The Journal of Politics and International Affairs

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Editors in Chief

Ruth Elendu   Joey Miller

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to present the Spring 2022 edition of the Journal of Politics and International Affairs at The Ohio State University. This issue of the Journal features two papers from three excellent young scholars. These papers were chosen out of many of excellent submissions from around the world. We are confident in their quality and in their contribution to the academic literature of international relations, public policy, political theory, economics, and American politics.

Our Journal, revived in 2011 by a group of Ohio State undergraduate students, has continued to flourish thanks to the efforts of our editorial staff and officers. This Journal is the result of hundreds of hours of work by members of JPIA, and we are exceptionally proud for the deduction and passion they have shown during the publication process. We are also grateful and proud of those who have submitted their work to the Journal, as each of these students is contributing meaningfully to their respective fields.

This Journal, like all those before it, would not be possible without the help and support of the Department of Political Science. We would like to especially thank Dr. Jennifer Mitzen, JPIA's faculty advisor. Dr. Mitzen's experience, advice, and wisdom were invaluable. We would also like to thank Ms. Shay Valley, without whom this physical copy you're reading would not exist. In addition, we'd like to thank the faculty and staff of the Department for their support of JPIA and of all undergraduate researchers.

Finally, we'd like to thank you, the reader, for you interest in our Journal. We hope that its contents will introduce you to new perspectives and profound ideas; we hope that you find interest in these pages and that our work is meaningful to the development of a broader community of rigorous undergraduate research in the social sciences.

Ruth Elendu & Joey Miller

Editors in Chief

What Factors Contribute to Unskilled Americans' Opinion on Immigration and Trade?

Michael Dianetti and Ava Durant

Recent scholarship on public opinion about trade and immigration reject traditional labor market theory, and do not consider skilled or unskilled labor to be significant demographic variables. Rather, the literature emphasizes economic ignorance and ethnocentrism as key determinants of public opinion on these two issues. In this paper, we create a new model for skilled and unskilled labor that includes both income and education level. We test each of these variables against questions that target a respondent's level of support for international trade or immigration and find that there is a significant relationship between skilled and unskilled labor and positive or negative opinions on trade and immigration. We conclude that this is predominantly a result of education level, which accounts for skilled labor's formation of opinions that are more economically informed and less ethnocentric.

Introduction

In July 2015, Donald Trump said the following of Mexican immigrants: "They're taking our jobs. They're taking our manufacturing jobs. They're taking our money. They're killing us" (Kohn, 2016). Even before running for president, Trump and other conservatives advanced the idea that immigration leads to increased unemployment among native-born unskilled American laborers. In 2015, a Rasmussen poll found that 51 percent of respondents believed undocumented immigrants were taking jobs away from U.S. workers.[1] Similarly, Trump has been very critical about the U.S. international trade deficit, specifically the export deficit with China. Those who view the trade deficit as negative believe that when the U.S. imports more goods than it is exporting, this adversely impacts American workers. However, international trade theory has demonstrated that both free trade and immigration have positive effects on economies internationally and have similar economic benefits on the distribution of labor. In fact, immigrants to the U.S. often fall into different unskilled sectors of labor than native-born unskilled workers, with immigrants often working in the service sector and native-born

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[1] Rasmussen is a conservative leaning pollster.

Americans working in manufacturing. Likewise, trade deficits are neither good nor bad for a country. Cheaper international goods can benefit consumers through lower prices, reducing the welfare loss that may have occurred from any changes in the distribution of labor in the domestic economy.

Many Trump supporters that share negative opinions on international trade can be classified as unskilled labor. In the 2016 election, Trump dominated more rural, less populous areas of the country characterized by factories and manufacturing (Porter, 2016). This demographic often earns lower wages and has a high school education or less. While this demographic of Trump supporters tends to share Trump's negative opinions on immigration and trade, they have little theoretical basis for their claims. We would like to examine what factors influence these opinions most.

We're interested in expanding upon this understanding by creating a new combined measure for unskilled labor, defining it by level of education and income. This leads us to our research question: which variable, or combination of variables, best correlates with current public opinions on trade and immigration? We're also interested in examining the factors behind any major differences in opinions on trade and immigration. In general, U.S. opinions on immigration have become more positive over the last decade (Pew, 2018), so it will be interesting to see if this trend is universal across demographic groups. We will explore the literature's rejection of labor market theory as an explanatory variable for public opinion on trade and immigration, acknowledge and critique alternative explanations, and detail what we hope to contribute. We'll tackle this research question by performing a series of regressions on different variables that make up what it means to be "unskilled" labor and public opinion on immigration and trade. We conclude with our analysis and results which find a highly statistically significant relationship between being an unskilled worker and harboring negative opinions on both trade and immigration.

Literature Review

In this literature review, we will review the content and conclusions of the literature on public opinion on trade and immigration. First, we will examine the rejection of conventional labor market theory on each issue through the work of Rho and Tomz, Espenada and Calhoun, and Citrin et al. Then we

will explore alternative explanations for unskilled labor's opinion on each issue by adding in the work of Owen and Johnston, and Mutz. Thirdly, we will summarize the collective results, agreements, and disagreements among the literature. We will add our own critiques and offer our proposed solution to fill the gap in the literature.

Traditional Labor Market Theory and H-O on Trade

The Heckscher-Ohlin model is a foundational principle of International Economics that arose after WW2. The theorem utilizes the 2x2x2 model to demonstrate how two countries, producing two commodities, with two different factors (resource endowments) trade with each other. Each country will produce the commodity for which their factor endowment is necessary. For example, a 2x2x2 model could consist of Country A and Country B, Grain and Computer Software, and low-skilled labor and high-skilled labor. If Country A is abundant in high-skilled labor, it will develop and export Computer Software and it will not export grain. Country B, if abundant in low-skilled labor, would then grow and export grain while importing computer software from Country A. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem explains that under this model, the low-skilled labor in country A will "lose" meaning that they will receive lower real wages because of international Trade, while the high-skilled labor will "win" meaning that they will receive higher real wages Likewise, the high-skilled labor in Country B will "lose" while the low-skilled labor "wins" Economists, however, assume that because of the net benefits of comparative advantages, the winners will compensate the losers. Finally, the Rybczynski Theorem reveals that immigration can change the endowments of countries and have a similar effect as international trade to the abundant or scarce factors in terms of real wages.

