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Contents

Editor in Chief

Ruth Elendu

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to present the Spring 2021 edition of the Journal of Politics and International Affairs at The Ohio State University. This issue of the Journal features three papers from three excellent young scholars. These papers were chosen out of many of excellent submissions from around the world. We are confident in their quality and in their contribution to the academic literature of international relations, public policy, political theory, economics, and American politics.

Our Journal, revived in 2011 by a group of Ohio State undergraduate students, has continued to flourish thanks to the efforts of our editorial staff and officers. This Journal is the result of hundreds of hours of work by members of JPIA, and we are exceptionally proud of the deduction and passion they have shown during the publication process. We are also grateful and proud of those who have submitted their work to the Journal, as each of these students is contributing meaningfully to their respective fields.

This Journal, like all those before it, would not be possible without the help and support of the Department of Political Science. We would like to especially thank Dr. Jennifer Mitzen, JPIA's faculty advisor. Dr. Mitzen's experience, advice, and wisdom were invaluable. We would also like to thank Shay Valley, without whom this physical copy you're reading would not exist. In addition, we'd like to thank the faculty and staff of the Department for their support of JPIA and of all undergraduate researchers.

Finally, we'd like to thank you, the reader, for you interest in our Journal. We hope that its contents will introduce you to new perspectives and profound ideas; we hope that you find interest in these pages and that our work is meaningful to the development of a broader community of rigorous undergraduate research in the social sciences.

Ruth Elendu

Editor in Chief

All views and opinions expressed the respective authors in the following papers are their own and do not reflect those of the Journal of Politics and International Affairs or the Ohio State University.

Surviving a Batterer

An Ideal Policy Approach to Combating Intimate Partner Violence (IPV)

Samantha Molisee

Gender violence has plagued developed and developing societies for centuries, embedded in culture, structures, and ways of life. Women have been seen as pieces of property with no autonomy or individualism, just as extensions of their husbands. My research centers around finding an ideal policy solution to diminish rates of intimate partner violence (IPV) in the case of California. Interviews and data collection with legislators concerning education, rehabilitation, or batterer intervention programs (BIP), and care providers in emergency shelters regarding victims' services provided insight on a three-pronged approach targeted at curbing rates of IPV in California. My findings yielded that, although these variables are present in California, there must be an allocation of more resources and funding in order for ideal policy to be effective in California and across the nation.

Introduction

Gender violence occurs at alarming rates worldwide, with preventative measures available, yet not adequately implemented. Gender violence is embedded in societal structures, cultures, and ways of life especially in countries with a culture of machismo. Since antiquity, and currently in some countries, women were (are) merely seen as pieces of property and as extensions of their husbands. These beliefs did not grant women rights to property, equality, and individual autonomy. Individual, communal, and societal actions can all greatly contribute to gender violence. Countries that have the highest reported rates of spousal abuse include India, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Sierra Leone[1]; however, gender violence does not discriminate based on country, ethnicity, race, gender, or marital status. It is not exclusive to anyone. Panda and Agarwal even connect women's property ownership to higher levels of marital violence in India. Their case study revealed marital violence is especially high due to the reflection of non-existent women's rights and low autonomy, as many people still believe women

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1   Geraldine Terry, Gender-based Violence (Cowley: Oxfam GB, 2007), xiii.

merely should be extensions of their husbands.[2] Moreover, some countries in the Middle East and Africa have yet to criminalize marital rape. Dr. Gunilla Krantz, from the Nordic School of Public Health, surveyed communities around the globe and found that "24 countries on four continents revealed that between 20% and 50% of women interviewed reported that they had suffered physical violence from their male partner."[3] Gender violence is a tragic, global occurrence. Citizens, policymakers, physicians, and key actors alike should concern themselves with solutions to gender violence.

In this thesis, I ask: what is the ideal public policy for the reduction of intimate partner violence (IPV)? Before proceeding, I establish the definitions of gender violence and intimate partner violence. The first article of UN Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993) defines gender violence or violence against women to include but not be limited to, the following:

Physical, sexual, and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence, and violence related to exploitation.[4]

Intimate partner violence (IPV) is physical violence, sexual violence, stalking, or psychological harm by a current or former partner or spouse that does not require sexual intimacy.[5]

This thesis's objective is to identify the key features of policies aimed at reducing/eliminating intimate partner violence, to analyze to what extent a political system can be effective in developing said policies, and to gauge what variables lead to ideal policies. I use California as a case to develop my model of ideal policy and the hypothesized variables that lead to legislative effectiveness. The ideal policies I identify are education, rehabilitation, and victims' services. The hypothesized variables that lead to the effective implementation of these policies include women's representation in legislatures and/or individuals as

key actors in developing policies; women-friendly states which facilitate an inclusive, convenient, and safe place where women can grow, prosper, and participate effectively in developing their city; and the presence of women's movements acting on issues of gender violence. The thesis uses the method of hypothesis-generating case studies, which means "starting out with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses and attempting to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a large number of cases."[6] That is, I explore hypotheses connecting variables related to ideal policies in the state of California in an attempt to understand what hypotheses should be tested in other states across the United States.

Working with the State Board of Education in Nevada my senior year of high school, I got the opportunity to see the impact I can have on children and educators when I bring forward issues that matter to me. Among these issues were domestic violence and sexual assault on college campuses. These issues resonate with me not only as a woman, but as a product of a household characterized by domestic violence. My father, an alcoholic and substance abuser, repeatedly verbally and physically abused my mother. The abuse was not just one-sided, as my mother consistently retaliated. Into my adolescence, witnessing healthy relationships around me allowed me to escape a vicious cycle of abuse. I know that policy had little to no effect on my familial relations, and for that reason I seek normative conclusions about ideal policies. This is an example of my reflexivity[7] as a researcher, giving me critical insight, perspective into my own biases, and transparency about my results. I seek to be an ally to sexual assault survivors, and, if my activism and research can change the life of at least one young man or woman who find themselves in the same situation I did, it will all have been worth it.

The case of California herein demonstrates that education, batterers' intervention programs, and victims' services are essential in reducing rates of IPV. Critical actors, California as a women-friendly state, and women's movements played a crucial role in helping pass legislation concerning education, implementing BIP programs, and creating community resources for victims' services. However, we are still lacking in allocating the proper

2   Pradeep Panda and Bina Agarwal, "Marital Violence, Human Development and Women's Property Status in India," *World Development* 33, no. 5 (2005), 847.
3   Gunilla Krantz, "Violence Against Women: A Global Public Health Issue!," (2002): 242
4   Kanchan Mathur, *Countering Gender Violence: Initiatives Towards Collective Action in Rajasthan* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2004), 23.
5   "Intimate Partner Violence, Violence Prevention, Injury Center," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, last modified October 23, 2018, https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/index.html.
6   Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): 682.
7   Esha Patnaik, "Reflexivity: Situating the Researcher in Qualitative Research," *Humanities and Social Science Studies* 2, no. 2 (2013): 98.

resources to the key aspects of ideal policy. We can see from interviews and data in the research that there is more to be done in terms of community resources and funding that are essential to making my ideal policy model effective. I have found that there are both personal and societal consequences to IPV. Government solutions have not been efficient in curbing or diminishing rates of IPV. Therefore, we must look to local-level solutions in state governments to find ideal policy reform in coalition with women's movements, activists, and critical actors to lobby for the resources needed. My case study alters the current models to include these resources.

Literature Review

The review of scholarly literature will be as follows: personal consequences of IPV for women, societal consequences of IPV, current government solutions, local-level solutions, preventative measures, and responsive measures.

It is important to recognize the personal consequences that IPV victims face. The apparent effects of IPV include physical and emotional repercussions. In a study done by Campbell and Lewandowski, they identified that women who face IPV have suffered from sexually transmitted diseases, broken bones, facial trauma, vaginal bleeding, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder -- the list goes on.[8] IPV is a violation of bodily integrity/autonomy. However, personal consequences are not limited to physical and emotional abuse but can have serious repercussions on a woman's economic security as well. Panda and Agarwal, in studying India, established a link between marital violence and employment status. Women who are unemployed, have no property, and have no other financial means face a difficult decision when leaving their abusive partners:

> Security provided by property is relatively certain, unlike employment, which is subject to the vagaries of the labor market. A house or land also visibly signals the strength of a woman's fallback position and her tangible exit option abuse. Should she face violence, owning (or otherwise having access to) a house or land can give a woman an immediate escape option. A house would be especially important in this respect since it can provide a ready roof over the head.[9]

Studies done in Southern India[10] and Northern India[11] yielded the same findings. Without access to employment or property, women can become vulnerable to spousal abuse and have no feasible escape options. These patterns of abuse can also generate cyclical abuse for children in households where IPV is present and learned. Researcher Lois Weithorn identifies the negative effects of domestic violence exposure on children. Weithorn finds children growing up in a household of domestic abuse are as much at risk from violence itself as they are from adopting unhealthy habits from witnessing the violence. Although several states in the US have implemented interventions such as child protective services and judicial intervention like restraining orders, the results are weak, as they are not targeting the core of preventing abuse.[12] Furthermore, children exposed to intimate partner violence at a young age experience emotional distress that impedes developmental growth such as hitting important age-related milestones. Children influenced by IPV are more likely to abuse substances, have juvenile pregnancy, and exhibit criminal behavior and suicidal tendencies.[13] Personal consequences then translate into familial consequences, eventually producing societal consequences.

Societal consequences are extensive, from negative beliefs systems to gender equality, and should prompt change from policymakers. Social structures and political institutions can be at risk from the consequences of IPV. Gender violence is deeply embedded in most societies with high levels of traditional machismo, which translates into the way societies function. Sally Engle Merry, professor at New York University, highlights gender violence in relation to traditional culture by explaining the deeply embedded machismo in systems of kinship, religion, warfare, nationalism and notes that there must be major social and structural change to eradicate the violence.[14] The inherent divide in gender relations and cultural aggression towards women have clear societal repercussions that flow into political and social spheres. Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer study the effect of gender violence in global political offices.

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8   Jacquelyn C. Campbell and Linda A. Lewandowski, "Mental and Physical Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence on Women and Children," *Psychiatric Clinics of North America* 20, no. 2 (1997): 353-354.
9   Panda and Agarwal, "Marital Violence, Human Development and Women's Property Status in India," 825.

10   Suneeta Krishnan, "Gender, Caste, and Economic Inequalities and Marital Violence in Rural South India," *Health Care for Women International* 26, no. 1 (2005): 97.
11   Manasi Bhattacharyya, Arjun S. Bedi, and Amrita Chhachhi, "Marital Violence and Women's Employment and Property Status: Evidence from North Indian Villages," *World Development* 39, no. 9 (2011): 1687.
12   Lois A. Weithorn, "Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes," *Hastings LJ* 53 (2001): 1.
13   Vincent J. Felitti, "The Relationship of Adult Health Status to Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction," *American Journal of Preventive Medicine* 14 (1998): 245-248.
14   Sally Engle Merry, *Gender Violence: A Cultural Perspective* (Chicester: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2008): 17.

Scholarly literature paints women as cooperative and men as conflictual, hence why this pair of scholars focused on the relationships between domestic gender equality/violence to predict the way a head of state will react in an international crisis. The pair analyzed female heads of state all over Europe, finding that those who came to power in a male-dominated political sphere with inherently unequal domestic gender relations felt the need to be more aggressive in crisis situations in order to prove themselves in male-dominated fields.[15] This equality disparity can cause a harmful ripple effect for societies in terms of not only interpersonal relations among men and women but also international conflict situations.

A macro-level analysis of the international community translates back into a micro-level analysis of public violence in the US. A study done by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy concluded that of 308,423 observations, those individuals convicted of domestic violence were more likely than other offenders to commit another violent felony and had a higher level of recidivism.[16] Intimate partner violence is not just a problem for the criminal justice system. It affects public health, policy, and social reform. Alafair Burke did a study on an alternative reconceptualization of domestic violence. Burke argues for separate criminal repercussions for IPV offenders because motivation and recidivism is completely different from any other violent crime: "Outside the realm of criminal law, social scientists almost universally describe domestic violence as an ongoing pattern of conduct motivated by the batterer's desire for power and control over the victim.'"[17] Failing to realize we need reform when it comes to handling IPV and hoping for solutions from individual governments can be detrimental to not only current victims, future victims, and children, but the communities surrounding them plagued with foreseeable consequences. This failure reflects in both international communities and systems in the United States. Celeste Montoya, a professor in women's studies, highlights that government measures like anti-violence legislation and policing systems used to protect women from violence are ineffective. Although anti-violence legislation in countries like Mexico, South Africa, Italy, and several others have passed

into legislation, women are still facing brutal murder, rape, sexual assault, and kidnapping at alarming rates. There are transnational movements and widespread information readily available, but the problem remains the same. [18]We can pass as many laws as we would like that criminalize gender violence. However, the legislation would be ineffective without preventive measures that teach individuals to recognize signs of abuse. Scholars in the field of gender studies provide local-level solutions from public health options to prevention techniques done by the community and education through appropriate venues.

Local-level solutions such as intervention, education, and raising communal awareness have shown to be key in combating high levels of IPV. After looking at all local-level solutions, I have established two categories of responses: preventative measures and responsive measures. Preventive measures include education and media campaigns, whereas responsive measures are women's shelters, rehabilitation, and victims' services. Among these two categories, scholars identify what leads to the ideal outcome of reduced intimate partner violence, the avenues we can take to get there, and the key actors involved. My understanding of an ideal response includes one preventive measure of education and two responsive measures of rehabilitation services for perpetrators and victim services.

