Shadow of Authoritarian Patronage: Village Leaders and Elections in Democratizing South Korea*

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Abstract

This paper investigates the enduring influence of authoritarian patronage between the dictatorial regime and rural voters on subsequent elections in both authoritarian and democratic settings. We argue that the persistence of authoritarian patronage depends on rural voters' ability to maintain strong trust in the authoritarian successor party's reciprocity for their loyalty. Using original data on village leaders trained under the New Village Movement, a government-led rural development initiative in the 1970s, we show that areas with higher concentrations of these leaders were more likely to support the ruling party in subsequent legislative elections. This pattern held through the authoritarian elections of the 1980s under a new dictatorship. Following South Korea's transition to democracy in 1987, the influence of patronage initially diminished but later resurged as the authoritarian successor party successfully rebranded itself through a strategic party merger. Nevertheless, as democracy became more consolidated and neoliberal globalization marginalized the agricultural sector, the effect of authoritarian patronage eventually faded. Our findings suggest that the legacy of an authoritarian regime is not merely an outcome of a strong dictatorship but is also significantly influenced by the evolving political and economic environment in a new democracy.

Keywords: Authoritarian Patronage, Electoral Authoritarianism, Democratization, Village Leaders, South Korea

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1 Introduction

Do the patronage ties formed under an authoritarian regime have an influence on the election outcomes in the subsequent authoritarian regime and those after democratization? Previous studies have shown that political patronage formed under dictatorship helps authoritarian rulers sustain the regime (Lust 2009, Stokes 2011, Stokes et al. 2013) and lasts in forms of political networks and culture despite the transition to democracy (Cruz, Labonne and Querubín 2017, Finan and Schechter 2012, Loxton 2018, Van de Walle 2009, Vicente and Wantchekon 2009). However, how patronage ties formed in a dictatorship *transforms* over time and across regime types and in which *conditions* it persists or disappears have not been as widely discussed in the literature.

This study examines the enduring yet shifting impacts of the patronage ties between South Korean rural village leaders and an authoritarian regime formed in the 1970s on elections in the subsequent authoritarian regime and during democratization. We claim that when the village leaders (and villagers) are able to maintain trust in rewards for their loyalty, their electoral support remains strong for the authoritarian successor party; however, once the reciprocity becomes incredible, given the political and economic transformations, the successor party's patronage advantage in election disappears. We draw our empirical evidence from the New Village Leader Training Program (*Saemaeul Jidoja Yeonsu*), a rural village and cooperative leader training program under South Korea's rural development program called the New Village Movement (*Saemaeul Undong*) (Hong, Park and Yang 2023, Looney 2020). Between 1972 and 1979, selected village leaders attended an intensive training program run by a national government agency, which we claim formed a strong patron-client bond and network between the authoritarian government and the trained village leaders (and the villagers, by extension).[1] We study the effects of these trainees on legislative election outcomes using longitudinal election data covering four authoritarian elections under two consecutive dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s and three democratic elections since the country's democratization in 1987 through the 1990s.

We chose South Korea as a test case to examine the dynamics of patronage in rural areas through political and economic transformations at the national and global levels. During our research period, South Korea went through fundamental shifts in both political and economic conditions, as the country

[1] Although the training program continued after 1980, its direct connection to the national government ended in 1980 as the training agency was reorganized as an independent special corporation (New Village Leader Training Center 1981).

went through rapid industrialization since the 1970s, and democratic movements and democratization in the 1980s, followed by drastic economic liberalization in the 1990s. The country's democratization and globalization overlapped with the global trend of democratization, i.e., the Third Wave (Huntington 1991), and the international push for economic liberalization centered on the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Milner and Mukherjee 2009). At the same time, the authoritarian incumbent parties and their successor party stayed in power for a significant period after democratization in Korea (Slater and Wong 2013): The incumbent party did not lose in the presidential election until 1997 – 10 years from democratization, – and the legislative election until 2004. This indicates that any changes observed in patronage relationships were not because the opposition party began to control the legislature or the administration, which might have drastically transformed the patronage dynamics. This unique setting allows us to investigate how institutional and economic changes affect the effects of patronage established under the past dictatorship through regime changes despite the absence of power alternation.

Our analysis shows that townships with more village leaders trained by the authoritarian government were more likely to cast more votes for the incumbent party in the subsequent legislative election in 1978. This tendency persisted in the following authoritarian elections in the 1980s under a new dictator, as the new dictatorship absorbed the agencies of the previous regime and maintained the policies relevant to rural areas with some change. In the first democratic election in 1988, however, the patronage effect disappeared, as it was an uncertain, volatile period from the client's perspective. Then, it reemerged in the 1992 election, which was held after the authoritarian successor party strategically merged with two large opposition parties to form a large conservative party. Eventually, as democracy consolidated and, more importantly, as the incumbent government pushed for economic liberalization despite fierce resistance from the disadvantaged agricultural sector, the patronage effect in rural areas disappeared from the 1996 election. Additionally, we find the patronage effects exist only through male village leader trainees in South Korea's patriarchal rural societies. Townships with more female leader trainees show no statistically significant difference from others.

This research contributes to the growing body of literature on authoritarian legacies (Albertus 2019, Langston 2017, Loxton 2015, Miller 2021, Neundorf 2010, Neundorf, Gerschewski and Olar 2020, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017, Riedl 2014, Self and Hicken 2019). Unlike existing studies that primarily focus on the long-lasting effects of authoritarian institutions, policies, and practices, this

paper traces the longitudinal effects of the "human legacies" – the roles played by village leaders with a direct connection to the past authoritarian regime in shaping electoral outcomes under authoritarian regimes and during democratization. This measure of human legacy highlights the diverse relationships that citizens under authoritarianism have with the past authoritarianism and how they transform and influence the political outcomes after democratization, which recent studies on the legacy of authoritarian experience on post-democratization political attitudes did not engage with (Neundorf and Pop-Eleches 2020, Neundorf, Gerschewski and Olar 2020). The key metric for patronage connection that we measure through the NVL training program is the unique instance where direct networks between selective village leaders and a central governmental organ were established, which was absent in any programs preceding or following this one to this scale and likely left strong and lasting perceptional and psychological impacts on the participating village leaders and, further, on villagers.

In particular, our studies complement the previous findings on the long-term legacy effects of the rural development movement in South Korea presented in Hong, Park and Yang (2023). The previous study finds that the government subsidies for the New Village Movement in the 1970s had a positive impact on the election of the dictator's daughter as a democratic president in 2012. One entailing question is whether such legacy effects have sustained consistently significantly throughout the politically and economically volatile periods in between or remained latent until the momentum was created in political opportunities and conditions, such as the dictator's daughter becoming the presidential candidacy from the authoritarian successor party. Our paper supports the latter based on the analysis of patronage.

Another contribution of this study is a decades-long longitudinal analysis encompassing both political "and" economic transformations within the country (Milner and Mukherjee 2009, Rudra 2005; 2008). Our analyses comprehend the period of authoritarian patronage formation, an autocratic transition, a democratic transition, and democratic consolidation by examining elections over 30 years starting from the Park Chung-hee era in the 1970s, when the New Village Movement was actively carried out in rural areas and selected New Village leaders were trained by the government, through the subsequent autocratic Chun Doo-hwan administration (1980-1987), and into the post-democratization period (1987 -). At the same time, our analyses include the impact of an economic shock initiated by the Uruguay Round, which liberalized the highly protected agricultural market

of South Korea for the first time and critically damaged the agricultural sector. Despite major political changes during this period, the South Korean government's economic policy stance prioritizing economic growth through industrial advancement and export did not alter. This led the young democracy to jump on the bandwagon of neoliberal economic liberalization and globalization in the late 1980s and through the 1990s, despite fierce resistance from society and disadvantaged economic sectors, especially agriculture. This research highlights economic conditions that the clients experience after democratization substantially affect their trust in authoritarian patronage under new political institutions.

2 Authoritarian Patronage and its Legacy

Political patronage is pervasive in the developing world (Scott 1972). Scholars of clientelism define patronage within the context of (somewhat) competitive elections as a hierarchical and reciprocal bond between "public office holders" and "voters" (Hicken 2011, Stokes 2011).[2] However, scholars studying authoritarian regimes have pointed out that political patronage, where political patrons grant resources and appointments to individuals or groups in exchange for political support, thrives in contexts with heavily rigged elections or even in the absence of elections (Baturo and Elkink 2016, Nathan 1973, Remington 2013, Shih 2008, Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012).

Authoritarian regimes strategically create political patronage with specific groups whose support is critical in maintaining power. These patronage bonds are more likely to be credibly sustained as dictators have larger discretion over policy decisions and resources than democratic leaders. The relationships can be established with various elite groups, such as religious elites (Esberg 2020), or with broader societal segments, such as the middle class (Liu 2023, Rosenfeld 2021), or rural populations, including farmers (Capéau and Verwimp 2012, Thomson 2017). These targeted groups receive benefits in exchange for their loyalty and support, which can manifest in various forms, such as economic incentives, social services, or privileged access to resources. This system of patronage helps to secure the regime's stability by ensuring the cooperation of key constituencies and neutralizing potential

[2]For instance, Stokes (2011; pp. 650-651) defines patronage as the "proffering of public resources (most typically, public employment) by office holders in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution is the clientelist one: did you - will you - vote for me?" Hicken (2011) distinguishes patronage from clientelism as a narrower concept, noting that "in patronage, the patron must be an office holder or at least have access to state resources. In clientelism, the patron may or may not be an office holder and thus may not credibly promise to deliver public resources."

opposition.