The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem demonstrates that trade and immigration have similar positive externalities in the global economy, and both benefit the abundant factor while posing drawbacks to the scarce factor. Therefore, because economists operate under the assumption that individuals are rational and formulate opinions based on their own economic interest, traditional labor market theory predicts that the abundant factor would always have a positive opinion towards trade and immigration, while the scarce factor would always have a negative opinion towards trade and immigration. To the economist, trade and immigration are essentially the same in terms of public opinion.

In the United States, a skilled labor abundant country, the scarce factor is unskilled labor. Therefore, traditional labor market theory would make two predictions. First, skilled labor would a positive opinion both trade and immigration, while unskilled labor would have a negative opinion to both trade and immigration. Second, the degree to which skilled labor has a positive opinion on the economic tools would not differ dramatically, while the degree to which unskilled labor has a negative opinion on the economic tools would also not differ dramatically.

The literature on public opinion on trade and immigration is in consensus that neither of these assumptions hold true. Moreover, scholars reject the labor market hypothesis and offer several alternative frameworks for examining public opinion on trade and public opinion on immigration. In step with their rejection of the labor market hypotheses, few of the frameworks examine both trade and immigration through the same theoretical lens.

Rejection of Traditional Theory

Rho and Tomz re-frame the discourse on international political economy by arguing that American's trade preferences do not reflect economic self-interest. Their study explores economic ignorance as an explanation for this phenomenon. They find that the relationship between self-interest and opinion on trade becomes stronger when more information is provided (Rho and Tomz 2017). Rho and Tomz effectively undermine one of the key assumptions of traditional market theory, which eliminates actual economic impact in the form of real wage change as a determinant for public opinion.

Espenhade and Calhoun test the predominant hypothesis about public opinion on immigration using one data set.[2] They do not find support for a labor market competition hypothesis. Rather, they find cultural identity, education level, and political relation to be better correlated to opposition or support for undocumented immigration. Espensade and Calhoun do not account for the possibility that education level is involved in skills versus unskilled labor classifications, and thus they are not able to empirically reject labor market theory. Their work does leave room for economic motivations as they find evidence of respondents conducting individual cost-benefit analysis to formulate their opinions (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). Moreover, their

2   This data set is limited to Southern California

restriction of their study to a Southern California based data set poses issues in the empirical rejection of labor market theory as other determinant, such as cultural identity, may be more influential in this region of the country compared to the country.

Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong restrict the role of economic motivations to "beliefs about the state of the national economy, anxiety over taxes, and generalized feelings about Hispanics and Asians." (Citrin et al. 1997). They find many Americans' opinions are xenophobic as they view Hispanics and Asians as threats to their livelihoods and ability to work. This is a strong contribution to the literature as it narrows our view of how economic conditions influence public opinion on immigration. Their work misses a critical linkage between "generalized feelings about Hispanics and Asians" and different labor groups opinions of trade and immigration. In other words, while Citrin et al. find that opinions on immigration are linked to race, they fail to account that this linkage could be a result of different labor groups responses to real wage decreases as predicted by labor market theory.

Alternative Explanations

Owen and Johnston re-frame the discussion of public opinion on trade in yet another way. Rather than relying on the traditional measurements of skill, they explore the effects of occupations on public opinion on trade. They develop a task-based theory of the consequences of trade, predicting that individuals in routine-task-intensive occupations will be more opposed to trade because their jobs are more easily outsourced (Owen and Johnston 2017). Owen and Johnston develop two independent variables, routines and offshore-ability, and construct them by creating a categorical index. In this, they differ from Mutz, and Rho and Tomz, as they assume individuals form their opinions based on economic self-interest (Owen and Johnston 2017).

In an analysis of the 2016 Presidential election, Mutz identifies status-threat, rather than economic hardship, as the strongest motivator for Trump voters. She rejects the "left behind" thesis and argues that the election was centered around high-status groups' opposition to certain issues, including trade (Mutz 2018). She identifies opposition to immigration as a result of it status threat, but notes that public opinion towards immigration may be improving (Mutz 2018). While her analysis pertains more to domestic politics and was

conducted along party lines, it is important to consider when examining skilled and unskilled labor's opinions on trade and immigration.

Summary, Judgments, and Contribution

The literature agrees that traditional labor market theory, and purely economic explanations for public opinion on immigration and trade are not applicable as they assume a public understanding and prioritization of these economic principles. However, in its critique the literature has three predominant gaps. First, it does not offer strong, testable variables that explain unskilled labor's opinion on trade and immigration. Second, in its vehement rejection of labor market theory as an explanation for public opinion on trade and immigration, it overzealously divorces the two issues. Third, the literature fails to consider that its alternative sociological explanations for public opinion on trade and immigration may be influenced by an underlying lurking variable: traditional labor market theory.

Owen and Johnson propose the most viable alternative explanation for labor market theory, with their creation of a task-based theory of trade. However, their theory is difficult to apply when analyzing polling data sets, as routiness and task-orientedness of occupations are not readily available demographic variables. Rho and Tomz exploration of economic ignorance can be linked to a lack of education, which will be considered as a characteristic of unskilled labor in our methodology section. Moreover, lower levels of education can be linked to greater ethnocentrism, acknowledging the points made by Espeneda and Calhoun.