Media campaigns and women's movements stand at the core of an alternative approach to combating IPV. Media campaigns all across the globe have proven to be an effective way of breaking the silence surrounding violence against women. Geraldine Terry describes the innovative ways women's organizations have used to shine a light on the issue like that of global rallies and media campaigns. Today, we see annual rallies dedicated to speaking out for survivors. The Take Back the Night campaign is a global awareness movement targeted at creating awareness surrounding sexual assault and domestic violence. Established in 2001 and in partnership with women's movements all over the globe, the Take Back the Night Foundation holds events in 36 countries each year, educating and creating a community surrounding issues of IPV.[19] Rallies like these happen frequently in all different cities, states, and countries, giving survivors a platform to be heard and to help

15   Mary Caprioli and Mark A. Boyer, "Gender, Violence, and International Crisis," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 4 (2001): 503-18.
16   Robert P. Barnoski and Elizabeth K. Drake, "Washington's Offender Accountability Act: Department of Corrections' Static Risk Instrument," *Washington State Institute for Public Policy*, (2007): 4.
17   Alafair S. Burke, "Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization," *Geo. Wash. L. Rev.* 75 (2006): 552.

18   Celeste Montoya, *From Global to Grassroots: the European Union, Transnational Advocacy, and Combating Violence Against Women* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015): 1.
19   "What Is Take Back the Night," Take Back the Night, accessed March 20, 2020, https://takebackthenight.org/about-us/.

others understand how to target it. However, it is not just women who speak out against violence anymore. Organizations like the Gender Advocacy Project focus on all genders speaking out against IPV and targeting men to become advocates on non-violence.[20]

Specifically, the best avenue in targeting reduction of IPV is through preventative measures, eliminating violence at its roots. In examining California, Weinbaum et al. identified policy recommendations for domestic violence prevention programs. They concluded that the best way to prevent IPV is to identify venues that can model healthy and unhealthy relationships, such as childcare settings, schools, parenting classes, social service, healthcare settings, and agencies offering public assistance. For instance, examples from these venues include monitoring its negative effects on young children, modeling appropriate relationship behavior, highlighting skills for resolving conflict, and the availability of community resources are some of the initiatives we can focus on outside of policy. Studies show that modeling healthy behaviors and education on intimate partner violence is the best way for intervention at the core.[21]

From the literature on preventative measures, education is found to be the most effective model for prevention when creating an ideal policy response. Moira Carmody, a gender studies researcher, analyzes preventing sexual violence through education as an alternative to policy and legislation approaches for reducing domestic violence. Schools in Australia implemented a program in sex education teaching a healthy relationship curriculum and saw dramatic results, including reduced rates of IPV. However, the limitation is that children still want access to more knowledge on the subject that cannot be provided solely through health education courses. This includes access to on-site trained counselors and effective partnership with social services workers. Proper education needs to be provided to our children to demonstrate how education can display an alternative to violence elimination legislation. Education can be an additional option for how legislatures can address IPV. Jane Ellis reviews different prevention measures in her book, Preventing Violence against Women and Girls through Education: Dilemmas and Challenges, that can be looked

at in combination with education approaches. Too often, research and policy focusing on violence against women fall short of a good solution because policymakers are convinced that the answer lies in legislation, though it very well may, as long as policy efforts are legislating mandatory education of IPV in schools. Although we look to prevention as the smart and sensible approach through programs and policy, this cannot be the only means of preventing violence against women. Without formal education on healthy relationships and boundaries in order to prevent violence, there is a large amount of risk that we place on young girls. In addition to ineffective legislation measures, Ellis highlights the deficit between the public health model and what actual, effective education can do, which is essential to my ideal policy solution.[22]

Responsive measures, including women's shelters, rehabilitation, and victims' services, are equally as important as preventative measures if we cannot eliminate the violence. Engle, in focusing on eradicating deeply embedded values concerning violence, discusses how enforcing rehabilitation for batterers and creating shelters for women was much more proactive than pure punishment statutes. While the US originally sought a method of punishing perpetrators and creating reform programs, Engle advocates for a change in policy that steers away from simply punishing the batterer. This includes creating safe spaces like shelters and administering restraining orders. These measures were statistically proven to prevent violence than the latter approaches. Moreover, batterer intervention programs that are targeted at changing masculine beliefs of entitlement and violence were proven effective in Engle's case study in Hilo, Hawaii.[23] Shortly after the success stories in Duluth, Minnesota, states across the country began implementing BIP programs, including California. By re-educating batterers, states provide an alternative to punishment and, instead, rehabilitate batterers to ensure future violence does not occur. This responsive measure is crucial to an ideal policy plan.

Throughout the United States, non-profit organizations help fund shelters for victims of spousal abuse. Most commonly, these shelters provide access to food, resources, employment, counseling, etc. Research shows that a critical reason many battered women do not leave an abusive partnership is due to a

20   Terry, *Gender-based Violence*, 6.
21   Zipora Weinbaum, Terri Lee Stratton, Gilberto Chavez, Carol Motylewski-Link, Nancy Barrera, and Joseph G. Courtney, "Female Victims of Intimate Partner Physical Domestic Violence (IPP-DV)," *American Journal of Preventive Medicine* 21, no. 4 (2001): 313-319.

22   Jane Ellis, "Preventing Violence Against Women and Girls Through Education: Dilemmas and Challenges," *Educational Work with Children and Young People* (2014): 24-28.
23   Engle, *Gender Violence*, 123-126.

lack of access to community resources, much like the resources that shelters provide. A study done on the needs assessment of women after leaving a domestic violence shelter highlights that women require "numerous resources upon their exit from a domestic violence shelter. Sixty-two percent of the women needed legal assistance, and over half needed jobs, further education, transportation, material goods, social support, health care, financial assistance, childcare, and/or resources for their children."[24]

After a review of the literature, I determined the ideal policy solution is a combination of education, rehabilitation, and victims' services, as these factors produced the most effective results in diminishing violence as compared to current implementations of punishment.[25] Scholars propose variables that could influence implementing ideal outcomes: women's representation and the work of critical actors who advocate for ideal solutions, women-friendly states, and presence of women's movements on issues of gender violence. To operationalize these variables, I give definitions for each independent variable that contributes to ideal policy outcomes and analyze how I identify them.

In *State Feminism and Political Representation*, Lovenduski identifies independent variables for the success of women's movement to affect feminist policy in legislatures. These include representation in the legislature, women's liberation movements, and inclusion of women, children, and family interests in policy-making.[26] Lovenduski labels this the RNGS model, which is the model I will use to identify if my ideal policy outcome will be successful. Many scholars argue that a critical mass of women in the legislature is important, which I acknowledge. For clarification purposes, adequate women's representation in the legislature is seen as 30% or more of the legislature being composed of women. Drude Dahlerup, critical mass and critical actor theorist, conducted a study behind the theory of critical mass, the percentage of women in a legislature to make a difference for women's political representation. His

findings established: "… research has shown that it takes a certain minimum representation, … 30%, before the minority, here women, are able to make a substantial difference in politics."[27] States with more than 30% of women legislators (Arizona, Vermont, Washington, and California) had higher success in passing bills pertaining to women, children, and the family. Although scholars debate the exact percentage for effectiveness, their numbers range from 20% to 30%, making Dahlerup's projection an adequate target percentage. Although critical mass is important to effective change, I argue that critical actors also could be crucial to implementing ideal policy. Therefore, I recognize the critical mass in the legislature but will analyze the effectiveness of ideal policy by looking to critical actors.

Dahlerup claims change comes about from "critical acts" which heavily contributes to policy influence. Dahlerup defines critical actors as "legislators who initiate policy proposals on their own and/or embolden others to take steps to promote policies for women, regardless of the numbers of female representatives."[28] Critical actors are individuals who take steps to promote policies for women that do not necessarily need to be women as "men may play a crucial role in advancing women's policy concerns."[29] Therefore, I note herein the significance of a high representation of women in the legislature but will primarily focus on those critical legislators who promote policy for women and influence others to take those steps as well.

I define the women-friendly state as Nora Abada does in her study on women-friendly cities. It is important to recognize that although Abada targets cities, I believe the same criteria can be achieved at the state level as well:

> A women-friendly city facilitates the daily activities of women and makes their lives easier within their built environment. A women-friendly city is important for both working and non-working women. Therefore, the development of new policies and revisions of the policy making process are crucial to meet women's needs and ensure their full participation in the process of built development as a complete citizen, regardless of their age, race, or income…Women-friendly cities are defined as: An inclusion, convenience, and safety place where women can grow, prosper, and

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24   Cris M. Sullivan, Joanna Basta, Cheribeth Tan, and William S. Davidson II, "After the Crisis: A Needs Assessment of Women Leaving a Domestic Violence Shelter," *Violence and Victims* 7, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 273.
25   All of these solutions give us insight into what does work. Although touched upon only briefly, the solutions that do not work, outside of government solutions, are mandatory reporting, current police response/assistance, and a lack of access to community resources. We must get there by straying away from current implemented measures that are ineffective like that of mandatory reporting and policy regarding child protective services/court intervention. Researchers at the psychology department of Michigan State University developed a brief report on the needs assessment of women leaving domestic violence shelters finding that women in abusive situations actively sought assistance from their community including calling police, obtaining restraining orders, and contacting social workers. Although some community resources have a positive effect for women leaving their abuser, many of these arenas fall short in meeting the women's needs.
26   Joni Lovenduski, *State Feminism and Political Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12.

27   Drude Dahlerup, "The Story of the Theory of Critical Mass," *Politics & Gender* 2, no. 4 (2006): 511.
28   Drude Dahlerup, "From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian politics," S*candinavian Political Studies* 11, no. 4 (1988): 278.
29   Dahlerup, "From a Small to a Large Minority," 278.

participate effectively in developing their city.[30]

When the state legislature or government leads in a women-friendly state, I predict the entities will pass policies that are women-friendly. Scholars commonly identify women-friendly policies as ones that will advance women's social, economic, or political equality in combination with policies that deal with issues of women, children, and families. Reingold identifies that prevailing attitudes toward feminism and masculine norms contribute more than the sex-gender difference when it comes to passing women-friendly legislation. In her 1990 analysis of the political atmosphere in California, liberalism reigned true, which aligns with conventional definitions of women's policy interests like that of "anti-discrimination measures, issues of reproductive rights and health, and childcare measures,"[31] making California policies the third-most liberal in the country. This, as Reingold acknowledges provides the most conducive ideological atmosphere for the advocacy of women's issues, which is why ideal policy will be implemented.

As seen in the literature review, women's movements have launched media campaigns and awareness rallies as well as lobbied for change in legislation. I define effective women's movements as movements that can be observed as collective groups lobbying state officials about pro-women's policy and/or meeting with state officials that engage legislators to change policy. Scholarship shows that when organizations lobby the state, even if they are not successful in securing a direct policy outcome, they are known to promote women's goals in the legislative realm and actively contribute to preparing legislation and giving political statements.[32]

Methods

Based on the above-mentioned literature, I propose an ideal model for reducing intimate partner violence that advocates education, rehabilitation, and victim services. I argue that the factors that contribute to these measures are critical actors, the existence of women-friendly states, and active women's movements campaigning on IPV. To evaluate the model, I am conducting a hypothesis-generating case study. The model I review below will be used to

explore the case of California and can later be used to test hypotheses in other cases. In the conclusion, I will present the most viable hypothesis that can be explored for other case studies. The one case of California cannot prove or disprove my model, but I can use it to build theory and hypotheses that can be tested in other cases. Specifically, I explore the following hypotheses in the case of California.

Hypothesis 1: Critical actors present in state legislatures will positively impact the implementation of ideal policy.

Hypothesis 2: Because California can be considered a women-friendly state as seen in Table 1, it is likely to implement ideal policy.

Hypothesis 3: The numerous women's groups in California that lobby and advocate for changes in policy regarding gender and domestic violence will engage policy makers in implementing the ideal policy solution presented.

Table 1 (California as a Women-friendly State)

	Ranking
Overall	5th
Political Empowerment	10th
Reproductive Rights	9th
Employment and Earnings	8th
Health and Safety	9th
Health and Safety	2nd

Source: https://statusofwomendata.org

Case: California, due its prioritization of women's rights and interests, is a suitable case for exploring these hypotheses. It is among the top five most women-friendly states, factoring in political participation, reproductive rights, employment, earnings, and more from statusofwomendata.org, a project of the Institute for Women's Policy Research. Not only has California pushed above the national average for electing women to the state senate, according to Reingold, a researcher in gender studies, women who hold public office are more likely to value abortion rights, child support enforcement, harsher penalties for sexual assault, and violence against women. Women in public

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30   Nora Abada, "Understanding Women-Friendly Cities: Distilling Elements from United Nations Designated Cities," (Graduate Research Paper, Ball State University, 2013), 8.
31   Beth Reingold, *Representing Women: Sex, Gender, and Legislative Behavior in Arizona and California* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 70.
32   Lovenduski, *State Feminism and Political Representation*, 80.

office tend to prioritize issues pertaining to women, children, and families more than that of their male counterparts.[33] California is a leader in progressive policy regarding women's rights and interests. Using Lovenduski's RNGS model, California would be one of the best candidate states to test my ideal model due to the rapid increase in women in the legislature prioritizing women's rights.[34]

I conceptualize my dependent variable as an ideal intimate partner violence response as a three-pronged approach: education, rehabilitation, and services to victims. Whether this ideal model is developed likely depends on the following factors: a high level of women's representation in the legislature or critical actors, the existence of women-friendly cities, and active and effective women's movements working on domestic violence. The operationalization of these variables is included in Table 2.

