11
A HUMBLE FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Democracy as the politics of collective experience

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Democracy … is the sole way of living which believes wholeheartedly in the process of experience as end and as means.

*John Dewey, from Creative Democracy*

11.1 Introduction

Democracy, for Dewey, is a humble form of government in that both its inputs and its outputs are rooted in quotidian experience. Everyday life tells us where the shoe pinches, and what has relieved the chaffing. In a democracy, moreover, the relevant experiences come from the humble of society just as much as the exalted. Equality in having our interests served, as well as judging how they have been served, forms the foundation of democratic politics (Neblo, 2015).

Yet, there is also a kind of hubris in democracy. Everyday experience provides a notoriously myopic lens through which to view the good of the commonwealth. Those of a more aristocratic bent have long claimed that the common person tends toward avidity for immediate and personal gain at the expense of the long-term flourishing of all. T.S. Eliot, no democrat in his politics, cautions us against myopia toward both the past and the future. In the *Four Quartets* he writes that there is “only a limited value / In the knowledge gained from experience… The only wisdom we can hope to acquire / Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless.” Like Burke before him, Eliot believes that we tend to overestimate our ability to innovate ways to realize our future goals reliably, and to underestimate the past as a guide to what we really should want and how best to get it.

Juxtaposing Dewey and Eliot like this puts one in mind of the useful cliché attributed to Churchill that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others. The juxtaposition, however, also puts us in a better position to see why democracy is so allegedly bad, and how we might hedge against its badness. Attending carefully to the role of humility in democracy, then, can help us improve on its advantages over “all the others”—hopefully rendering the currently resurgent attractions of non-democratic regimes less tempting.

We first identify key distinctions between types of democracy, humility, and actors. The three models of democracy discussed here require differing levels of humility from different democratic actors, but deliberative models place particular expectations on citizens themselves.
To soften the apparent implications of these demands, we discuss the virtue of *sophrosyne* as a governor of just and humble discourse. Finally, we propose that a more complicated model of humility can provide plentiful room for further study regarding its relationship with efficacy and democratic innovation.

### 11.2 Distinctions

Both “humility” and “democracy” are multifaceted terms, so it behooves us to clarify the concepts and how we will be using them throughout this essay. The first such distinction relevant to applying humility to democracy hinges on what we might call “cognitive” versus “conative” humility. By “cognitive” we mean humility in forming, individually relying upon, and endeavoring to spread one’s beliefs. By “conative” we mean humility in forming, pursuing, and especially claiming social priority for the fulfillment of one’s desires. We can further distinguish the object of our cognitive and conative humility. We most naturally think of humility toward others: cognitive (or intellectual) humility vis-a-vis our epistemic superiors or even peers; conative humility toward others affected by the way that we pursue our goals (among further specifications of “others” pursued below). On certain virtue theories, though, we might also be humble with respect to ourselves, critically reflecting on our own beliefs and the pursuit of our desires, even when these do not importantly affect others. Finally, we add a temporal dimension to “others:” that is, humility toward the past when it comes to our beliefs and humility toward future generations when it comes to pursuing our desires (Burke again).

On the heels of these distinctions, we should also note that we will be treating “humility” as a bi-valent term. That is, we will understand humility as a virtue that admits of corresponding vices of excess and deficiency (Church and Samuelson, 2016). This choice is not obvious since one prominent theoretical and ordinary-language meaning of humility treats it as univalent: a person is either humble and virtuous, or arrogant and blameworthy. Eliot, a devout Christian, follows an important tradition according to which we are radically fallen creatures who should be maximally humble: that “humility is endless.” One might also use humility to anchor one end of a dichotomy and claim, pace Eliot, that the virtuous characteristic is to be found somewhere in the middle.

Instead, we will treat “humility” as the virtuous mean between two vicious extremes. In the case of cognitive (or intellectual) humility, the vice in which we are insufficiently humble is “arrogance,” and the vice in which we are overly humble is “diffidence.” Correspondingly, for conative humility, the vice in which we are insufficiently humble is “greed,” and the vice in which we are overly humble is “abnegation.” The virtuous mean of conative humility might also be described as knowing and asserting our proper self-worth (Neblo, 2007a).