We must bring the field of study back to two variables that we do have access to: income and education. We aim to contribute to the field by connecting newer trends in public opinion to traditional labor market theory, which has recently been cast aside in much of the existing literature. A large segment of Trump's voting base can be classified as unskilled by their lower incomes and lower levels of education. The alternative theories of opinion on immigration and trade, which include cultural factors, occupation, and status, can be encompassed into these two variables. Our methodology will help us expand upon the existing literature by creating an indexed variable for unskilled labor and examining how different income, education, and a combination of the two contribute to increasingly negative opinions on trade and immigration

within the Trump-supporting demographic.

Methodology

Description and Measurement

In this section we will identify the datasets and survey questions we plan to use, define our variables and explain the methodology we will use in our data analysis. In our study we used questions from both the 2018 and 2019 Chicago Council Surveys (CCS). CCS is an excellent nationally representative survey that measures public opinion on salient foreign policy issues. To create a population sample, the GfK (Growth from Knowledge) Group, which conducted the 2018 survey on behalf of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, sampled households from its KnowledgePanel. This is a probability-based web panel which is designed to be representative of the United States (Chicago Council, 2018). Ipsos Public Affairs used the same method to conduct the 2019 survey on behalf of the Chicago Council. In order to be eligible for the survey, respondents were required to be non-institutionalized, age 18 or over, and a United States resident. Using data from the years 2018 and 2019 allow us to gain insight into how public opinion on these topics may have changed over time with the onset of the Trump presidency from when the prior literature was written. The 2018 survey has several excellent questions regarding the effects of international trade in the U.S., while the 2019 survey includes questions measuring attitudes towards immigration. The CCS data also provides us with comprehensive information on respondent income, education, race, gender, and ideology, which will be critical when identifying our regressors, or our independent variables.

Dependent Variables

We used the following questions from the 2018 CCS to measure support for international trade.

1. Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for the U.S. Economy?
2. Do you think US trade policy should have restrictions on imported foreign goods to protect American jobs, or have no restrictions to enable American consumers to have the most choices and the lowest prices?

For the first question, a respondent's answer was coded on a two point

scale. We created a dummy variable to measure if a respondent views international trade as good or bad for the economy, assigning the response "Bad" with a value of zero, while the response "Good" with a value of one. We can therefore expect positive regression coefficients on these questions to be associated with more positive opinions on the effect trade. For the second question, measuring attitudes toward trade policy, the response "U.S. trade policy should have restrictions on imported foreign goods to protect American jobs" was assigned a value of zero, while the response "U.S. trade policy should have no restrictions to enable American consumers to have the most choices and lowest prices" was assigned a value of one. Thus, we can expect positive regression coefficients on this question to be associated with less protectionist opinions on trade policy.

We used the following questions from the 2019 CCS to measure support for immigration.

1. Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all.

    a. Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the U.S.

2. Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?

For both of these questions, the survey coded a respondent's answer on a three-point scale. In order to process the data in a more succinct manner, we created two dummy variables. For the first question, which measures attitudes towards threats to U.S. interests, the answers "critical threat" and "important but not a critical threat" were assigned a value of zero, and the answer "not an important threat" was assigned a value of one. In the second question regarding attitudes towards level of legal immigration, the answer "decreased" was assigned a value of zero, and the answers "kept at present level" and "increased" were assigned a value of one. Thus, for both of these questions positive coefficients would be related to positive opinions on the threat of and level of immigration.

Independent Variables and Multivariate Regression Design

Using ordinary least squares regression software we performed multiple

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions on each question, or dependent variable, of interest. We used OLS regression as the large sample size of the survey provides for a normal distribution in public opinion. Moreover, we included robust standard errors to account for heteroskedacticity. By running these regressions, we aimed to determine the most accurate and unbiased factors that influence opinions on trade and immigration, and if the two topics share similar determinants. Most notably, we are interested in how income, education, and being categorized as an unskilled or skilled worker impact these attitudes.

In each regression we included variables to control for gender, race and ideology. Excluding these independent variables would likely result in omitted variable bias, which would impact the accuracy and degree of bias in our coefficients of interest.3 Ideology is coded on a typical seven-point basis, with those who identify as extremely liberal being assigned a value of 1 and those who identify as extremely conservative being assigned a value of seven. Thus, a negative coefficient on ideology would signal a relationship where the more conservative a person is, the more negative their opinions are. In our regression analysis for the trade questions we also included a control for being in a union. This variable was only measured in the 2018 CCS, therefore we were limited to which models we could include it in. Measurement of union membership is predicted to be not only an important control for omitted variable bias, but also to examine on its own as an independent variable. If a respondent was a member of a union, they were assigned with a value of one, and those who were not in a union were assigned a value of two. Thus, a positive coefficient would signal a relationship where those who are not in a union are more likely to hold a positive opinion on the question.

For each question, we created three regression models that included the above controls. The first model included education and income as independent variables, the second model included our variable for being a skilled worker, and our third model included a variable for being unskilled. Tables 1 and 2 run these three models on our two questions regarding international trade, and Tables 3 and 4 run these three models on the questions regarding immigration. We did not include education, income, and being skilled or unskilled in the same regression due to multicollinearity, which would impact

our standard errors and reduce the precision of our t-statistics and p-values. Being an unskilled worker and being a skilled member of the workforce are defined differently to examine the different correlation that each has with our dependent variables. We define being skilled with a value of one when a respondent has a college degree or higher. Unskilled is defined with a value of one when a respondent has a high school diploma or less and their income is less than $49,999. Including race, or more specifically whiteness, in our aggregated variables may better measure the degree to which someone may have been a Trump supporter, or affected by Trump's rhetoric on trade and immigration. However, we chose not to do this as we are aiming to examine how purely economic and labor market indicators impact trade and immigration. We hypothesize that opinions on international trade and immigration will be similarly and significantly impacted by a respondent's skill level.