However, how do significant institutional changes like democratization affect the effect of political patronage formed under dictatorship? Although democratization allows greater access to political rights and enables more competitive elections, it does not necessarily nullify the influence of patronage formed under authoritarianism. Especially, with the strong presence of authoritarian successor parties in numerous new democracies (Langston 2017, Loxton 2015; 2018, Miller 2021, Riedl 2014, Slater and Wong 2013), patronage network is likely to remain or even strategically be employed by the successor parties.

Studies suggest that patronage networks from the authoritarian past are useful legacies for these parties (Cheng and Huang 2018, Kistchelt and Singer 2018, Loxton 2015, Self and Hicken 2019). Further, democratization may encourage the authoritarian successor parties to take advantage the past authoritarian patronage. Van de Walle (2009; p.1) notes that "democratization makes no difference to what are deeply ingrained political practices or political competition and the need to win electoral support in fact actually exacerbates clientelism." As Stokes (2011; p.651) points out, widespread patronage allows unpopular political parties to be electorally successful. As the example of Mexico's PRI (Fox 1994, Magaloni 2006), an authoritarian successor party may remain dominant not because they are popular but because collective action under political monopoly (i.e., voting against a long-time dominant party) is risky to citizens.

In this paper, we claim that authoritarian patronage continues to exert influences on voting in the following authoritarian regimes and even in the democratic setting if two essential conditions hold: First, for authoritarian patronage to persist, it is crucial that the *authoritarian successor party* remains strong in the authoritarian elections and the post-democratization elections. The incumbent party's strength to deliver clientelistic benefits through a bureaucratic system is critical for clientelism (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2017, Pierskalla 2022, Yıldırım and Kitschelt 2020). The successor party's inheritance of a robust organizational structure, financial resources, ideological foundation, or the core policy platforms of the previous authoritarian government constitutes a strong signal sustaining the patronage effects (Loxton 2018). Second, on the client's side, the persistence of authoritarian patronage is contingent upon the *clients' trust* in clientelistic reciprocity. Even after democratization, patronage may last as long as these clients believe that their support for the successor party will be reciprocated through either material rewards or policy-based club goods that disproportionately

benefit the group. When both of these conditions are met, the formal transition to democracy can coexist with persistent influences of authoritarian patronage. Nonetheless, if either condition is not met, for internal or external reasons, electoral support based on authoritarian patronage is likely to decline or disappear.

In the Korean context, authoritarian patronage has only been discussed to indicate two peculiar phenomena in Korean politics: 1) the relationship between political elites and large businesses under authoritarian regimes (Haggard and Moon 1990, Nam 1995, Park 2008); 2) the relationship between the major politicians, known as "Three Kims" who played the major roles in South Korean politics from the 1970s to early 2000s and their followers (Han 2021, Heo and Stockton 2005, Park 2008).[3] These national-level patronages have shaped Korean politics critically, most notably the collusion between politics and business that eventually led to the economic crisis in 1997 (Kang 2002) and the severe regional cleavages due to political mobilization under Three Kim's leadership (Moon 2005).

However, these high-level patronages do not directly address our research question, also the core subject in most electoral patronage literature, on the persisting electoral effects of authoritarian patronage as a direct clientelistic relationship between the voters and authoritarian regime. Often, as Bardhan (2022) notes, a hierarchical interlinkage exists between political patronage and social patronage mechanisms. Social patrons are those with high networking ability in the local context, who work as brokers delivering (and monitoring) the votes of their clients (voters) to political patrons (parties or leaders) in exchange for payments or post-election delivery promises by the political patron.[4] The clientelist exchange can be in the form of not only private goods to individuals (i.e., vote buying) but also club goods (benefits directed at groups of individuals).

We leverage a unique direct interaction between the national government agency and the rural village leaders who were chosen as New Village Leader trainees during the New Village Movement, a nationwide campaign-based rural development program in South Korea in the 1970s. The training curriculum extended beyond imparting agricultural techniques; it was strategically constructed to enact a comprehensive transformation in the thoughts and attitudes of the trainees and, ultimately, their

[3] They are Kim Young-sam, who was a long-time opposition leader under authoritarianism and served as a democratic president from 1993 to 1998, Kim Dae-jung, also a long-time opposition leader and the president from 1998 to 2003, and Kim Jong-pil, the prime minister from 1971 to 1975 during the Park Chung-hee's presidency and from 1998 and 2000 during the presidency of Kim Dae-jung.

[4] Hicken and Nathan (2020) claim that the literature has underestimated the difficulty of individual ballot monitoring. Normally, politicians can only observe and are interested in the aggregate voting behavior of a neighborhood or community rather than the precise individual ballots.

fellow villagers. This transformation includes ideological dimensions, such as patriotism, patriarchal statism, and anti-communism. Beyond the program's completion, trainees preserved their networks with the training agency and fellow participants. All of these factors fostered what we argue to be a strong and enduring foundation for authoritarian patronage amongst participants.

Based on these theoretical explorations, we present three principal hypotheses regarding the enduring influences of authoritarian patronage in elections as follows:

Hypothesis I (Support for Authoritarian Incumbent): Townships with more village leaders trained by the central government are more likely to support the authoritarian incumbent party in the subsequent election.

Hypothesis II (Support for Authoritarian Successor): If the villagers' clientelistic trust remains with the subsequent authoritarian regime, townships with more trainees are more likely to support the new authoritarian incumbent party in the election.

Hypothesis III (Support for Democratic Successor): If the villagers' trust in patronage continues to exist with the authoritarian successor party, townships with more trainees are more likely to support the authoritarian successor party in democratic elections.

3 New Village Leader Training and Elections in Korea

As the New Village Movement (NVM) launched nationwide in 1972, each of approximately 33,000 villages must select one male and one female New Village Leader (NVL) and report to the local office their profiles. Although there was no formal compensation to these leaders, the NVLs played crucial roles in planning, financing, and implementing the Movement within their village, often in competition with neighboring villages (Hong, Park and Yang 2023), and liaisoning with the local government offices and the Agricultural Cooperative Federation office. The position also had neither term limit nor official compensation (Park 1982; p.31). Among these NVLs, selective members were invited to the NVL Training Program in the NVL Training Center near Seoul. Although the detailed selection criteria are not clear or written down, village leaders with outstanding NVM performance

were more likely recommended by the local government offices, although sometimes poorly performing ones are selected and matched with high performers (Park 1982; pp. 18-19, p. 53). The selection of trainees was handled by the county and district local government offices, not by the training center or the central government (Park 1982; p. 53), which rejects the possible endogeneity between the training agent and the selected trainees. In the analysis, we also test whether the trainee selection is endogenous to previous election outcomes and find no statistically significant associations.

The NVL training program was initiated in 1972 as a two-week pilot program for 140 exemplary farmers. Later in the same year, it expanded into a more comprehensive New Village Leader Training Program for male NVLs, and from the following year, it included training programs for female NVLs and cooperative leaders.[5] This training initiative was planned by the Ministry of Agriculture and executed by the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, a nationwide government-organized agricultural cooperative. Over the next decade, the program trained 18,258 New Village Leaders and 10,299 Female Village Leaders.[6]

Table 1: Timetable of New Village Leader Training

Activity	Time	Activity	Time
Rising	5:50	Lunch	12:50 – 14:20
Roll call & group exercise	6:00 – 6:30	Afternoon lecture	14:20 – 18:10
Washing up & cleaning	6:30 – 7:00	Dinner	18:10 – 19:10
Breakfast	7:00 – 8:00	Group discussion	19:10 – 22:30
Morning assembly (meditation & conversation)	8:00 – 9:00	Night roll call	22:30 – 22:40
Morning lectures	9:00 – 12:50	Sleep	23:00

Source: New Village Leader Training Center (1981; p.128).

The daily training schedule was intense, running from 5:50 a.m. to 11 p.m., as depicted in Table 1. According to the official record, the standard curriculum allocates 30% of training time to "New Village Spirit" development,[7] 10% to education on national security and economics, 10% to special project

[5]Subsequently, the program expanded to include training of participants from diverse occupations such as social elites, college students, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, business leaders, factory supervisors, military personnel, teachers, professors, and doctors. However, the other training programs ran separately from the NVL Training Program and were handled by the respective government departments and training agencies.

[6]The duration of the training programs varied over time. The initial NVL training lasted 14 days in 1972, then was reduced to 11 days from 1973 to 1979, and further shortened to 6 days starting in 1980. Female NVL training has been 7 days since its inception.