I rely on one interview with a previous legislator, six interviews with shelter directors as care providers, publicly available data about legislation passed on education, penal codes regarding batterer intervention programs, and victims services across the state of California.

Table 2 (Operationalizing Variables)

Variable	Operationalization of Variable and Available Data
Education	Bills promoting healthy relationships and educating on gender violence, data includes interviews with assembly people
Rehabilitation	Batterers Intervention Programs (BIP)
Victim Services	Fully equipped shelters and community resources, data includes interviews with care providers
Critical Actors	Leadership regarding recent California legislation who make change for women regardless of gender
Women-Friendly State	Inclusion, convenience, and safety place where women can grow, prosper, and participate effectively in developing their city
Women's Movements	Collective groups lobbying state officials about pro-women's policy and/or meeting with state officials that engage legislators to change policy or have raised awareness

33   Reingold, *Representing Women*, 6.
34   Ibid.

Data Collection

In order to collect my findings, I composed different methods of data collection for each group. There was a combination of phone interviews and online data collection. Because I included human subjects in my study, I completed the Pepperdine Institutional Review Board CITI Program for minimal risk research. When studying the effect of education and legislation, I researched California state legislation regarding healthy relationships and preventing IPV in schools. I then chose the top four most recent bills passed in either the California House and Senate and reached out to the authors of the bill. Of the four congresspeople, Paul Fong, Dr. Shirley Weber, Connie Leyva, and Kevin DeLeon, I acquired an interview with only one individual, Paul Fong. Due to the current national circumstances, it was difficult to get in touch with those in the state legislature as they are dealing with extenuating circumstances of COVID-19. I compiled a list of six questions regarding prior experience with IPV, the origins of the bill they authored, and women's organizations involved in the lobbying process (see Appendix A and B).

To study the effect of batterers intervention programs (BIP) in California, I researched California programs and penal codes associated with introductions of BIP programs.

In order to assess victims' services, I determined the best contact was emergency shelters located across California. There are 176 domestic violence organizations, ranging from city to city. I compiled a list of all the cities that have domestic violence services and placed them in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. In order to get substantial feedback on shelter practices on victims' services, I contacted 15 shelters. I used a random number generator (RNG) to choose from all cities in which there was a shelter located. From there, if the city had more than one emergency shelter, I used the RNG to determine which shelter I contacted. After choosing a shelter, I asked to be connected with the shelter director to interview them on their experiences with victim's services as care providers. Although I contacted 15 shelters, I only received interviews with 6 shelter directors. Understanding that the confidentiality of victims is a crucial part of protecting IPV victims, I ensured shelter directors that I would never ask them to disclose any personal information about victims.

Limitations

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I did not get in contact with as many politicians and care providers as I hoped. Answers from their interviews could have provided valuable insight that I may have missed in my personal research. Because of the intricacies of the ideal policy I was looking for, I decided using one case (California) was going to best narrow down my research from a state level. For future research, I hope this model can be used to test cases outside of California on a state, national, and even global level. With a limitation on the length of my research, I did not get to include all audiences facing IPV including women who are currently incarcerated, male victims, and members of the LGBTQ community. These victims are just as important and deserving of justice when it comes to IPV, and I want to ensure they are acknowledged when it comes to finding a solution; however, dominant literature on the subject predominantly represents women with male spouses.

Findings

Education is at the forefront of gender violence prevention reform. The introduction of gender and domestic violence curricula in health education exists in other states besides California. California began discussing intimate partner violence and teen dating abuse in 2012 when Assemblyman Paul Fong from the district 28 introduced AB 1857. In the previous year, Fong attempted to pass AB 1373 with the help of the California Partnership to End Domestic Violence. After convening a conversation among both youth and adults in Oakland, it became clear that there was a need for promoting healthy relationships and providing education in schools on preventing teen dating violence. The bill died in the appropriations committee after members found it too costly despite it being backed by 25 local, state, and national domestic violence advocacy organizations and women's organizations.[35] However, Assemblyman Fong did not stop here. In the next legislative session, Fong introduced AB 1857 promoting healthy relationships and preventing teen dating abuse which passed in the Assembly 7-3. Fong is a long-time civil rights activist and supporter of eliminating domestic violence. In an interview with Fong, he shared his views as a feminist and progressive whose goals are tackling violence against women. His work associate at Evergreen College, Marjorie Clark, who

is head of the women's center on campus, consistently educates Fong on not only domestic violence but also sexual assault on their campus where Fong serves out his new position as the Evergreen Federation of Teachers president. Working closely with organizations like the Democratic Actors for Women Now (DAWN) and the California Partnership to End Domestic Violence (CPEDV), Fong was able to pass AB 1857 to create curricula addressing healthy relationships and teen dating violence prevention.[36] Although Paul Fong is not a woman, he played a critical role in passing legislation to promote the safety of young women. Fong is considered a critical actor for his contributions in passing legislation for education on healthy relationships. Active women's movements in California played a significant role in working closely with Fong to lobby for this legislation.

Paul Fong paved the way to addressing gender violence in education through legislative measures. Policymakers did not stop with AB 1857. In February of 2015, the California State Assembly introduced AB-329 authored by Dr. Shirley Weber, amending the current health education curriculum to highlight LGBT issues, HIV, and healthy relationships. This newly amended bill modified current California sex education instructions by introducing the California Healthy Youth Act. This bill covers knowledge on healthy relationships, intimate partner violence, and consent. There has been an outcry by educators, women's activists, and individuals wanting to see change when it comes to how we arm our children with the knowledge it takes to protect themselves. As the ACLU in Northern California stated:

> It won't come as a surprise to anyone that our society provides confusing, at times contradictory, messages to young people about sex and relationships. The media is saturated with negative stereotypes, and teens trade misinformation about preventing pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections that can end up putting their health at risk.[37]

The chapter amendment labeled the California Healthy Youth Act included in this bill came about because of the insufficient means that children have to protect themselves. The legislation was introduced to the assembly by Dr. Shirley Weber who has been a member of the California State Assembly in

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35   "What Happened to AB 1373 (Fong)?" California Partnership to End Domestic Violence, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.cpedv.org/blog-post/what-happened-ab-137

36   Paul Fong, telephone conversation with author, March 20, 2020.
37   Phyllida Burlingame, "New Bill Will Strengthen Sex Education in California: ACLU of Northern CA," ACLU of Northern California, May 29, 2015, https://www.aclunc.org/blog/new-bill-will-strengthen-sex-education-california.

2012 and is known to prioritize women's and family issues. She previously sat on the board of the Battered Women's Services committee and is known to work closely with women's organizations to pass policy protecting women and family. Dr. Weber is not the only politician acknowledging that education is a crucial part of the solution to IPV. From 2010 to 2014, Senator DeLeon served as the President pro Tempore; he was elected by his colleagues for his innate leadership skills. In October of 2015, DeLeon passed SB 695 that requires a section in health education teaching students about sexual harassment and violence. DeLeon has been a longtime advocate and partner of Planned Parenthood and has fought for women's choice when it comes to family planning, alongside sponsoring bills to prevent sexual assault on college campuses and funding subsidized healthcare. Although DeLeon is not a female legislator, he is a critical actor for advocacy on women's issues. These legislators are who we consider critical actors and partners of women organizations all over California, serving as advocates in presenting education legislation to combat IPV at its roots. (See Table 3)

As discussed in my literature review, Engle explains batterer training programs in Hilo, Hawaii, as a rehabilitation response instead of convictions for batterers. These programs, including the Alternatives to Violence (ATV) program, were created by women's groups through independent grants and eventually, by state funding. The program follows a feminist approach developed by battered women in Duluth, Minnesota, that focuses on exploring men's feelings which encourages them to analyze their own behavior when they feel the need to batter women. Group discussions center around changing beliefs about male entitlement to make authoritative decisions and back them up with violence. Men who were convicted of spousal abuse in Hilo were required to attend these programs that reinforced skills like maximizing relationships with their spouse by creating a foundation of love and respect. In her research, Engle outlines Melanie Shepard's independent evaluation of the Duluth method in which Shepard identifies that from a sample size of 100 men, only 40 percent of the men were labeled as recidivists, which can be interpreted as the other 60 percent successfully completing the program. However, she is cautious to draw that conclusion due to characteristics of the batterer being

more important in predicting recidivism than the form of intervention.[38]

Shortly after being introduced in Duluth in the 1990s, batterer intervention programs following that model became a dominant approach to treating batterers as a rehabilitation approach. Following suit in 1994, California created a section in the California Penal Code (CPC) mandating these batterer intervention programs be implemented. Section 1203.097 of the CPC mandates a 52-week batterer intervention program with weekly two-hour sessions. The program uses a teaching method of small, positive changes in attitudes and beliefs in personal management, anger management, and how their abuse affects others. Independent analysis of the programs shows the success of these programs in California:

> Even after controlling for individual characteristics, two jurisdictions showed statistically significant differences in outcomes for offenders. Using Los Angeles as the base for comparison, offenders in Solano County had a likelihood of re-arrest at 12 months after intake that is one-third the likelihood of offenders in Los Angeles County, while offenders in Santa Clara County were 1.6 times as likely to be arrested as offenders in Los Angeles.[39]

It is worthy to note that these programs have not been removed from California penal code and still stand as the program used post-conviction. Today, there are both state-provided batterer intervention programs and those run by nonprofits like the Daz Foundation in Los Angeles. However, due to an improper allocation of funds, many individuals cannot afford the yearlong program that is paid for out of pocket and instead opt for traditional probation. Therefore, the next step is to provide state funding in order for these programs to prosper.

The third component to a compounded IPV solution is an analysis of victims' services. As discussed in the literature review, a large aspect of safety for IPV victims' centers around emergency shelters. With over 117 domestic violence programs in California providing emergency services, the victims' services prong of my solution should be adequate. However, emergency services are not the only resources IPV victims are in need of. After interviewing several care providers, directors shared that many of the shelters in California are still

38   Ibid.
39   G. MacLeod, Ron Pi, David Smith, and Leah Rose-Goodwin, "Batterer Intervention Systems in California," *California Judicial Council of California/Administrative Office of the Courts*, (2009), ii.

lacking in critical resources. Emergency shelter is typically the first step after leaving a batterer. Stays in an emergency shelter can range anywhere from one night to a year depending on the capacity and availability of beds. All shelter directors made it clear that safety is the number one need of victims seeking emergency services. However, Perla Flores, division director for Community Solutions Non-Profit, explained that Santa Clara County only has 62 beds available, leaving approximately 2,000 unanswered requests annually for victims seeking shelter due to a lack of availability.[40] Under CPC 13823.15, a standard shelter must be equipped with fourteen core services for operating an emergency shelter: 24-hour crisis line, counseling for both individuals and peers, business center, emergency shelter for survivors and their children, emergency food and clothing, emergency response to calls from law enforcement and emergency medical services, transportation, counseling for children, social services advocates, legal assistance, court accompaniment, creation of a community network, and permanent housing assistance. For most shelters, these basic services are all that is covered in their annual funding from federal and state government stipends. This does not include overnight staff, childcare services in shelters, educational support groups, case managers, support staff, and so on. Shelter directors estimate that these much-needed additions could cost another $250,00-$300,000, which the state and federal government will not allocate.

While some shelters are lucky enough to have 30% of their budget from private donors and nonprofits who provide unrestricted funds, other shelters operate on 100% government funding, making it very restrictive on how they can spend their money. There is a significant resource gap. Victims need access to services now more than ever. In 2017, Governor Jerry Brown passed a series of laws including AB 557, authored by Assemblywoman Blanca Rubio, to benefit women, children, and families. The bill was advocated for by the California Partnership to End Domestic Violence: "AB 557 provides additional CalWORKs protections for survivors impacted by poverty as a result of domestic violence and includes immediate temporary housing assistance while a victim's application is in-process, required good cause waivers for children's immunization and school attendance, and information about local support

services."[41] It is efforts like these that will contribute to expanding victims' services. Politicians like Susan Rubio, who extended the statute of limitations on IPV charges, and all legislators who are prioritizing victims' rights and services are at the forefront of the solution alongside care providers. In order to create an ideal policy to fit the needs of victims, we must prioritize allocating funding for emergency services and post-shelter success while creating a communal network to support those exiting shelters and re-entering the workforce.

Conclusion

Based on previous scholarly literature, experts have concluded that local-level solutions include raising awareness through women's movements for access to victims' services, formal education, rehabilitation vs prosecution, and removal of ineffective government measures. In my findings on these ideal policy solutions, I have learned that they are indeed effective in reducing rates of intimate partner violence. Education reform passed by critical legislators has taught students in California about IPV and healthy relationships, equipping them with the tools to prevent future violence and educate others. Rehabilitation programs have proven to rehabilitate batterers through changing beliefs, therefore eliminating violence at its core and reducing recidivism rates. Emergency shelters and communal resources provide victims with services to leave their batters and provide skills to take back their lives. The implementation of these core solutions would not have been possible without critical actors in both the community and the legislature, California as a women-friendly state, and active women's movements participating in lobbying for change. These answers lie in education, rehabilitation, and victims' services. As shown in my findings, there is still much more to be done. We are lacking in access to resources and funding initiatives. In my use of a hypothesis-generating case study from empirical knowledge, I formed another hypothesis in my research which is the available resources and these resources need to be examined. The reason we have not seen ideal policy go further in California is due to this lack of resources, which is our next challenge.