Correlation and Results

In this section we will report the results of our regressions and our hypothesis tests. Which regressors are statistically significantly different from zero?

International Trade

According to the 2018 Chicago Council Survey Field Report, 83.1 percent of respondents view international trade as good for the U.S. economy, while 15.5 percent respondents view international trade as bad for the U.S. economy. Moreover, 61.2 percent of respondents believe U.S. trade policy should have restrictions on imported foreign goods to protect American jobs, while only 36.5 percent of respondents support U.S. trade policy having no restrictions "to enable American consumers to have the most choices and the lowest prices," (Chicago Council, 2018). Figures that represent these findings graphically can be found in the Appendix. These statistics portray an American public that is conflicted over how they view international trade. On the one hand, the public appears to widely support international trade when the topic is framed with regards to the U.S. economy. On the other hand, a majority of the American public supports increasing restrictions on imports to protect American jobs. Our regression analysis will provide more insight into the factors behind these conflicting views by highlighting which factors determine American's opinions on international trade.

In our first model, household income was statistically significantly related to more positive opinions on how international trade impacts the U.S. economy. An increase in household income is related to being more likely to respond to international trade as having a good impact on the economy as a whole. Interestingly, household income is not a statistically significant predictor of opinions on restrictions, or lack thereof, of imports. This stands somewhat in line with Rho and Tomz and Espenhade and Calhoun, who generally conclude that economic factors and by extension household income have little to no impact on opinions of international trade. Education was found to be quite statistically significant on both trade questions, meaning those with higher levels of education are more likely to respond to international trade as having a good impact on the U.S. economy, and being more likely to advocate for less restrictions on imported foreign goods. This finding is supported by the literature.

In our second and third models, we found that being a skilled or an unskilled worker were both significant determinants of answers to both questions. Being skilled, meaning a respondent had a college degree or higher, is associated with being more likely to respond to international trade as having a good impact on the economy, and being more likely to support reduced restrictions on imports. Being unskilled, meaning having an income below $49,999 and a high school diploma or less, is associated with being more likely to respond to international trade as having a bad impact on the economy, and being more likely to support increasing restrictions on imports.

Gender and race were generally not significant determinants on trade opinions, except in our first model on the first question, where we found that race was a statistically significant regression with only 90 percent confidence. Although this appears to be an interesting result, race is likely not a key factor in determining international trade opinions, as its significance only existed in one model for one question. In all three models, our control variables for being in a union and ideology were both significant. These findings held across both questions on international trade. Not being in a union was associated with being more likely to respond that international trade has a good impact on the U.S. economy and being more likely to support decreasing restrictions on

foreign imported goods. Notably, this indicates that union membership is linked to more negative opinions on international trade. Moreover, being ideologically conservative was associated with more negative opinions on the topic of international trade in general. These findings demonstrate why controlling for these variables was important because unskilled workers may be more likely to be conservative or in a union.

Table 1: Is International Trade Good or Bad for the U.S. Economy?

Variables	Model 1 (1)	Model 2 (2)	Model 3 (3)
Household Income	0.00633*** (0.00203)		
Educational (Categorical)	0.0454*** (0.00949)		
Are you or your spouse a member of a labor union?	0.0716*** (0.0223)	0.0695*** (0.0227)	0.0764*** (0.0226)
Race/Ethnicity	0.0122* (0.00682)	0.0101 (0.00676)	0.00941 (0.00680)
Gender	-0.00349 (0.0165)	-0.00829 (0.0165)	-0.00730 (0.0165)
Ideology	-0.0101** (0.00498)	-0.0102** (0.00501)	-0.0110** (0.00503)
Skilled		0.106*** (0.0160)	
Unskilled			-0.130*** (0.0254)
Constant	0.508*** (0.0667)	0.707*** (0.0563)	0.752*** (0.0553)
Observations	2,046	2,046	2,046
R-Squared	0.036	0.027	0.026

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 2: Should the U.S. Have Restrictions on Imported Goods (No = 1)

Variables	Model 1 (1)	Model 2 (2)	Model 3 (3)
Household Income	0.00170 (0.00210)		
Educational (Categorical)	0.0408*** (0.00974)		
Are you or your spouse a member of a labor union?	0.0376** (0.0191)	0.0365* (0.0190)	0.0413** (0.0192)
Race/Ethnicity	0.0109 (0.00781)	0.00956 (0.00780)	0.00843 (0.00779)
Gender	-0.0213 (0.0170)	-0.0221 (0.0170)	-0.0234 (0.0170)
Ideology	-0.0344*** (0.00522)	-0.0348*** (0.00521)	-0.0356*** (0.00525)
Skilled		0.0901*** (0.0193)	
Unskilled			-0.0732*** (0.0203)
Constant	0.127** (0.0598)	0.248*** (0.0495)	0.287*** (0.0498)
Observations	2,046	2,046	2,046
R-Squared	0.039	0.038	0.032

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Immigration

According to the 2019 Chicago Council Survey Field Report, 44.6 percent of survey respondents view large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the U.S. as a critical threat, 35.5 percent view this group as an important but not critical threat, and only 19.7 percent of respondents view immigrants and refugees as not an important threat at all. Additionally, 43.2 percent of respondents want to keep the level of legal immigration to the United States at its current level, 25.8 percent advocate for increasing the level of immigration, and 30.2 percent of respondents want to decrease the level of

legal immigration to the U.S. (Chicago Council, 2019).[3] Given the split nature of this data, regression analysis will again provide us with some clarity behind the characteristics of the groups that hold these opinions.

On the topic of immigration, our first model found household income to be an insignificant determinant of public opinion on both questions. As was the case with trade opinions, this finding should be in line with much of the scholarly consensus that income does not influence opinions on immigration. Predictably, education was found to be a statistically significant determinant of immigration opinions in both questions with over 99 percent confidence. Those with higher levels of education are more likely to view immigration as a non-important threat and support increasing or keeping levels of immigration the same, holding other factors constant.

