

POLITSC 7880: Political Economy Field Seminar
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, AUTUMN 2016

Instructor: Jan H. Pierskalla
Time and Location: Thursday 2:30pm-5:15pm, Derby Hall 150
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Overview and Objectives

This class is an introduction to the the field of political economy. The term “political economy” generally refers to studies of the interaction of states and markets and/or the application of methods from economics to political science questions. This class will put emphasis on the former interpretation, while paying necessary tribute to the latter.

The goal of this class is threefold. First, to familiarize you with basic theoretical and empirical approaches in political economy; second, to simultaneously introduce you to the classics and cutting edge of the field; third, to push you towards doing your own research on political economy questions. Good research combines technical skills with important substantive questions. Hence, we will engage the readings for this class with an eye toward the linkages between theory, research design, and data.

The course is organized in roughly three parts. We will spend the first three weeks discussing foundational questions of theoretical and empirical modeling. This should provide us with basic conceptual frameworks and tools we can apply to the substantive questions of the class. The second part of the course deals with the interplay between markets and the organization of power in society, focusing on three foundational topics of interest: economic development, the origin of states, and regime change. The third part of the course engages a variety of specific policy domains (public goods, welfare states, trade, finance, corruption).

Requirements

The course will largely be taught in a seminar format, but I now and then I will provide short input lectures.

- **RESEARCH PROPOSAL, PRESENTATION, AND FEEDBACK (45%):** 8-10 pages (double-spaced). Proposal due on NOV 29, presentation on DEC 1. You will also be required to provide written feedback for one of your peer’s proposals.
- **A LITERATURE OR BOOK REVIEW (15%):** Pick a week after Sept 8. Either write a concise literature review that goes beyond the assigned readings or a review that engages one specific book. Each review is due on the week of the assigned topic/book. Literature reviews should be approximately 5-7 pages (double-spaced). Book reviews should be 3-5 pages (double-spaced) and you also have to prepare a 5-10 minute presentation for the rest of the class.

- **ARTICLE REVIEW (10%)**: Imagine you are a reviewer for a top journal. Write a 1-2 page review of one of the following articles (due on OCT 12). B. Miller, J. Pevehouse, R. Rogowski, D. Tingley, and R. Wilson. How To Be a Peer Reviewer: A Guide for Recent and Soon-to-be PhDs. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 46(1):120–123, 2013 provides some helpful guidance.
 - S. Gulzar and B. Pasquale. Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India. *American Political Science Review*, 2016
 - A. Dasgupta. Why Dominant Parties Decline: the Role of Distributive Conflict with Evidence from India’s Green Revolution. 2016
 - V. Fouka. Backlash: The Unintended Effects of Language Prohibition in US Schools after World War I. 2015
 - D. Christensen. Concession Stands: How Foreign Investment Incites Protest in Africa. 2016
 - C. V. Rivera. Political Dynasties and Party Strength: Evidence from Victorian Britain. 2015
- **GROUP REPLICATION (15%)**: Build teams of three to four. Pick an empirical political economy article and prepare a short replication memo. Please only pick an article if it has a well-documented replication archive. Your replication memo should cover a brief summary of the main hypothesis, research design, data sources, specifics of the modeling approach, reproduce one of the main tables/findings, and identify potential areas of weakness. The replication report is due on NOV 17.
- **PARTICIPATION (15%)**: Please read all the assigned readings before class and send at least two discussion questions to me the night before class.
- **SUMMARY OF MOST IMPORTANT DATES**:
 - OCT 12: Article Review
 - NOV 17: Replication Memo
 - NOV 29: Research Proposal
 - DEC 1: Research Proposal Presentation

Academic Misconduct

It is the responsibility of the Committee on Academic Misconduct to investigate or establish procedures for the investigation of all reported cases of student academic misconduct. The term “academic misconduct” includes all forms of student academic misconduct wherever committed; illustrated by, but not limited to, cases of plagiarism and dishonest practices in connection with examinations. Instructors shall report all instances of alleged academic misconduct to the committee (Faculty Rule 3335-5-487). For additional information, see the Code of Student Conduct <http://studentlife.osu.edu/csc/>.

Disability

The University strives to make all learning experiences as accessible as possible. If you anticipate or experience academic barriers based on your disability (including mental health, chronic or temporary medical conditions), please let me know immediately so that we can privately discuss options.

You are also welcome to register with Student Life Disability Services to establish reasonable accommodations. After registration, make arrangements with me as soon as possible to discuss your accommodations so that they may be implemented in a timely fashion. SLDS contact information: slds@osu.edu; 614-292-3307; slds.osu.edu; 098 Baker Hall, 113 W. 12th Avenue.

Beyond class activities

OSU has many interesting talks and seminars that pertain to the topics of the class. I will make you aware of interesting events as they come up. I will notify you on the specific dates as they are published.

Course Material

There are no assigned books for this class. Each week usually features four to five assigned readings. I expect you to read all assigned readings in detail before class. Despite the lack of assigned books, I encourage you to build a functional library. Here is a list of good background reading that I highly recommend for our class:

- Overview of the political economy field:
 - D. C. Mueller. *Public Choice III*. Cambridge University Press, 2003
 - T. Persson and G. Tabellini. *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*. MIT Press, 2000
 - A. M. Drazen. *Political Economy in Macroeconomics*. Princeton University Press, 2000
 - T. Besley. *Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government*. Oxford University Press, 2006
 - B. R. Weingast and D. A. Whitman. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford University Press, 2006
- Game theory and formal models:
 - S. Gehlbach. *Formal Models of Domestic Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2013
 - N. McCarty and A. Meirowitz. *Political Game Theory*. Cambridge University Press, 2007
- Empirical techniques:
 - J. D. Angrist and J.-S. Pischke. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics*. Princeton University Press, 2009
 - J. D. Angrist and J.-S. Pischke. *Mastering 'Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton University Press, 2014
 - T. Dunning. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences. A Design-Based Approach*. Cambridge University Press, 2012
 - S. L. Morgan and C. Winship. *Counterfactuals and Causal Inference. Methods and Principles for Social Research*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2007

Course Outline

Week 1 (Aug 25): Introduction and Overview & Models

Introduction to the class, general requirements and logistics. Second half deals with the role of models in PE.