From my hypothesis-generating case study, I propose hypotheses for other states. States with critical actors and critical mass in the legislature,

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40   Perla Flores, telephone conversation with author, March 7, 2020.

41   "CalWORKs Bill Supporting Survivors of Domestic Violence Signed into Law," California Partnership to End Domestic Violence, accessed April 9, 2020, https://www.cpedv.org/press-release/calworks-bill-supporting-survivors-do-mestic-violence-signed-law.

active women's movements lobbying state officials, and women-friendly, progressive political atmospheres lead to ideal policy response on IPV, including education, rehabilitation, and victims' services. This will only be possible if there is a collective agreement to allocate proper funding and resources to both rehabilitation programs and victims' services, which will include communal awareness and resources. Comparatively, the implementation of ideal policy in other states will teach us how to target and reduce levels of IPV, in an effort to eradicate violence at its core with a three-pronged approach or preventative and responsive measures. This policy is implemented once legislators see the effectiveness of policy reform instead of antiquated penal consequences. Once we have tackled how to identify IPV and create ideal policy, we must ask questions like whether we are breaking the vicious cycles of abuse for children who grow up witnessing these events. This is a sociological problem that plagues our current society. An ideal policy will also act to diminish this cyclical abuse in households where IPV is present.

A crucial aspect of discovering whether an ideal policy will work in California is by looking at our situation of federalism in the United States. Progressive measures were initiated in states outside of California like Hawaii and Minnesota. In turn, other states see progression from these models and other states fall in to test them as well. The system of federalism in the US allows for states to try things while other states follow. The same works for this ideal policy model. When we increase our resources and funding for the ideal policy model and see positive outcomes in California, other states will follow, reducing rates of IPV across the nation.

Scholarly literature discusses personal and societal consequences, local-level solutions, and preventative/responsive measures. From my research, we can gauge how a combination of these local-level, preventative, and responsive measures can be used to create ideal policy. Although California has education measures, BIP programs, and victims' service resources in place, we are still lacking in allocating the proper resources to make IPV rates significantly diminish. In order for ideal policy models to be effective in both California and across the globe, local and state governments must take steps to allocate the proper funding and resources.

As I started this research, my goal was to be an advocate for women and children across the globe. In identifying and implementing this solution, the scholarly literature and my findings show that we will save lives and change ideologies when it comes to intimate partner violence. I want to live in a society where women's rights and gender equality are prioritized so that all women have an opportunity to thrive in society and democracy. My hope is now that one day we live in a society where a woman never has to fear she will face violence at the hands of her partner.

TABLES AND APPENDICES

Table 3 (Legislation in Education)

AB 329 October 2015	SB 695 October 2015	AB 1857 November 2012	SB 592 April 2015
Introduced by Shirley Weber (District 79)	Introduced by Kevin DeLeon (District 24)	Introduced by Paul Fong (District 28)	Introduced by Connie Leyva (District 20)
Instruction and materials shall provide pupils with knowledge and skills they need to form healthy relationships that are based on mutual respect and affection, and are free from violence, coercion, and intimidation.	Requires school district completion of a course in health education as a condition of high school graduation to include instruction in sexual harassment and violence, and to consider including a distinct category for grades 9 through 12 on sexual harassment and violence.	Authorizes school districts to provide education programs that promote healthy relationships and prevent teen dating violence (TDV) through curricular, extracurricular, and school climate improvement activities.	Requires school districts to provide educational programs that promote healthy relationships and prevent adolescent relationship abuse to students in grades 6 through 12 and requires school safety plans to include procedures and policies to prevent and respond to adolescent relationship abuse.

Source: http://www.legislature.ca.gov/bill_information.html

Table 4 (Findings)

	Education	Batterer Intervention Programs	Victims' Services
Women representation (percentage and Key Actors)	There were 30.8% of female legislators, the four congresspeople, both men and women, were critical actors essential to passing legislation educating on IPV. Working closely with critical actors in women's movements and feminists allowed for the passage of these bills.	Key actors like those involved in the Duluth BIP programs paved the way for programs across the nation. Those in Minnesota and Hawaii passing legislation to require BIP programs and California legislators introducing them into penal codes allowed for systemic change.	Legislators are advocating for resources and victims' services through policy to provide for victims and victims' needs. Care providers are a key inclusion in creating programs that are essential in transitional and emergency shelters, but they need the funding to do so.
Women's Movements	Working closely with both legislators passing these bills and lobbying for other bills concerning the gender violence curriculum, women's movements played a critical role in advocating for education.	Collective groups lobbying for the implementation of this program as an alternative to punishment in order to eliminate violence at its core and educate others on how it is valuable are essential to ideal policy.	Women's movements are lobbying legislators to provide funding and resources for IPV victims, pushing through the legislative process to pressure policy makers into allocating funding and resources.

Women-Friendly State	As California became a more progressive environment, legislatures were more likely to pass legislation concerning healthy relationships and IPV. As Fong stated, this was not possible in early 2010s because of the political environment, acknowledgment of the #MeToo and #I'mWithHer movements.	Because of the federalist system across the country, change comes from following the lead of other states. Progressive states like Hawaii and Minnesota motivated California, another women-friendly state, to take an alternative approach to rehabilitation vs punishment.	Having those in positions of power and leadership in the state provides legitimacy to access to resources to victims and allows for legislation to be passed on behalf of these victims. This legislation is providing the ability for women to be safe and prosper in their environment.

Additional factors: Following the lead of other states

Appendix A

Interview Questions for Politicians

1. What are the origins of this bill (insert specific bill)?
2. What is your prior experience with policy advocacy concerning gender violence/ domestic violence?
3. Why did you feel it was necessary to add Domestic/gender violence to the new curriculum established by (insert specific bill)?
4. What other women's groups were interested in Gender Violence issues presented in bill and how did they participate in the policy making process?
5. Were there any dissenting arguments made in relation to the Gender Violence portions of the bill? Who made these arguments?
6. Are there any other lobbying efforts on gender violence curriculum in education in California?

Appendix B

Interview Questions for Care Providers

1. What shelter practices best equip women for post shelter success?
2. What shelter practices can be modified to have better outcomes for victims?
3. What is the number one necessity women need when entering shelters?
4. How much funding are you allocated from the government and is there guidelines for how it can be used?
5. What portion of the victim population have had previous interactions/ stays at the shelter?
6. What is a fully equipped shelter in your opinion? How much funding would you need to run a shelter that is fully equipped?
7. Are there any private sources/non-profit organizations that sustain/fund the work of the shelters?

About the Author

Samantha Molisee is a recent graduate of Pepperdine University with a degree in Honors Political Science and Sociology. Samantha's interests include gender relations, women's studies, and local solutions to domestic and gender violence. Samantha would like to that Dr. Candice Ortbals for her guidance and contributions to her research journey.

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Trust in Police and Democracy

An Examination of the Legacy of the Soviet Union on Contemporary Perceptions of Police

Jacob H. Share

This brief study of European nations examines the relationship between the health of a state's democracy and the level of public trust in its police. While a country's political history plays a significant role, this research finds that the strength of democratic and rule of law institutions is more statistically important. This finding is consistent with procedural justice theory because rule of law institutions provide protections against police misconduct. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) provides various measures for the strength of democracy and rule of law in various countries, while the European Social Survey provides data on the public's trust in police. This data was used in regression analyses and found a direct relationship between trust in police and the strength of democratic and rule of law institutions. In particular, greater judicial independence from the executive branch (which includes police and security forces) was shown to have an outsized effect on increasing trust in police. Even when examining a state's history of having been a Soviet republic or satellite, where there was a history of police abuse, the strength of democratic institutions was the statistically significant predictor for trust in police.

Introduction

While Europeans overall tend to have moderate trust in the police, there are considerable discrepancies in this trust across the various regions of the continent. Whereas Western Europe exhibits higher than average trust in the police compared to Europe overall, there is remarkably less trust in Eastern Europe (see Figure 1). The former presence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe provides a likely explanation for this variation in trust in police. Figure 1 provides preliminary evidence for this explanation. The Soviet Union's characteristics as a police state with totalitarian leadership provide ample reason for the decreased trust in police in Eastern Europe. I argue that the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state had a negative and lasting effect on trust in police not only because it used its police to commit atrocities but also because it used the police to undermine the rule of law. I will begin with a brief examination of the history of policing in Russia and the Soviet Union and then will examine how this legacy has shaped current perceptions of police.

Figure 1: Average Trust in the Police Compared Across Regions in Europe

NOTE: 0 = Complete Trust in Police; 0 = No Trust in Police

Policing in the Former Soviet Union

Whereas policing in most of Europe evolved to embrace Enlightenment ideals, policing in Russia and the Soviet Union did not. When French King Louis XIV introduced the first police force on the European continent in 1667, the force's primary purpose was to advance the domestic interests of the monarch.[1] This notion, readily adopted in tsarist Russia when it instituted its own police. Beginning in the late 18th century, France and other parts of Western Europe embraced the Enlightenment concept of civil liberties and the notion that the state ought to embody the will of the people.[2] Even in more authoritarian countries, such as 19th century Germany, the government evolved to ensure that the police followed the rule of law, even if those laws did not align with what the people wanted.[3] When the Bolsheviks took control of Russia in 1917, the police force they installed, known as the Workers' and Peasants' Militia, was beholden neither to the people nor to the rule of law.[4] The Soviet militia was involved in every aspect of life, from those traditionally being considered in the jurisdiction of police, such as criminal investigations, to other miscellaneous functions, such as assisting veterinary organizations in instituting

quarantines.[5] Playing a role in so many aspects of life, the militia was a highly effective instrument for political, social, and economic control. It would stamp out dissent wherever found. The Communist Party had a direct hand in the militia and its leadership, making the police force a highly political institution. While Western Europe adopted the liberal philosophies of the Enlightenment, the Soviet Union rejected these ideas and maintained a police force that remained deeply political and boundless in its jurisdiction.

After the death of Stalin, there had been numerous attempts to liberalize policing practices; however, there was remarkable institutional inertia that could not be overcome. It was not until Gorbachev and his perestroika program that the police started observing the rule of law and began fully depoliticizing. However, towards the end of his rule, the militia stopped democratizing and returned to embrace orthodox communist ideals, eventually taking part in an attempted coup against Gorbachev.[6] In post-Soviet Russia, the quality of policing did not improve. There was widespread corruption and racism as well as violations of human rights, including allegations of torture, unlawful detention, and fabrication of evidence.[7] It is clear that the police practices of the Soviet Union made a mark on the current police practices in Russia and the successor states to the Soviet Union.

The Argument

The legacy of the Soviet Union impacts current perceptions of trust in police. While one explanation is that the societal memory of abusive police practices under the totalitarian regime engenders distrust in police, I contend that there are other cultural and societal factors at play. In other formerly authoritarian states, such as Germany, Spain, and Italy, trust in police has more or less recovered, and these states have higher rates of trust in police than in the former Soviet Union and its satellites. Unlike most of the Soviet successor states, Germany, Spain, and Italy have all developed stronger democratic institutions, a factor that I believe is key in understanding why there is a gap in trust in police.

I argue that there is a connection between confidence in police and the liberal ideas of both rule of law and democracy. First, I argue that the strength

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1   Louise I. Shelley, *Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control* (London: Routledge, 2005), 5.
2   Shelley, *Policing Soviet Society*, 5.
3   Ibid, 8.
4   Ibid, 8.

5   Ibid, 7.
6   Ibid, 58.
7   Adrian Beck and Annette Robertson, "Challenges to Developing Democratic Policing in Post-Soviet Societies: The Russian Experience," *Police Practice and Research* 10, no. 4 (August 2009): 286-290.

of the rule of law in a country has an effect on the perceptions of its police force. The police can play an important role in upholding the rule of law but can also play a role in undermining it. Therefore, countries with greater checks on the police should also exhibit greater trust in the police. Secondly, I will show that people trust law enforcement more when they believe the police share values with the public, a situation which I contend is more likely in a democracy because it ensures that public interest is enshrined in government.

I begin by outlining some of the theory that explains the causal factors driving trust in police. The primary theory I discuss is Tom Tyler's concept of procedural justice, which is closely tied to—and in fact incorporates—his theory of motive-based trust. Tyler's writings demonstrate how particular factors relate to the perceived legitimacy of police and criminal justice institutions, including the courts, prison system, and more. I then analyze the political theory of legitimacy in the context of power to connect Tyler's theories to aspects of liberal democracy. Various texts on Western political thought demonstrate the importance of the aspects of procedural justice and motive-based trust. From these writings, I extrapolate a handful of mechanisms that could connect the level of liberal democracy in a country to confidence in police. These possible connections form several specific hypotheses that I test in the following sections.

To test these hypotheses, I use a cross-national comparison of European countries and their respective levels of trust in police. These results show that there is some connection between liberal democracy and trust in police; however, the relationship is not as robust as I hypothesize. In my analysis, I find that the presence of liberal democracy has an effect on trust in police, and when controlling for this effect, a country's history of having been a former Soviet republic or satellite no longer has an effect on that country's level of confidence in law enforcement.

