**Political Science 7380**

**International Political Economy (Seminar)**

Autumn 2017 Tu: 2-4:45pm

2078 Derby Hall

Sarah Brooks and Daniel Verdier

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1. **Course Description**

This course examines how domestic and international politics influence the economic relations between states. It will address the major theoretical debates in the field and introduce the chief methodological approaches used in contemporary analyses. We will focus attention on four types of cross-border flows and the policies and international institutions that regulate them: the flow of goods (trade policy), the flow of capital (financial and exchange rate policy), the flow and location of production (foreign investment policy), and the flow of people (immigration policy). No prior knowledge of math or economics is necessary.

1. **Course Goals**

As part of the core sequence for the subfield of international relations, this course has three main goals; note that, at the end of the day, all three are structured to make you a more successful researcher:

* 1. **Knowledge of the field of IPE**

As in any subfield, it is critical to understand what we already know before we try to answer an existing question. You may have lots of interesting theories about how the world works, but before you spend (literally) years of your life working to get a paper published on a particular question, you should be sure that someone else hasn’t already provided a compelling answer. To help with this goal, several of the readings for each week are drawn from “classics” in the field – works that have been heavily cited, and that serve as a touchstone for more general discussion among scholars.

* 1. **Capacity to critique existing work**

However, just because a paper has been assigned in this class does not mean that it is the final word on the subject. No paper is perfect – sometimes this happens because newer methodological approaches supplant prior ones, or because new events suggest that our prior theoretical models were incomplete. The purpose of science is to refine our accumulation of knowledge about the world, and it is impossible to do this if you are incapable of recognizing the shortcomings of existing work.

* 1. **Ideas for better approaches for future research**

While learning to effectively identify problems with work done by others is a critical piece of developing your own capacity to conduct research, this is not the final destination for training in graduate school. It is very common for students in their first few years of a Ph.D. program to become adept at tearing down the work of others, but never learn the step which is actually the most important for your success as an academic: what can we do better? Speaking from experience, you will be much better regarded by other scholars if you not only identify issues, but also propose solutions. This, fundamentally, is the heart of what we should do, and so you should always try to think of ways that existing approaches could be improved.

**III. Course Requirements**

The principal requirement for students is to read thoroughly each of the assigned works and to come to seminar prepared to discuss the readings. In addition to preparing for seminar and participating actively in discussions, the requirements for this course are:

1. **Class Discussion:**

All students are expected to come to class prepared to discuss each week’s readings. To jumpstart this discussion, we will randomly select a student to provide a brief summary of the main points of each paper. We will practice how to think about the main pieces of a research paper the first week of class, but in general you should try to answer the following set of questions for each piece:

1. *Research question*: What is this paper about? What is the topic that the authors explore?

2. *Argument*: What is the main theory developed in the piece? What assumptions does it make? Are these reasonable?

3. *Evidence*: How do the authors test their theory? Do their measures match well the main components of their argument? Are there issues with the way the data are analyzed (either quantitatively or qualitatively)?

NOTE: Some students may take this class in their first semester of graduate school. While some students might have prior training in research methods, most do not, and so this final piece may be more challenging to students who have not yet completed the core sequences in quantitative methodology. Don’t worry too much about this at first.

1. **Critical Review:**

Each student will select a topic from one week in the semester and write a 5-7 page paper that evaluates critically the arguments made in the papers assigned that week. While a successful analysis likely requires a short summary of each piece (goal 1 of the course), the bulk of the paper should be dedicated to providing original criticisms of the research (goal 2). Importantly, the essay should also provide some sense of what could be done to “fix” these issues (goal 3). This paper will be due the day before the seminar (Monday) of your designated week, by 2 p.m..

1. **Research Paper:**

Each student will formulate a research question addressing a topic in the field of international political economy. The research paper should deploy theoretical literature and an empirical puzzle to set up the research question, develop hypotheses, and utilize an appropriate methodology for testing the hypotheses. The research must include an analysis of the research question (e.g., it will perform statistical analyses, or write a case study). The paper paper therefore takes a first step toward the development of an original research project, which might later be turned into a conference paper and a future publication. To complete the research paper, you’ll need, first, to come up with a research question or puzzle—this is sometimes the most difficult part; you are advised to keep this task in mind as you read for each week; you should ask us if you want to read further on a particular topic. Second, you will need to figure out what’s been done on the topic or in similar areas and imagine ways in which arguments about one set of phenomena could be brought to bear on your question (a literature review). Then, you will have to develop a set of hypotheses regarding your research question. Last, you should think about how you can test these hypotheses (qualitatively, quantitatively, or formally), with which cases or with what sorts of data.