- Core readings:
 - A. Przeworski. *States and Markets. A Primer in Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press, 2003 Chapters 1
 - K. A. Clarke and D. M. Primo. Modernizing Political Science: A Model-Based Approach. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(4):741–754, 2007
- Supplementary readings:
 - T. Besley. *The New Political Economy*. Published: Keynes Lecture in Economics
 - T. Dewan and K. A. Shepsle. Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part II. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(3):543–564, 2008
 - T. Dewan and K. Shepsle. Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part I. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(2):363–382, 2008
 - K. A. Shepsle and M. S. Bonchek. *Analyzing Politics. Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. W. W. Norton, 1997 Chapter 1-2
 - S. d. Marchi. *Computational and Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge University Press, 2005 Chapter 1-2
 - R. M. Morton. *Methods & Models. A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science*. Cambridge University Press, 1999 Chapter 1-3
 - K. Arrow. *Social Choice and Individual Values*. Yale University Press, 1970
 - D. P. Baron and J. A. Ferejohn. Bargaining in Legislatures. *American Political Science Review*, 83(4):1181–1206, 1989
 - K. A. Clarke and D. M. Primo. *A Model Discipline: Political Science and the Logic of Representation*. Oxford University Press, 2012
 - A. Downs. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper, New York, NY, 1957
 - S. Gehlbach. *Formal Models of Domestic Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2013
 - S. Gehlbach, K. Sonin, and M. W. Svolik. Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2015
 - T. Kuran. Sparks and Prairie Fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution. *Public Choice*, 61:41–74, 1989

Week 2 (Sep 1): APSA

No meeting in class, but take the time to read more from Week 1 and have a look at the posted lecture notes.

Week 3 (Sep 8): Causality and Empirical Analysis in Political Economy

- Core readings:
 - A. Przeworski. Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible? pages 147–171. Oxford University Press, 2007
 - T. Dunning. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences. A Design-Based Approach*. Cambridge University Press, 2012 Chapter 1
 - M. Humphreys and J. Weinstein. Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12:367–78, 2009
 - C. Samii. Causal Empiricism in Quantitative Research. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(3):941–955, May 2016
- Supplementary readings:
 - S. Athey and G. W. Imbens. *The State of Applied Econometrics - Causality and Policy Evaluation*. 2016
 - J. D. Angrist and J.-S. Pischke. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics*. Princeton University Press, 2009
 - J. D. Angrist and J.-S. Pischke. The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out of Econometrics. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 24(2):3–30, 2010
 - J. D. Angrist and J.-S. Pischke. *Mastering 'Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton University Press, 2014
 - D. Acemoglu. Theory, General Equilibrium and Political Economy in Development Economics. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 24(3):17–32, 2010. Published: NBER Working Paper
 - A. V. Banerjee and E. Duflo. *The Experimental Approach to Development Economics*. Nov. 2008. Published: NBER Working Paper No. 14467
 - H. E. Brady and D. Collier. *Rethinking Social Inquiry. Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004
 - A. Deaton. Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(2):424–55, 2010
 - M. Friedman. The Methodology of Positive Economics. In M. Friedman, editor, *Essays in Positive Economics*. University of Chicago Press, 1953
 - B. Geddes. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mi, 2003
 - A. S. Gerber and D. P. Green. Field Experiments and Natural Experiments. In J. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, and D. Collier, editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, pages 357–384. Oxford University Press, 2008
 - J. Gerring. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge University Press, 2007
 - L. Keele and W. Minozzi. How Much Is Minnesota Like Wisconsin? Assumptions and Counterfactuals in Causal Inference with Observational Data. *Political Analysis*, 2013

- D. S. Lee and T. Lemieux. Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(2):281–355, 2010
- S. L. Morgan and C. Winship. *Counterfactuals and Causal Inference. Methods and Principles for Social Research*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2007
- R. M. Morton. *Methods & Models. A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science*. Cambridge University Press, 1999
- M. R. Rosenzweig and K. I. Wolpin. Natural “Natural Experiments” in Economics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38:827–874, 2000
- A. J. Sovey and D. P. Green. Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science: A Reader’s Guide. *American Journal of Political Science*, 2010

Week 4 (Sep 15): PE of Development I

- Core readings:

- D. Acemoglu. *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*. Princeton University Press, 2008 (Chapter 1 and 2)
- W. Easterly. *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2001 (pp.24-69)
- D. C. North and B. R. Weingast. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(4):803–832, 1989
- D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5):1369–1401, 2001
- M. Dell. The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita. *Econometrica*, 78(6):1863–1903, 2010

- Supplementary readings:

- D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson. Political Losers as Barrier to Development. *American Economic Review*, 90(2):126–130, 2000
- D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson. Reversal of Fortunes: Geography and Institutions in the Modern World Income Distribution. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4):1231–1294, 2002
- D. Acemoglu, S. Jonson, and J. Robinson. The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 95(3):546–579, 2005
- D. Acemoglu, D. Cantoni, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson. The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3286–3307, 2011
- D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson. *Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. Crown Business, 2012
- D. Acemoglu, F. A. Gallego, and J. A. Robinson. Institutions, Human Capital and Development. *Annual Review of Economics*, 6:875–912, 2014
- D. Acemoglu, S. Naidu, P. Restrepo, and J. A. Robinson. Democracy Does Cause Growth. NBER Working Paper 20004, Mar. 2014

- D. Y. Albouy. *The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An investigation of the Settler Mortality Data*. June 2008. Published: NBER Working Paper 14130
- A. Banerjee and L. Iyer. *History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India*. Working Paper, Oct. 2004
- R. J. Barro. Democracy and Growth. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 1:1–27, 1996
- R. J. Barro. *Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study*. MIT Press, 1997
- M. Bruhn and F. A. Gallego. Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do They Matter for Economic Development? *The Review of Economic and Statistics*, 94(2):433–461, 2012
- E. Chaney. *Ethnic Cleansing and the Long-Term Persistence of Extractive Institutions: Evidence from the Expulsion of the Moriscos*. Sept. 2008. Published: Working Paper
- S. Engerman and K. L. Sokoloff. Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies. *Economia*, 3(1):41–109, 2002
- J. Feyrer and B. Sacerdote. *Colonialism and Modern Income - Islands as Natural Experiments*. Sept. 2006. Published: NBER Working Paper 12546
- J. Hough and R. Grier. *The Long Process of Development. Building Markets and States in Pre-industrial England, Spain, and Their Colonies*. Cambridge University Press, 2015
- D. C. North, J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. *Violence and Social Orders. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. Cambridge University Press, 2009
- D. C. North. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2007
- N. Nunn. The Long-term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1):139–176, Feb. 2008
- P. Pinto and J. Timmons. The Political Determinants of Economic Performance: Political Competition and the Sources of Growth. *Comparative Political Studies*, 38:26–50, 2005
- X. Sala-i Martin, G. Doppelhofer, and R. I. Miller. Determinants of Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE). *The American Economic Review*, 94(4):813–835, 2004
- X. Sala-I-Martin. I Just Ran Two Million Regressions. *The American Economic Review*, 87(2):178–183, 1997
- D. Stasavage. Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274-1785. *International Organization*, 61(3):489–525, 2007

Week 5 (Sep 22): PE of Development II

- Core readings:

- E. L. Glaeser, R. L. Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. Do Institutions Cause Growth. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9:271–303, 2004
- J. D. Sachs. *Institutions Don’t Rule: Direct Effect of Geography On Per Capita Income*. Feb. 2003. Published: NBER Working Paper No.9490
- D. A. Hibbs and O. Olsson. Geography, biogeography, and why some countries are rich and others poor. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 101(10):3715–3720, 2004

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- V. Bockstette, A. Chanda, and L. Putterman. States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 7:347–369, 2002
 - L. Putterman and D. N. Weil. Post-1500 Population Flows and The Long-Run Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequality. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(4):1627–1682, Nov. 2010
 - Supplementary readings:
 - Q. Ashraf and O. Galor. Human Genetic Diversity and Comparative Economic Development. *AER*, 2012
 - G. Clark. *A Farewell to Alms. A Brief Economic History of the World*. Princeton University Press, 2007
 - D. Comin, W. Easterly, and E. Gong. Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 BC? *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2(3):65–97, 2010
 - J. Diamond. *Guns, Germs, and Steel*. W.W. Norton, 1997
 - M. Dell, B. F. Jones, and B. A. Olken. Temperature and Income: Reconciling New Cross-Sectional and Panel Estimates. *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings*, 99(2):198–204, 2009
 - W. Easterly and R. Levine. The European Origins of Economic Development. Working Paper, Nov. 2013
 - P. Evans. *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil*. Princeton University Press, 1979
 - B. F. Jones and B. A. Olken. Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3):835–864, 2005
 - S. Michalopoulos and E. Papaioannou. Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development. *Econometrica*, 81(1):113–152, 2013
 - N. Nunn and D. Puga. Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in Africa. *The Review of Economic and Statistics*, 94(1):20–36, 2012
 - K. Pommeranz. *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*. Princeton University Press, 2000
 - J. D. Sachs. Tropical Underdevelopment. Working Paper 8119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass, 2001
 - J. Sachs and A. Warner. The curse of natural resources. *European Economic Review*, 45:827–838, 2001
 - J. Sachs and P. Malaney. The economic and social burden of malaria. *Nature*, 415(7):680–685, 2002
 - E. Spolaore and R. Wacziarg. The Diffusion of Development. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2):469–529, May 2009
 - E. Spolaore and R. Wacziarg. How Deep Are the Roots of Economic Development? *Journal of Economic Literature*, 51(2):325–69, 2013
 - R. Wade. *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton University Press, 1990