Theory: Sources of Trust in Police

Procedural Justice Theory and Motive-Based Trust

The core principle of procedural justice theory is that people will view criminal justice institutions with greater legitimacy if they abide by processes deemed just by society. Tyler, one of the chief pioneers of this theory, holds that one's level of trust in law enforcement revolves around whether her

perception is that they are acting fairly.[8] He theorizes that this perception of fairness requires police to be neutral, honest, polite, and respect the rights of citizens.[9] In an empirical study of satisfaction with the Chicago Police, Tyler finds that when people perceive certain characteristics of police behavior they are more likely to believe that law enforcement is upholding a fair process, boosting confidence in police. These characteristics include lacking bias and dishonesty, making an effort to be fair, acting ethically, providing the accused with an opportunity to explain themselves, and issuing quality decisions.[10] In a study on trust in police in Bulgaria and the UK, Jonathan Jackson and colleagues verify Tyler's theory using European public opinion data.[11] In their study, they compare how aspects of perceptions of police effectiveness at responding to crime and beliefs about police corruption affect one's trust in criminal justice institutions. Consistent with procedural justice theory, they find that police corruption, the only aspect tied to the fairness of police actions, is the most statistically significant predictor of trust in criminal justice institutions. The current literature provides robust evidence for the theory that the perception that the police follow a fair set of procedures drives trust in police.

Motive-based trust theory — which is closely intertwined with procedural justice theory — holds that a moral alignment of values between authority figures and the people increases confidence in police. Since people want processes of justice to reflect their own perceptions of fairness, many of the same factors of procedural justice are components of motive-based trust. Tyler finds that the components of procedural justice are relevant determinants of how people perceive authority figures' motives.[12] When law enforcement adheres to justice protocols, individuals believe that the police are acting with bona fide intent.[13] Tyler also finds that perceived social bonds between the police and the public are an additional key factor in motive-based trust theory.[14] When people perceive these social bonds, they tend to believe that the police are

8 Tyler, "Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law," *Crime and Criminal Justice: A Review of Research* 30, no. 1 (2003): 286.
9 Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 5. See also, Tyler, "Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Rule of Law," 298; Tyler, "What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures," *Law & Society Review* 22, no. 1 (1988): 104-105.
10 Tyler, "What Is Procedural Justice?" 121. Tyler defines quality decisions as those in which the police use all of the relevant information to make a decision and make their decision in a transparent manner (112).
11 Jackson et al., "Developing European Indicators of Trust in Justice," *European Journal of Criminology* 8, no. 4 (2011): 278-280.
12 Tyler, "Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Rule of Law," 299.
13 Jackson and Bradford, "Trust and Confidence in Police," 247.
14 Tyler, "Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Rule of Law," 299.

more likely to be motivated by shared interests and values, thereby promoting confidence.[15] When the police are perceived to be acting in the interest of the public, citizens tend to place greater trust in the authorities.

Trust in Democratic Institutions and Its Relationship to Trust in Police

The existing literature in political thought on legitimacy in politics connects to procedural justice and motive-based trust. At the same time, liberal political thought dictates that democratic institutions provide certain benefits that are essential for political legitimacy. Since the literature on political authority links democratic institutions with trust in police, I begin by analyzing the key components of legitimacy theory. David Beetham argues that the exercise of power is legitimate if it meets three criteria:

i) it conforms to established rules

ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate, and

iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation.[16]

In the context of power in law enforcement, Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe classify Beetham's three criteria as legality, shared values, and consent, respectively.[17] I focus on the first two criteria because these have the most direct connection to procedural fairness, motive-based trust, and liberal thought.

The concept of legality is analogous to the ideas of procedural fairness. The central tenet of procedural justice theory holds that the police must act according to a set of unbiased rules in order to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This theory is closely tied to Beetham's idea that the power belonging to an institution is legitimate only if it is "exercised in accordance with an established set of rules."[18] Jean-Marc Coicaud argues that holders of power derive their legitimacy from being "subordinate to the law," and Bottoms and Tankebe note that this concept of legality is closely tied to

the existence of strong rule of law institutions.[19] Steve Herbert discusses how a central component of law enforcement's legitimacy is its subservience to public interests.[20] Police forces seen as following fair procedures and therefore more legitimate are subservient to the public interest and have appropriate checks on their authority.

The shared values component of legitimacy theory bears similarities to motive-based trust. Beetham contends that the legitimate use of power "must be seen to serve a recognizably general interest."[21] Furthermore, he holds that any justification for the use of power should appeal to "some conception of common interest" between an authority and subordinate.[22] These ideas align closely with the idea that police legitimacy is driven by the perception of shared values between law enforcement and the community.

An examination of Western political thought shows how liberal institutions confer legitimacy onto the state, including the police. The concept of rule of law connects the need for established rules in legitimacy theory to liberal institutions of government. Since the origins of Western political thought, philosophers have feared tyranny in government, even if democratically elected.[23] In a key contribution to liberalism, the Framers of the US Constitution in *The Federalist Papers* express their fear of a "gradual concentration of the several powers," resulting in tyranny.[24] To combat this problem, they envisioned a system of checks and balances by which different branches of government prevent each other from gaining excessive power. Liberal countries achieve this outcome with independent legislative and judicial bodies that can investigate the abuses of the executive when it does not follow the appropriate rules and procedures that granted it legitimacy in the first place. This investigative authority is significant for my purposes because the executive branch generally houses the police. Therefore, holding the executive accountable can have the effect of holding the police accountable to high ethical standards. I hypothesize that there will be greater trust in law

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15   Ibid, 294. See also, Jason Sunshine and Tom Tyler, "Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Community, and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a Group's Moral Values," in *Social Psychology Quarterly* 66, no. 2 (June 2003): 154.
16   David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power: Issues in Political Theory,* (New York: Palgrave, 1991), 16.
17   Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe, "Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice," *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 102, no. 1 (2012): 133. Bottoms and Tankebe note that Beetham's three criteria align closely with Jean-Marc Coicaud's conception of legitimacy which requires consent, a network of agreed upon norms in a society, and laws. See Jean-Marc Coicaud, *Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility*, trans. David Ames Curtis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.
18   Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, 16.

19   Coicaud, *Legitimacy and Politics,* 19; Bottoms and Tankebe, "Beyond Procedural Justice," 137.
20   Steve Herbert, "Tangled Up in Blue: Conflicting Paths to Police Legitimacy," *Theoretical Criminology* 10, no. 4 (2006): 496.
21   Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power,* 17.
22   Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power,* 17. See also Bottoms and Tankebe, "Beyond Procedural Justice," 142.
23   For example, see Aristotle, *The Politics of Aristotle*, trans. Peter L. Phillips Simpson (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997): 89 (III.7.1279a22-1279b4).
24   James Madison, "The Federalist No. 51," in *American Governance*, ed. Stephen Schechter, et al. (Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2016), 5:351, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CX3629100761/GPS.

enforcement given sufficiently independent judiciary and legislative branches that are capable of investigating abuses of power by the executive.

Having democratic processes bolsters the legitimacy of government institutions, including those of criminal justice, because they promote shared values between the state and the public. Brian Tamanaha notes that, according to the Enlightenment thinking of John Locke, "legislation should be established by majority vote" given "the consensual nature of civil society."[25] Creating legislation in this manner ensures that it will embody the will of the people. Since the laws made through a democratic process account for the public interest, they are seen as more legitimate according to Beetham's theory. By extension, criminal justice institutions' enforcement of these laws and their prosecution of lawbreakers should be seen with greater legitimacy because the laws encompass the values of the people. Considering the theoretical advantages of a democratic form of government when it comes to promoting legitimacy of laws and government institutions, I hypothesize that a country that provides more democratic opportunities will have greater trust in its criminal justice apparatus. Specifically, this hypothesis can be tested by comparing trust in police against access to the ballot and the openness of elections across various countries.

One additional benefit that I foresee in a liberal democracy regarding trust in police is the ability to voice dissent. Enshrined in a liberal democracy is the freedom of the press, which provides a vehicle for citizens to voice dissent and expose corruption. Having the right to a free press has the possibility to uncover unfair practices in the police and potentially lead to the correction of these practices by creating political pressure.[26] My final hypothesis is that freedom of press will correlate with increased trust in police.

Methodology and Data

This study draws on data from the fifth round of the European Social Survey (ESS) and the 2019 report from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). ESS provides high-quality public opinion datasets, and their 2010 survey took

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25   Tamanaha, *On the Rule of Law*, 49. Tamanaha invokes the idea of consent, which is an aspect of legitimacy that I do not analyze. Bottoms and Tankebe aptly note, however, that the act of voting in a democracy is a demonstration of a citizen's consent to be governed by the officials who win election. This is an additional mechanism by which democracy promotes legitimacy in government. See Bottoms and Tankebe, "Beyond Procedural Justice," 136. See also, Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, 12.
26   Michael K. Reynolds, Olga B. Semukhina, and Nicolai Demidov, "A longitudinal Analysis of Public Satisfaction with the Police in the Vogograd Region of Russia," *International Criminal Justice Review* 18, no. 2 (June 2008): 165-166.

an in-depth look at the perceptions of policing practices in Europe. Each country's mean score for the ESS "trust in police" variable, weighted on a scale from 1 to 10 in accordance with the recommendations of ESS, are the dependent variable in this study. I use all 26 European countries for which ESS provides data and Israel because it is included in the ESS dataset and is sufficiently similar to Europe for inclusion. There certainly did not seem to be any analytical or methodological reason to exclude Israel. V-Dem is a nonprofit organization that has produced an in-depth dataset on the health of democratic institutions in countries across the globe for every year since 1789, with some gaps. The organization contracts with over 3,000 international experts who provide opinions and help V-Dem researchers code over 1,000 data points per country per year. These data points are developed into 408 aggregate indices of the health of democracy, nine of which are used in this study as independent variables. These independent variables are used in both bivariate and multivariate analyses in comparison against trust in police, the dependent variable. Finally, I will use GDP data from the World Bank as a control variable.

Measuring Liberal Democracy

V-Dem's primary aggregate index is a measure of "liberal democracy," a variable that is composed of eight of their most significant indicators. V-Dem categorizes these sub-indices broadly as measures of either how democratic a country is or how liberal a country is. In the former category, indices measure the openness and fairness of elections. In the latter category, indices measure the efficacy of checks and balances between branches of government. Regarding the liberal democracy variable, countries tend to receive higher scores when they have both free elections and more constraints on officials in power.

The indices that measure the level of democracy in a country examine both the protection of free and open discussion and the effectiveness of the elections. Regarding freedom of the press and the ability of individuals to dissent, the variable "freedom of expression and alternative information sources" ("free expression") is an index that captures a host of indicators from media bias to a selection of civil liberties. In a similar vein, the "freedom of association" variable measures the ability to form political parties that can

participate in elections. With respect to indicators more directly dealing with democracy itself, the "suffrage" variable is a measure of the percentage of the population that has a de jure right to vote, irrespective of whether they have a de facto right to vote. For example, a country that allows all men and only men to vote would be coded at 0.50, regardless of whether in practice all men could actually cast a ballot. The "clean elections" variable, on the other hand, does include considerations of voter fraud, election irregularities, voter intimidation, vote buying, and election violence. Finally, the "elected officials" index measures whether or not the head of state and members of the legislature are directly elected or appointed. In the latter case, it measures what proportion of officials are directly elected.

The variables that measure the checks and balances on the head of state make up the liberal component to V-Dem's liberal democracy index. The "civil liberties" index measures the extent to which people are equal before the law and are guaranteed individual liberties. This measure accounts for the transparency of laws, the enforcement of laws, and the impartiality of such enforcement. The "judicial independence" variable is negatively correlated with the level of influence that the executive has over court decisions and is positively correlated with a country's high court's ability to enforce its decisions. The final indicator in the liberal category is the "legislative independence" variable that measures the ability of the legislature, including ministerial departments, such as a country's attorney general, to exercise oversight authority and investigate the executive branch.

Data Irregularities

While V-Dem and ESS both provide high quality data, they do present some methodological issues. Most of the European countries in this study show relatively high levels of democracy with little variation. Consequently, all V-Dem variables were logged before analysis to reduce the skew towards liberal democracy. Nevertheless, every European country in this study offers 100% de jure voting rights to its citizens, so the suffrage variable is dropped from regression analysis but is still a factor in the overall liberal democracy variable. Similarly, the elected officials category is dropped because all countries but Spain have elected officials holding office in 100% of legislative and head of state positions, resulting in insufficient variation for analysis. Furthermore,

V-Dem states that the elected officials variable "should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right," further justifying its removal from the regression analysis.[27]

The second issue that arises with the V-Dem data in the regression analysis is multicollinearity. Although all of V-Dem's indices are composed of raw indicators that are not components of any other index, many of the indices that I examine in this study measure similar aspects of political life in a country, resulting in collinear indices. When analyzing the variance inflation factors, as can be seen in Table 1, the multicollinearity in the data becomes clear. The variables civil liberties, free expression, and judicial independence all show high levels of variance inflation, implying multicollinearity. The consequence is that a regression model cannot properly dissect the effects of one independent variable from another because they are too closely correlated. To fix the problem of multicollinearity, I decide to drop the variables civil liberties and free expression in favor of keeping judicial independence because those two have the highest VIF values. Analytically speaking, by dropping these two variables, I assume that civil liberties and free expression are measuring the same thing as judicial independence.[28] While it is not valid logic a priori to assume that an independent judiciary implies that there will be strong protection of civil liberties and press, in reality that is what is happening. This pattern is seen in the data with civil liberties and free expression having strong (r > 0.85) bivariate correlations with judicial independence. Therefore, judicial independence can to some extent also be interpreted as a measure of civil liberties and free expression. Once these two variables are removed from the model, all variables' VIFs are below 5.