For general discussions of research design in political science, you may want to consult Keohane, King and Verba’s *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton, 1994) or Brady and Collier’s *Rethinking Social Inquiry* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). During the second part of the semester, we will devote seminar time to discussing the topics of your research papers, and then to presenting them.

1. **Readings and Schedule**

**Introduction and Overview of IPE (August 22)**

For those of you seeking a background in the field of IPE, there are a number of pieces by scholars that discuss the current direction of mainstream work. The list below is just an introduction; *these are not required*.

* Jeffry A. Frieden. 2007. Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century. New York: W.W. Norton.
* Cohen, Benjamin J. (2008) International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1.
* Keohane, Robert O. (2009) “The Old IPE and the New.” Review of International Political Economy 16(1): 34-46.
* Lake, David A. (2009) “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review,” The Review Of International Organizations 4 (3): 219-244.
* Cohen, Benjamin J. (2010) “Are IPE Journals Becoming Boring?” International Studies Quarterly 54: 887-891.
* Maliniak, Daniel and Michael J. Tierney (2009) “The American school of IPE,” Review of International Political Economy 16 (1): 6-33

### Week 1. Trade preference formation (August 29)

* Magee, Stephen. 1980. “Three simple tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.” In Peter Oppenheimer, ed., *Issues in International Economics* (London: Oriel Press): 138-153.
* Ronald Rogowski. 1987. “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” *American Political Science Review* 81:4 (December), 1121-1137
* Hiscox, Michael. 2001. “Class versus industry cleavages: inter-industry factor mobility and the politics of trade.” *International Organization* 55, 1: 1-46.
* Baker, Andy. 2003. “Why is trade reform so popular in Latin America?” *World Politics* 55 (April): 423-44.
* Scheve, Kenneth and Slaughter, Matthew J. 2001. “What determines individual trade-policy preferences?” *Journal of International Economics*, 54 (2): 267-292.

**Recommended**

* Alt, James E., & Michael Gilligan (1994) “The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions.” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2(2): 165–192.
* Goldberg, Pinelopi K., & Giovanni Maggi (1999) “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation.” *American Economic Review* 89(5): 1135–1155.
* Mansfield, Edward and Mark Busch (1995) “The Political Economy of Non-Tariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis,” *International Organization* 49(4): 723-749.
* Jeong, Gyung-Ho. 2009. “Constituent influence on international trade policy in the United States.” *ISQ* 53, 2: 519-40.
* Mansfield, Edward D., Diana C. Mutz, and Laura R. Silver. 2015. “Men, women, trade, and free markets.” *ISQ* 59(2):303-15.
* Lü, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. "Inequity aversion and the international distribution of trade protection." *American Journal of Political Science* 56.3 (2012): 638-654.
* Scheve, Kenneth and Slaughter, Matthew J. 2004, Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48: 662–674.
* Ahlquist, John S., Clayton, Amanda B, Levi, Margaret. 2014. “Provoking preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, and the ILWU Puzzle.” *International Organization* 68(1):33-75.

### Week 2: Trade interest Mobilization (September 5)

* Grossman, Gene M., & Elhanan Helpman (1994) “Protection for Sale.” *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833–850.
* Busch, M. L. and Eric Reinhardt. 1999. “Industrial location and protection: the political and economic geography of US nontariff barriers.” *American Journal of Political Science* 43, 4: 1028-50.
* Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein, and Barry Weingast. 1997. “The institutional roots of American trade policy: politics, coalitions, and international trade.” *World Politics* 49, 3:309-38.
* Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff (2000) “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review*: 305-21.
* Park, J. J. and M. Jansen. 2007. “Electoral competition and agricultural support in OECD countries.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51, 2: 314-29.
* Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. “Optimal obfuscation: democracy and trade policy transparency.” *American Political Science Review* 100, 3: 369-384.