Similarly, “democracy” is a capacious concept that means many things to different people. For our purposes, we will not insist on a single, encompassing definition, but rather distinguish between three ideal-typical notions of democracy, and then examine the role of humility in them separately. We do not necessarily mean that humility is required in each of these understandings of democracy in order for them to self-perpetuate, but that for each system to provide desirable goods, some form of humility must be present somewhere in the process. These goods include improvements in the epistemic dynamics of deliberation and the power dynamics of democratic decision making. Desirable epistemic dynamics require that the right people assert and defer in the proper contexts, while desirable power dynamics emerge when people humbly adhere to their roles. We shall focus on three broad theoretical genera of democracy, further distinguishing species under them only as it seems necessary (Neblo, 2007b). We call the three main theories we will analyze as follows: competitive-elitist democracy, liberal democracy, and deliberative democracy.
A humble form of government

Competitive-elitist theories of democracy focus on securing peaceful transitions of power between elites elected by the masses at semi-regular intervals. These are sometimes called “deflationary” theories because they are relatively unambitious regarding the standards that they apply for policy success. Such theories generally disavow notions of a common good, or at least reliable means of knowing and securing such a common good, should it exist. Weber, Schumpeter, Riker, and, more recently, Achen and Bartels fall under this category. In between elections, average citizens play a minimal role in forming policy, and can only be intermittently and imperfectly relied upon to turn elites out of power if they fail to please the electorate.

Calling the next group “liberal” theories invites some confusion because the concept of liberalism is at best oblique to democracy. That said, as an empirical matter, the combination (liberalism paired with democracy) co-occurs often enough to treat it as a sort of genus. The “liberal” part of liberal democracy tends to focus on pluralism, individual rights, limited government, the separation of powers—that is, limits or at least inflections on what democratic majorities can accomplish. Some variants are skeptical of singular notions of the common good, though many would acknowledge a finite number of competing notions of the good. Others countenance the idea of a common good but counsel caution, arguing that liberal constraints conduce toward it (or at least hedge against grave deviations). Madison and, more recently, Brennan (2009) typify this latter approach.

Deliberative theories of democracy embody more ambitious standards for forming and judging policy decisions than the other two theories, and non-elites generally play a more important role in deliberative theories as well (Neblo et al., 2018). Though only a few embrace a strong, singular theory of the common good, they almost all have some robust notion of better and worse arguments in favor of prospective policy choices, and in judging their consequences after the fact (Neblo, 2005). Habermas, Mansbridge, Cohen, Dryzek, Fishkin, as well as Gutmann and Thompson have all proposed theoretical variants on the deliberative model (Bächtiger et al., 2010).

Finally, we distinguish between the kind and degree of humility required by the various roles that one might play in an actually functioning democracy. One tends to think of citizens (or perhaps all those subject to the political power of a given jurisdiction) as the obvious agents who relate to each other in terms of humility, arrogance, and diffidence, or greed and abnegation. Nearly all modern democracies, however, are representative democracies. So we must distinguish between the officials who make and enforce law and policy, and those subject to those laws and policies, but, being subject to them, typically elect their representatives (Minzioni et al., 2015). In addition to being representative, modern democracies are also typically large, complex states, governing a wide array of policy areas. Thus the role of policy experts in democracies has grown dramatically in the modern era; below, we will discuss the pattern of virtues necessary for the proper functioning of democracy according to each model as broken out by citizens, officials, and experts (Goold et al., 2012).

11.3 Competitive-elitist democracy

Citizens: in competitive-elitist models of democracy, average citizens play a minimal and highly indirect role in influencing policy. Political entrepreneurs (usually parties) package policy bundles and compete for votes and other forms of political support. As a relative matter, voters do not need to be highly informed in order to choose among those vying for their vote and, by extension, they do not have to display a high degree of cognitive humility in order for the system to run reasonably well by its own standards. Just so long as votes are not systematically perverse vis-a-vis relatively good policy (and voters do not empower authoritarians so that democracy itself fails), competitive-elitism can satisfy their theoretical and practical requirements. That said, citizens do have to evince a degree of conative humility in not empowering authoritarians or
(what amounts to almost the same) in supporting democratically empowered elites who refuse the peaceful transfer of power upon electoral losses. We can construe such conative humility in self-referential terms (being a virtuous person), interpersonally (being a good democratic citizen), and vis-a-vis history (recognizing that sacrificing short-term authoritarian advantage to long-term democratic goods is generally a poor strategy).