Table 1: Independent Variable Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)

	VIFs	
Free Expression	10.362	
Freedom of Association	2.669	2.072
Clean Elections	4.977	3.191
Judicial Independence	6.596	2.804

27   Michael Coppedge et al., "V-Dem Codebook v9" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
28   Michael Patrick Allen, *Understanding Regression Analysis* (New York: Plenum Press, 1997): 179.

Civil Liberties	14.028	
Legislative independence	3.231	1.435

NOTE—VIF = 1: no multicollinearity; VIF < 5: moderate multicollinearity; VIF > 5: strong

multicollinearity; VIF > 10: multicollinearity is problematic

Results

The first topic of analysis is to examine the relationship between the liberal democracy index, V-Dem's overarching indicator, with the level of trust in police. The results from a bivariate regression between the two variables demonstrates that they are positively correlated. A Pearson correlation test demonstrates that the two variables are strongly related to each other, as can be seen in Figure 2. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that stronger democratic institutions are linked to the public's perception of law enforcement.


Figure 2

Since the liberal democracy index is made up of eight component indices, I examine each of the index's relationship to trust in police in a multivariate regression to see if there is one particular aspect of liberal democracy that is driving this trend. Table 2 contains the results of the regression models. In Model 1, I include each of the four relevant indices and a dummy variable indicating whether a country is a former Soviet republic. The results show a strong, positive relationship between the judicial independence variable and

trust in police. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that a judiciary that is free from interference from the head of state corresponds with a greater sense of trust in police. Notably, none of the other variables, including having been a former Soviet republic, show a statistically significant correlation with trust in police.

Table 2: Regression Models

	Model 1 (β)	Model 2 (β)	Model 3 (β)
Freedom of Association	-0.2077	-0.1404	-0.1472
Clean Elections	0.0801	0.0127	0.1624
Judicial Independence	0.9936***	0.9205***	0.7198**
Legislative Independence	0.1784	0.1168	0.0535
Soviet Republic	-0.5926		
Soviet Republic or Satellite		-0.8519**	0.3273
GDP Per Capita			-0.4396

NOTE— * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; N = 27

Model 2 and Model 3 analyze the effects of these liberal democracy indices on trust in police but look at them in the context of the former Soviet Union and its satellites. I ran Model 2 in the same manner as Model 1 with the four indices of liberal democracy, but the Soviet republics dummy variable was replaced with one to include Soviet satellites too. This model produced similar results to the first one, with judicial independence being the only statistically significant variable of the four liberal democracy indicators. Again, this variable was positively correlated with trust in police. However, unlike Model 1, this model indicated that having been a former Soviet republic or satellite had a statistically significant and negative impact on trust in police. Therefore, the data demonstrate that having been a Soviet republic or satellite did have an effect on current trust in police for reasons that are not explained by an absence of strong liberal and democratic institutions. Model 3, however, adds a control for GDP per capita onto the variables included in Model 2. Model 3 indicates once again that judicial independence is positively correlated with trust in police in a statistically significant manner, although the relationship is no longer as

strong. This model now indicates that there is no relationship between trust in police and having been a former Soviet republic or satellite. Finally, GDP per capita was found not to be a significant marker of trust in police when controlling for the remaining independent variables in the model.

Analysis

From this data, I can identify both a broad finding and a narrow finding. The broad finding is that there is a strong correlation between trust in police and the strength of liberal democratic institutions in Europe which perhaps extends to other parts of the globe. Nested inside this conclusion is the narrower finding that the absence of liberal democratic institutions in former Soviet states explains why there is lower trust in the police in these countries. Beginning with the broad finding, the regression analyses show that there is a strong relationship between liberal democracy, particularly with the judicial independence component, and trust in police. The overall bivariate correlation provides strong evidence that a country with stronger liberal and democratic institutions will have greater trust in police. However, when looking at the multivariate analysis, an overly broad conclusion is not justified. The results show that the only aspect of liberal democracy that had a statistically significant impact on the level of trust in police is the presence of an independent judiciary. It is worth remembering, too, that the variable measuring judicial independence is collinear with the measures for civil liberties and freedom of expression. This implies that these variables are likely also important factors that have an impact on the level of trust in police in a significant manner. This finding is consistent in particular with the theory of procedural justice. Having independent and effective courts promotes trust in police because they create the belief that the process by which justice is executed is a fair one that is free from corruption.

Secondly, the measure of civil liberties accounts for aspects such as transparency of laws and impartial enforcement. The fact that this measure is important in establishing the credibility of police also aligns with procedural justice theory. The finding that freedom of expression is positively correlated with trust in police, however, is not as closely connected with procedural justice theory. In fact, it suggests that my hypothesis that the ability to voice dissent and expose corruption in the police has a positive effect on police legitimacy

holds merit. This element of the findings suggests that there may be a broader relationship between the presence of a liberal democracy and trust in police that is not as firmly based in procedural justice theory. While the data provide support for the theory that liberal democracy has a positive effect on trust in police, the fact that only the judicial independence variable contributed to this effect makes it difficult to support the generalized conclusion that all elements of a liberal democracy help boost trust in police.

The narrower finding that the former presence of the Soviet Union is not a statistically significant variable when predicting trust in police is more straightforward. It is clear that the legacy of the Soviet Union has an effect on current perceptions of police based on the data in Figure 1. Model 1 shows that within former Soviet republics, the decreased judicial independence is the factor responsible for depressed trust in police. Model 2 suggests that the Soviet Union's legacy on its satellites and republics affects perceptions of police in a manner that is not accounted for exclusively by the legacy of poorer institutions of liberal democracy in these states. One of the major elements of Soviet control was the communist economic system. Since William Ross Campbell has shown that economic performance is a key driver of institutional trust in police, I theorized that the economic legacy of the Soviet Union may have an impact on contemporary trust in police.[29] Adding the GDP per capita variable in Model 3 has the effect of controlling for the economic performance of these countries. When controlling for economic strength, the significance of having been a former Soviet colony or satellite disappears. However, the GDP per capita variable was not a statistically significant indicator. This latter finding means that I must reject the hypothesis that the economic legacy of the Soviet Union has had an effect on trust in police. Nonetheless, Model 3 suggests that the only significant predictor of trust in police was the level of judicial independence, irrespective of having been a former Soviet state or satellite. Ultimately, the data show that one of the key drivers of variation of trust in police between former Soviet territories and other states is the current presence of liberal democracy or lack thereof.

I differentiate these findings because there are different analytical implications to the two of them regarding causality. The broader finding is

29   William Ross Campbell, "The Sources of Institutional Trust in East and West Germany: Civic Culture or Economic Performance?" *German Politics* 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 416.

simply one of correlation. The mathematical analysis presented here does not justify the theory that judicial independence actually *causes* trust in police. Above, I outlined a theoretical mechanism by which this relationship may occur, and the data analysis does lend support for this theory, although certainly does not prove it. The mixed results of the regression analysis instead suggest that this is an area that will require further research in order to draw conclusions about the cause and effect relationship between liberal democracy and trust in police. On the other hand, my narrower finding that the successor states to the Soviet Union have lower trust in police because they lack judicial independence implies a greater degree of causality. The regression analysis conclusively shows that when controlling for judicial independence, Soviet successor states have roughly the same level of trust in police as non-Soviet successors. This conclusion does not necessarily rely on my theory that liberal democracy affects perceptions of police, so the conclusions can suggest causality with greater confidence.

There are additional limitations to these findings, particularly the finding that liberal democracy is a factor in determining confidence in law enforcement. The primary limitation comes from the fact that this study only analyzes European countries, limiting the generalizability of these findings in non-European countries. Considering that the theories I discuss rely heavily on *Western* political thought, the connection I make between liberal democracy and institutional trust in police may not apply outside of the West where these theories are not widely accepted. There may be places, for example, that reject the notion that liberal democracy best embodies the will of the people. In this case, my theory begins to fall apart because people then will not confer as much motive-based trust on the state and the police if there is an elected government. Constraining the analysis to Europe reduces the analytical leverage of the study because there is not significant variation across European countries when it comes to liberal democracies. Most countries in Europe have similar levels of democratic institutions which precludes analysis of important variables, such as the fraction of population with suffrage. Including less liberal countries in the study would make for more thorough research into the relationship between government institutions and trust in police.

The second limitation of this study is the presence of multicollinearity in

the data. Although there was only moderate multicollinearity in the regression analysis, I was only able to create a model without the negative effects of multicollinearity by removing independent variables. This prevents analysis of the importance of measuring civil liberties and freedom of expression. While these two variables do bear some similarity to judicial independence, they are not exactly the same, and it would be ideal if the data allowed me to tease apart the differences. This problem could possibly be alleviated too by examining more, perhaps non-European, countries.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union unquestionably left a legacy on Eastern Europe, and this legacy has an impact on current perceptions of police practices. The theories of procedural justice and motive-based trust are fitting hypotheses that explain how the legacy of the Soviet Union affects trust in police. Louis Shelley notes that "Soviet law enforcement emphasized results (arrests and prosecutions) rather than application of established legal procedure."[30] Even though the Soviet Union has since fallen, these ideas left a legacy on law enforcement in much of Eastern Europe, thereby corrupting the perceived need to follow established procedures among the law enforcement community. While this explanation is valid, I contend that the lack of liberal democratic institutions helps explain the decreased trust in police in these countries. My theory is not mutually exclusive with Tyler's theories of motive-based trust and procedural justice; in fact, my hypothesis relies on these two ideas.

There is considerable overlap between procedural justice theory, motive-based trust, and liberal political thought. I seek to connect these ideas in an effort to demonstrate how the presence of liberal democracy impacts trust in police. While I do manage to connect these theories, their connection is somewhat tenuous. Further research in the political theory of criminology, particular trust in police and its connections to liberal thought, are certainly required. There is no doubt that philosophers have long pondered how to create a system that is perceived as just. However, the literature that connects the theories of government to more empirical theories on trust in police, such as procedural fairness, is thin.

The relationship between liberal democracy and trust in police is also

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30   Shelley, *Policing Soviet Society*, 15.

an area for further empirical research. As mentioned earlier, including more states in a cross-national analysis may be helpful in examining the relationship between these two topics. In addition to a cross-national analysis, case-studies of countries with weaker democratic institutions would also be an effective means of testing any potential causality between liberal democracy and trust in police. A case study could also be an effective tool for disproving the theory that there is such a relationship between liberal democracy and trust in police and may also be able to raise alternate theories.

The question of the effects of liberal democracy or a lack thereof is an important one. V-Dem notes that there is a "third wave of autocratization" that is currently on the rise. Police practices in these autocratic states can often be abusive -- for example, in Brazil, where police killings recently hit a record high. If there is in fact a relationship between liberal democracy and police practices, the amount of public trust in law enforcement and the number of police abuses in a country could be important indicators of the health of the rule of law and democracy.

About the Author

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Health and Politics

The Impact of Medicaid on American Political Efficacy

Anna L. Smith

Introduction

The politics of healthcare is one that affects many, as healthcare systems impact various populations and individuals in different ways. The United States health system is ranked as one of the lowest in various measures of health status by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Schroeder 2007), as it is a system of extreme confusion and complexity, with high expenditures and poor outcomes. In addition to health, political participation in the United States is also relatively low, as shown through measurements of voter turnout, social capital, political engagement, and more (Powell 1986; Cummins 2005; Hendryx 2002). Political researchers have analyzed political efficacy in the form of political participation and have investigated multiple causes over time that may produce higher political participation, most of which are sociodemographic in their nature (Andersen 1975; Persson 2013; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). With this in mind, this project will analyze a possible cause for the emergence of literature concerned with health accessibility throughout different types of health insurance. Stated differently, investigating if health insurance type (such as Medicare, Medicaid, Private, or no insurance) impacts political efficacy.

This is an area of growing relevance and interest as healthcare evolves and new programs aim to fulfill the needs of various populations. The impact of healthcare on political efficacy is also extremely important, as a lack of efficacy for those disproportionately impacted negatively by the health system may result in underrepresentation in politics and governance. Furthermore, this could result in a vicious cycle of health policy which further disadvantages underrepresented populations. Various scholars have shown that poor health reduces political participation: Cummins (2005) concluded that poor health was significantly associated with low political engagement; Reitan (2003) found that

life expectancy and electoral turnout were positively and significantly correlated with each other in Russia in the 1990s; Schur and Kruse (2005) found that those with spinal cord injuries had 10% lower voter turnout than otherwise similar people. While this evidence shows that poor health reduces political participation in various forms, this paper investigates whether lack of access to private insurance may reduce political efficacy and, in turn, reduce political participation amongst the poor. More specifically, this analysis will center around the impact of Medicaid (independent of health status) on the political efficacy of welfare recipients compared to other insurance types.