**Recommended**

* Dai, Xinyuan (2002) “Political Regimes and International Trade: The Democratic Difference Revisited.” APSR 96 (1): 159-66.
* Fordham, Benjamin O., and Katja B. Kleinberg (2012) “How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?” IO 66 (2): 311-28.
* Guisinger, Alexandra (2009) "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?" IO 63 (3): 533-557.
* Fordham, Benjamin O. and Katja B. Kleinberg. 2012. “How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?” IO 66 (2): 311-328. o Rho, S., &
* Tomz, M. (2017). “Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?” IO 71(S1), S85-S108.
* Ehrlich, Sean (2007) "Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies." IO 61 (3): 571-605.
* Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota (2005) “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries.” International Organization 59(1): 107-143.
* Kono, Daniel Yuichi (2009) “Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy.” International Studies Quarterly 53: 885–906.
* Milner, H. V. and Kubota, K. 2005. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and trade policy in the developing countries.” *IO* 59(1):107-43.
* Richter, T. 2012. “When do autocracies start to liberalize foreign trade? Evidence from four cases in the Middle East and North Africa.” *Review of International Political Economy* 20(4):760-787.
* Goldstein, Judith and Robert Gulotty. “America trade liberalization: The limits of institutional reform.” IO 68(2):263-95.

### Week 3. Scale economy and product differentiation models (September 12)

* Yarbrough, Beth V. and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1987. "Cooperation in the liberalization of international trade: after hegemony, what?" *IO* 41, 1: 1-26.
* Krugman, Paul. 1987. "Is Free Trade Passé?" *Economic Perspectives* 1(2): 131-144..
* Gilligan, Michael. 1997. "Lobbying as a private good with intra-industry trade," *ISQ* 41: 455-474.
* Chase, Kerry. 2003. “Economic interests and regional trading agreements: the case of NAFTA.” *International Organization* 57, 1: 137-74.
* Bombardini, Matilde and Francesco Trebbi. 2012. “Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?” *Journal of International Economics* 87(1):12-26.
* Kim, In Song. 2017. “Political cleavages within industry: Firm-level lobbying for trade liberalization.” *APSR* 111(1):1-20.

**Recommended**

* Mayda, Anna Maria and Dani Rodrik. (2005) “Why Are Some People (And Countries) More Protectionist than Others? *European Economic Review* 49(August): 1393-1430.
* Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff . (2002) “Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 167-70.
* Milner, Helen and Dustin Tingley (2011) “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Policy.” *International Organization* 65(1) 37-68.
* Mukherjee, Bumba, Dale Smith and Quan Li (2009) “Labor (Im)mobility and the Politics of Trade Protection in Majoritarian Democracies.” *Journal of Politics 71*(1): 291-308

### Week 4. Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates (September 19)

* Mundell, Robert A. 1961. “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.” *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 51, No. 4: 657-665.
* Obtsfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor. 2005. “The Trilemma in history: tradeoffs among exchange rates, monetary policies, and capital mobility.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(3):423-38
* Pevehouse, Jon and Mark Copelovitch. 2013. “Ties that Bind? Preferential Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice.” *International Studies Quarterly* 57(2): 385-99.
* Broz, Lawrence J. 2002. “Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes.” *International Organization* 56, 4: 861-887
* Rey, Helen. 2015. Dilemma not trilemma: The global financial cycle and monetary policy independence. NBER working paper 21162.
* Hallerberg, Mark. 2011. “Fiscal federalism reforms in the European Union and the Greek crisis.” *European Union Politics,* 12 (1): 127-142

**Recommended**

* Broz, J. Lawrence, and Michael Plouffe (2010) “The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors: Firm-Level Evidence.” International Organization 64 (Fall): 695-717.
* Banducci, Susan A., Jeffry A. Karp, and Peter H. Loedel (2009) “Economic interests and public support for the euro.” Journal of European Public Policy 16 (4): 564-581.
* Eichengreen, Barry (2008) [1998] Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
* Frieden, Jeffrey (2015) Currency Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
* Guisinger, Alexandra, and David Andrew Singer (2010) “Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility.” International Organization 64 (Spring): 313-37.
* Hobolt, Sara Binzer, and Patrick Leblond (2009) “Is My Crown Better Than Your Euro?: Exchange Rates and Public Opinion on the European Single Currency.” European Union Politics 10(2): 202-25.
* Kinderman, Daniel (2008) “The Political Economy of Sectoral Exchange Rate Preferences and Lobbying: Germany from 1960 - 2008 and Beyond.” Review of International Political Economy 15(5): 851-80.
* Knight, Sarah Cleeland (2010) “Divested Interests: Globalization and the New Politics of Exchange Rates.” Business and Politics 12(2): Article 3.