[7]Training program focusing on the "New Village Spirit" was the direction ordered by President Park (Park 1982; p.15). The trainee survey revealed that the enhancement of the "New Village Spirit" was the main difference that the training made (Park 1982; pp.23-25).

development or field trips, 15% to case studies of successful initiatives, 25% to group discussions, and the remaining 10% to miscellaneous activities (New Village Leader Training Center 1981; p.126). The training sessions also featured high-profile guest lectures, including those by the President's Special Economic Advisor and the Chairman of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation. A unique aspect of the curriculum is its emphasis on patriotic education, which incorporates lessons on national security and anti-communism. The program underscores the idea that rural development is vital for the nation's progress and security. For example, during group discussions, one of the proposed questions was: "What have I done for the nation?" To bolster these themes, the program included lectures from defector soldiers from North Korea and screenings of anti-communist films (New Village Leader Training Center 1981). Several interviewees, who used to work as New Village Leaders, considered their roles as NVLs to be state-appointed responsibilities, underlining the movement and training program's meaning as a national central policy and their dedication.[8]

> "This role of New Village leader has been bestowed upon me by the nation. In carrying out this role, there will inevitably be obstacles and roadblocks. To overcome these with the least amount of difficulty, there are all kinds of problems and hardships, but we must push through. When I absolutely couldn't proceed any further, I often contributed my own personal funds. A national perspective is necessary to undertake New Village work." – Guan-young Seo, appointed in 1976 as an NVL of 7-tong, Munseong-dong, Cheonan-gun, Chungchungnam-do[9]

After 1-2 weeks of training, the training center maintained a close relationship with the former trainees through various measures. The director of the center sent individual letters to almost all male and female NVLs. The record notes that 15,943 letters were sent to male NVLs and 7,868 letters to female NVLs from the center (New Village Leader Training Center 1981; pp. 278-9). In return, 7,181 letters were sent from the former trainees to the center. Trainers toured former trainees' villages or their gatherings to follow up on the progress after training (Park 1982; pp.65-70). From 1974, distance learning materials called "New Village Movement" were also sent to the former trainees periodically. From 1976, a 1-2 day-retraining program was also offered. Finally, various trainee associations were

[8] Park (1982; p.32) notes that despite the lack of payment, many NVLs felt paid enough by President Park's recognition of their service.

[9] Original interview is available at http://archives.saemaul.or.kr/oralrecord/video/60/0.

active at the local level.

Figure 1: Timeline of Korean Politics (1970s to 1990s)

Regime Type	Authoritarian			Authoritarian			Democratic			Democratic		
Administration	Park Chung-hee			Chun Doo-hwan			Roh Tae-woo			Kim Young-Sam		
Legislative Election	1978		1981		1985		1988		1992		1996	
Political Events	Death of Park (Oct 1979) Coup by Chun (Dec 1979)				Democratization (Jun 1987)			Three-Party Merger (Jan 1990)		Signing of Uruguay Round (Apr 1994)		

However, the sudden death of Park Chung-hee was the first point of inflection for the NVM and NVL's role. After the assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979, after 18 years in power, another military regime was established by Chun Doo-hwan through a coup in the same year. (See the major political events and administrations in Figure 1.) The new regime faced resistance from the citizens which began to boil before the assassination of Park against the suppressive auto-coup regime since 1972. In May 1980, the new regime oppressed a city-wide public uprising in Gwangju, a southwestern city, using military forces, known as the Gwangju Massacre.

Within a year from the coup by Chun, the NVM lost the formal support and connection of the central government. The NVM became a civil movement organization and the training center became separate from the government organization as a corporation. At the same time, however, several interview records note that the new regime requested the training center to mobilize the NVLs for the new regime.

> "The problem was that as time passed, the new military regime, after experiencing events like May 18 and December 12,[10] demanded that 300,000 to 500,000 New Village Leaders gather in Yeouido Square[11] to publicly declare their support for the regime..... Hence, we had no other option but to create a New Village headquarters. During this process, we

[10] May 18 refers to the Gwangju Massacre on May 18, 1980, and December 12 to the coup by Chun Doo-hwan on December 12, 1979.

[11] Yeouido is where the National Assembly is located and was considered as a symbolically critical place in Korean politics.

> established the New Village Leaders Council, the Female New Village Leaders Council, the Factory New Village Council, and the Workplace New Village Council, among others." – Jeong-hyeon Gwak, a founding member and a Vice-director (1976-78) of the NVL training center[12]

The Chun regime put effort into appeasing the rural population by promising unprecedented rural household income boosting using industrial policy and financial support. The most notable initiative was the enactment and promulgation of the Law for the Promotion of Income Source Development in Agricultural and Fishing Villages at the end of 1983. The core promise of this law was to attract manufacturing and service sectors to rural areas to improve income structure and boost income. Mayors and county governors have discretion over tax breaks and other support for factories and corporations operating in rural areas. According to the Economic Planning Board's Report on the Implementation of the Agricultural and Fishing Village Industrialization Policy, as of November 1986, 22 agricultural industrial zones had been designated and a total of 34 such zones were anticipated to be designated by the end of 1986. The report projected that if the development of these agricultural industrial zones proceeded as planned, it would lead to a groundbreaking increase in rural household income.[13] These mobilization and cooptation strategies employed by the subsequent authoritarian regime likely served to reassure the NVLs, helping to maintain their trust in the patronage system with regard to policy attention and resource allocation.

However, in Korea's rapidly expanding urban districts, street protests for democratization became increasingly widespread toward the end of the 7-year term limit of Chun, not just by political activists but strongly by college students, labor unions, white-collar workers, and religious groups. Nationwide demonstrations called the June Democratic Uprising forced the Chun regime to accept constitutional reforms, including direct presidential elections and more electoral competition. As a part of democratic reforms, local legislative and government elections were adopted and held in 1991 and 1994, respectively. In particular, the local legislative election opened a window of opportunity for some NVLs to formally represent the village and township. One interview record by Yu-hyeok Kim, who

[12] Original interview is available at http://archives.saemaul.or.kr/oralrecord/video/93/0.

[13] Original archival document is available at https://theme.archives.go.kr/viewer/common/archWebViewer.do?singleData=Y&archiveEventId=0049164583#3. This policy held significant appeal for rural residents for several reasons. On an individual level, many farmers anticipated an increase in land values if their area was designated as an agricultural-industrial zone. More fundamentally, farmers who had been marginalized by industrialization saw the policy as an opportunity to benefit from the industrialization of their own sectors and regions.

served as the President of the New Village headquarters from 1993-1995, marks that at one point over 1,000 NVLs were elected as local legislative members.[14] Although the political incorporation of village leaders into political institutions was a benefit of democratization, it was also an alternative solution to obtain resources from the government: with democratization and eventual democratic consolidation, the village leaders could no longer depend on the patronage of the incumbent regime and the ruling party for necessary resources. Participating in local legislature is a way to appeal and obtain financial support and policy in the new political system.

Moreover, democratization coincided with or led to another inflection point that shattered the village leaders' and villagers' clientelistic trust in the national government and the incumbent party. The watershed point was the negotiation for the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round, conducted between 1986 to 1994, is one of the rounds of multilateral trade negotiations conducted within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) under the World Trade Organization (WTO). South Korea, like many other countries, had a highly protected agricultural sector, largely to ensure food autonomy and maintain rural communities despite the sector's inferior comparative advantage to its manufacturing counterpart in the global market. Rice, in particular, was a central agricultural product of the nation not just historically and culturally, but also in the process of the NVM. The NVM under Park was highly focused on enhancing the productivity of rice cultivation by adopting and expanding a new species called "Tong-il." The prospect of opening up agricultural markets to international competition was met with fierce disagreements and resistance in South Korea, especially from rural areas. Protests by farmers continued and intensified as the multinational negotiation was wrapping up and the market opening was looming. Despite the unprecedentedly fierce and violent resistance by farmers, the negotiation liberalized most agricultural markets: the agricultural import liberalization rate rose sharply from 16% in 1985 to 94.5% in 1995.[15] Although rice was excluded in the final agreement of market opening, years-long conflicts between the democratized government by ASP and the farmers generated a drastic change in previous patronage between the authoritarian government and farmers. Subsequent global competition and marginalization in the national economy further dissipated the patriarchal trust in government among South Korean rural residents.

[14] Original interview is available at http://archives.saemaul.or.kr/oralrecord/video/89/0.

[15] Agricultural import liberalization rate is calculated by the number of agricultural products opened to import out of total agricultural products by the standardized product classification. More information on the Korean government's negotiation in the Uruguay Round is available at https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Development-Overview/all/uruguay-round-agriculture-agreement--54.do.