Week 6 (Sep 29): The Origins of States and State-Building

- Core readings:
 - C. Tilly. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*. Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1990 (pp.1–95)
 - J. Herbst. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000 (Introduction + Chapter 1)
 - T. Besley and T. Persson. The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. *American Economic Review*, 99(4):1218–44, 2009
 - K. K. Karaman and S. Pamuk. Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction Between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime. *American Political Science Review*, 107(3):603–626, 2013
 - R. S. d. I. Sierra. On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo. Working Paper, Nov. 2013
- Supplementary readings:
 - D. Acemoglu. Institutions, Factor Prices, and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States. *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings*, 100(2):115–119, 2010
 - D. Acemoglu, C. Garcia-Jimeno, and J. A. Robinson. State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach. Working Paper, Sept. 2013
 - D. Acemoglu, I. N. Chaves, P. Osafo-Kwaako, and J. A. Robinson. Indirect Rule and State Weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in Comparative Perspective. NBER Working Paper 20092, May 2014
 - A. Alesina and E. Spolaore. On the Number and Size of Nations. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112:1027–1056, 1997
 - Y. Barzel. *A Theory of the State*. Cambridge University Press, 2002
 - R. H. Bates. State Failure. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11:1–12, 2008
 - R. H. Bates. *When Things Fell Apart. State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2008
 - G. Bertocchi and A. Guerzoni. Growth, history, or institutions: What explains state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa? *Journal of Peace Research*, 49(6):769–783, 2012
 - T. Besley and T. Persson. *Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2011
 - C. Boone. *Political Topographies of the African State. Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*. Cambridge University Press, 2003
 - M. Dincecco. *Political Transformations and Public Finances. Europe, 1650-1913*. Cambridge University Press, 2011
 - R. F. Doner, B. K. Ritchie, and D. Slater. Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective. *International Organization*, 59:327–361, 2005
 - L. Fergusson, H. Larreguy, and J. F. Riano. Political Constraints and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico. Working Paper, June 2014

- N. Gennaioli and H.-J. Voth. State Capacity and Military Conflict. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2014
- M. Levi. *Of Rule and Revenue*. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1989
- E. F. Kisangani and J. Pickering. Rebels, Rivals, and Post-Colonial State-Building: Identifying Bellicist Influences on State Extractive Capacity. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58:187–198, 2014
- M. J. Kurtz. *Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective. Social Foundations of Institutional Order*. Cambridge University Press, 2013
- J. C. Scott. *The Art of Not Being Governed. An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press, 2009
- J. C. Scott. *Seeing Like A State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Yale University Press, 1998
- D. Slater. *Ordering Power. Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2010
- H. D. Soifer. *State Building in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press, 2016
- D. Stasavage. When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies. *American Political Science Review*, 104(04):625–643, Nov. 2010
- D. Ziblatt. Why Some Cities Provide More Public Goods than Others: A Subnational Comparison of the Provision of Public Goods in German Cities in 1912. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 43:273–289, 2008

Week 7 (Oct 6): Autumn Break

Week 8 (Oct 13): PE of Democratization and Regime Change

- Core readings:
 - C. Boix and S. C. Stokes. Endogenous Democratization. *World Politics*, 55(04):517–549, July 2003
 - D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson. A Theory of Political Transitions. *American Economic Review*, 91(4):938–963, 2001
 - S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman. Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule. *American Political Science Review*, 106(03):495–516, Aug. 2012
 - B. Ansell and D. Samuels. Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43:1543–1574, 2010
 - T. S. Aidt and P. S. Jensen. Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820-1938. *European Economic Review*, 72:52–75, 2014
- Supplementary readings:
 - D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson. Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(4):1167–1199, 2000

- D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson, and P. Yared. Income and Democracy. *American Economic Review*, 98(3):808–42, 2008
- D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2006
- M. Adena, R. Enikolopov, M. Petrova, V. Santarosa, and E. Zhuravskaya. Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany. Working Paper, July 2013
- T. S. Aidt and R. Franck. Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832. *Econometrica*, 83(2):505–547, Mar. 2015
- B. W. Ansell and D. Samuels. *Inequality and Democratization. An Elite-Competition Approach*. Cambridge University Press, 2014
- M. Ardanaz and I. Mares. Labor Shortages, Rural Inequality, and Democratization. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(12):1639–1669, Oct. 2014
- M. Barron, E. Miguel, and S. Satyanath. Economic Shocks and Democratization in Africa. Working Paper, May 2013
- S. Berman. Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic. *World Politics*, 49(3):401–429, 1997
- C. Boix. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2003
- M. Brücker and A. Ciccone. Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity. *Econometrica*, 79(3):923–947, 2011
- M. Cervellati, F. Jung, U. Sunde, and T. Vischer. Income and Democracy: Comment. *American Economic Review*, 104(2):707–19, 2014
- J. R. Freeman and D. M. Quinn. The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered. Working Paper. University of Minnesota. <http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/seminars/pdfs/2010/FreemanQ> (accessed November 1, 2011), 2010
- M. Gassebner, M. J. Lamla, and J. R. Vreeland. Extreme Bounds of Democracy. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57(2):171–197, Apr. 2013
- P. Giuliano and N. Nunn. The Transmission of Democracy: From the Village to the Nation-State. *American Economic Review*, 103(3):86–92, 2013
- E. Glaeser, G. Ponzetto, and A. Shleifer. Why Does Democracy Need Education? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12:77–99, 2007
- J. G. Hariri. The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood. *American Political Science Review*, 106(03):471–494, Aug. 2012
- C. Houle. Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization. *World Politics*, 61(04):589–622, Oct. 2009
- T. Lankina and L. Getachew. Mission or Empire, Word or Sword? The Human Capital Legacy in Postcolonial Democratic Development. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(2):465–483, 2012
- A. Lizzeri and N. Persico. Why Did the Elite Extend the Franchise? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britains Age of Reform. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(2):705–763, 2004
- G. M. Luebbert. *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy. Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe*. Oxford University Press, 1991