**Officials**: since elected officials are the first movers in competitive-elitist theories, they play a nearly determinative role in forming policy. They are broadly constrained by what they can sell voters, of course, but they stage political conflict in a way that sets the terms of debate. As such, the production of desirable deliberative and power dynamics in this system relies on them possessing more than a modicum of intellectual virtue, prominently cognitive humility. That said, the role of conative humility looms larger. Politicians willing to sacrifice social goods in the quest for a short- or even long-term hold on power have a lot of rope to hang all of us under this model of democracy. There need not exist a single common good in order for politics to realize all manner of (near) consensually bad outcomes. While this system would be self-sustaining in that elites need not consider any public goods in order to replicate it, the competitive-elitist system of democracy could hardly produce fair decision-making dynamics without the presence of humility. Conative humility toward future generations, in particular, would seem to be a desideratum of officials in competitive-elitist models of democracy.

**Experts**: since competitive-elitism places so few cognitive burdens on citizens, and only moderate ones on officials, it falls to experts to carry most of the cognitive weight of inputs into forming good public policy. As such, they would seem to need a higher degree of cognitive humility, depending on the structure of competition among policy experts. Similarly, since other democratic actors are not in a good position to challenge their cognitive contributions to the policy process, they would need a higher degree of conative humility in order not to exploit the slack in the system to their personal or collective advantage (again, conditional on the structure and degree of competition among elites—e.g., whether there is an overarching community of scientific experts, or whether they divided into think-tanks that roughly mirror the structure of partisan competition). Such exploitation is antithetical to the good democratic decision-making that humility is intended to buy us.

**11.4 Liberal democracy**

**Citizens**: the cognitive burden placed on average citizens under most liberal models of democracy are more extensive than under the competitive-elitist account, but, as we will see, less than that on the modal deliberative account. On a Madisonian account, for example, their main function is to select leaders with sound judgment, not just those whose policy packages promise the most payoff for one personally. Rather than staging all political conflict (constrained only by the broadest sense of public sentiment), leaders on the liberal model should, in the words of Federalist 10, “refine and enlarge the public views.” Note that, here, members of the public are, in a sense, the first actors, in contrast to the competitive-elitist view.

Under pluralism, most citizens are members of sub-groups that have more or less coherent values and interests. As such, they must articulate those values and interests, and thus need corresponding levels of cognitive humility so as not to under or even oversell their individual views. While they ought to be open to the possibility of being factually wrong, they also ought not to be so preoccupied with doubt that their views are not heard and enlarged by their representatives. Unlike in the competitive-elitism model, citizens must only select among representatives rather than among policy bundles, so they have a greater risk of their interests not being met if they are not appropriately articulating those interests. What cognitive humility gives us is a fairer
epistemic dynamic in citizens’ expression of their choices, such that personality is not predicting who is heard. But citizens are not generally responsible for wisely balancing and reconciling those values and interests against other groups. Hence the demands on both their cognitive and conative humility are more specific and less intense than those expected of their elected representatives. They are less intense in that there is a backstop against their arrogance and greed (i.e., the presumably more virtuous representatives). They are more specific in that their conative humility need not apply so much to their desire for first-order political goods, just so long as it does not extend to punishing elected officials who wisely and fairly sacrificed some of those first-order goods to the just demands of others and the commonweal more generally.

**Officials:** on the liberal model, elected officials are empowered by selection, but are more constrained than on the competitive model, where they stage almost all political conflict. Thus they need a middling level of cognitive humility. As with the elitist model, cognitive humility is required for parties to peacefully transfer power to others when the majority and minority balance changes. If each party is appropriately aware of the justifications for their beliefs and open to the possibility that they might be wrong, it will be easier to pass the torch to another ideological group than if they inappropriately overvalue the positive epistemic status of their beliefs. In addition, however, on the liberal model they must also attempt to “refine and enlarge the public views” by making reasonable trade-offs between social groups.

Conative humility is important for representatives on a Madisonian understanding of liberal democracy for similar reasons. The peaceful transfer of power and reasonably balancing group interests are only possible when officials understand that their desires do not warrant more attention than the desires of other elected officials, since they were all chosen by the same selection process and represent plural worldviews and interests. Even if the quality of representatives differs such that some do a better job encapsulating the interests of their districts and some do worse, this would still not warrant officials discrediting the desires of others on this basis. Not only would other officials not know the quality of other officials’ representation unless they were well acquainted with another official’s constituents, but the selection model of liberal democracy does not require that representation be good as long as the official has the legitimacy of having been elected. Ultimately, epistemic virtue on a liberal model depends on the ability of incumbent representatives to exercise self-restraint, since they are in a position to achieve their desires if they believe they are deserving (Neblo, 2004). In theory, if they recognize that their own knowledge is limited, then they are more likely to acknowledge that government itself ought also to be limited (Kober, 1997).

