidate Behavior in Presidential Nomination Campaigns: A Dynamic Model." *The Journal of Politics* 55(1): 115-139.
- Ward, H. (1993). "Game Theory and the Politics of the Global Commons." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(2): 203-235.
- Rummel, R. J. (1972). "U.S. Foreign Relations: Conflict, Cooperation, and Attribute Distances," in Russett, B. M., *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills and London: Sage University Press.
- Azar, E. E. (1975). "Ten Issues in Events Research," in Azar, E. E. and J. D. Ben-Dak, Eds., *Theory and Practice of Events Research: Studies in International Actions and Interactions*. New York, Gordon and Breach.
- Ward, M. D., and A. Mintz. (1987). "Dynamics of Military Spending in Israel: A Computer Simulation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(1): 86-105.
- Choucri, N. and R. C. North (1975). *Nations In Conflict: National Growth and International Violence*. San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, chs. 10, 16, appendices A-C.
- Deutsch, K. W. (1978). *The Analysis of International Relations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, ch. 10.
- Nicholson, M. (1983). *The Scientific Analysis of Social Behaviour: A Defence of Empiricism in Social Science*. London, Frances Pinter, ch. 8.
- Bremer, S. A. (1985). "The GLOBUS Model: History, Structure, and Illustrative Results," in Ward, M. D., Ed., *Theories, Models, and Simulations in International Relations: Essays in Honor of Harold Guetzkow*. Boulder and London, Westview Press.

Week 3 Equilibration Mechanisms

- Brown, C. (1993) "Nonlinear Transformation in a Landslide: Johnson and Goldwater in 1964." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 582-609.
- Bendor, J., and T. M. Moe (1985) "An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics." *American Political Science Review* 79(3): 755-774.
- Francisco, R. A. (1996) "Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(4): 1179-1204.
- Stahel, A. A. (1985) "Dynamic Models of Guerrilla Warfare." In Luterbacher, U. and M. D. Ward, Eds., *Dynamic Models of International Conflict*. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Gilpin, R. (1981) *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, chs. 1-2.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1998) "The End of the Cold War: Predicting an Emergent Property." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(2): 131-155.

Recommended

- Stoll, R. J. (1982) "Let the Researcher Beware: The Use of the Richardson Equations to Estimate the Parameters of a Dyadic Arms Acquisition Process." *American Journal of Political Science* 26(1): 77-89.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1994) "Political Forecasting." In Bueno de Mesquita, B., and F. N. Stokman, eds., *European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Taylor, J. G. (1983). *Lanchester Models of Warfare*. Arlington, VA, Operations Research Society of America.
- Epstein, J. M. (1985) *The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis without Lanchester Theory*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Studies in Defense Policy, pp. 1-13.
- Gerner, D. J. (1985). "A Markov Simulation of Trade as a Form of Petrodollar Recycling," in Ward, M. D., Ed., *Theories, Models, and Simulations in International Relations: Essays in Honor of Harold Guetzkow*. Boulder and London, Westview Press.
- Midlarsky, M. I. (1981) "Equilibria in the Nineteenth-Century Balance-of-Power System." *American Journal of Political Science* 25(2): 270-296.
- Bennett, D. S., and A. C. Stam III (1998) "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(3): 344-366.
- Mayer, T. F. (1985) "Transform Methods and Dynamic Models." In Luterbacher, U. and M. D. Ward, op cit.
- Schrodt, P. A. (1985). "The Role of Stochastic Models in International Relations Research," in Ward, op cit.
- Box-Steffensmeier, J., and R. M. Smith (1998) "Investigating Political Dynamics Using Fractional Integration Methods." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(2): 661-689.

Week 4 Optimization Mechanisms

- Alt, J. E., and Woolley, J. T. (1982) "Reaction Functions, Optimization, and Politics: Modelling the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 26(4): 709-740.
- Gillespie, J. V., Zinnes, D. A., Tahim, G. S., Schrodtt, P. A., and Rubison, R. M. (1977) "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races." *American Political Science Review* 71(1): 226-244.
- Brophy-Baermann, B., and Conybeare, J. A. C. (1994) "Retaliating against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion." *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 196-210.
- Intriligator, M. D., and D. L. Brito. (1989) "Richardsonian Arms Race Models." In Midlarsky, M. I., Ed., *Handbook of War Studies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1970) *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, chs. 8-9.
- Magee, S. P., Brock, W. A., and Young, L. (1989) *Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 5.