4 Data and Empirical Strategy

We collect information on the NVL trainees educated at the NVL Training Center from a series of *Trainee Graduation Album* from 1972 to 1979.[16] The Center published an album containing pictures of participants and training sessions for each training cohort. At the end of the album, it presents a list of all trainees and detailed personal information about each trainee, such as address. Albums occasionally also contain age, occupation, and/or educational attainment information. Figure **??** and Figure **??** in the appendix is the sample list of the first and 8th NVL trainee cohorts, where the former only has names and addresses while the latter has age, occupation, and education information in addition. From these lists, we collect information on 26,808 individuals who attained either the NVL training, female NVL training, or cooperative leader or manager training. To verify the coverage of the data that we have collected, we crosscheck the annual count of trainees in each training type over the years with the records in New Village Leader Training Center (1981) which offer the aggregate number of participants of each program by year (See the comparison in Table A.1.1). The crosschecking confirms the thorough coverage of our data. Discrepancies between the official report and our data are largely explained by either miscounting or an unexplained exclusion of specific groups in New Village Leader Training Center (1981).

We then match the NVL data to election outcome data using the NVL leaders' address information at the township level, i.e., the *eup-myeon-dong* (EMD) level in Korean.[17] In this process, we lost some observations, largely due to some trainee who either did not provide detailed addresses or left their office address. They are predominantly participants from local bureaucratic offices or government agencies. Still, over 95% of our data are matched to township-level electoral data. The geographic distribution of trained NVLs is illustrated in Figure 3. The geographic distribution of trained NVLs in three distinctive categories – male leaders, female leaders, and cooperative managers – is in the appendix as Figure A.1.1.[18]

To analyze the long-term effects of trained NVLs on authoritarian to democratic elections, empiri-

[16] Although the program nominally existed in the following regime, the direct connection between the national government and the village leaders ended in 1980 with the beginning of the new regime, as the NVM transformed into a civil movement and the training center became an independent corporation.

[17] The election data comes from the National Election Commission: `http://www.nec.go.kr`. EMD is the third layer of administrative units following the province (*do*) and the county (*si-gun-gu*), and above the village (*li* or *maeul*). As of 2022, there were 3,518 townships in South Korea.

[18] Missing observations on Figure A.1.1 are either city districts, which were ineligible for the NVM program, or districts that were untraceable due to a complete administrative boundary change.

Figure 2: Number of Trainees by Leadership Type



cal analysis covers the elections from the 1973 and 1978 authoritarian elections under Park Chung-hee, the 1981 and 1985 authoritarian elections under Chun Doo-hwan, and three democratic elections between 1988 and 1996. We track changes in administrative boundaries and make a township-level panel dataset spanning those seven legislative elections, using the administrative boundary from 1970 as the base of the tracking process. For example, if a township split into multiple townships after 1970, we combine the fragments and treat them as one unit to prevent those data points from being coded as missing. To accurately track administrative unit changes, we use various methods, such as verifying city and county ordinances related to administrative boundary changes and cross-checking the GIS boundary maps from different years.[19].

To incorporate socioeconomic control variables, we collect various data from the *Population Census* surveyed every five years (population census, hereafter) and the *Census of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries* conducted every five to ten years (agricultural census, hereafter).[20] As the election year and census year do not overlap exactly, we match the census data from the year closest to an election year with the election results.

[19]County ordinances are from Handbook of Administrative Districts (*jibang haengjeongguyeok yoram*), published by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety. The GIS boundary maps are collected from Statistics Korea's Statistics Geographic Information Service (https://sgis.kostat.go.kr)

[20]From 1960 to 1990, the agricultural census was conducted every ten years. Afterward, the cycle was reduced to five years.

Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of Trained NVLs



Our key identification strategy leverages the township's authoritarian patronage formed through the *trained* NVLs, not the patronage of all NVLs. During the NVM, all villages were required to appoint or elect two NVLs, one male and one female, and report their profiles to the township office each year. The township office kept the list of village leaders along with the designated local public official as a supervisor of the village's NVM (See Figure **??** as an example). Therefore, every village had two NVLs without exception and they all were supposed to lead the NVM in their own village. Without the central training, however, the village leaders had a connection only to the township government office through a designated local official, the lowest-level bureaucratic unit in South Korea. In contrast, the trained village leaders, and their villagers by extension, began to have a direct connection to the *central government* through the central training agency, highly likely for the first time as rural residents, for a nationwide movement that the national leader proposed and drove as his signature policy. Approximately 16,000 NVLs received this training out of about 33,000 villages between 1972 and 1979, meaning not all village leaders had the training experience.[21] Our identification strategy captures this difference.

Our empirical specification is a township-level cross-sectional analysis for each of the six legislative election outcomes.

$$\text{IncumbentVoteShare}_{i,c,t} = \beta_1 \text{trainedNVLs}_{i,c,t} + X_{i,c,t}\eta + \tau_c + \varepsilon_{i,c,t} \tag{1}$$

Our dependent variable, $\text{IncumbentVoteShare}_{i,c,t}$, is the vote share of the authoritarian ruling party or the authoritarian successor party in township i in county c in the legislative election in year t.[22] The key independent variable, $\text{trainedNVLs}_{i,c,t}$, is the ratio of the accumulated NVLs trained per all voters (registered as of 1973, divided by 1,000) in year t in township i in county c. For the 1978 election, we accumulated trainees since the previous election, from 1973 to 1978. The following elections include all trainees until 1979. $X_{i,c,t}$ includes control variables that allow us to address various features of each township. First, we include the incumbent vote share of the previous elections to control any underlying political characteristics of the town. We include demographic and agricultural features

[21] There was no designated term for the NVLs. Although not often, it is possible that more than one leader took the training from one village during the NVM period.

[22] Although South Korea has maintained a presidential system since its establishment, our analysis relies on the legislative elections. Through an autocoup in 1972, Park Chung-hee abolished the popular presidential election, which was reinstated in 1987 after democratization.

to account for a township's development level both *before* the beginning of the NVM program and *at* the time of the election. All analyses include each township's area size (km^2) in 1970, a dummy variable for the township of being the county capital (*eup*) in a county in 1970, the proportion of women in 1970, the proportion over age 15 in 1970, the proportion over age 55 in 1970, the population change from 1966 to 1970, the share of households owning mechanical cultivators in 1970, the share of full-time farming households in 1970, and change in agricultural population from 1960 to 1970 (log) to account for the development level before the NVM. Also, to control a township's characteristics *at* the time of the election, we include the same demographic and agricultural variables from the census closest to the election year.[23]

Finally, we include county (*si-gun-gu*) fixed effects (τ_c), which refer to the administrative layer above the township, to address time-invariant omitted variables at the county level. Therefore, our estimates are drawn from the *within* county township-level variations, which addresses the issue of regionalism to a considerable extent. Political regionalism refers to the regional cleavage between the southwestern region (Honam) and the southeastern region (Youngnam), which has been a longstanding feature of Korean politics since the 1980s. Acknowledging the significant influence of regionalism on the national election outcome, our specification captures the difference in the authoritarian incumbent's or successor's vote share due to the difference in the share of trained NVLs *compared to other townships within a county*. We cluster the standard errors ($\varepsilon_{i,c,t}$) at the county level.

Note that we have alternatively used electoral district fixed effects to control regional variation under the multi-member district system from 1972 to 1985, as Charnysh and Finkel (2017) did. The results using electoral district fixed effects with electoral district-level clustered standard errors remain similar to the main results using county fixed effects with county-level clustered standard errors, as shown in Table **??** of the appendix. As electoral districts are combined by one to four countries, we believe county fixed effects are more appropriate to control any regional variations.

[23]For example, the analysis of the 1996 election includes the proportion of women in 1995, the proportion of the population over age 15 in 1995, the proportion of over-age-55 in 1995, the population change from 1990 to 1995, the share of households owning mechanical cultivators in 1995 (log), the share of full-time farming households in 1995, and change in agricultural population from 1990 to 1995 (log).

5 Empirical Analyses

5.1 Main Results

We first examine the electoral impact of authoritarian patronage, measured by the proportion of trained NVLs within the township voters, across both authoritarian and democratic elections. Table 2 presents our findings. Columns (1) to (3) cover three authoritarian legislative elections: one held in 1978 under the Park regime and two in 1981 and 1985 during Chun's tenure. Columns (4) to (6) analyze three democratic legislative elections that followed the 1987 democratization.

Our statistical results indicate that townships with a higher concentration of trained NVLs were more likely to support the authoritarian ruling party in the 1978 election, showing support for the authoritarian ruling party implementing the NVM program. Specifically, one more trained NVLs per 1,000 voters between 1973 and 1978 is associated with a 0.5 percentage increase in the incumbent party's vote share (Column (1)). The coefficient is statistically significant in the 95% confidence interval after accounting for the township's vote share in the previous legislative election, along with numerous demographic and economic trends and conditions in the 1970s, in addition to the county fixed effects (Column (1)). Notably, it is noteworthy that despite the national electoral results favoring the primary opposition party – wherein the opposition party, the New People's Party (*Shinmindang*), garnered 32.82% of the total vote (4,861,204 votes) compared to the authoritarian government party, the Democratic Republican Party (*Minjugonghwadang*), securing 31.7% (4,695,965 votes) – the influence of trained NVLs in bolstering support for the authoritarian ruling party was substantial.