### Week 5. Policy Preference Formation: Finance (September 26)

* Gowa, Joanne. 1988. “Public goods and political institutions: trade and monetary policy processes in the United States.” *International Organization* 42, 1: 15-32.
* Frieden, Jeffry. 1991. "Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance." *International Organization* 45, 4: 425-452.
* Rajan, G. R., and Luigi Zingales. 2003. “The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century.” *Journal of Financial Economics* 69():5-50.
* Braun, Matias, and Claudio Raddatz. 2008. The politics of financial development: evidence from trade liberalization.” *Journal of Finance* 63(3):1469-1508.
* Walter, Stefanie. 2008. “A new approach for determining exchange-rate level preferences.” *International Organization* 62, 3: 405-438.
* Copelovitch, Mark S. and David A. Singer. 2008. “Financial regulation, monetary policy, and inflation in the industrialized world.” *Journal of Politics* 70, 3: 663-80.

**Recommended:**

* Frieden, Jeffry 2015. Currency Politics. Princeton University Press
* Knight, Sarah Cleeland. 2010. “Divested Interests: Globalization and the New Politics of Exchange Rates.” *Business and Politics* 12(2):1-28.
* Broz, J. Lawrence and Seth Werfel. 2014. “Exchange Rates and Industry Demands for Trade Protection.” International Organization 68 (2): 393-416.
* Kathleen McNamara. 1998. The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
* Steinberg, David and Krishan Malhotra. 2014. The Effect of Authoritarian Regime Type on Exchange Rate Policy. *World Politics* 66(3): 491-529.

### Week 6. Globalization & Compensation (October 3)

* Skim: Ruggie John G. 1982. “International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order.” *International Organization*, 36, 195-231.
* Rudra, Nita. 2002. Globalization and the decline of the welfare state in LDCs.” *International Organization* 56, 2: 411-46.
* Mares, Isabela. 2004. “Economic insecurity and social policy expansion: evidence from interwar Europe.” *International Organization* 58, 4: 745-74.
* Wibbels, Erik. 2006. “Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World.” *International Organization* 60: 433-468.
* Margalit, Yotam. 2011. Costly Jobs: Trade-related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections. *American Political Science Review*, 105(1), 166-188.
* Walter, Stefanie. 2010. “Globalization and the Welfare State: Testing the Microfoundations of the Compensation Hypothesis.” *International Studies Quarterly* 54: 403–426.
* Burgoon, Brian. 2012. Partisan Embedding of Liberalism: How Trade, Investment, and Immigration Affect Party Support for the Welfare State. *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (5):606-635.

**Recommended**

* Rodrik, Dani (1997) *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington: Institute for International Economics. Chapters 2 and 4.
* Avelino, George, David S. Brown, and Wendy Hunter (2005) “The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America. 1980–1999,” *American Journal of Political Science* 49: 625-641.
* Cusack, T. R. (1997). Partisan politics and public finance: Changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies 1955–1989. Public Choice, 91, 375–395.
* Garrett, G. 1998b. Global markets and national politics: Collision course or virtuous circle? International Organization, 52(4), 787–824.
* Hicks, Alexander and Christopher Zorn. 2005. “Economic globalization, the macro economy, and reversals of welfare: expansion in affluent democracies, 1978-94.” *International Organization* 59(3):631-62.
* Hays, Jude. 2009. *Globalization and the New Politics of Embedded Liberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Burgoon, Brian. 2009. “Globalization and Backlash: Polayni's revenge?” *Review of International Political Economy* 16 (2):145 - 77.
* Mosley, Layna. 2000. “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States.” *International Organization* 54 (4): 737-773.
* Kaufman, R., & Segura-Ubiergo, A. 2001. Globalization, domestic politics, and social spending in Latin America: A time-series cross-section analysis, 1973–1997. World Politics, 53, 553–587.