Again, as was the case with opinions on international trade, our second and third models found that a respondent being skilled or unskilled is strongly and statistically significantly related to opinions on immigration. Moreover, opinions on immigration trend in the same direction as opinions on trade based on skill level. Being skilled is linked to being more likely to consider immigration as a not important threat and being more likely to support increasing or keeping the current level of immigration the same, holding other factors constant. Despite national public opinion on immigration improving over time, being unskilled is associated with being more likely to consider immigration a critical or important threat, and it is also associated with support for decreasing the level of immigration to the U.S. This is the most important finding of this paper, as it suggests that unskilled laborers may be forming their opinions from the perceived impact of trade and immigration on their industry, despite trade and immigration providing similar social welfare benefits to the U.S. economy.

Regarding our control variables, we found that gender and race were again generally not statistically significant factors in determining opinions on immigration. Gender was not found to be statistically significant on any questions in any model, and race was only significant with 90 percent confidence for the first model on the question regarding the level of immigration to the U.S. We can likely conclude that race is not a key factor in determining immigration opinions, as its significance only existed in one model

3   Figures that represent these findings graphically can be found in the Appendix.

for one question. Finally, in all three models we found that our control variable for ideology was statistically significant. Being more conservative is associated with considering immigration to be a critical or important threat to the interests of the U.S. and supporting a decrease of the level of immigration to the U.S. Although general public opinion on immigration is trending positively, Republicans and ideological conservatives have consistently held comparably negative attitudes on the subject.

Table 3: Do You Consider Immigration a Critical, Important, or Not Important Threat?

Variables	Model 1 (1)	Model 2 (2)	Model 3 (3)
Household Income	0.00184 (0.00201)		
Educational (Categorical)	0.0480*** (0.00926)		
Gender	-0.0116 (0.0163)	-0.0140 (0.0163)	-0.0169 (0.0163)
Race/Ethnicity	0.00555 (0.00743)	0.00319 (0.00743)	0.00129 (0.00745)
Ideology	-0.0878*** (0.00551)	-0.0885*** (0.00557)	-0.0909*** (0.00558)
Skilled		0.0910*** (0.0182)	
Unskilled			-0.0599*** (0.0209)
Constant	0.393*** (0.0537)	0.540** (0.0423)	0.598*** (0.0410)
Observations	2,059	2,059	2,059
R-Squared	0.158	0.154	0.146

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Should the Level of Immigration Be Increased, Decreased, or Kept the Same?

Variables	Model 1 (1)	Model 2 (2)	Model 3 (3)
Household Income	-0.00118 (0.00236) 0.0790***		
Educational (Categorical)	(0.0115)		
Gender	0.0165 (0.0193)	0.0146 (0.0193)	0.0121 (0.0194)
Race/Ethnicity	0.0148* (0.00803)	0.0111 (0.00806)	0.00929 (0.00809)
Ideology	-0.0756*** (0.00582)	-0.0776*** (0.00586)	-0.0805*** (0.00581)
Skilled		0.112*** (0.0197)	
Unskilled			-0.0923*** (0.0280)
Constant	0.737*** (0.0615)	0.935*** (0.0430)	1.007*** (0.0401)
Observations	2,059	2,059	2,059
R-Squared	0.111	0.100	0.093

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1

Summary, Conclusions, and Implications

Trade and immigration both became highly salient issues during the four years of the Trump Administration and will no doubt continue to be relevant as the Biden Administration repeals Trump-era policies and implements its own. Therefore, it is imperative for politicians, policy-makers, and academics to have a well-developed understanding of the variables that influence public opinion on trade and immigration.

Recent literature on public opinion relating to trade and immigration rejects labor market theory and emphasizes the role of racism, nativism, and ethnocentrism as determining factors. Moreover, it assumes that the American public is generally ignorant of economics and misguidedly self-interested.

Our analysis demonstrates that this rejection is presumptive and that public opinion on both trade and immigration is still highly correlated with skill level, as determined by income and education. America's abundance of high-skilled labor is a result of a generally strong education system that produces a high number of college-educated or professionally trained individuals. Per our methodology section, income can be an identifier of skill level but only when education is also considered. Given our findings, we conclude that the presumptive rejection of traditional labor market theory is caused by critics' failure to consider education level as an element of labor market theory.

Espendande and Calhoun cite education as an important variable that influences public opinion on immigration, while they explicitly reject labor market theory. Rho and Tomz, as well as Citrin et al, presume American ignorance and constrain economic motivations to a few key concerns, respectively. Reconsidering education and economic awareness as a characteristic of skilled labor, rather than assuming general ignorance across groups, allows us to conclude that high-skilled laborers may be more economically aware than previously thought.

Much of the literature emphasizes the role of race and ethnocentrism in influencing public opinion on trade and immigration. Controlling for race did not diminish the significance of skill level on public opinion, nor did it prove to be a significant variable itself. However, as we included education in our model of labor market theory, we can also predict that high-skilled labor is less likely than unskilled labor to possess ethnocentric and nativist based opinions on trade and immigration. Thus, unskilled labor votes against their economic self-interest because of economic ignorance and ethnocentrism, while skilled labor votes in their self-interest because of economic awareness.

We do not reject the literature's inclusion of race and ethnocentrism or its assumptions of economic ignorance; however, we insist that a new understanding of labor market theory that includes education as a key determinant of skill level be accepted as an explanation for public opinion on trade and immigration. Going forward, more research is needed to examine the degree to which education level is correlated to an understanding of economics and the relationship between education and ethnocentrism. We predict that these correlations will be significant and support our findings in this paper.