**Experts:** since on the liberal model officials are presumed to have some of the knowledge and judgment allocated to experts on the elitist model, their need for both cognitive and conative humility is correspondingly less, though that is not to say negligible. At the cognitive level, they need to avoid confusing their own desires with their expertise, and, at the conative level, they need to avoid exploiting their superior knowledge against elected officials (and, to a lesser extent, the public). Which is to say that they need both types of humility to a moderate degree.

### 11.5 Deliberative democracy

**Citizens:** theorists have developed many variants on the basic deliberative model, but for all of them the cognitive burden placed on citizens is generally at least somewhat higher than on the liberal and competitive-elitist models. The distinction between proceduralist and epistemic interpretations of deliberative theory does not really change this burden all that much, since the quality of procedures includes criteria like the informedness and reasoning of the deliberators (Neblo, 2006). That said, some have overestimated the cognitive demands on the deliberative
account. The idea is not that average citizens should quit their day jobs and spend all of their time deliberating about all the issues of the day. The main claim is only that the quality of the reasoning processes feeding into the policy process (as they are broadly understood) matter for judging the quality of the outcomes (Lazer et al., 2015). Since, on most deliberative accounts, the line between average citizens and officials is at least somewhat blurred, their need for both cognitive and conative humility increases accordingly. Moreover, worries over vices of excess loom larger on the deliberative account. Denigrating one’s cognitive status and legitimate conative claims is more likely to lead to injustices on the deliberative model than on the other two (Wu, 2011). When citizens themselves have the responsibility of seeing their interests heard and prioritized rather than leaving most of these demands up to officials, the interests of the too-humble citizen are more likely to be ignored in favor of the interests of the more assertive.

Official: since, on the deliberative model, citizens, officials, and experts are all responsible for the quality of debate, the cognitive demands on officials is somewhat less (in relative terms) than on the other two models. Rather than officials being first movers (as with the competitive-elitist theory) or second movers (as with liberal theories), the deliberative model imagines a much more recursive and cooperative process cycling through the larger political system (Lazer et al., 2011). Both cognitive and conative humility, then, are importantly and somewhat distinctively directed among civil society, formal government actors, and expert communities.

Expert: as with elected representatives and governmental officials more generally, experts bear a bit less of the relative cognitive burden of forming good policy on the deliberative model because their cognitive status is something akin to first-among-equals, rather than constituting a qualitative break in deliberative capacity regarding policy. Jasanoff (2003), for example, argues for “technologies of humility” vis-a-vis scientific expertise in democracy. As such, experts’ need for both cognitive and conative humility, while still substantial, is less acute than on the other two models. Given that the deliberative model requires more humility on the part of the average citizen than the other models, we need to analyze such demands in practice to see how democratic citizens might practically realize such virtue.

11.6 Sophrosyne and deliberative democracy

Skeptics of deliberative conceptions of democracy often point to the rather demanding expectations imposed on citizens in the deliberative account. With some justice, critics argue that it is utopian to believe that sufficient numbers of citizens in mass democracy will dramatically improve their knowledge about politics and sophistication in reasoning about policy. We argue that the key characteristic required of deliberative democratic citizens is not so much political knowledge, sophistication in reasoning, or, in their absence, humility as it is narrowly understood. Rather, the key trait to develop is something akin to what the ancients called sophrosyne, a conceptual cousin to humility, but whose broader connotations are remarkably apt for fostering good democratic—and especially deliberative democratic—citizenship (Neblo, 2011).