Recommended

- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1989). "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics." *International Security* 13(4): 54-89.
- Epstein, J. M. (1989). "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies." *International Security* 13(4): 90-127.
- McGuire, M. (1985) "Lanchester Models of Battlefield Attrition and the Organization of Combat Forces." In Luterbacher, U. and M. D. Ward, Eds., *Dynamic Models of International Conflict*. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Majeski, S. J. (1983) "Mathematical Models of the U.S. Military Expenditure Decision-making Process." *American Journal of Political Science* 27(3): 485-514.
- Lichbach, M. I. (1989) "Stability in Richardson's Arms Races and Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Arms Rivalries." *American Journal of Political Science* 33(4): 1016-1047.

Week 5 Learning Mechanisms

- Levy, J. S. (1994). "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield." *International Organization* 48(2): 279-312.
- Reiter, D. (1994). "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past." *World Politics* 46(4): 490-526.
- Lupia, A., and McCubbins, M. D. (1998) *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need To Know?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, figs. 5.4a, 5.4b, chs. 7-8.
- Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. J. (1990) "Culture and Cooperation." In Mansfield, J. J., Ed., *Beyond Self-Interest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Smith, A., and Stam, A. C. (2004) "Bargaining and the Nature of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 783-813.
- Baum, M. A., and T. Groeling. (2010) "Reality Asserts Itself: Public Opinion on Iraq and the Elasticity of Reality." *International Organization* 64: 443-79.

Week 6 Interaction Mechanisms I: Strategic Interaction

- Wagner, R. H. (2000). "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3): 469-484.
- Fearon, J. D. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.
- Gartzke, E. (1999) "'War is in the Error Term.'" *International Organization* 53(3): 567-587.
- Schultz, K. A. (1999). "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization* 53(2): 233-266.
- Stone, R. W. (2001). "The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations: The Theory of Moves." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(2): 216-244.
- Brams, S. J. (2001). "Response to Randall Stone: Heresy or Scientific Progress?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(2): 245-254.
- Yee, A. S. (1997) "Thick Rationality and the Missing 'Brute Fact': The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas." *The Journal of Politics* 59(4): 1001-1039.

Recommended

- Green, D., and I. Shapiro. (1994). *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Friedman, J. (Ed.) (1996). *The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sen, A. (1982). "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory." Reprinted in *Sen, Choice, Welfare, and Measurement*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Lake, D. A., and R. Powell, Eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Becker, G. S. (1996). *Accounting for Tastes*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, chs. 1, 11.
- Wagner, R. H. (1986). "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power." *World Politics* 38(4): 546-576.
- Downs, G. W. and D. M. Rocke (1990). *Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, chs. 3-4.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. and D. Lalman (1992). *War and Reason*. New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Bendor, J., and P. Swistak (1997) "The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 91(2): 290-307.

Week 7 Interaction Mechanisms II: Integration and Aggregation

Integration

- Deutsch, K. W. (1978). *The Analysis of International Relations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, chs. 15, 18.
- Zinnes, D. A., and Muncaster, R. (1987). "Transaction Flows and Integrative Processes," in Cioffi-Revilla, C., R. L. Merritt, et al., Eds., *Communication and Interaction in Global Politics*. Beverly Hills and London, Sage Publications, Inc.
- Alker Jr., H. R. (1970) "Integration Logics: A Review, Extension, and Critique." *International Organization* 24: 869-914.

Aggregation

- McDonald, H. B. and R. Rosecrance (1985). "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System: A Reinterpretation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29(1): 57-82.
- Axelrod, R. and D. S. Bennett (1993). "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation." *British Journal of Political Science* 23: 211-233.
- Clauset, A., and F. W. Weigel. (2010) "A Generalized Aggregation-Disintegration Model for the Frequency of Severe Terrorist Attacks." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1): 179 197.