Additionally, the unskilled and skilled categorizations are externally valid and have value in that they can be applied to any state to analyze their domestic public opinion on trade and immigration based on labor category. The specific metrics involved in creating the unskilled and skilled variables would need to be adjusted to account for different average incomes and potentially different education levels depending on the makeup of the case state's economy. It is possible that these categorizations could only be applicable in countries with plenty of capital and high-skilled labor compared to low-skilled labor, or they may offer marginal scientific value if the majority of the population is low-skilled. However, that is a point for further research.

Appendix

Survey Data

Survey by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Conducted by GfK Group. Interview Date(s): 07/12/2018 - 07/31/2018
Survey by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Conducted by Ipsos Public Affairs. Interview Date(s): 06/07/2019 - 06/20/2019

Additional Figures

Below we have graphed the percentage of respondents for each answer to our four questions of interest. Interpretations of these findings are discussed at length in the paper.

IS INTERNATIONAL TRADE GOOD OR BAD FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY?

Bad 16%
Good 84%

SHOULD THE LEVEL OF IMMIGRATION BE KEPT AT ITS CURRENT LEVEL, INCREASED, OR DECREASED?

■ Kept at current level ■ Increased ■ Decreased

30%
44%
26%

SHOULD U.S. TRADE POLICY HAVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTED GOODS?

No restrictions 37%
Restrict imports 63%

ARE IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES A CRITICAL, IMPORTANT, OR NOT IMPORTANT THREAT?

■ Critical threat ■ Important threat ■ Not an important threat

20%
45%
35%

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How Will China Deal with Taiwan?

A Classical Realist Prospective

Jing Zhong

China and Taiwan have been arguing about sole sovereignty over China since the Nationalists lost the civil war and fled to Taiwan. And the current geopolitical situation is deteriorating the cross-strait relationship. The root issue of the continuously worsening situation can be traced back to the beginning of Tsai Ing-wen's presidency in Taiwan when she refused to support the "1992 consensus." Since then the implicit denial of the "one China principle" has been her main tune. China's current diplomatic policies further have deteriorated the situation by overreacting to other countries' voices. This significantly undermines the cross-strait relationship. This paper selects classical realism as the guiding principle. It starts by opening the "black box" of domestic politics in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) respectively. Then the paper turns to a grander study of the balance of powers dynamic in the region. All these factors indicate that conflict—and even a full-scale war—is significantly likely. However, the paper ends by providing some suggestions for both sides to work for stability.

There has been continuous debate about the cross-strait relationship. Between the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) in the mainland and the nationalist Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, the debate is about who owns the sole legitimate governance over the "one China." While the PRC and the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hold the "one China" principle, public opinion within Taiwan has moved against it. With the establishment and surprising popularity of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan, the debate shifts to whether there is one China, two Chinas, or one China and one Taiwan. Beside the historical issue, the global rise of the PRC and the influence of the US in the Asia-Pacific arena make the Taiwan issue closely related to the superpower relationship between PRC and the US. Other crucial stakeholders like Japan, the ASEAN countries, and even American allies in Europe are paying close attention to the issue.[1]

There are four possible outcomes for the Taiwan issue: independence, keeping the status quo, unification by peaceful measures, and unification by force. This article will use classical realism as the guiding theory to indicate why

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[1]   This article uses China, PRC, and mainland China to represent the People's Republic of China. It uses Taiwan and ROC to represent the Republic of China.

unification by force is the most probable one. The beginning two parts analyze the domestic political environments in the PRC and the ROC, respectively, to show how domestic politics are moving away from a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue. Then, in the third part, by switching the focus from domestic to international level, the article adopts balance of power theory to elaborate further how efforts at keeping a balance may counter-productively provoke the war. Lastly, it concludes with several practical policy options for PRC.

Domestic Politics in PRC

The most noteworthy characteristic of the PRC's domestic politics is hubris among leadership and the population. For the former, president Xi Jinping's hubris is demonstrated by the National People's Congress removal of term limits for Xi's presidency. Such action is unprecedented in the PRC's history since Deng Xiaoping, one of the most outstanding leaders in PRC, put a two-consecutive-term limit to China's presidency to prevent the "chaos and tumult that can sometimes happen when you have a single authoritarian leader, as China had with Mao Zedong," Elizabeth Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations told NPR (Doubek, 2018, p1). The unvarnished denial of previous rules reveals Xi's vaulting ambition to build himself as a historically great leader. After the effective anti-corruption campaigns and continuous economic development of recent years, Xi felt invincible, as evidenced by his decision to include "the addition of a political philosophy called Xi Jinping Thought to the constitution" (Doubek, 2018, p1).

Moreover, hubristic over-reach expands to the common population. The CCP adopted nationalism for the legitimacy of its governance after observing the possible instability of economic development, which was once the primary legitimizing tool. Policies compel the school curriculum to include patriotic content such as sayings from Xi. Influenced by this overwhelming nationalism, the population tends to show a pro-war attitude when hearing disputes between China and other countries or regions, especially Taiwan, Japan, and the US— the three significant forces aligned against China in the Taiwan issue (Qi, 2021, p1). People are also too proud of their country's recent achievements in economy and military to rationally realize that a war is still detrimental for the PRC. Oriana Mastro, a China expert at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, studies and elaborates

Chinese military and security policy and coercive diplomacy in his article The Taiwan Temptation. According to him, a survey done by the state-run Global Times indicates that more than 70% of mainlanders strongly support unification by force (Mastro, 2021, p1). Additionally, the leading group and the population reinforce each other's hubristic feelings, triggering a worrisome spiral. Intentional or not, the state cultivates hubris in the population. In turn, witnessing the fever is likely to fuel hubris among policymakers backward and misjudgments on critical issues, especially when there is an unintended accident (clarify this bit).

