

**Description:** The course examines the origins of war from rationalist, human nature, political, social, and cultural perspectives as well as a wide range of theories on the causes of conflict and cooperation. Much of what is interesting in the study of international relations does not involve strategies of pure conflict (zero-sum games), so the course focuses on theories of interdependent decision-making in mixed-motive games, which model conflict as a bargaining situation. Given that the essence of international conflict is disagreement over policy choices and/or the allocation of scarce resources and that politics is, at its core, a process of bargaining to arrive at a mutual agreement that resolves these political disputes, the course examines and critiques non-cooperative bargaining theories of war – as well as putative causal drivers of war at all levels of analysis (systemic, domestic, and individual).

**Requirements:** Class participation and a 25-35 page critical analysis of the literature under one of the subheadings or a review essay that uses a recent and important book as a springboard for the paper.

**Required Books:**

1. Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (Free Press, 1973).
2. Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford UP, 2006).
3. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism* (University of Chicago Press, 1982)
4. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard UP, 1960)
5. Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation* (Princeton UP, 2010).
6. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1982).
7. Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Palgrave, 2005).

**Topic 1: Origins of War: Human Nature or Cultural Invention?**

Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (New York: Oxford UP, 2006).

**Topic 2: Power**

Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Palgrave, 2005).

Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, II (July 1957), 201-15.

Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec., 1962), pp. 947-952

David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends vs. Old Tendencies," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979): 161-94.

Robert Art, "American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer, 1996), pp. 7-42.

David Baldwin, "Force, Fungibility, and Influence," *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 1999), pp. 173-183.

Robert Art, "Force and Fungibility Reconsidered," *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 1999), pp. 184-190.

**Topic 3: Theories of War**

Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism* (University of Chicago Press, 1982).

#### **Topic 4: Coercive Diplomacy**

Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, chaps. 1-3, 8-9.

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, chaps. 1-3.

Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 289-324.

Vipin Narang, "What Does it Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 57, no. 3 (June 2013), pp. 478-508.

#### *Supplementary Reading on Deterrence Theory:*

Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36:4 (July 1984): 496-526.

The following articles are all from a special issue of *World Politics* 41:2 (January 1989) on the deterrence debate: Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," 143-169; Alexander George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," 170-182; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," 208-224.

Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 50 (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, August 1968). A discussion of Schelling's "rationality of irrationality."

Jonathan Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970*, pp. 5-33.

Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Concept of Commitment in International Relations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 1969): 39-56.

Charles Glaser, "Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence," in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), ch. 2.

#### **Topic 5: Bargaining Theories of War**

James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49:3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.

Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," *American Political Science Review* 97:4 (November 2003): 621-32.

Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2003): 27-43.

Miles Kahler, "Rationality in International Relations," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 919-41.

Daniel Treisman, "Rational Appeasement," *International Organization* 58 (Spring 2004), pp. 345-373.

James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, no. 3 (Sept. 1994), pp. 577-592.

James Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 52:2 (Spring 1998): 269-305.

#### *Supplementary Reading:*

Robert Powell, "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (June 2002): 1-30.

George Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsboom, "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News

About Cooperation," International Organization 50 (Summer 1996):379-406.  
 Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*, chaps 1-3.  
 Alexander George, D. K. Hall, and W. E. Simon, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), chaps. 1, 5.  
 Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-60.  
 Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics, Vol. 44, April 1992), pp. 466-496.  
 Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, chaps., 2, 7.  
 Robert Jervis, "Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics," in J. R. Pennock and John W. Chapman, *Coercion* (Chicago and New York: Aldine, 1972), pp. 272-288.  
 Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics 49 (April 1997):371-400.