The 1981 election was the first election under the new authoritarian leadership of Chun Doo-hwan, after a series of tumultuous political incidents: the abrupt assassination of Park Chung-hee in October 1979, Chun's military coup in December of the same year, and the Gwangju uprising for democracy followed by a brutal military crackdown in May 1980. Despite the political volatility arising from this series of unanticipated incidents within a mere six-month span, our findings underscore that the influence of the NVL trainees on the township voters' support for the authoritarian party remained positive and statistically significant in the 1981 election, as shown in Column (2) in Table 2. Notably, however, that the magnitude of this influence diminished by approximately 40% compared to its

Table 2: Effects of NVLs on Authoritarian and Democratic Elections

	Incumbent Party Vote Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime	Park	Chun		Democracy		
Election	1978	1981	1985	1988	1992	1996
Trained NVL share	0.005*	0.003*	0.004**	0.001	0.003*	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1324	1318	1346	1346	1283	1274
Adjusted R^2	0.818	0.801	0.800	0.839	0.828	0.819

Notes. *Trained NVLs* refers to the proportion of the accumulated NVL trainees in total voters as of 1973. For the 1978 election, we accumulated trainees since the previous election, from 1973 to 1978. The following elections include all trainees until 1979. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and all Columns include the county fixed effects. Table A.1.6 of the appendix presents the full results. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

presence in the 1978 election under Park. Subsequently, in the 1985 election, the second legislative election under Chun, the legacy of authoritarian patronage bequeathed by the preceding dictatorship continued to exhibit a robust and statistically significant effect, as in Column (3) of Table 2.[24]

Despite Chun's dictatorship discontinuing financial investment and bureaucratic support for the NVM, multiple factors enabled the endurance of authoritarian patronage established by the movement. Firstly, while the momentum of the movement waned as the new authoritarian regime shifted its responsibility to non-governmental organizations, the regime nonetheless made concerted efforts to sustain and mobilize the patronage network by forming the New Village Leaders Associations, as discussed in the background section. Secondly, the Chun administration launched and expanded the agricultural industrial complexes(Hong and Park 2016). These complexes were a variation from the Park administration's industrial complex policy at the national and regional levels. However, under Chun, the government extended it into rural districts for the manufacturing process of agricultural products, which likely resonated with the rural electorates.

The subsequent columns (Columns (4) to (6)) in Table 2 show whether the effects of authoritarian

[24]Even though the authoritarian party won the largest number of seats in the 1985 election with 35.2% of the total votes, it faced considerable opposition. The newly formed New Korean Democratic Party (*Sinhanminjudang*), perceived by many voters as a genuine democratic alternative, secured 29.3% of the vote (Im 2014). The opposition party aligned itself with a broad pro-democracy coalition consisting of student activists, dissident intellectuals, and progressive religious leaders (Jung 2011). Massive street protests advocating democratization continued until June 1987 when the dictator conceded to a constitutional reform, paving the way for a direct presidential election in December 1987.

patronage sustain or transform in a democratic setting after the country's democratization in 1987. The estimate of Trained NVLs in Column (4) reveals the null effects of trained NVLs on the incumbent vote share. The preceding year, 1987, was marked by massive pro-democracy protests that culminated in the successful democratization of the country in June. Subsequently, a direct democratic presidential election was held in December 1987, resulting in the victory of the authoritarian successor, Roh Tae-woo, largely due to the split between the two primary opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dea-jung. The 1988 legislative elections occurred merely two months after the authoritarian successor assumed his presidential role. The regime transition and political changes have highly likely posited uncertainties to the patronage network and clientelistic trust built and reinforced during authoritarian periods.[25] We interpret the insignificant result in Column (4) underscores the political uncertainties that the clients (i.e., trained rural villager leaders and villagers) faced with regards to the benefit and credibility of previous patronage with the authoritarian regime.

Nonetheless, the following column (Column (5)) for the 1992 election demonstrates that authoritarian patronage may wield a strong influence in a democratic election. The incumbent authoritarian successor party, the Democratic Justice Party (*Minjeongdang*) expanded into a supermajority ruling party in the legislature in 1990 with an unprecedentedly large party merger with the second opposition party, the United Democratic Party (*Tongilminjudang*) led by Kim Young-sam with a regional base in the southeastern region (Youngnam), and the third opposition party New Republican Party (*Shin-gonghwadang*) led by Kim Jong-pil with a regional base in the middle region (Chungcheong) (Choi and Hong 2020). This three-party merger was a pivotal incident that established a mega-conservative party orchestrated by the authoritarian successor party. This incident has likely served as a powerful signal to the clients of authoritarian patronage for the potential benefit of sustaining the patronage linkage in democracy. The empirical finding of Column (5) provides support for the sustaining utility of the NVM's clientelistic linkages, as townships with more trained NVLs are more likely to support the incumbent party. A 1 more trainee per 1,000 voters is associated with a 0.3 percentage increase in the incumbent party's vote share after controlling for the township's support for the incumbent party in the previous election, various demographic and economic factors from the 1960s to 1980s, and the

[25] In a climate where political uncertainty following a regime transition had not fully stabilized, politicians leaned heavily on their regional political base. Political regionalism, known as the most significant voting pattern in Korea since the 1980s, is characterized by voters in the southeastern region (Yeongnam) supporting the conservative authoritarian successor party, while voters in the southwestern region (Honam) supporting the progressive party. This regional cleavage became more pronounced after 1987 (Hong and Park 2016).

county-level fixed effects.

However, the rural support for the authoritarian successor party based on authoritarian patronage lost momentum following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round at the end of 1993 for global market liberalization which in turn indicates the failure of years-long resistance by farmers. The negotiation of the Uruguay Round prompted massive and often violent protests among farmers, who strongly opposed the agricultural market opening.[26] Therefore, the rehabilitation of the patronage linkage shown in the 1992 election, which fundamentally assumes the reciprocity of material benefits for electoral support, was no longer seen as incredible to rural voters. As demonstrated in Column (6) of Table 2, no association is detected between the proportion of trained NVLs and the incumbent authoritarian successor party's vote share in 1996.

As democracy consolidated and the agricultural sector continued to marginalize, no statistically significant association was found between authoritarian patronage and the support for the conservative party in any subsequent democratic elections after 1996 until the most recent legislative election in 2020.[27] Figure 4 shows the continuous null findings. The two conspicuous points are the 2000 election and the 2012 election: The 2000 election was the legislative election after the 1997 East Asian Economic Crisis, which further facilitated neoliberal reforms and economic globalization for the Korean economy. The effect of authoritarian patronage became negative for the first time in the 2000 election. After 2000, while statistically insignificant, the effect of authoritarian patronage remained negative in all legislative elections except for once. The only election that this effect flipped to the positive side was the 2012 legislative election. In this election, the party leader of the conservative party was Park Geun-hye, the first daughter of Park Chung-hee. The fact that the daughter of Park Chung-hee, the founder of the NVM, was leading the party for the election likely mobilized the rural clients and voters more cohesively.

5.2 Endogeneity

We conduct several additional analyses to support the robustness of our analysis. First, we test the possibility of endogeneity in the NVL trainee selection with regards to electoral support. Our core

[26]The South Korean government agreed to eliminate non-tariff barriers and liberalize the market for all agricultural commodities, with the exception of rice. Even though rice received an exemption, the market liberalization of other agricultural commodities and the elimination of subsidies for the rice market had significant repercussions for farmers.

[27]In addition, the trained NVLs, who were on average 38.6 years old, might have passed away in most recent elections.

Figure 4: Effects of Trained NVLs on the Township's Support for the Authoritarian Incumbent and Successor Party (1981–2020)



Notes. *Trained NVLs* refers to the share of the accumulated NVL trainees from 1972 to 1979 in total voters in 1978.

claim and finding is that authoritarian patronage built through the central training program for the selected village leaders affects the villagers' support for the authoritarian incumbent and successor party in the following elections. Although historical accounts state that the selection of NVL trainees were delegated to local government offices (New Village Leader Training Center 1981, Park 1982), an endogeneity concern may arise if the electoral outcome of the previous election influenced the regime's recruiting decision of the NVL trainees. For instance, the authoritarian regime may have selected more trainees from a township where they garnered greater electoral support in the previous election. To address this potential issue of endogeneity, we examined whether the incumbent party's vote share in the prior election is correlated with the proportion of the trained NVLs in the subsequent year.

We first utilize the 1971 election outcome, which was held before the initiation of the NVM or the NVL training program. The results, presented in Column (1) in Table 3, demonstrate that there is no discernible correlation between the level of electoral support for the incumbent party in the 1971 elections and the share of trained NVLs in total voters in 1972. At the outset of the NVM program in 1972, it appears that the decision of New Village Leaders who received direct training from the central government was not influenced by electoral support within the township. Similarly, no statistically significant association is found for the 1973 and 1978 election outcomes and the NVL trainees selection in the following year, signifying that the endogeneity does not bias our empirical findings.