Recommended

Integration

- Hoffmann, S. (1966) "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe." In Hoffman, S., Ed., *Conditions of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Finsterbusch, K. (1975). "Trends in International Integration as Indicated by Trends in International Mail Flows," in Azar, E. E. and J. D. Ben-Dak, Eds., *Theory and Practice of Events Research: Studies in Inter-Nation Actions and Interactions*. New York, Gordon and Breach.
- Nierop, T. (1994). *Systems and Regions in Global Politics*. New York, John Wiley and Sons.
- Young, H. P. (1998). *Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Aggregation

- Schelling, T. C. (1978) *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*. New York: W. W. Norton, ch. 4.
- Goodman, R., J. Hart, and R. Rosecrance (1975). "Testing International Theory: Methods and Data in a Situational Analysis of International Politics," in Azar, E. E. and J. D. Ben-Dak, Eds., *Theory and Practice of Events Research: Studies in Inter-Nation Actions and Interactions*. New York, Gordon and Breach.
- Enelow, J. M. and M. J. Hinich (1984). *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Harary, F. (1961). "A Structural Analysis of the Situation in the Middle East." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5: 167-178.
- Harary, F. (1972). *Graph Theory*. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley.
- Hart, J. (1974). "Symmetry and Polarization in the European International System, 1870-1879: A Methodological Study." *Journal of Peace Research* XI(3): 229-244.
- Healy, B. and A. Stein (1973). "The Balance of Power in International History." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17(1): 33-61.

Lee, S.-C., R. G. Muncaster, et al. (1994). "'The Friend of My Enemy Is My Enemy': Modeling Triadic International Relationships." *Synthese* 100: 333-358.

Week 8 Interaction Mechanisms III: Contagion/Diffusion

- Braumoeller, B. (2006) "Explaining Variance: Or, Stuck in a Moment We Can't Get Out Of." *Political Analysis* 14 (3): only pp. 275-278.
- Buhaug, H., and Gleditsch, K. S. (2008) "Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space." *International Studies Quarterly* 52: 215-233.
- Cao, X. (2010) "Networks as Channels of Policy Diffusion: Explaining Worldwide Changes in Capital Taxation, 1998-2006." *International Studies Quarterly* 54: 823-854.
- Horowitz, M. C. (2010) "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism." *International Organization* 64: 33-64.
- Nickerson, D. W. (2008) "Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments." *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 49-57.
- Shipan, C. R., and Volden, C. (2008) "The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 840-857.
- Weyland, K. (2009) "The Diffusion of Revolution: '1848' in Europe and Latin America." *International Organization* 63: 391-423.

Week 9 Interaction Mechanisms IV: Evolution and Complexity

- Gould, S. J. (1996) *Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin*. New York: Three Rivers Press, ch. 10.
- Spruyt, H. (2001) *Diversity or Uniformity in the Modern World? Answers from Evolutionary Theory, Learning, and Social Adaptation*. In W. R. Thompson (Ed.), *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, pp. 110-132. New York: Routledge.
- Bremer, S. A., and M. Mihalka (1977). "Machiavelli in Machina: Or Politics Among Hexagons," in Deutsch, K. W., B. Fritsch, et al., Eds., *Problems of World Modeling: Political and Social Implications*. Cambridge, MA, Ballinger Publishing Co.
- Cederman, L.-E. (1997). *Emergent Actors in World Politics*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, ch. 4.
- Jervis, R. (1997) *System Effects*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, ch. 2.
- Barnett, M. (2009) "Evolution Without Progress? Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt." *International Organization* 63: 621-63.

Recommended

- Weibull, J. W. (1995). *Evolutionary Game Theory*. Cambridge: MIT Press. Chs. 3-4.

Week 10 Universal, Contextual, and Synthetic Mechanisms

- Zimmerman, W. (1973) "Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process: A Research Note in Search of a General Theory." *American Political Science Review* 67(4): 1204-1212.
- Goertz, G. (1994) *Contexts of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapters 2, 7.
- March, J. G., and J. P. Olsen (1998). "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization* 52(4): 943-969.
- Niou, E. M. S. and P. Ordeshook (1994). "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate." *World Politics* 46(2): 209-234.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., M. Kahler, and A. H. Montgomery (2009). "Network Analysis for International Relations." *International Organization* 63: 559-92.
- Maoz, Z. (2009). "The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict Across Levels of Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(1): 223-240.

Recommended

- Braumoeller, B. F. (2008) "Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 77-93.
- Chong, D. (2000). *Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, chs. 1, 2, 6.
- Most, B. A., and H. Starr (1989) *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*. Columbia: South Carolina, chapters 2, 5.
- Putnam, R. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42: 427-460.
- Iida, K. (1993). "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games With Uncertainty." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37: 403-426.
- Wolfers, A. (1962) *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 3-35.
- Wilson, E. O. (1998) *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*. New York: Random House.