Methodology

This research design proposal will begin with the hypothesis that those who benefit from more dependent forms of insurance (Medicaid), or those who are uninsured, have lower political efficacy than those with private insurance. To preface the analysis, the investigation of existing literature is summarized in the literature review. This literature review will show that significant evidence exists indicating that poor health leads to lower participation (both individually and at the community level). This is followed by sufficient evidence that demonstrates the connection between the structure of health insurance itself as a disempowering aspect independent from its effects on the health of an individual (resulting in a stigma surrounding Medicaid). The literature review will back up the central claim of this paper, showing that those benefiting from Medicaid and other welfare programs have low levels of political efficacy. After reviewing existing studies and literature, this paper will perform a preliminary analysis of existing data demonstrating the relationship between health insurance and political efficacy; this preliminary data analysis will provide a starting point for further research, described in the proposed research design.

Literature Review

Impact of Limited Healthcare Access on Political Participation

Healthcare and politics interact on an individual level and locally, as well as nationally and often internationally in society, and many researchers have looked at this relationship through various lenses. Nevertheless, the focus of this paper examines the relationship between health insurance types and political efficacy. There is expansive literature that illustrates the relationship between these two concepts, and accounts for various measurements in order to understand the correlation. The political variable entails voter turnout, social capital, and trust. Health is measured through self-rated health, physical health, and insurance/health access.

The Independent: Health Insurance

The United States' insurance structure contains four broad groupings: private insurance, Medicare (available to those over 65 years old), Medicaid, and the uninsured. Among adults ages 18-64, in 2018, 68.9% of adults had private insurance, 12.8% were insured by Medicaid, and 13.3% were uninsured (National Center 2018). It is noteworthy that this analysis will exclude children; while there are insurance programs specifically created for kids (namely CHIP), many other studies already concluded that intelligence and age are the major factors regarding levels of political efficacy (Merelman 1971; White 1968). There is limited research on the impact of health on a child's political efficacy, hence the focus on those 18 years and older.

While those aged over 18 are included, it is important to note the case of Medicare. There is evidence suggesting less stigmatization of Medicare, and most studies analyzed here focus on Medicaid or lack of insurance in comparison to private insurance. Schroeder claims that one of the United States' only higher rankings from the OECD is life expectancy at age 65 due to the extensive programming of Medicare (Schroeder 2007). Soss (1999) utilized the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) as a comparison between social insurance and the public assistance program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); the SSDI is only attainable for those who have worked long enough to gain the benefit while Supplemental Security Income is available to those who meet other requirements regarding income separate from age. Overall, Medicare is a more specific subset of insurance that is comparable in this study to private insurance, as it lacks stigmatization since it benefits anyone over a certain age, so it is important in the discussion of Medicaid.

Finally, it is necessary to contextualize the current situation of health insurance programs in the United States. The 'welfare state' began its development in the 1910s and slowly increased in reach. In 1965, both Medicare for those aged over 65 and Medicaid for certain low-income populations were created. Over time, these programs evolved to include more populations (such as redefining the poverty line, placing emphasis on pregnant

women, people with disabilities, and others). Most recently, the Affordable Care Act expanded upon Medicaid (Fox & Kongstvedt 2012; Haselswerdt 2017). In addition to these programs, the rate of uninsured populations has increased as a result of rising costs of healthcare (Gilmer & Kronick 2005) and falling coverage rates (Long and Rodgers 1995). This literature review will investigate current discourse regarding why different insurance statuses may impact political efficacy. But what does political efficacy mean in the context of this analysis?

The Dependent: Political Efficacy

Understanding the meaning of political efficacy is important in this analysis, as it is more internal and complex than simple measures of voter turnout or political participation. Political efficacy as defined by Weissburg "refers to an individual's belief in the value of political action and the probability of success in this action" (Weissburg 1975). Campbell defines it as "the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change" (Campbell et al. 1954; Soss 1999). More specifically, external efficacy refers to the focus on governmental ability to make a change, and internal efficacy indicates the focus on personal ability to make a change, with both acting as predictors for participation (Abramson 1983; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993). Political efficacy is an abstract yet measurable concept that allows for the analysis of a deeper sense of individual meaning than political participation alone. While other measurements of political efficacy were considered, including social capital and voter turnout, they did not capture the question at hand from the United States' perspective.

The Relationship

With this understanding of health insurance and political efficacy, this paper will investigate if recipients of welfare programs and Medicaid, along with those who are uninsured, will have a lower political efficacy. The relationship between health and politics is illustrated by multiple studies, each looking at different aspects of health and political participation in order to define the relationship. Some studies connect self-rated health status, a strong and reliable predictor of health (Crossley & Kennedy 2002; Jylha 2009), with political participation; some suggest that poor health (based on Self-Rated

Health Status [SRHS]) reduces political participation (Mattila et al. 2013; Pacheco & Fletcher 2015). Others argue that there is a direct link between health and voter turnout (Denny & Doyle 2007; Mattila et al 2013; Pacheco & Fletcher 2015; Reitan 2003; Schur & Kruse 2000).

Some psychological studies find that such connection between system involvement and political efficacy may be predicted by attitudes, as feelings and sentiments towards the system arising from direct experience tend to have greater clarity and are held with greater confidence (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Soss 1999). However, a few studies focus specifically on welfare and Medicaid as independent variables that directly impact political efficacy. While the literature is limited, current discourse regarding the distinct connection between Medicaid and political efficacy establishes a strong basis for further research.

In an effort to understand the relationship between Medicaid and political efficacy, a few different studies utilized a variety of methodologies. Soss (1999) questioned how welfare programs and participation in them affects political involvement and political quiescence. He compared public assistance programs (related to welfare, entitled Aid to Families with Dependent Children) to a social insurance program (SSDI), essentially comparing the political efficacy of Medicaid and Medicare. He makes multiple conclusions that both back up this paper's claim and refute alternative arguments: 1) AFDC clients are less likely to engage in political action than SSDI recipients; 2) the disparity remains even after controlling for key demographic differences and, hence, cannot be dismissed on the basis of prior characteristics; 3) AFDC clients are less likely to be politically active than non-recipients who share salient demographic characteristics, which suggests that their quiescence may be traceable to some factor associated with welfare participation itself (Soss 1999). This disproves alternative arguments that state that background characteristics define political participation (Verba et. al 1995), and other arguments that claimed that welfare recipients are predisposed to have poor access to political resources and information (Verba et. al 1972).

Michener's study (2017) uses Soss as a basis for her argument stating that where there are higher concentrations of Medicaid participation experience a decrease in political participation; she also claims that Medicaid beneficiaries are less likely to be involved politically through political action (Michener

forthcoming). She concludes that high concentrations of Medicaid beneficiaries in locales are negatively correlated with political participation. Haselswerdt (2017) hypothesized the opposite, claiming that increased enrollment in Medicaid (as a result of expansion through the Affordable Care Act (ACA) increases voter turnout; he came to this conclusion due to both an increase in turnout for new beneficiaries and a backlash effect among conservative voters opposed to the law and its implementation. These conflicting findings may be connected to a recent expansion of programs or a lacking relationship that requires further study. Overall, there is strong evidence in support of the argument of this paper, but there remain alternatives that have strong support as well and require analysis in order to successfully complete this project. The next section will discuss possible underlying reasoning behind this relationship and then discuss alternative arguments.

Stigma

While the evidence shows a connection between the healthcare insurance structure and politics, is it possible that the structure of health insurance is itself disempowering, independent of its effects on health? Many welfare recipients claim to feel a stigma surrounding their quality of healthcare. One study found that 14% of respondents felt stigmatized due to an experience regarding healthcare; furthermore, one-third of that percentage was uninsured while two-thirds were on Medicaid (Allen et al. 2014). In addition, other studies conclude that stigma plays a large role in deterring those in need from accepting a welfare plan (Levinson & Rahardja 2004), and others find that there is no relationship between stigma and alternative background characteristics of recipients (Handler & Hollingsworth 1969). Other contributions to the stigmatization of certain welfare programs include the language used against participants (Mills 1996) and the perception of certain welfare programs as 'better,' such as Medicare and Social Security (Grogan & Park 2017). Another source of stigma is the vast number of interactions with the system experienced by welfare recipients in order to prove their eligibility, and the power that the "street-level bureaucrats" hold (Gordon 1994; Soss 1999). Other studies utilize this information to analyze the relationship between healthcare insurance stigma and political efficacy.

Michener performed one study that analyzes this connection (2017).

She argued that Medicaid policy concentration has community-wide political effects. Identifying the underlying stigma regarding Medicaid, Michener concludes that the stigmatization of Medicaid has negative consequences on how those receiving Medicaid or those related to beneficiaries engage in politics. Haselswerdt (2017) included a hypothesis regarding a possible decrease in voter turnout due to healthcare influence and concluded that recipients of Medicaid had a negative effect on political participation. Through these studies, it is clear that stigma is present in Medicaid recipients as a result of their experiences in the system. However, it is necessary to observe alternative arguments before proceeding to preliminary data analysis.

Alternative Arguments

This section will focus on alternative arguments that go against this paper's central claim. These include physical illness determining political efficacy, sociodemographic factors contributing to both health and political efficacy (an issue of spuriousness), and social capital causing health status (an issue of endogeneity).

Poor health and political participation are connected at both individual levels as well as community levels. Social capital is the focus of many researcher's studies and focuses on community-level political involvement and measurements of neighborhood capital. Hendryx, Ahern, Lovrich, & McCurdy (2002) and Mohseni & Lindstrom (2013) investigate how social capital impacts health status in a community. Hendryx concludes that better social capital is related to higher health status as it results in stronger social institutions, while Mohseni and Lindstrom claim that low trust in healthcare systems (a subset of social capital) is associated with poor health. Cummins, Stafford, Macintyre, Marmot, and Ellaway (2005) also concluded that poor neighborhood capital (defined through low political involvement, poor physical environment, high unemployment, etc.) lead to poor health outcomes for the population, independent of sex, age, social class, and economic activity. These studies are somewhat contradictory to this paper's claim, as they state that low social capital results in poor health.

Demographic factors play a major role in health and are frequently considered when determining political efficacy. Each factor interacts heavily with others, and these can include age, education levels, income levels, race,

ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, and many more. Multiple studies show the specific demographics that are less likely to vote, such as non-white, younger, lower socio-economic groups (Anon 2019), and conclude that there are some background characteristics (family involvement, volunteerism, religiosity, and more) that impact political efficacy in some capacity (Verba et al. 1995). Despite this, demographics of those less likely to participate can be juxtaposed against the characteristics of those who are uninsured or subscribe to Medicaid or other public assistance programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (Soss 1999). Ultimately, demographic factors play a role in both determining health status as well as political efficacy; such information can lead one to identify a possible source of spuriousness in this project. However, according to one study, demographic factors do not play as large of a part in determining health insurance coverage. This study found that demographic and employment shifts should have resulted in a 0.5% increase in coverage rates if following the prediction of those uninsured decreasing overall, but instead these metrics fell by 6.2% (Gilmer & Kronick 2005). This analysis can disprove the spurious claim that outside factors such as demographics affect both health and political efficacy. Another study found that welfare recipients with the exact same demographic descriptions (all else held equal) but different insurance types had extremely varied political efficacy in a Most Similar Systems design (Soss 1999). Soss (1999) also refuted the arguments of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) where they claim that specific demographic factors account for participation differences across programs by showing empirical evidence that demographic factors have no effect on participation. As such, demographic factors are important to consider and control for future studies.

In regards to health, many researchers utilized physical health (or self-rated health status) when measuring health in relation to political efficacy and participation; many suggest that poor health reduces participation (Mattila et al. 2013; Pacheco & Fletcher 2015). While physical illness is a factor, quality health insurance impacts illness, too; those who have better health insurance are more likely to seek healthcare and maintain a healthy lifestyle than those who rely on the welfare program. Schroeder (2007) argues that a "lack of health insurance leads to poor health." Some may argue that poor health independently affects health insurance type or that poor health acts as a direct cause of lowered efficacy; however, the researchers stated above refute this.

Conclusion

Political efficacy is a widely studied concept that illustrates political involvement and trust through different analyses. Healthcare in the United States undergoes heavy debate as citizens look to the healthcare systems of other nations for solutions, but is it possible that health and political efficacy are connected? In this next section, the central hypothesis will be defined, and a preliminary data analysis will be performed on available data. The data analysis will look at a few different variables compiled together to represent political efficacy, as well as those relating to health insurance and status. It will describe the general statistics associated with each of the variables, as well as illustrate the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Finally, the evaluation of the findings will present a starting point for further research in this area.

Hypothesis

The central hypothesis of this study is that those who have private health insurance will have higher levels of political efficacy than those who have Medicaid or no insurance. However, in this preliminary data analysis the hypothesis cannot be investigated in regards to specific health insurance types. As a result, the analysis will instead focus on if one has health insurance through their employer or not. The hypothesis studied here is that those with health insurance through their employer will have higher levels of political efficacy than those who do not.

Preliminary Data Analysis

Description of PDA Variables

The variables studied in this analysis are slightly different than those in the literature review or in the hypothesis, but they are still connected to the central theme of the research. The independent variable is health insurance, defined here as whether or not one receives health insurance through their employer (designated as emphealth). It is measured through the 2008 General Social Survey (in Ballots B and C) which asked participants this question and then subsequent questions regarding the specific sources of their health insurance. For the purposes of this analysis, the subsequent question results are excluded as the number of observations becomes quite small. The responses are

recorded as "Yes" or "No," along with the possible options of "Don't know," "Not applicable," and "No answer" (these responses were also excluded from the analysis for each of the variables). This was the main variable utilized for the independent variable, and the dependent variables were analyzed by their responses to this question.