Table 3: Endogeneity Test

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent Variable	Trained NVLs Share in		
	1972	1974	1979
Incumbent party vote share in 1971	0.111		
	(0.110)		
Incumbent party vote share in 1973		0.037	
		(0.160)	
Incumbent party vote share in 1978			0.347
			(0.207)
Controls	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1356	1355	1324
Adjusted R^2	0.047	0.117	0.252

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and all Columns include the county fixed effects and control variables used in Table 2. Table A.1.9 of the appendix presents the full results. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

5.3 Mechanisms

5.3.1 Village leaders' political influence within village

We claim that the authoritarian patronage between the dictator and trained village leaders has enduring effects because the village leaders could exert political influence over the villagers, which was observable in electoral outcomes. We investigate this mechanism by analyzing genders and types of NVL trainees had distinctive effects with regard to electoral impact (Table 4). New Village Leaders are categorized into three distinct types: male leaders, female leaders, and cooperative manager leaders (as illustrated in Figure 2). While all leaders served the common goals of leading the villagers and encouraging their active participation in the NVM program, the specific roles that each type of leadership undertook within the program varied. Male leaders were primarily responsible for overseeing all aspects of the NVM program and progress in their respective towns.

They conveyed messages from the local office, gathered the opinions of villagers, made financial and implementation plans for village income enhancement, and played a pivotal role in making crucial decisions regarding the NVM program. Male village leaders, therefore, were the majority of the trainees, constituting approximately 59% of the total trainees.[28] Female leaders, comprising 29% of the total, mainly focused on housekeeping and village cleaning tasks. They were more involved in support-centric work in the NVM, as opposed to the decision-making roles held by male counterparts. Moreover, in a patriarchal and traditional rural society in 1970s South Korea, women were strongly discouraged from engaging in or discussing political matters.[29] Finally, cooperative manager leaders are selected from the members of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, a semi-governmental and semi-private organization formed by farmers for their collective industrial interests. They normally oversaw large projects related to enhancing agricultural productivity in the township or the district. This means that the cooperative managers did not necessarily represent nor have a close relationship with a particular village, but they had significant leverage as elite leaders in rural districts. The training program for the cooperative managers lasted for four years, from 1973 to 1976.

Panel A in Table 4 examines the effects of male leader trainees on following elections. Consistent with the main results presented in Table 2, townships with more trained male leaders demonstrate

[28] In our data, the total number of male leaders is 15,843 out of 26,808, accounting for 59.1%, while official reports indicate a figure of 15,901 out of 27,192, accounting for 58.5%. For more information, refer to Table A.1.1.

[29] In 1978, only 8 legislators (3.5%) were female, including appointed members.

Table 4: Three Types of NVM Leaders and Elections

Panel A: Male Village Leaders						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime	Park	Chun			Democracy	
Election	1978	1981	1985	1988	1992	1996
Male Leaders	0.013*	0.011**	0.012**	-0.000	0.009*	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1324	1318	1346	1346	1283	1274
Adjusted R^2	0.818	0.802	0.800	0.839	0.829	0.819
Panel B: Female Village Leaders						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime	Park	Chun			Democracy	
Election	1978	1981	1985	1988	1992	1996
Female Leaders	0.000	-0.004	-0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1324	1318	1346	1346	1283	1274
Adjusted R^2	0.816	0.801	0.799	0.839	0.828	0.819
Panel C: Cooperative Manager Leaders						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime	Park	Chun			Democracy	
Election	1978	1981	1985	1988	1992	1996
Cooperative Managers	0.052***	0.014	0.042***	0.011	0.014	0.018
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1324	1318	1346	1346	1283	1274
Adjusted R^2	0.819	0.801	0.801	0.839	0.828	0.819

Notes. The independent variable is the share of the accumulated NVL trainees of each category in total voters as of 1973. For the 1978 election, we accumulated trainees since the previous election, from 1973 to 1978. The following elections include all trainees until 1979. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level when the county fixed effects are used. Tables **??**, **??**, and **??** in the appendix present the full results. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

greater support for the authoritarian incumbent party and its successor party in democracy. The magnitude of the effect is two to three times larger than the aggregated regression in Table 2.

A stark contrast to this finding is the case of female leaders, as displayed in Panel B of Table 4. The training of female leaders yields no discernible impact on election outcomes in the following elections. This evident divergence between the positive and significant effect observed for male leaders

and the null effect associated with female leaders can be attributed to their distinct roles within the NVM program based on different gender norms in rural Korea in the 1970s. Male leaders played the central role in the NVM, actively engaging in information dissemination and collective decision-making in their towns. For male leaders, the training program and the group discussion at the center often included political topics like anti-communist ideology and patriotism, according to the archival data. These factors placed the male leaders in the central position in fostering patronage between the regime and the village. In contrast, female leaders, while they were also involved actively in village affairs, were mostly assigned to auxiliary roles and excluded from political discussions in the village under the highly patriarchal culture in rural Korea. Even among female leaders selected for the training, we find no qualitative evidence in the archival data that they discussed political topics like male leaders during the training program.

Finally, Panel C in Table 4 presents the results from the cooperative manager trainees. As rural elites with significant leverage over agricultural activities, the cooperative managers who were trained by the central government agency exhibited a strong influence on electoral outcomes under authoritarian rule (Columns (1) to (3) in Panel C, Table 4). However, interestingly, as the subsequent columns (Columns (4) to (6) in Panel C, Table 4), their impact on elections did not persist in democratic elections. Several factors may explain this finding: first, while the cooperative managers resided in a village, they may not have strong bonds with other villagers as they were not farmers but worked for a local branch of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation. Therefore, the patronage the cooperative managers hold may not have been transmitted to the village voters in the long run as the male leaders would have. Another factor might be the shorter period of the training program. The training program for cooperative manager leaders was shorter than other programs, four years between 1973 and 1976. Hence, the cooperative manager trainees consist of 12% of the total trainees, relatively small compared to those of male and female village leaders (59% and 29% respectively).

5.3.2 Aging and decease of village leaders

We then examine varying effects of the NVLs on elections by trained leaders' age to investigate the mechanism why the patronage effect disappeared after the 1996 election. An alternative interpretation of our main results is that the patronage effect may disappear because the trainees become too old or

deceased. The average age of NVL trainees in our dataset is 38.6: a trainee who was 38.6 years old in 1975 would reach the age of life expectancy, 83.6 years old, in 2020, the year of most recent election.[30] Although we believe that most NVL trainees were likely alive for the period of our main analysis until the mid-1990s, we examine the possibility that trained leaders' old age or decease account for the insignificant results in elections after 1992. To address this possibility, we employ the trainees' age to group them into age cohorts from their 20s or younger to 50s or older with a 10-year bandwidth and examine which age group drives the effects in elections over time. If the effects are mainly driven by younger cohorts, it is unlikely that the patronage effects disappeared due to the decreases in clients. Figure 5 shows the results. The results indicate that the patronage effects in the 1992 election were driven by the younger cohorts, who were in their 30s or younger in the 1970s. These leaders are in their 50s in the 1990s, which makes the null results due to the deaths of trainees unlikely.

5.3.3 Regionalism

Finally, we examine a sub-sample analysis at the region level to address the concern about political regionalism. Political regionalism in the Korean context refers to the prevailing voting patterns, where voters in the southeastern region called *Yeongnam* (two Gyeongsang provinces) tend to support the conservative authoritarian successor party, while voters in the southwestern region called *Honam* (two Jeolla provinces) lean toward the progressive party. Scholars familiar with this regional cleavage in Korea may raise the question that the effects of NVL trainees may be mostly derived from voters in Gyeongsang provinces who have strongly favored the conservative party, particularly since democratization (Hong and Park 2016). Our dataset, which is a panel of rural townships as of 1970, confirms that the regional cleavage in legislative elections in the countryside was a phenomenon that emerged toward the end of the authoritarian rule and starkly intensified after democratization, as displayed in Figure 6.

Table 5 reports the results from the subsample analysis using the same Columns in Table 2 for Honam region (Jeolla provinces) in Panel A, Yeongnam region (Gyeongsang provinces) in Panel B, and Chungcheong in Panel C. Contrast to popular perception of the voting behavior in Yeongnam region, authoritarian patronage measured by the share of trained village leaders yielded no discernible

[30] The mean age of trained leaders at the time of training is 38.6 (with a 7.87 standard error). The youngest leader was 14, and the oldest was 70.

Figure 5: Effects of Trained NVLs by Leaders' Age



Notes. Trained NVLs refers to the proportion of the accumulated NVL trainees by their ages. Table **??** to Table A.1.8 of the appendix presents the full results of all eight graphs.

Figure 6: Emergence of Electoral Regionalism in Rural Korea



Note. "H" refers to the average vote share in Honam and "Y" in Yeongnam.