### Week 7. Sovereign Risk and Debt Markets (October 10)

* Schultz, Kenneth A., & Barry R. Weingast (2003) “The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition.” *International Organization* 57(1): 3–42.
* Kaplan, Stephen. (2017) The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt: Global Finance and Electoral Cycles." *The Journal of Politics*. 79:2, 605-623.
* Brooks, Sarah M., Raphael Cunha, and Layna Mosley (2014) “Categories, Creditworthiness, and Contagion: How Investors’ Shortcuts Affect Sovereign Debt Markets.” *International Studies Quarterly*.
* Stasavage, David (2007) “Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274–1785.” *International Organization* 61(3): 489–525.
* Beaulieu, Emily, Gary W. Cox and Sebastian Saiegh (2012) “Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage.” *International Organization* 6 (4): 709-738.
* Michael Breen, and Iain McMenamin. 2013. “Political Institutions, Credible Commitment, and Sovereign Debt in Advanced Economies,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 57, 4: 842–854.

**Recommended**

* Tomz, Michael (2007) Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 2, & 5.
* Aggarwal, Vinod K. (1996) Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* Block, Steven and Paul Vaaler. 2004. “The price of democracy: sovereign risk ratings, bond spreads and political business cycles in developing countries.” Journal of International Money & Finance, 23(6), 917-946.
* Cantor, Richard and Frank Packer. 1996. “Determinants and impacts of sovereign credit ratings,” Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2 (2): 37-53.
* Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (1989) “A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt.” Journal of Political Economy 97(1): 155–178.
* Eaton, Jonathan, and Mark Gersovitz (1981) “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” Review of Economic Studies 48(2): 289–309.
* Gersovitz, Mark (2009) “A Review of Michael Tomz’s Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries.” Journal of Economic Literature 47(2): 475–481.
* Mosley, Layna (2006) Global Capital and National Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* North, Douglass, C., and Barry Weingast (1989) “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” Journal of Economic History 49(4): 803–832.
* Panizza, Ugo, Federico Sturzenegger, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (2009) “The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default.” Journal of Economic Literature 47(3): 651–698.
* Stasavage, David (2003) Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* Tomz, Michael and Mark L.J. Wright. 2013. “Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default.” Annual Review of Economics 5:1, 247-272

### Week 8. Immigration (October 17)

* Freeman, Gary P. 1995. “Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states.” *International Migration Review* 29(4):881-902.
* Joppke, Christian. 1998. “Why liberal states accept unwanted immigration?” *World Politics* 50(2):266-293.
* Wellisch, Dietmar and Uwe Lalx. 1998. “Why do rich countries prefer free trade over free migration? The role of the modern welfare state.” *European Economic Review* 42:1595-1612.
* Hatton, Timothy J. and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2005. A dual policy paradox: why have trade and immigration policies always differed in labor scarce economies? NBER working paper 11866.
* Facchini, Giovanni, Anna Maria Mayda, and Prachi Mishra. 2008. Do interest groups affect US immigration policy? IMF working paper
* Peters, Margaret. 2015. Open trade, closed borders: immigration policy in the era of globalization. *World Politics* 67(1):114-154.

**Recommended**

* Sides, John and Jack Citrin. 2007. “European opinion about immigration: the role of identities, interests and information.” *British Journal of Political Science* 37:457-504.
* Jeong, Gyung\_Ho, Gary J. Miller, Camilla Schofield, and Itai Sened. 2011. “Cracks in the opposition: immigration as a wedge issue for the Reagan coalition.” *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3):511-25.
* Hainmueller, J., & Hopkins, D. J. (2015) “The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A conjoint analysis of attitudes toward immigrants.” *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(3), 529-548.
* Peters, Margaret E. (2014) “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Immigration Policy Making in the US.” *International Organization*.
* Boeri, Tito, Gordon Hanson, and Barry McCormick (2002) *Immigration Policy and the Welfare System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Hanson, Gordon H. (2006) “Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States.” *Journal of Economic Literature* 44(4): 869-924.
* Mayda, Anna M. (2006) “Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 88(3): 510–530.
* Rudolph, Christopher (2003) “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration.” *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 603–620.
* Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter (2001) “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133–45.
* Timmer, Ashley S., & Jeffrey G. Williamson (1998) “Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s: Labor Markets, Policy Interactions, and Globalization Backlash.” *Population and Development Review* 24(4): 739–771.