The dependent variables were also found in the General Social Survey from 2008 and consist of three different questions asked of participants. "Confidence in the Executive Branch" and "Confidence in Congress" were two of these variables, with the question stated as "I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?" (Smith et. al 2008). The responses were recorded on a three-point scale that included "Hardly any" (coded as 1), "Only some" (coded as 2), and "A great deal" (coded as 3). Confidence in governmental institutions strongly reflects political efficacy, as it focuses on one's external efficacy and the belief that the government cares what people think (Craig and Maggiotto 1982); this allows for analysis and interpretation from the perspective of the hypothesis.

Another variable is analyzed that relates more to internal efficacy. Termed as fatalism, this refers to a general sentiment regarding efficacy overall (not specifically in politics), and is also found in the 2008 General Social Survey (GSS). Participants were asked if they agree or disagree with the statement, "There is little that people can do to change the course of their lives" (Smith et. al 2008). They then answer based upon a five-point scale ranging from "Strongly agree" (coded as 1) to "Strongly disagree" (coded as 5). These three variables allow for a multi-faceted analysis of the data in order to determine results that reflect the central hypothesis.

It is important to note some aspects of the data set obtained from the GSS that do not appear in this analysis. As mentioned before, responses such as "Don't know," "Not applicable," and "No answer" were excluded from the analysis to avoid outliers/unnecessary data affecting the statistics produced. In addition, those above the age of 65 did not have answers recorded for the emphealth variable in the original data set, most likely because they were qualified to receive benefits from Medicare. However, all of those data values

are re-coded from "Not applicable" to "Medicare" for those above the age of 65. This adjustment is seen in the data presented below, where the responses for emphealth are "Yes," "No," and "Medicare." These adjustments and exclusions allow for more specific analysis and for the elimination of unnecessary data.

Data Presentation

Descriptive statistics are a fundamental aspect of data analysis, and this section will focus on that first. Firstly, the means of each dependent variable were calculated after being categorized into responses to the emphealth question. The data output chart is shown in Figure 1 below, and it shows variance amongst the dependent variables by the error bars.


Figure 1: Bar Graph of Each Dependent Variable Showing Mean Response (Categorized by Source of Health Insurance)

When analyzing this graph, it is clear that any difference among dependent variables is minimal. The average responses to the Confidence questions were very close, and the error bars demonstrate variance that shows the values are not really different. Detailed analysis of the numerical values for the Confidence in Government variables is found below Figure 2. The visualization of the data makes it clear that no true relationship exists here. When looking at the Fatalism data, the difference here is also minimal at best: those with insurance average out at 4.19, those without at 4.14, and those with Medicare at 4.01. Finally, a 95% Confidence Interval was calculated and is shown through the error bars; these values give yet another example of the lack of differentiation between health insurance types and political confidence, as the bars show extensive overlap in each healthcare category. Overall, this

extreme similarity of values suggests that there is no relationship here.

Figure 2: Bar Graph depicting Mean Responses of Confidence in Branches of Government (Categorized by Source of Health Insurance)

One interesting point found in this graph is that the confidence in the executive is higher for those with health insurance (1.71) than those without (1.63), while the confidence in Congress is higher for those without (1.72) than those with (1.70). In addition to this, Medicare responses average at values underneath both of these (1.54 for the executive, and 1.68 for Congress). These differences (while small), solidify their lack of a relationship as they contradict each other in the context of the hypothesis. With this in mind, the visualization of this data does not show any true difference; this suggests that the variables do not share a relationship.


Figure 3: Frequency Distribution of Fatalism Responses (Categorized by Source of Health Insurance)

Taking a deeper look at the Fatalism Responses, the frequency distribution shown in Figure 3 shows a similarly shaped distribution in all three healthcare categories. Each group, on average, had more participants respond that they disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that people cannot change the course of their lives, with both distributions centering around 'disagree.' This is important to analyze, as the lack of difference between those with and without health insurance suggests the lack of a relationship between the variables.

Overall, this descriptive data suggests that while there may be a slight positive correlation between health and political efficacy measurements, it is relatively minimal. In addition to descriptive data, inferential data analyses were also investigated through the form of an independent-samples t-test. The confidence interval was calculated at 95%; therefore, the p-value must be less than .05 for the results to be statistically significant (i.e. to prove the hypothesis correct). It is important to note that Medicare respondents were excluded from the t-test, as the grouping variable would only allow two categories (and in order to answer the central hypothesis, Medicare was excluded). The results of the test confirmed what was depicted in the data.

For Confidence in the Executive Branch, the p-value was .136 and standard error of .051; for Confidence in Congress, the p-value equaled .326 and standard error equaled .050; and for Fatalism, the p-value was .571 with a standard error of .076. These p-values are higher than expected, and confirm the growing suspicion that the variables are not very correlated. In addition, the standard error values confirm the high variance seen in the means and confidence intervals. The descriptive data, in conjunction with the inferential testing, shows that there is no relationship found within these variables, which will be analyzed in the next section.

Data Analysis

This preliminary data description resulted in drawing unexpected and important conclusions. Firstly, when looking at the descriptive statistics and the means, it is clear the difference is minimal with high variance in the error bars. In the confidence variables, those without health insurance had less trust in the executive branch, but more trust in Congress, than those with health insurance. These opposing numbers suggest that there is no true relationship underlying the variables. Fatalism data also experiences similar variation, as those without

health insurance on average agree more that people cannot change the course of their lives (albeit by very few points), but with very high variation. The values of variance in these variables is relatively high as they range from over half a point to almost a whole point deviation; this shows that the values are highly spread out, but does not necessarily mean that the relationship is not there. However, the confidence intervals maintain this suggestion, and t-test proves this to be the case. The mean and standard deviations show that the differences are minimal, as well.

The p-values reported above, when converted from proportions into percentages, depict the probability that a relationship is found when there really is no relationship. The percentages range from 13.6% to 57.1%, which is a large range of high values. The p-values vary, but each shows a relatively high probability that the relationship between insurance and confidence/fatalism does not exist in the real world. The standard errors reported along with the p-values demonstrate the high variance found in the sample, as variance increases the standard error increases along with it. Further, none of the p-values are statistically significant as they all exceed the alpha value of .05, therefore the hypothesis is rejected. In simpler terms, this means that the null hypothesis, which states that there is no relationship between the independent and dependent variables, is accepted. Essentially, the t-test showed that there is no significant relationship that connects health insurance and political efficacy. Overall, health insurance and political efficacy variables are minimally related, if at all, and are shown to lack correlation through both this test and the descriptive statistics.

Political efficacy is quite an expansive concept with multiple possible causes (as are most things found in the world). These variables studied here are extremely limited and do not allow for an expansive data analysis; despite this, they do offer important information that is relevant to this research project. While the literature all pointed towards a high correlation, this test shows that this relationship may not be as strong as once thought (in fact, it likely does not exist at all). Further research that includes variables of race, income, education levels, and other determinants of health and political efficacy would account for multiple causality, but regardless, this analysis has shown that health insurance is not directly related to political efficacy. The similarities in the means,

overlapping confidence intervals, high standard errors, and the high p-values all pointed towards the hypothesis being proven wrong in that there is no relationship. Ultimately, the rejection of this hypothesis is crucial as it disproves the previous literature and pushes for further analysis and exploration into these variables. This data analysis provides the foundation for further exploration of this topic, which is proposed in the final section of this research design.

Proposed Research Design

Methodology and Sample

Similar to the methodology utilized in the preliminary data analysis, the ideal methodology of a future research project would involve a statistical method through survey analysis. The survey will be administered nationally in a simple random sample of the United States. Ideally, it will divide the country into regions for study (i.e. Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, etc). By analyzing the data by region, researchers can account for urban/rural disparities, education levels, and other possible causal variables. Both regional and national analyses can be performed through this data collection. In addition to this, the statistical approach would also group together those of similar backgrounds through a matched pairs study; by focusing on Most Similar Systems in responses, researchers can account for other alternative explanations.

Variables

In studying health insurance and political efficacy, these variables will be measured through responses to survey questions. The survey will include questions based on sociodemographic factors: age, gender, race, income, socioeconomic status, education level, employment, etc. In order to measure health, the survey will include questions on self-rated health status and a question on health insurance type, including Private, Medicare, Medicaid, Employer, and none. When measuring political efficacy, these questions are more extensive and are based on other researchers' studies involving political efficacy questions (Morrell 2003; Niemi et. al 1991). External political efficacy will be measured by questions in the "How much do you agree with this statement…" format, and include:

- Public officials don't care what we think.
- Elected officials lose touch with people quickly.
- Political parties are only interested in people's votes, not their

opinions.

- How much does the political system allow people like you to have a say in government?
- How much does the political system allow people like you to have an influence in politics?

Internal efficacy is measured by similarly formatted questions, including:

- How able are you to take an active role in a group focused on political issues?
- How much confidence do you have in your own ability to participate in politics?
- Are politics too complicated?
- Do you consider yourself qualified to participate in politics?
- Do you have a strong understanding of important political issues?
- Are you better informed about politics than most people?

Responses to these efficacy questions can be measured through scales ranging from 1-5, with responses being categorized as "agree/disagree" statements or "not at all/very much" statements. In addition, these extensive questions include both external and internal efficacy variables, which allows for a deeper analysis. An additional level of analysis dealing with stigma can be analyzed through this survey as well by including questions regarding experiences in the welfare system (Levinson & Rahardja 2004; Handler & Hollingsworth 1969):

- Have you ever been a recipient of Medicaid or other government welfare programs?
- Are you currently a recipient of Medicaid or a participant in other welfare programs? (If so, continue with the questions in Ballot A. If they had been in the past, then continue to ask questions in Ballot B. If they have never been involved with these systems, move on to Ballot C).

Ballot A

- Have you had any difficulties or problems with people or businesses in the community that you think happened because you are a welfare recipient?
- How do you think people in this community feel about people like you who are in welfare programs? (Responses measured from very

hostile to very understanding)

- How do you feel when you are with people who don't receive welfare? (Responses measured from very embarrassed/uncomfortable to not at all embarrassed/uncomfortable)
- How much do you agree with this statement: Welfare helps people get back on their feet when they are in a bad situation.
- How much do you agree with this statement: Welfare makes people work less than they would if there wasn't a welfare system.

Ballot B

- When on welfare, did you have any difficulties or problems with people or businesses in the community that you think happened because you were a welfare recipient?
- Do you believe people in this community feel differently about welfare recipients (as you were then) than those who are not in such programs (as you are now)? (Responses measured from very hostile to very understanding, divided into Then and Now)
- How much do you agree with this statement: Welfare helps people get back on their feet when they are in a bad situation.
- How much do you agree with this statement: Welfare makes people work less than they would if there wasn't a welfare system.

Ballot C

- Have you ever experienced difficulties or problems with people or businesses in the community as a result of your health status? As a result of your socioeconomic status?
- How do you feel towards people in this community who are welfare recipients or enrolled in welfare programs? (Responses measured from very hostile to very understanding)
- How do you feel around peers who receive welfare or are enrolled in welfare programs? (Responses measured from very embarrassed/ uncomfortable to not at all embarrassed/uncomfortable)
- How much do you agree with this statement: Welfare helps people get back on their feet when they are in a bad situation.
- How much do you agree with this statement: Welfare makes people work less than they would if there wasn't a welfare system.

By including stigma questions, one can assess for this possible underlying reason that has been researched before. In addition, dividing groups into these three ballots of questions can help determine how people from all insurance brackets feel towards welfare and possibly identify any underlying stigmas. While this is being performed at a regional survey level, this can also be utilized in a matched pairs method where all else is held equal but their insurance type; this can help demonstrate clear stigma sentiments in certain groups. These variables aim to answer the question and help to support the hypothesis sought after in this study.

Overall, the methodology followed here is similar to the preliminary analysis performed as part of this research paper. The proposed research would look at a larger population in a more specific way through regions, and includes more specific questions regarding insurance type and political efficacy, as well as stigma surrounding healthcare. While the preliminary analysis showed that no relationship exists between these variables, performing a larger survey focused around this claim would contribute to a more specific analysis and would allow for some control of multiple causality by including those variables in the survey. By including questions on demographics, researchers can control for the major alternative explanations by controlling these variables through a multivariate analysis at the national level; at a regional level, these disparities can be held equal through a matched pairs analysis and analyze the differences in insurance type. The statistical approach is the best way to prove if the relationship between health insurance and political efficacy exists or not on a large scale while also controlling/encompassing alternative explanations in its conception.

Do people benefiting from Medicaid experience lower levels of political efficacy? This paper has shown limited yet crucial evidence in support of this claim, as well as initial alternative evidence suggesting a strong connection between health systems and political participation. However, existing data points to such a relationship not existing in the real world. With this research completed, further research is required to understand the complex relationship between health insurance and political efficacy.

About the Author

Anna Smith is a 3rd year undergraduate student studying Political Science and Public Health at Drew University in Madison, NJ. Her research interests combine her fields of study, analyzing the impact of a broken healthcare system on the political participation and confidence in the United States. Anna wishes to thank Dr. Jason Jordan for all of his guidance and help throughout the entirety of this project.

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