In addition, domestic politics defines what "state security" is. Or, in a broader sense, it defines what a country's primary goal is. For the PRC decades ago, the main goal was to develop the economy, guided by Deng's famous saying, "hide your strength and bide your time." The hubris brought by the PRC's strengthening power pivoted it from this principle to be more assertive, especially during Xi's presidency. For the PRC, the most current trend is to prioritize the solution of the Taiwan issue. At an event marking the 110th anniversary of the revolution that overthrew China's last imperial dynasty in 1911, Xi stated unification of Taiwan is destined for the Chinese people by saying, "the historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled and will definitely be fulfilled" (BBC, 2021, p1). Xi also claimed that the Taiwan issue is closely related to the PRC's integrity and should not be "passed on from generation to generation" (Reuters, 2013, p1). Much of the public also regards unification as an end to the humiliation in the 20th century and closely connected to China's honor.

The presence of hubris decreases the possibility of defining "state security" defensively because the sense of being invincible will cause overreach. The state's concentration of power decreases the likelihood of defining "state security" rationally because the lack of different voices prevents the policymaker from considering all the elements. These two factors mutually contribute a formidable possibility that President Xi will decide unification is related to "state security." Then as an irrational individual blinded by the hubris of himself and the cultivated population, he is likely to make risky decisions that trigger the war, and no other domestic forces can stop him.

Domestic Politics in ROC

Changes in Taiwan's domestic politics also contribute to a possible war ahead. Entering the 21st century, the Taiwanese indicate an utterly opposite attitude towards the issue compared with their counterparts in the mainland. From Election Study Center surveys, the NCCU shows the percentage of pro-unification people, including "unification as soon as possible" and "maintain status quo, move towards unification," decreased from 20% in 1994 to 7.1% in 2021 (Hambach, 2017, p1305). This gives the DPP, a pro-independence party, a significant voters' base. Firstly, it is related to a somewhat constructivist view that most voters now are indigenous Taiwanese born and educated in Taiwan instead of those who fled to Taiwan right after losing the civil war. But this trend is further amplified and used by the DPP to serve its own political goals and these moves are dangerous at the international, particularly cross-strait, level.

An earlier striking instance happened during Chen Shui-bian's presidency, which strongly supported constitutional reform. The reform included a possible name change from the Republic of China to the Republic of Taiwan. With other specific terms, PRC regarded this as a formal declaration for independence. The response was a massive military buildup including missiles, naval and air power. The current Tsai administration attempts similar things to comply with the DPP's founding principle of pro-independence. But after facing pressure from the mainland, DPP switched to a more subtle measure by distancing Taiwan from mainland China. A typical case is the cancellation of cooperation between National Tsinghua University in Taiwan (NTHU) with Tsinghua University in Beijing after being accused of pro-communism. According to the news report, a group of alumni from NTHU together with Tsinghua University rented an office in NTHU for joint research and possible networking events. But the Tsai administration ordered the National Security Bureau (NSB) to investigate and shut down the office because there were potential breaches of The Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (Hioe, 2021, p1).

The DPP has been distancing itself from the PRC and communism through other similar domestic policies and acts (Bush, 2019, p1). Nevertheless, just as CCP uses nationalism for legitimacy, it appears the DPP is trying to motivate the population and gain support through McCarthyism in Taiwan. With this background, policymakers in Taiwan can naturally define "state security" purely as anti-communist or even anti-PRC. The first possible impact is that the PRC will have less tolerance for Taiwan's moves because it can sense the targeted hostility and the insistent pro-independence attitude. It leaves less room for negotiation when there is friction across the strait. Another implication is the possible alliance with other countries. President Tsai calls for collective action by claiming, "when authoritarian regimes demonstrate expansionist tendencies, democratic countries should come together to stand against them" (Ripley, Cheung, and Westcott, 2021, p1). By portraying communist China as authoritarian, evil, but powerful, she emphasizes Taiwan as a democratic but weak victim. As the US and its allies have been championing themselves as fighters for democracy, Tsai hopes this statement can win Taiwan a better moral and strategic position for defense. However, these two impacts are more likely to trigger China's proactive policies against the possible formation of an alliance, which may start with a conflict and then evolve into a destructive war.

Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific

Closely related to the possible impacts at the end of each section above, this part will explain international-level reasons towards war. This part explores a broader picture of the Asia-Pacific region that involves other stakeholders, namely the US and its allies. A justification for this switched focus has two main reasons. The first is the reality of insurmountable power differences between Taiwan and China in that Taiwan alone is not capable of balancing China. A more strategic reason is a general power dynamic, especially the geopolitical tensions between the US and China. Therefore, expanding our focus to the Asia-Pacific region is more reasonable, and the two sides of balance will be China versus Taiwan, the US, and its allies.

Though many articles from newspaper and academic magazines like the Guardian and the Foreign Policy claim that the US should not risk a war with China on the Taiwan issue, and though classical realism mentions secondary powers can be sacrificed if it serves the interests of maintaining balance, classical realism also implies no state is allowed to achieve a preponderance of power and become of hegemonic power. Therefore, there are still two reasons why the US will strive to balance China on Taiwan. The first one is relatively