- B. Moore. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Beacon Press, 1966
- A. Przeworski, M. E. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2000
- S. Satyanath, N. Voigtländer, and H.-J. Voth. Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany. NBER Working Paper 19201, July 2013
- D. Stasavage. *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State. France and Great Britain, 1688-1789*. Cambridge University Press, 2003
- D. Stasavage. When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies. *American Political Science Review*, 104(04):625–643, Nov. 2010
- M. W. Svobik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012
- M. Svobik. Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation. *American Political Science Review*, 102(02):153–168, May 2008
- D. Treisman. Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(4):927–942, Oct. 2015
- K. Weyland. Crafting Counterrevolution: How Reactionaries Learned to Combat Change in 1848. *American Political Science Review*, 110(02):215–231, May 2016
- E. Wibbels and J. S. Ahlquist. Development, Trade, and Social Insurance. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55:125–149, 2011
- R. D. Woodberry. The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy. *American Political Science Review*, 106(02):244–274, May 2012

Week 9 (Oct 20): PE of Democracy and Public Goods Provision

- Core readings:

- M. Ross. Is Democracy Good for the Poor? *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4):860–874, 2006
- T. Besley and R. Burgess. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4):1415–1451, 2002
- B. A. Olken. Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. *American Political Science Review*, 104(02):243–267, May 2010
- G. Miller. Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3):1287–1327, Aug. 2008
- R. Harding and D. Stasavage. What Democracy Does (and Doesn’t do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(01):229–245, 2014

- Supplementary readings:

- T. S. Aidt and B. Dallal. Female voting power: the contribution of women’s suffrage to the growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869-1960). *Public Choice*, 134(3-4):391–417, 2008

- T. S. Aidt and P. S. Jensen. Democratization and the size of government: evidence from the long 19th century. *Public Choice*, 157:511–542, 2013
- A. Adam, M. D. Delis, and P. Kammass. Are democratic governments more efficient? *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27:75–86, 2011
- R. H. Bates. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa. The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. University of California Press, 1981
- M. M. Bechtel, D. Hangartner, and L. Schmid. Does Compulsory Voting Increase Support for Leftist Policy? *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(3):752–767, July 2016
- T. Besley and S. Coate. An Economic Model of Representative Democracy. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(1):85–114, 1997
- T. Besley. *Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government*. Oxford University Press, 2006
- T. Besley, R. Pande, and V. Rao. *Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India*. Oct. 2007. Published: NBER Working Paper
- T. Besley and M. Reynal-Querol. Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders? *American Political Science Review*, 105(03):552–566, Aug. 2011
- D. S. Brown and A. M. Mobarak. The Transforming Power of Democracy: Regime Type and the Distribution of Electricity. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02):193–213, May 2009
- R. Burgess, R. Jedwab, E. Miguel, A. Morjaria, and G. Padro-i Miguel. The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya. NBER Working Paper 19398, Sept. 2013
- R. Chattopadhyay and E. Duflo. Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India. *Econometrica*, 72(5):1409–1443, 2004
- A. D. L. O. Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1):1–14, 2013
- T. Fujiwara. Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil. *Econometrica*, 83(2):423–464, Mar. 2015
- G. Grossman. Do Selection Rules Affect Leader Responsiveness? Evidence from Rural Uganda. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 9(1):1–44, Mar. 2014
- G. Grossman and W. W. Hanlon. Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations? Evidence from Uganda. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(3):669–686, 2014
- C.-T. Hsieh, E. Miguel, D. Ortega, and F. Rodriguez. The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela’s Maisanta. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(2):196–214, 2011
- M. Kudamatsu. Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Micro Data. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 10(6):1294–1317, 2012
- M. Manacorda, E. Miguel, and A. Vigorito. Government Transfers and Political Support. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(3):1–28, 2011

- M. Martinez-Bravo, G. Padro-i Miguel, N. Qian, and Y. Yao. *The Effects of Democratization on Public Goods and Redistribution: Evidence from China*. May 2012. Published: NBER Working Paper 18101
- B. Min. *Power and the Vote: Elections and Electricity in the Developing World*. Cambridge University Press, 2015
- L. Tsai. *Accountability without Democracy*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2007

Week 10 (Oct 27): The Welfare State and Redistribution

- Core readings:

- A. H. Meltzer and S. F. Richard. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 89(5):914–927, 1981
- T. Iversen and D. Soskice. Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others. *American Political Science Review*, null(02):165–181, May 2006
- M. Dahlberg, K. Edmark, and H. Lundqvist. Ethnic Diversity and Preferences for Redistribution. *Journal of Political Economy*, 120(1):41–76, 2012
- B. T. Hinnerich and P. Pettersson-Lidbom. Democracy, Redistribution, and Political Participation: Evidence From Sweden 1919–1938. *Econometrica*, 82(3):961–993, 2014
- D. Acemoglu. Inefficient Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, null(03):649–661, Sept. 2001

- Supplementary readings:

- D. Acemoglu, S. Naidu, P. Restrepo, and J. A. Robinson. Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality. NBER Working Paper 19746, Dec. 2013
- A. Adsera and C. Boix. Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness. *International Organization*, 56(2):229–262, 2002
- J. S. Ahlquist. Building Strategic Capacity: The Political Underpinnings of Coordinated Wage Bargaining. *American Political Science Review*, 104(01):171–188, Feb. 2010
- M. Albertus. *Autocracy and Redistribution. The Politics of Land Reform*. Cambridge University Press, 2016
- B. W. Ansell. *From the Ballot to the Blackboard. The Redistributive Political Economy of Education*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2010
- B. Ansell. The Political Economy of Ownership: Housing Markets and the Welfare State. *American Political Science Review*, 108(02):383–402, May 2014
- B. Ansell and J. Lindvall. The Political Origins of Primary Education Systems: Ideology, Institutions, and Interdenominational Conflict in an Era of Nation-Building. *American Political Science Review*, 107(03):505–522, Aug. 2013
- D. Austen-Smith. Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation. *Journal of Political Economy*, 108(6):1235–1269, 2000
- P. Beramendi and D. Rueda. Social Democracy Constrained: Indirect Taxation in Industrialized Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(04):619–641, 2007