Table 5: Regional Heterogeneity in the Effects of Trained NVLs

Panel A: Honam						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime	Park	Chun			Democracy	
Election	1978	1981	1985	1988	1992	1996
Trained NVL share	0.011**	-0.001	0.004	0.006*	0.006**	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	360	360	389	389	369	369
Adjusted R^2	0.843	0.801	0.773	0.660	0.796	0.751
Panel B: Yeongnam						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime	Park	Chun			Democracy	
Election	1978	1981	1985	1988	1992	1996
Trained NVL share	-0.001	0.005	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	424	423	423	423	409	409
Adjusted R^2	0.806	0.815	0.791	0.742	0.806	0.827
Panel C: Chungcheong						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime	Park	Chun			Democracy	
Election	1978	1981	1985	1988	1992	1996
Trained NVL share	0.002	0.002	0.010***	-0.001	0.005	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	282	281	281	281	268	268
Adjusted R^2	0.789	0.803	0.852	0.811	0.801	0.814

Notes. Trained NVLs refers to the proportion of the accumulated NVL trainees in total voters as of 1973. For the 1978 election, we accumulated trainees since the previous election, from 1973 to 1978. The following elections include all trainees until 1979. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and all Columns include the county fixed effects. Tables **??**, **??**, and **??** of the appendix present the full results. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

impact on election outcomes either in the short or long run. While it is true that Yeongnam has been a strong support base for the authoritarian successor party, the additional effect generated from the trained NVLs appears negligibly small and significant. In contrast, contrary again to the conventional wisdom in Korean politics, the effects of trained NVLs on authoritarian and democratic elections are

estimated to be stronger and statistically significant in Honam region. Considering the weak support that the incumbent party could gain with the strong regional voting patterns post democratization, a 6 percentage greater vote share in the 1988 and 1992 elections with one percent greater share of the MVL trainees (Columns (4) and (5) in Table 5) is instrumental for the incumbent party.

Yet another alternative interpretation of the insignificant effect in 1996 is the split of the conservatives right before the 1996 election. In 1995, some conservative politicians whose regional bases are Chungcheong left the then-incumbent conservative party (Democratic Liberal Party, *Minjadang*) and formed a new conservative party, United Liberal Democrats (*Jaminryeon*). To capture the split of conservative voters in the 1996 elections, we have analyzed the same model as Table 2 with a new dependent variable adding both the then-incumbent conservative party and a new conservative party. The result of the 1996 election still is insignificant, the same as Column (6) of Table 2.

6 Conclusion

Authoritarian regimes build various political patronages with diverse groups of voters to fortify their control and mobilize social and economic resources. But when a transition to a new dictatorship or a democracy occurs, how does this authoritarian patronage transition into the subsequent regime? This study examines the enduring electoral effects of authoritarian patronage using the New Village Leader Training Program during South Korea's New Village Movement in the 1970s.

Our empirical evidence reveals that areas with a higher concentration of village leaders trained by the authoritarian government show a consistent tendency to support the authoritarian incumbent party. This pattern was evident in the elections in the 1980s under the new dictator and strongly appeared even after South Korea's transition to democracy. However, the influence of authoritarian patronage waned as democratic institutions consolidated and the agricultural sector's relevance diminished in the industrialized Korean economy in the wake of economic globalization.

An interesting dimension in our findings was the gendered nature of authoritarian patronage and its enduring legacy. We find that the patronage effects were exclusively tied to male village leaders. Although a substantial number of female village leaders were trained by the government, they did not manifest any statistically significant impact on electoral outcomes in the following decades. This disparity suggests that the deep-rooted patriarchal norms prevalent in South Korea's rural society

during this period assigned distinct roles to male and female leaders in the rural development movement and inhibited any political role played by female village leaders.

Our findings elucidate that the authoritarian incumbent party and the successor parties have benefited from the rural patronage formed by the former authoritarian regime and that changes in clientelistic dynamics are not solely determined by power or institutional shifts. However, when clientelistic reciprocity becomes unreliable for rural voters, either by internal or external factors, the electoral effects of political patronage diminish drastically. Both democratic consolidation and global economic liberalization led the incumbent party to no longer persuade the rural voters that the reciprocity under patronage was still credible.

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Supporting Information

Shadow of Authoritarian Patronage: Village Leaders and Elections in Democratizing South Korea

A.1 Tables and Figures

Table A.1.1: Crosschecking with Official Report on the NVL Trainee Headcounts

	Official report			Our NVL data			Our NVL data (with matchable address)		
Year	NVL	Female	Coop	NVL	Female	Coop	NVL	Female	Coop
1972	1,490	0	0	1,496	0	0	1,495	0	0
1973	1,212	1,203	1,903	1,222	872	1,915	1,052	570	1,543
1974	1,792	1,000	1,044	1,845	1,002	1,032	1,788	990	841
1975	2,215	978	114	2,217	979	116	2,200	959	108
1976	2,497	1,079	201	2,503	1,079	201	2,503	1,077	137
1977	2,396	1,202	0	2,396	1,202	0	2,396	1,201	0
1978	2,391	1,062	0	2,249	1,062	0	2,249	1,062	0
1979	1,913	1,505	0	1,915	1,505	0	1,915	1,486	0
Total	15,901	8,029	3,262	15,843	7,701	3,264	15,598	7,345	2,629

Source: New Village Leader Training Center (1981; pp.436 – 443)

Table A.1.2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Authoritarian Incumbent/Successor Party Vote Share in			
1968 Legislative Election	0.551	0.13	1449
1971 Legislative Election	0.539	0.133	1449
1973 Legislative Election	0.404	0.189	1370
1978 Legislative Election	0.371	0.164	1424
1981 Legislative Election	0.393	0.163	1454
1985 Legislative Election	0.456	0.152	1457
1988 Legislative Election	0.424	0.16	1459
1992 Legislative Election	0.428	0.161	1459
1996 Legislative Election	0.342	0.184	1459
2000 Legislative Election	0.301	0.228	1459
2004 Legislative Election	0.307	0.242	1459
2008 Legislative Election	0.357	0.225	1459
2012 Legislative Election	0.409	0.261	1459
2016 Legislative Election	0.431	0.26	1438
2020 Legislative Election	0.427	0.274	1459
Trained New Village Leaders/1,000 Voters in 1978			
NVLs trained from 1973 to 1978	3.84	1.618	1373
NVLs trained from 1972 to 1979	4.629	1.84	1373
Male leaders trained from 1973 to 1978	1.155	0.576	1373
Male leaders trained from 1972 to 1979	1.419	0.657	1373
Female leaders trained from 1973 to 1978	0.405	0.331	1373
Female leaders trained from 1972 to 1979	0.498	0.37	1373
Cooperative Mangers Trained from 1972 to 1979	0.334	0.193	1373

Table A.1.3: Summary Statistics (cont.)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Control Variables			
Area in 1970	0.066	0.047	1459
County capital (*eup*)	0.084	0.278	1459
Share of female pop. in 1970	0.495	0.016	1454
Share of female pop. in 1975	0.49	0.016	1459
Share of female pop. in 1980	0.496	0.011	1451
Share of female pop. in 1985	0.494	0.012	1459
Share of female pop. in 1990	0.498	0.015	1459
Share of female pop. in 1995	0.506	0.018	1459
Share of female pop. in 2000	0.508	0.02	1459
Share of female pop. in 2005	0.515	0.026	1393
Share of female pop. in 2010	0.517	0.028	1393
Share of female pop. in 2015	0.496	0.031	1459
Share of female pop. in 2020	0.49	0.031	1459
Share of age 15+ pop. in 1970	0.71	0.015	1453
Share of age 15+ pop. in 1975	0.733	0.015	1458
Share of age 15+ pop. in 1980	0.768	0.021	1451
Share of age 15+ pop. in 1985	0.796	0.019	1459
Share of age 15+ pop. in 1990	0.851	0.019	1459
Share of age 15+ pop. in 1995	0.873	0.027	1459
Share of age 15+ pop. in 2000	0.899	0.03	1459
Share of age 15+ pop. in 2005	0.916	0.031	1393
Share of age 15+ pop. in 2010	0.926	0.032	1393
Share of age 15+ pop. in 2015	0.941	0.029	1459
Share of age 15+ pop. in 2020	0.953	0.027	1459
Share of age 55+ pop. in 1970	0.103	0.014	1453
Share of age 55+ pop. in 1975	0.056	0.008	1459
Share of age 55+ pop. in 1980	0.139	0.026	1451
Share of age 55+ pop. in 1985	0.085	0.019	1459
Share of age 55+ pop. in 1990	0.111	0.031	1459
Share of age 55+ pop. in 1995	0.151	0.049	1459
Share of age 55+ pop. in 2000	0.175	0.062	1459
Share of age 55+ pop. in 2005	0.208	0.073	1393
Share of age 55+ pop. in 2010	0.47	0.157	1393
Share of age 55+ pop. in 2015	0.235	0.071	1459
Share of age 55+ pop. in 2020	0.268	0.075	1459
Pop. change in 1966 - 1970 (log)	-0.065	0.134	1452
Pop. change in 2005 - 2010 (log)	-0.043	0.232	1393
Pop. change in 1970 - 1975 (log)	-0.032	0.152	1454
Pop. change in 1975 - 1980 (log)	-0.121	0.484	1459
Pop. change in 1980 - 1985 (log)	-0.097	0.26	1451
Pop. change in 1985 - 1990 (log)	-0.131	0.211	1459
Pop. change in 1990 - 1995 (log)	-0.131	0.352	1459
Pop. change in 1995 - 2000 (log)	-0.03	0.409	1459
Pop. change in 2000 - 2005 (log)	-0.113	0.419	1459
Pop. change in 2005 - 2010 (log)	-0.043	0.232	1393
Pop. change in 2010 - 2015 (log)	0.162	1.371	1393
Pop. change in 2015 - 2020 (log)	0.015	0.404	1459
Share of household with cultivator in 1970	0.003	0.005	1453
Share of household with cultivator in 1980	0.105	0.069	1451
Share of household with cultivator in 1990	0.302	0.145	1375
Share of household with cultivator in 1995	0.321	0.15	1394
Share of household with cultivator in 2010	0.212	0.13	1391
Share of household with cultivator in 2000	0.304	0.159	1458
Share of household with cultivator in 2005	0.251	0.146	1393
Share of household with cultivator in 2015	0.154	0.111	1459
Share of household with cultivator in 2020	0.151	0.101	1458
Share of full-time farming households in 1970	0.552	0.203	1453
Share of full-time farming households in 1980	0.587	0.226	1451
Share of full-time farming households in 1990	0.432	0.204	1375
Share of full-time farming households in 1995	0.362	0.193	1394
Share of full-time farming households in 2000	0.367	0.202	1458
Share of full-time farming households in 2005	0.33	0.182	1393
Share of full-time farming households in 2010	0.263	0.152	1391
Share of full-time farming households in 2015	0.227	0.141	1459
Share of full-time farming households in 2020	0.211	0.13	1458