symbolic. Abandoning Taiwan implies the weakness of the US, which in turn will invoke questions about the US's hegemony. This is especially dangerous when China is arguably bidding for hegemony. Former allies, especially those in Southeast Asia who have less power to resist China, may reconsider the US's commitment and consider joining the China bandwagon. Given China's hubristic overreach in domestic politics, Chinese leaders may misjudge the US's move as an appeasement policy and become more determined in bidding for hegemony, which, as classical realism insists, is dangerous. Secondly, in Asia, many status quo powers like Japan and the US regard the rise of China as a bid for regional or even global hegemony, which is unacceptable for these existing powers in more practical terms when considering interests. Therefore, they will naturally form alliances to contain China from gaining too much influence. A recent instance is the collective defense alliance among Australia, the UK, and the US (also known as AUKUS), which includes the trade of nuclear submarines, a highly controversial and sensitive weapon previously owned only by a limited number of countries (Nobuyuki , 2021, p1). Though never admitted by any of the three countries, it is widely considered a measure to counter China's increasing navy power. The US officially terminated the mutual defense treaty with ROC in 1979, and the arms sales are facing domestic controversy and pressure from PRC. In other words, the US cannot directly defend Taiwan by sending troops there. Therefore, forming new alliances like AUKUS and strengthening existing ones is a relatively indirect but still effective alternative for the US and its allies to balance China's power on the Taiwan issue by including Taiwan in their defensive sphere. From a military geography perspective, abandoning Taiwan directly means giving up the First Island chain for the general containment strategy that the US has been cultivating for years. The break of the chain opens the gate for China into the South China Sea, East China Sea, and even the Pacific Ocean. The first two areas are where China has territorial disputes with neighboring countries, and the Pacific Ocean has been the US's sphere of influence for decades. Given these two reasons, Taiwan is so crucial for the US that the US may not even allow Taiwan to surrender.

China has also been trying to balance the US and its allies' influence and alleviate the containment. However, simply balancing the power will not gratify China anymore in the future. Despite the fulfillment of a historical mission for PRC, winning Taiwan signals a successful start bidding for the hegemony. And practical benefits also include access for further projection of power to a larger region. Besides, given the hubristic overreach in China's domestic politics, this equilibrium seems upset and therefore China may seek a more profitable scenario, arguably unification, that causes disequilibrium, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of conflicts.

Policy Suggestions

Though ROC is also an important stakeholder in this issue, its policy is significantly guided and constrained by the US. In other words, it is not possible to discuss ROC's policy options without considering US policy on the Taiwan issue. But given the strategic tension between China and the US, it would take another paper to discuss the US's policy towards China. Therefore, this section will focus on policy options for PRC. While realists view war as a norm, and this article claims that unification by force is the most possible outcome, it is not the only option. Therefore, there are still two directions for policy options. The first set aims at preparing for the war, and the second one is designed to foster stability in the region.

Prepare for War

Unlike many other articles that argue time is on China's side, this article claims the opposite. If unification is as crucial as Chinese leaders regard, the first policy for China is to strike as soon as possible. Domestically, China's advantages lie in its stable and continuous domestic politics. Changing the presidency in democratic countries often brings policy inconsistency and turbulence in the transferring period. And this inconsistency may decrease efficiency when making policies responding to possible wars. In contrast, China should make the best use of Xi's concentration of power, the stability of the regime, and the current heated nationalism to motivate the country to fight the war. Though the Chinese government has tighter control on culture, many more demands for democratic reform have been heard in recent years. Therefore, the future of the domestic political environment is hard to predict.

At the international level, it is also more reasonable. Forming alliances and coordinating military tactics is time-consuming. But once it is established, China alone is not likely to counter the force. China has the geographical

proximity and familiarity of the region. Striking as soon as possible gives little time and room for the US and its allies to project its military timely and react in coordination. A related policy can be forming a stronger alliance with Russia to check the possible involvement of European powers. But this is a risky move to trigger another world war, which should be carefully considered and negotiated between China and Russia.

Work for Stability

The discussion balance of power almost excludes the possibility of peaceful unification, but keeping a stable status quo is still possible. Maintaining the status quo also reserves China a lot more options in the future. Among three suggestions, China should firstly start with scrutinizing its domestic hubris, especially the hyper-nationalism among the population. As indicated in the first section, this is a dangerous trend in deciding whether, when, and how to strike. Realizing the possible blinding effects can prevent PRC from making irrational decisions. The second suggestion is to circumvent Taiwan and keep the direct dialogue with the US because Taiwan's policy is so attached to the US's attitude on the Taiwan issue. Leverages in other areas like trade can be used to negotiate the Taiwan issue. The objective is to soften the US's support for Taiwan (not to say abandon Taiwan). Finally, China should use democratic and military activities to indicate its resoluteness on the Taiwan issue. It is crucial to indicate that while China can accept a status quo, it also has the willingness to escalate. The aim is to present a credible threat to deter any moves that may break the stability and change the balance against China.

Conclusion

This article mainly adopts classical realism to discuss the possible outcome for cross-strait. It starts with domestic level analysis. Domestic factors in both the PRC and the ROC can misguide the policy-making process. For the PRC, these elements are the concentration of power to an individual leader, Xi Jinping, and the hubris among the leadership and population. For the ROC, the main concern is the DPP using anti-communism and anti-China for legitimacy, which serves the party's interests at the expense of the cross-strait relationship. The section further elaborates that these moves may infuriate the PRC and trigger a more proactive attitude. Then the article switches to an international-level analysis by focusing on the balance of power dynamic in the

broader region, Asia-Pacific. It explains the practical and symbolic reasons why both sides (the US and its allies versus China) are unwilling to compromise on the Taiwan issue. It further claims the balance of power that each side wants to reach is not possible, given the hubris in China's domestic politics. And the disequilibrium will eventually lead to full-scale war. Then, in the final section, the article uses the "wish for the best but prepare for the worst" idea to offer some policy suggestions to China. The worst situation, also the most likely one, is a full-scale war. And China should be prepared for that and strike as soon as possible given the domestic and international advantages. On the other hand, the best situation, still possible, is to keep a stable status quo. And a key point for China's policy is to present not only willingness to obey the order but also a credible threat for deterrence.

In conclusion, by focusing on classical realism's domestic and international level, this article considers unification by force as the most possible outcome for the Taiwan issue. But while China needs to prepare for that, all stakeholders should still make efforts to keep the stability of a continued status quo outcome and avoid disastrous war.

About the Author

Jing Zhong is a junior student at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University. He majors in international affairs with a concentration in international economics. His research interests include international relations of East Asia. He appreciates Professor Olsen for his insights and helps.

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