- C. Boix. *Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy*. Cambridge University Press, 1998
- C. Boix. *Political Order and Inequality. Their Foundations and Their Consequences for Human Welfare*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2015
- D. Bradley, E. Huber, S. Moller, F. Nielsen, and J. D. Stephens. Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies. *World Politics*, 55(02):193–228, Jan. 2003
- G. Cox. *Swing voters, core voters and distribution*. 2007. Published: Working Paper
- S. Coate and S. Morris. On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests. *Journal of Political Economy*, 103:1210–1235, 1995
- A. Dixit and J. Londregan. Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 113:497–529, 1998
- A. Dixit and J. Londregan. The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(4):1132–1155, 1996
- G. Esping-Andersen. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1990
- P. A. Hall and D. Soskice, editors. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford University Press, 2001
- E. Huber and J. D. Stephens. *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2001
- E. Huber, T. Mustillo, and J. D. Stephens. Politics and Social Spending in Latin America. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(02):420–436, Apr. 2008
- T. Iversen and D. Soskice. An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences. *American Political Science Review*, 95(4):874–893, 2001
- T. Iversen and D. Soskice. Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the Nineteenth Century. *World Politics*, 61(03):438–486, July 2009
- T. Iversen and J. D. Stephens. Partisan Politics, the Welfare State, and Three Worlds of Human Capital Formation. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4/5):600–637, 2008
- P. H. Lindert. *Growing Public. Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century Vol. I*. Cambridge University Press, 2004
- P. H. Lindert. *Growing Public. Social Expenditure and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century Vol II*. Cambridge University Press, 2004
- N. Lupu and J. Pontusson. The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 105(02):316–336, May 2011
- I. Mares. *The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development*. Cambridge University Press, 2003
- I. Mares and M. E. Carnes. Social Policy in Developing Countries. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12:93–113, 2009
- K. O. Moene and M. Wallerstein. Earnings Inequality and Welfare Spending: A Disaggregated Analysis. *World Politics*, 55(04):485–516, July 2003
- J. Nickelsburg and J. F. Timmons. On the (Ir)relevance of Skill Specificity for Social Insurance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 7:35–67, 2012
- P. Petterson-Lidbom. Does the size of the legislature affect the size of government? Evidence from two natural experiments. *Journal of Public Economics*, 96:269–278, 2012

- P. Rehm. Social Policy by Popular Demand. *World Politics*, 63(02):271–299, Apr. 2011
- P. Rehm. *Risk Inequality and Welfare States. Social Policy Preferences, Development, and Dynamics*. Cambridge University Press, 2016
- P. Rehm, J. S. Hacker, and M. Schlesinger. Insecure Alliances: Risk, Inequality, and Support for the Welfare State. *American Political Science Review*, 106(02):386–406, May 2012
- D. RUEDA. Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties. *American Political Science Review*, 99(01):61–74, 2005
- M. Shayo. A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02):147–174, May 2009
- D. Stasavage and K. Scheve. Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1(3):255–286, 2006
- K. Scheve and D. Stasavage. The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation. *International Organization*, 64(04):529–561, Oct. 2010
- J. F. Timmons. Taxation and Representation in Recent History. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(01):191–208, Jan. 2010
- E. Wibbels and J. S. Ahlquist. Development, Trade, and Social Insurance. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55:125–149, 2011

Week 11 (Nov 3): PE of Trade

- Core readings:

- R. Rogowski. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *The American Political Science Review*, 81(4):1121–1137, 1987
- M. Hiscox. Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. *International Organization*, 55(01):1–46, 2003
- D. Berger, W. Easterly, N. Nunn, and S. Satyanath. Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War. *American Economic Review*, 103(2):863–96, 2013
- M. J. Hiscox. Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing. *International Organization*, 60(03):755–780, July 2006
- I. S. Kim. Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm level lobbying for Trade Liberalization. Working Paper, Oct. 2013

- Supplementary readings:

- J. S. Ahlquist, A. B. Clayton, and M. Levi. Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, and the ILWU Puzzle. *International Organization*, 68(01):33–75, Jan. 2014
- J. C. Aker, M. W. Klein, S. A. O’Connell, and M. Yang. Borders, Ethnicity and Trade. *Journal of Development Economics*, 2013
- A. Baker. Why is Trade Reform So Popular in Latin America?: A Consumption-Based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences. *World Politics*, 55(03):423–455, Apr. 2003

- R. E. Baldwin. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 3(4):119–135, 1989
- J. L. Broz and S. H. Werfel. Exchange Rates and Industry Demands for Trade Protection. *International Organization*, 68(02):393–416, Mar. 2014
- M. L. Busch and E. Reinhardt. Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(4):703–719, 2000
- C. L. Davis. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review*, null(01):153–169, Feb. 2004
- G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman. *Special Interest Politics*. The MIT Press, 2001
- C. R. Hankla. Parties and Patronage. An Analysis of Trade and Industrial Policy in India. *Comparative Politics*, 41(1):41–60, 2008
- T. Hellwig. *Globalization and Mass Politics: Retaining the Room to Maneuver*. Cambridge University Press, 2014
- M. J. Hiscox. *International Trade & Political Conflict. Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility*. Princeton University Press, 2002
- D. Y. Kono. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review*, null(03):369–384, Aug. 2006
- E. D. Mansfield and D. C. Mutz. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization*, 63(03):425–457, July 2009
- H. V. Milner and K. Kubota. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade on the Developing Countries. *International Organization*, 59:107–143, 2005
- J. H. Park. *The Political Economy of Specific Subsidies*. 2008. Published: Working Paper
- J. Hee Park and N. Jensen. Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2):314–329, 2007
- D. Puga and D. Trefler. International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(2):753–821, May 2014
- R. Rogowski. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton University Press, 1989
- K. F. Scheve and M. J. Slaughter. What determines individual trade-policy preferences? *Journal of International Economics*, 54(2):267–292, Aug. 2001
- M. D. Ward, J. S. Ahlquist, and A. Rozenas. Gravity’s Rainbow: A dynamic latent space model for the world trade network. *Network Science*, 1(01):95–118, Apr. 2013