### **Topic 6: Critiques of Bargaining and Strategic Choice Theories of War**

Stephen Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), 5-48.  
 Jonathan Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?" Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 2000): 143-50.  
 Erik Gartzke, "War Is in the Error Term," International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Summer 1999): 567-87.  
 Arthur A. Stein, "The Limits of Strategic Choice: Constrained Rationality and Incomplete Explanation," in David Lake and Robert Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), chapter 7.  
 Marc Tractenberg, "Audience Costs: A Historical Analysis," Security Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan.-March 2012), pp. 3-42.  
 "Do Audience Costs Exist? A Symposium." Articles by Kenneth Schultz, Branislav Slantchev, Jack Levy, Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu, Jonathan Mercer, and Marc Tractenberg, in Security Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July-Sept. 2012).

#### *Supplementary Reading:*

Jack Snyder and Erica Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, No. 3 (August 2011), pp. 437-56.  
 Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40 (April 1988): 317-349.  
 Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, egoism, and third images: *The Evolution of Cooperation* in international relations," International Organization, 40, 1 (Winter 1986):167-186.

### **Topic 7: The Security Dilemma and Offense-Defense Balance Theory**

Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation* (Princeton UP, 2010).  
 Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton UP, 1976), ch. 3, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Perceptions of the Adversary." Use this link: <http://web.mit.edu/afarrell/Public/1742papers/JERVIS-58-83.PDF>  
 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30 (January 1978): 317-349.  
 Randall Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 90-121.  
 Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," *Security Studies*, Vol. 18.

No. 3 (July-September 2009), pp. 587-623.

*Supplementary Reading the Security Dilemma and Offense-Defense Theory:*

Charles Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 50 (October 1997): 171-201.

Kier Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, 25, 1 (Summer 2000): 71-104.

Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 44-82.

Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way?: A Review Essay," International Security 24:2 (Fall 1999):166-98.

Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 660-91.

Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 5-35.

Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security 22:4 (Spring 1998): 5-43.

Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," The Journal of Politics 63 (August 2001):741-77.

Jennifer Mitzen and Randall L. Schweller, "Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War," Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan-March 2011), pp. 2-35.

Randall Schweller, "Rational Theory for a Bygone Era," Security Studies, Vol. 20 (September 2011): 460-468.

**Topic 8: Domestic Politics and War: Part 1**

Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1991), chaps. 1 and 2.

Stephen Walt, "Revolution and War," World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992).

Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *The Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). Use this link from his website: <http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/Levy%20-%20Diversionary%20theory.pdf>

Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004).

*Supplementary Reading:*

Jack Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge UP, 1988).

Jack A. Goldstone, Kurt Dassel, and Stephen Walt, "Forum on Revolution and War" in Security Studies 6, no. 2 (Winter 1996/97):127-196.

Peter Trubowitz, *Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft* (Princeton UP, 2011).

Jack L. Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," *The National Interest* (Spring 2003).

**Topic 9: Domestic Politics and War: Part 2**

Jonathan Caverley, "The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam," International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010): 119-57.

James McAllister, "Who Lost Vietnam? Soldiers, Civilians, and U.S. Military Strategy," International Security 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/2011): 95-123. [McAllister provides a

contrary view to Caverley's emphasis on the role of public opinion.]

Jessica L. Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (May 2012): 326–347.

Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser, "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *International Organization* 66, no. 3 (July 2012): 457–89.

Jessica Chen Weiss, "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences and Nationalist Protest in China," *International Organization* 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 1–35.

Elizabeth N. Saunders, "War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the Politics of Using Force," *Security Studies*, 24, no. 3 (July-September 2015).

### **Topic 10: Leaders and Leadership**

Robert Jervis, "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?" *Security Studies* 22, Number 2 (April-June 2013), pp. 153-79.

Rose McDermott, Anthony Lopez, and Peter K. Hatemi, "An Evolutionary Approach to Political Leadership," *Security Studies* 25, No. 4 (October-December 2016).

Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (July 2004): 604–19

### **Topic 11: Misperception and Cognitive Processes: Does It Make a Difference How the Brain Works?**

Chaim Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Foreign Policy Decision Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 38:4 (December 1994), 557-86

Jack S. Levy "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," *World Politics* 36:1 (October 1983): 76-99.

Jack Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," *International Organization* 48, 2 (1994): 279-312.

Rose McDermott, James H. Fowler, and Oleg Smirnov, "On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory Preferences," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 70, No. 02 (April 2008), pp 335-350.