### Week 9. Emigration (October 24)

* Khoudour-Casteras, David. nd. Exchange rate regimes and labor mobility: the key role of international migration in the adjustment process of the classical gold standard.
* Singer, David A. 2010. “Migrant remittances and exchange rate regimes in the developing world.” *APSR* 104(2):307-23.
* Wright, Joseph. 2010. Exit during crisis: how openness, migration, and economic crisis affect democratization. Kellogg Institute working paper 367.
* Pfutze, Tobias. 2014. “Clientelism Versus Social Learning: The Electoral Effects of International Migration,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 58, 2: 295–307.
* Escriba-Folch, A., C. Meseguer, and J. Wright. 2015. Remittances and democratization. *International Studies Quarterly*.
* Doyle, David. 2015. “Remittances and Social Spending.” *American Political Science Review,* *109*(4), 785-802.

**Recommended**

* Bermeo, Sarah and David Leblang (2015) “Migration and Foreign Aid.” *International Organization* 69(3): 627-657.
* Gaikwad, N., & Nellis, G. (2017) “The Majority-Minority Divide in Attitudes toward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai.” *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(2), 456-472.
* Michael D. Tyburski; 2012. “The Resource Curse Reversed? Remittances and Corruption in Mexico,” International Studies Quarterly, 56, 2: 339–350
* Lauren Duquette-Rury. 2014. “Collective Remittances and Transnational Coproduction: the 3 × 1 Program for Migrants and Household Access to Public Goods in Mexico.” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 49, 1:112–139.
* Pablo Acosta , Cesar Calderón , Pablo Fajnzylber , and Humberto Lopez . 2008. What is the Impact of Remittances on Poverty and Inequality in Latin America? *World Development* 36 (1): 89–114.
* Aparicio, Javier and Covadonga Meseguer . 2012. Collective Remittances and the State: The 3×1 Program in Mexican Municipalities. *World Development* 40 (1): 206–22.
* Regan, Patrick M. and Richard W. Frank. 2014. “Migrant remittances and the onset of civil war.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31, 5: 502 – 520.

### Week 10: International influences reconsidered: Ideas, networks, diffusion (October 31)

* Simmons, Beth and Zachary Elkins 2004. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. *American Political Science Review*, 98(1), 171-189.
* Simmons, Beth, Dobbin, Frank, & Garrett, Geoff. 2006. Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism. *International Organization*, 60(4), 781-810.
* Chweiroth, Jeffrey (2007) “Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets.” *International Organization* 61(2): 443-463.
* Oatley, T., Winecoff, W., Pennock, A., & Danzman, S. 2013. The Political Economy of Global Finance: A Network Model. *Perspectives on Politics*, 11(1), 133-153.
* Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen V. Milner, and Xun Pang. 2015. “International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations.” *International Organization* 69 (3): 1-35.
* Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Miles Kahler and Alexander Montgomery (2009) “Network Analysis for International Relations.” International Organization 63(3): 559-592.

**Recommended**

* Lieven Baele , and Koen Inghelbrecht . 2010. “Time-varying Integration, Interdependence and Contagion.” Journal of International Money and Finance 29(5): 791–818.
* Cao, Xun (2010) “Networks as Channels of Policy Diffusion: Explaining Worldwide Changes in Capital Taxation, 1998–2006.” International Studies Quarterly 54: 823–854.
* Brooks, Sarah M. (2007) “When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural Pension Reforms across Nations.” Journal of Politics 69(3): 701-715.
* Drezner, Daniel (2009) “Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics.” International Security 34(2): 7-35.
* Brooks, S., & Kurtz, M. (2012). Paths to Financial Policy Diffusion: Statist Legacies in Latin America's Globalization. International Organization, 66(1), 95-128.
* Prakash, Aseem, and Matthew Potoski (2007) “Investing Up: FDI and the Cross-Country
* Brooks, Sarah M. 2005. “Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The Diffusion of Pension Privatization Around the World,” International Studies Quarterly, 49, 2: 273–294.
* Oatley, Thomas (2011) “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy.” International Organization 65 (2).

### Week 11: Global Inequality (November 7)

* Milgrom, Paul R., North, Douglass C. and Weingast, Barry R. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs. *Economics & Politics*, 2: 1–23.
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### Weeks 13 & 14: Student presentations (November 28 & December 5)

**Final Paper due December 12, 5 p.m.**