The Greek word has an unusually wide range of translations, but it is often rendered as temperance, moderation, sobriety, self-control, and sound-mindedness. Sophrosyne is alone among the ancient cardinal virtues in lacking a clear modern referent, and it has been relatively neglected in updated accounts of politics and the virtues. Yet, we argue that sophrosyne is a particularly needful virtue in the citizenry if a deliberative conception of democracy is to fulfill its purpose of allowing us to steer between technocratic elitism, vulgar populism, and an anomic politics-as-market. Unlike producing vast increases in information and political sophistication, fostering sophrosyne in the context of democratic deliberation is a plausible goal. Thus, it should be regarded as a kind of low-hanging fruit for hopes of democratic reform.
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In his underappreciated dialogue Charmides, Plato runs through four definitions of sophrosyne (quietness, modesty, minding one’s own business, and knowledge of what one knows and does not know). Despite the aporetic ending of the dialogue, these definitions, taken together, sketch a syndrome of deliberative habits that is remarkably well tailored to ameliorating the main vulnerabilities of deliberative politics in an imperfect world. The main barriers to deliberation are not rooted in individuals being ignorant or naïve, but rather in mobilizing the knowledge and judgment latent in varying sectors of the public appropriately.

Each of the definitions bear some connection to our broad notion of humility as it relates to democratic politics. Quietness is necessary for listening to others, a precondition for cognitive humility, and an enactment of conative humility insofar as one is not trying to win the debate by any means. Obviously one must not be too quiet, which is one of the reasons that Socrates rejects quietness as an adequate definition. That said, even if humility is a bi-valent concept, most people are, as a general matter, more apt to both cognitive and conative assertiveness than their opposites (though, in a political context, this may be less true of women and under-represented minorities). Thus urging a bit more quietness is wise counsel for most of us, most of the time.

Plato’s second definition, modesty, seems to be almost constitutive of humility (again, on the presumption that more people tend toward assertiveness than self-effacement more often than not). The dialogue’s third definition, “minding one’s own business,” is crucial for finding the virtuous mean: we should be more assertive when we are relative experts and our well-being is most at stake, and less so when the reverse is true (Minozzi et al., 2012). Finally, “knowledge of what one knows and does not know,” is a kind of second-order knowledge that is again necessary for properly sorting cases where we should be deferent versus those where assertiveness would be appropriate.

Thus, if we want to correct the vulnerabilities of deliberation, we have a duty as citizens to foster reasoned discourse about public matters in a manner congruent with sophrosyne. Many people, however, treat political choices like impulsive consumer choices and political discourse like a call-in show on sports radio. If we are going to use our political power to pass laws affecting our fellow citizens, though, we owe each other reasoned explanations in a way that we do not about what sports teams we support or what toothpaste we buy. Political choices are different from consumer choices and sports loyalties because laws are enforced by people with guns.

That said, discourse governed by sophrosyne is not the same as polite, unemotional discourse. Democracies sometimes need passionate protest, and civil disobedience can actually be a duty in extreme cases (Neblo, 2003). The tricky part is knowing the difference between gross injustices that cry out for redress, and deep but reasonable disagreements that people in a diverse society cannot avoid. Who is to decide which is which? The first amendment to the U.S. constitution, wisely, says that it cannot be the government itself—the people with guns. So the only ones left to decide are you and me and our fellow citizens. That is one of the main reasons why sophrosyne is so important to good deliberative citizenship, and usefully augments standard accounts of the role of humility in democratic politics. As a sibling virtue to humility, sophrosyne adds needed dimensions to our understanding of democratic virtues, but cannot replace humility. We can certainly argue, then, that humility understood this way not only relates to how citizens epistemically evaluate conclusions and prioritize goals, but also to whether or not they are confident in their societal goals and can reasonably expect them to be accomplished.

11.7 Humility and political efficacy

Empirically oriented political scientists conceptualize and measure a widely studied construct they call political “efficacy.” Efficacy comes in distinct “internal” and “external” varieties.
External political efficacy measures people’s beliefs that they can influence the political system—e.g., that elected officials will listen and respond to their input. Internal political efficacy measures people’s sense of competence to participate in politics—e.g., that the policy process is not too complicated for a person like them to understand. In principle, the two concepts can swing independently of each other as an empirical matter: e.g., one might believe that government officials should be responsive to me because I am politically competent, and yet believe that such officials will not, in fact, be responsive.

Obviously internal political efficacy is related to cognitive humility vis-a-vis democratic citizenship. Heretofore, there has been some confusion in the literature because political scientists have assumed that humility is univalent—those who are cognitively humble do not think of themselves as especially competent, and hence there would be a negative relationship between cognitive humility and internal efficacy. But on the bi-valent conception of cognitive humility, the relationship becomes more complex. Presumably one should express levels of internal political efficacy appropriate to one’s actual level of political competence. If so, then the relationship between humility and efficacy is open to further exploration, and may even exhibit “unfolding” properties—i.e., rather than relating in a linear fashion, the relationship would follow an inverted U shape, since one might be inappropriately matched in either direction: excess or deficiency.