#### Supplementary Readings

Arthur Stein, "When Misperception Matters," *World Politics*, 4 (July 1982): 505-26.

Robert Jervis, "Political Implications of Loss Aversion," *Political Psychology* 13, no. 2 (June 1992): 187–204.

Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems," *Political Psychology* 13, no. 2 (June 1992): 283-310.

### **Topic 12: Motivated Biases and Emotion**

Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, "The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 7-40.

Emanuele Castano and Roger Giner-Sorolla, "Not Quite Human: Infrhumanization in Response to Collective Responsibility for Intergroup Killing," *Journal of Personality and*

Social Psychology, Vol. 90, No. 5 (2006), pp. 804-18.

Jonathan Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," International Organization, Vol. 64 (Winter 2010), pp. 1-31.

Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 39-75.

Smith, Eliot R., Charles R. Seger, and Diane M. Mackie, "Can Emotions Be Truly Group Level? Evidence Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 93, No. 3 (2007), pp. 431-46.

*Supplementary Reading:*

Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails* (Cornell UP, 2010).

### **Topic 13: Power Shifts and War**

Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, "Balancing in Neorealism," *International Security*, Vol. 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015), pp. 51-86.

Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40 (October 1987): 82-107.

Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., *Engaging China: Managing a Rising Power* (Routledge, 1999), chap. 1.

Randall Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992): 235-69.

Jack S. Levy, "Preventive War and Democratic Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (March 2008): 1-24. [Levy critiques my 1992 *World Politics* article]

Robert Powell, "War as a Commitment Problem," *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (January 2006): 169–203.

*Supplementary Reading of Power Shifts and Preventive War:*

James Morrow, "The Logic of Overtaking," in Jacek Kugler and D. Lemke, eds., Parity and War (University of Michigan Press, 1996).

Jack S. Levy, "Preventive War and the Bush Doctrine: Theoretical Logic and Historical Roots," in *The Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in the Age of Terrorism*, eds. Stanley A. Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (London: Routledge, 2007).

Jack S. Levy and Joseph R. Gochel, "Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai Campaign," Security Studies 11, no. 4 (Winter 2001/02): 1-49.

### **Topic 14: Alliance Dynamics**

Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36 (July 1984): 461-496.

Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War," *International Organization* 48:1 (Winter 1994): 39-75.

Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, vol. 44: 2 (Spring 1990): 137-168.

Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict," *International Organization* 53, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 343-77.

James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," *International Organization* 47, no 2 (Spring 1993): 207-34.

Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43:2 (January 1991): 233-56.

Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227-262.

Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac, "Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance," *International Interactions* Vol. 31, No. 3 (2005): 183-202.

Brett Ashley Leeds, "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties," *International Organization* Vol. 57, No. 4 (Autumn 2003): 801-827.

*Supplementary Readings on Alliances and War:*

Robert Jervis, *System Effects* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997), chaps. 5 and 6.

Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," *World Politics* 46:4 (July 1994), 490-526.

G. Murphy, "On Satellitship," *Journal of Economic History* 21, No. 4 (Dec. 1961):641-51.

Randall Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (Columbia UP, 1998), chap. 3.

Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," in Francis A. Beer, ed., *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World* (NewYork: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 121-140.

**Topic 15: Appeasement, Concerts, and Cooperation Theory**

David Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," *World Politics* 24:1 (October 1971): 19-38.

Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct. 1985), pp. 1-24.

Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Oct. 1985), pp. 58-79.

Robert Powell, "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement," *American Political Science Review* 90:4 (December 1996): 749-64.

Amitai Etzioni, "The Kennedy Experiment," *Western Political Quarterly* (June 1967).

*Supplementary Readings on Appeasement:*

Paul Kennedy, "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1939," in Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).

J. L. Richardson, "New Perspectives on Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 40:3 (April 1988): 289-316.

John Herz, "The Relevancy and Irrelevancy of Appeasement," *Social Research* 31 (Autumn 1964):296-320.