Table A.1.4: Summary Statistics (cont.)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Change in agricultural pop. (log, 1960 - 1970)	0.023	0.174	1439
Change in agricultural pop. (log, 1970 - 1980)	-0.296	0.171	1442
Change in agricultural pop. (log, 1980 - 1990)	-0.51	0.199	1375
Change in agricultural pop. (log, 1990 - 1995)	-0.325	0.137	1366
Change in agricultural pop. (log, 1995 - 2000)	-0.199	0.138	1393
Change in agricultural pop. (log, 2000 - 2005)	-0.213	0.161	1458
Change in agricultural pop. (log, 2005 - 2010)	-0.15	0.152	1459
Change in agricultural pop. (log, 2010 - 2015)	-0.195	0.14	1459
Change in agricultural pop. (log, 2015 - 2020)	-0.188	0.178	1458

Table A.1.5: Effects of NVLs on Authoritarian and Democratic Elections

	Incumbent Party Vote Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime	Park	Chun			Democracy	
Election	1978	1981	1985	1988	1992	1996
Panel 1: Effects of NVLs on Authoritarian and Democratic Elections (Full Table)						
Trained NVLs share	0.005*	0.003*	0.004**	0.001	0.003*	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Panel 2: Effects of Trained Male NVLs on Authoritarian and Democratic Elections (Full Table)						
Trained male leaders share	0.013*	0.011**	0.012**	0.000	0.009*	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Panel 3: Effects of Trained Female NVLs on Authoritarian and Democratic Elections (Full Table)						
Trained female leaders share	0.000	-0.003	-0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Panel 4: Effects of Trained Cooperative Managers on Authoritarian and Democratic Elections (Full Table)						
Trained cooperative managers share	0.052***	0.014	0.042***	0.012	0.014	0.018
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Panel 5: Regional Heterogeneity in the Effects of Trained NVLs (Honam)						
Trained NVLs share	0.011**	-0.001	0.004	0.006*	0.006**	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Panel 6: Regional Heterogeneity in the Effects of Trained NVLs (Yeongnam)						
Trained NVLs share	-0.001	0.005	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)

Notes. Trained NVLs share refers to the proportion of the accumulated NVL trainees in total voters as of 1973. For the 1978 election, we accumulated trainees since the previous election, from 1973 to 1978. The following elections include all trainees until 1979. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and all Columns include the county fixed effects. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A.1.6: Effects of NVLs on Authoritarian and Democratic Elections (cont.)

	Incumbent Party Vote Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Regime	Park	Chun			Democracy	
Election	1978	1981	1985	1988	1992	1996
Panel 7: Regional Heterogeneity in the Effects of Trained NVLs (Chungcheong))						
Trained NVLs share	0.002	0.002	0.010***	-0.001	0.005	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Panel 8: Effects of NVLs on Elections with Electoral District Fixed Effects						
Trained NVLs share (1973 - 1978)	0.009*	0.007+	0.007**	-0.003	0.003+	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)

Notes. Trained NVLs share refers to the proportion of the accumulated NVL trainees in total voters as of 1973. For the 1978 election, we accumulated trainees since the previous election, from 1973 to 1978. The following elections include all trainees until 1979. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and all Columns include the county fixed effects. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A.1.7: Effects of Trained Leaders by their Ages in Elections

	Incumbent Party Vote Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel 1: Effects of Trained Leaders by their Ages in the 1978 Election				
Trained NVLs in the 20s	0.011			
	(0.008)			
Trained NVLs in the 30s		0.005		
		(0.006)		
Trained NVLs in the 40s			0.012*	
			(0.006)	
Trained NVLs in the 50s+over				0.024+
				(0.013)
Panel 2: Effects of Trained Leaders by their Ages in the 1981 Election				
Trained NVLs in the 20s	0.006			
	(0.008)			
Trained NVLs in the 30s		0.005		
		(0.004)		
Trained NVLs in the 40s			0.008	
			(0.005)	
Trained NVLs in the 50s and over				0.001
				(0.012)

Notes. Trained NVLs refers to the accumulated NVL trainees from 1973 to 1979 by their age brackets, proportional to total voters as of 1973. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and all Columns include the county fixed effects. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A.1.8: Effects of Trained Leaders by their Ages in Elections (cont.)

	Incumbent Party Vote Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel 3: Effects of Trained Leaders by their Ages in the 1985 Election				
Trained NVLs in the 20s	0.011			
	(0.007)			
Trained NVLs in the 30s		0.008^{+}		
		(0.005)		
Trained NVLs in the 40s			0.009*	
			(0.004)	
Trained NVLs in the 50s and over				0.005
				(0.011)
Panel 4: Effects of Trained Leaders by their Ages in the 1988 Election				
Trained NVLs in the 20s	0.008			
	(0.007)			
Trained NVLs in the 30s		0.000		
		(0.004)		
Trained NVLs in the 40s			-0.001	
			(0.005)	
Trained NVLs in the 50s and over				-0.003
				(0.012)
Panel 5: Effects of Trained Leaders by their Ages in the 1992 Election				
Trained NVLs in the 20s	0.009			
	(0.006)			
Trained NVLs in the 30s		0.008^{+}		
		(0.004)		
Trained NVLs in the 40s			0.004	
			(0.005)	
Trained NVLs in the 50s and over				0.008
				(0.010)
Panel 6: Effects of Trained Leaders by their Ages in the 1996 Election				
Trained NVLs in the 20s	0.012			
	(0.008)			
Trained NVLs in the 30s		0.000		
		(0.005)		
Trained NVLs in the 40s			0.003	
			(0.005)	
Trained NVLs in the 50s and over				-0.006
				(0.011)

Notes. Trained NVLs refers to the accumulated NVL trainees from 1973 to 1979 by their age brackets, proportional to total voters as of 1973. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and all Columns include the county fixed effects. $+$ $p < 0.1$, $*$ $p < 0.05$, $**$ $p < 0.01$, $***$ $p < 0.001$.

Table A.1.9: Endogeneity Test

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Trained NVLs Share in		
	1972	1974	1979
Incumbent party vote share in 1971	0.111		
	(0.110)		
Incumbent party vote share in 1973		0.037	
		(0.160)	
Incumbent party vote share in 1978			0.347
			(0.207)
Area in 1970	-0.896**	-0.849	-0.629
	(0.293)	(0.489)	(0.366)
County capital	0.008	-0.021	-0.111
	(0.026)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Share of female population in 1970	-0.783	-2.979	-4.351
	(1.286)	(2.367)	(3.267)
Share of age 15+ population in 1970	-1.709	1.458	7.969**
	(1.104)	(2.186)	(2.546)
Share of age 55+ population in 1970	3.964***	6.886***	0.360
	(1.159)	(1.954)	(3.770)
Population change in 1966 - 1970	-0.041	0.060	-0.099
	(0.038)	(0.070)	(0.083)
Share of household with cultivator in 1970	2.276	-4.174	-2.577
	(1.618)	(2.812)	(2.461)
Share of full-time farming households in 1970	0.083	0.294*	-0.106
	(0.063)	(0.120)	(0.125)
Change in agricultural population	0.027	0.114	-0.158
(log, 1960 - 1970)	(0.095)	(0.182)	(0.198)
Share of female population in 1975			2.434
			(2.503)
Share of age 15+ population in 1975			0.923
			(1.996)
Population change in 1970 - 1975			0.066
			(0.172)
Share of age 55+ population in 1975			-2.189
			(6.109)
Constant	1.423	0.338	-4.791*
	(1.017)	(1.853)	(2.168)
Observations	1356	1355	1324
Adjusted R^2	0.047	0.117	0.252

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and all Columns include the county fixed effects. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure A.1.1: Geographic Distribution of Three Types of NVL Trainees