Week 12 (Nov 10): Finance

- Core readings:
 - J. Frieden. Invested interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization*, 45(4):425–451, 1991
 - P. M. Pinto and S. M. Pinto. The Politics of Investment: Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment. *Economics & Politics*, 20(2):216–254, 2008

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- D. Leblang and S. Satyanath. Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises. *International Organization*, 60(01):245–262, Jan. 2006
 - M. M. Bechtel, J. Hainmueller, and Y. Margalit. Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4):835–856, 2014
 - A. Mian, A. Sufi, and F. Trebbi. The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis. *American Economic Review*, 100(5):1967–98, 2010
 - Supplementary readings:
 - W. Bernhard and D. Leblang. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments. *International Organization*, 53(1):71–97, 1999
 - W. Bernhard and D. Leblang. *Democratic Processes and Financial Markets. Pricing Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2006
 - D. Campello. The Politics of Financial Booms and Crises Evidence From Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(2):260–286, Feb. 2014
 - E. Grossman and C. Woll. Saving the Banks The Political Economy of Bailouts. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(4):574–600, Mar. 2014
 - J. Hainmueller and M. J. Hiscox. Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 104(01):61–84, Feb. 2010
 - N. M. Jensen. Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization*, 57(3):587–616, 2003
 - N. Jensen. Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(04):1040–1052, Oct. 2008
 - M. Kim, A. H. Liu, K.-L. Tuxhorn, D. S. Brown, and D. Leblang. Lingua Mercatoria: Language and Foreign Direct Investment. *International Studies Quarterly*, 2014
 - P. Krugman. A Model of Balance of Payments Crises. *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking*, 11(3):311–325, 1979
 - Q. Li and A. Resnick. Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries. *International Organization*, 57(1):175–211, 2003
 - S. C. Nelson. Playing Favorites: How Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF’s Lending Decisions. *International Organization*, 68(02):297–328, Mar. 2014
 - D. P. Quinn and C. Inclan. The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(3):771–813, 1997
 - U. Panizza, F. Sturzenegger, and J. Zettelmeyer. The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt Default. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 47(3):651–698, 2009
 - T. Pepinsky. *Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes. Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2009
 - T. B. Pepinsky. *Do Currency Crises Cause Capital Account Liberalization?* Feb. 2008. Published: Working Paper

- T. B. Pepinsky. Institutions and Capital Flight in the Global Economic Crisis. *Economics & Politics*, 2014
- S. Satyanath. *Globalization, Politics, And Financial Turmoil. Asia's Banking Crisis*. Cambridge University Press, 2006
- B. A. Simmons and Z. Elkins. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. *American Political Science Review*, null(01):171–189, Feb. 2004
- D. A. Singer. Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World. *American Political Science Review*, 104(02):307–323, May 2010
- M. Tomz. *Reputation and International Cooperation. Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries*. Princeton University Press, 2007
- S. Walter. *Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments*. Cambridge University Press, 2015

Week 13 (Nov 17): Lobbying and Corruption

- Core readings:

- M. Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971
- G. Grossman and E. Helpman. Protection for Sale. *American Economic Review*, 84(4):833–50, 1994
- B. Olken. Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(2):200–249, 2007
- R. Fisman. Estimating the Value of Political Connections. *American Economic Review*, 91(4):1095–1102, 2001
- R. Fisman, F. Schulz, and V. Vig. The Private Returns to Public Office. *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(4):806–862, 2014
- C. Ferraz and F. Finan. Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. *American Economic Review*, 101:1274–1311, 2011. Published: BREAD Working Paper

- Supplementary readings:

- M. Bertrand, S. Djankov, R. Hanna, and S. Mullainathan. Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(4):1639–1676, Nov. 2007
- J. Blanes i Vidal, M. Draca, and C. Fons-Rosen. Revolving Door Lobbyists. *American Economic Review*, 102(7):3731–48, 2012
- M. Callen and J. D. Long. Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. Working Paper, 2012
- F. R. Campante and Q.-A. Do. Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States. Working Paper, May 2012
- Y. L. Cheung, P. R. Rau, and A. Stouraitis. *How Much Do Firms Pay As Bribes and What Benefits Do They Get? Evidence From Corruption Cases Worldwide*. Apr. 2012. Published: NBER Working Paper 17981