Additionally, most political science literature casts high levels of political efficacy as a good thing. Democratic legitimacy hinges on reasonable levels of external political efficacy, and democratic engagement relies on people believing that they are competent to participate (Neblo et al., 2010). But given the augmentation of humility with sophrosyne, one should generally “mind one’s own business” and remain vigilant about “what one knows and does not know,” rather than assuming more self-confidence is always a good thing. This divergence might result from modern politics reversing which vice is more common: whereas in most cases people have too high an opinion of themselves (e.g., 90% of people believe that they are above average drivers), in modern mass politics, many people feel disempowered and overwhelmed by the complexity of the policy process. Conditional on entering the process they may tend toward over-assertiveness, but many are hesitant to begin in the first place.

In the empirical literature, Grönlund et al. (2010) hypothesized that deliberation would increase both kinds of political efficacy by increasing people’s political knowledge. Instead, they found that deliberation led to a slight decrease in internal political efficacy, though Morrell (2005) and Nabatchi (2010) found positive effects. Esterling et al. (2011) found that deliberation between elected officials and members of the public increased external political efficacy for the public, but did not affect internal political efficacy either way (though this null finding might be a result of people more appropriately estimating their political competence—i.e., that those who were excessively high on internal political efficacy were humbled somewhat, and those who were excessively low experienced a better sense of their potential). Interestingly, Himmelroos et al. (2017) found that “enclave” deliberation—i.e., among like-minded people—significantly increased internal political efficacy among marginalized groups with few political resources. This discussion of political efficacy suggests potential reforms of standard democratic practices as well.

11.8 Humility and delegative democracy

Recently there has been a surge of interest in a novel form of governance called “delegative” (or sometimes “liquid”) democracy (Blum and Zuber, 2016). The idea is that voters have the option of delegating their voting power to others. They can always vote themselves, or vote on some
issues but not others, or revoke or change their delegated authority. Some think of delegative democracy as a compromise between direct and representative democracy, but this view does not do justice to the potential flexibility of delegative democracy in that it could generate a variation on either of those pure theories, rather than standing as an alternative per se. For example, one could imagine a system of representative democracy in which votes for one’s representatives were subject to delegation. Similarly, one could imagine a system of direct democracy in which some people voted directly, while others delegated, or people mixed the topics that they delegated or engaged directly on. Several experiments in delegative democracy have been undertaken; for example, in Argentina, with the Democracia en Red initiative.

Delegative democracy is of special interest to those concerned about the role of humility in democracy because the entire system would seem to hinge on the virtuous exercise of both cognitive and conative humility. Knowing one’s own strengths and limits vis-a-vis different issues, as well as whom to trust as a delegate would be essential for delegative democracy to function properly. Further theoretical and empirical research on humility in such democratic innovations is well warranted.

11.9 Conclusion

Although humility is sometimes understood as univalent such that one can never be too humble, this understanding can be more harmful than helpful for understanding its role in democracy. Although citizens ought to overestimate neither their epistemic conclusions nor the level of priority that should be attributed to their societal goals, it is also important that they not underestimate these. For this reason, we examine a bi-valent concept, where the ideal is a virtuous mean between extremes.

We have outlined several advantages to this approach. Since we have identified that deliberative models in particular place a high virtuous burden on citizens, this conception of humility taken alongside the Greek virtue of sophrosyne allows us to more clearly identify how citizens in a deliberative model ought to behave. This approach shifts the focus away from democracy as a consumer choice and toward democracy as a reasoned discourse regarding what is just or unjust. Aside from these normative advantages, our concept of humility also has practical benefits. Treating humility as bi-valent gives us space to explore how humility and political efficacy relate from one problematic extreme to the other. Additionally, we can use humility to help us understand innovations in democracy and deliberation.

Our hope is that humility will be a useful lens through which to see how democracy might be improved and its advantages made more attractive. Democracy itself incorporates both the modesty of the average citizen’s everyday experiences as well as the hubris of narrow self-interest in people’s views and demands. Exploring how individuals can balance themselves between diffidence and arrogance may give us insight as to how government might do the same.

Note

1 In the discussion below, we have been informed by, but freely modify the taxonomy and analyses in, Kelly (2012: 44–58).

References