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- D. Donchev and G. Ujhelyi. What Do Corruption Indices Measure? *Economics & Politics*, 2014
 - L. Drutman. *The Business of America is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate*. Oxford University Press, 2015
 - A. C. Eggers and J. Hainmueller. MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 103(04):513–533, Nov. 2009
 - R. Fisman and E. Miguel. Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(6):1020–1048, 2007
 - G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman. *Special Interest Politics*. The MIT Press, 2001
 - B. Harstad and J. Svensson. Bribes, Lobbying, and Development. *American Political Science Review*, 105(01):46–63, Feb. 2011
 - A. I. Khwaja and A. Mian. Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firm? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(4):1371–1411, 2005
 - J. McMillan and P. Zoido. How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(4):69–92, 2004
 - E. J. Malesky and K. Samphantharak. Predictable Corruption and Firm Investment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment and Survey of Cambodian Entrepreneurs. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 3(3):227–267, Oct. 2008
 - B. Olken and P. Barron. The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh. *Journal of Political Economy*, 2009
 - B. Olken. Corruption and the Cost of Redistribution. Micro Evidence from Indonesia. *Journal of Public Economics*, 90(4-5):853–870, 2006
 - M. Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press, 1965
 - P. Querubin and J. M. S. Jr. The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850-1880. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8(409-450), 2013
 - P. Querubin. Family and Politics: Dynastic Incumbency Advanatge in the Philippines. Working Paper, Feb. 2013
 - R. Reinikka and J. Svensson. Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2-3):259–267, Apr. 2005
 - B. K. Richter, K. Samphantharak, and J. F. Timmons. Lobbying and Taxes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(4):893–909, 2009
 - J. Svensson. Eight Questions about Corruption. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3):19–42, 2005
 - D. Treisman. What Have We Learned About The Causes Of Corruption From Ten Years Of Cross-National Empirical Research? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10:211–44, 2007
 - V. Yadav. Legislative Institutions and Corruption in Developing Country Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(8):1027–1058, Aug. 2012

- V. Yadav. *Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries*. Oxford University Press, 2011
- V. Yadav and B. Mukherjee. *The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships*. Cambridge University Press, 2016

Week 14 (Nov 24): Thanksgiving Break

Week 15 (Dec 1): Presentations

Other Topics

Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Reform

- C. Adolph. *The Dilemma of Discretion: Career Ambitions and the Politics of Central Banking*. Cambridge University Press, 2012
- A. Alesina. Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 102(3):651–678, 1987
- A. Alesina and H. Rosenthal. *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*. Cambridge University Press, 1995
- R. H. Bates. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa. The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. University of California Press, 1981
- W. Bernhard, J. L. Broz, and W. R. Clark. The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions. *International Organization*, 56:693–723, 2002
- T. Besley and A. Case. Political institutions and policy choices: Evidence from the United States. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 41(1):7–73, 2003
- J. D. Brown, J. S. Earle, and S. Gehlbach. Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? State Bureaucracy and Privatization Effectiveness. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02):264–283, May 2009
- V. Bunce. Democratization and Economic Reform. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4:43–65, 2001
- L. Calmfors, J. Driffill, S. Honkapohja, and F. Giavazzi. Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance. *Economic Policy*, 3(6):13–61, 1988
- M. S. Copelovitch and D. A. Singer. Financial Regulation, Monetary Policy, and Inflation in the Industrialized World. *Journal of Politics*
- S. Gehlbach and E. J. Malesky. The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(04):957–975, Oct. 2010
- P. A. Gourevitch. *Politics in Hard Times. Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises*. Cornell University Press, 1986
- P. Hall and R. Franzese. Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union. *International Organization*, 52(03):505–535, 1998

- M. Hallerberg. Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions. *International Organization*, 56(4):775–802, 2002
- J. S. Hellman. Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post Transitions. *World Politics*, 50(2):203–234, 1998
- T. Iversen and D. Soskice. New Macroeconomics and Political Science. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9:425–53, 2006
- P. Keefer and D. Stasavage. Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments. *International Organization*, 56(4):751–774, 2002
- L. L. Leachman, G. Rosas, P. Lange, and A. Bester. The Political Economy of Budget Deficits. *Economics & Politics*, 19(3):369–420, 2007
- B. Mukherjee and D. A. Singer. Monetary Institutions, Partisanship, and Inflation Targeting. *International Organization*, 62(02):323–358, Apr. 2008
- H. Schamis. Distributional Coalitions and Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. *World Politics*, 51(2):236–268, 1999
- B. L. Slantchev. The Political Economy of Simultaneous Transitions: An Empirical Test of Two Models. *Political Research Quarterly*, 58(2):279–294, 2005

Political Business Cycles

- T. S. Aidt and G. Mooney. Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: Evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902-1937. *Journal of Public Economics*, 2014
- A. Alesina and M. Paradisi. Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities. NBER Working Paper 20570, Oct. 2014
- A. Alesina, N. Roubini, and G. Cohen. *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy*. Cambridge University Press, 1997
- J. E. Alt and D. D. Lassen. Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(3):530–550, 2006
- A. Brender and A. Drazen. Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 52(7):1271–1295, Oct. 2005
- B. Canes-Wrone and J.-K. Park. Electoral Business Cycles in OECD Countries. *American Political Science Review*, 106(01):103–122, Feb. 2012
- R. Franzese. Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5:369–421, 2002
- R. Franzese. *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, 2002
- M. Hanusch and P. Keefer. Younger parties, bigger spenders? Party age and political budget cycles. *European Economic Review*, 72:1–18, Nov. 2014

- D. Hibbs. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. *American Political Science Review*, 71:1467–1487, 1977
- M. A. Kayser. Partisan Waves: International Business Cycles and Electoral Choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(4):950–970, 2009
- S. Khemani. Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian States. *Journal of Development Economics*, 73:125–154, 2004
- J. Labonne. Local Political Business Cycles. Evidence from Philippine Municipalities. Working Paper, Aug. 2014
- W. D. Nordhaus. The Political Business Cycle. *Review of Economic Studies*, 42:169–190, 1975
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