Who Heeds the Call of the Party in Congress?

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Abstract

When party leaders seek support, who heeds the call and who remains unswayed? The canonical error-free spatial model of voting predicts the targeting of fence-sitting moderates. In contrast, we advance a random-utility-based model of party calls, wherein legislators who benefit the most from a common party position respond to the call of party leaders. This model predicts that extremists will heed the call of the party more than moderates, even upon controlling for baseline rates of voting with the party. To test this prediction, we develop a new method to identify "party-influenced votes," to generate estimates of "party-free ideal points," and to examine rates of responsiveness to political parties across members in the House of Representatives between 1973 and 2006. We find that, contrary to common portrayals of party influence, those most responsive to their parties are not the chamber moderates. Rather, responsiveness is greatest for ideological extremists in both the majority and minority parties, declining significantly among more moderate members. This finding sets the stage for new theoretical and empirical work on the role of parties in Congress.

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A common portrayal of partisan coalition building in Congress involves the targeting of fence-sitting moderates. Having secured the party's base, majority party leaders work to win over swing voting moderates, perhaps through concessions in the bill itself or through a variety of side deals. Yet, in so doing, more extreme members of the majority party (whether liberal Democrats or conservative Republicans) grumble that they may not be able to hold with the party any longer. Finally, a deal is struck, votes are cast, and a new policy is brought into being.

As compelling as this narrative may seem, this form of party influence in floor voting, while possibly important, is rare. Instead, we argue that the main role of party influence in congressional voting is one of coordination. Given the number of votes cast, the complexity of issues, and the many pressures to which members of Congress must respond, lawmakers are unsure about just how to vote on many issues. When the party leadership determines that a particular position would be valuable to the party as a whole – to develop a brand name on a specific issue, to advance a broader agenda, to thwart a presidential proposal – a call is sent out to party members to vote together in the best interests of the party. For those who most benefit from the party's brand name, for example, this call resolves any uncertainty and brings these members in line with their party. For a lawmaker who had a well-formed opinion on the issue at hand (due to its salience to the member, her district, or favored interest groups), the party call does little to sway her vote. And for moderate members, who may actually benefit electorally by differentiating their positions from their party, this call may have little influence (or occasionally may lead to a vote *against* the party).

Unlike the rare persuasion of fence-sitting moderates on the occasional close and highly contentious vote, the call to coordinated party action is commonplace, detectable, and has systematic effects on voting patterns in Congress. Put bluntly, scholars may have been looking in the wrong place for party influence in floor voting.

In this article, we turn from the familiar questions of "whether" and "when" parties matter in Congress to questions of "who" and "how."[1] To do so, we devise and deploy a method for exploring who heeds the call of the party, while crucially controlling for ideology and the baseline propensity to vote with the party absent such influence. Specifically, we (a) separate party-influenced votes from party-free votes, (b) generate party-free ideological ideal points, (c) calculate support rates for each member on both party-influenced and party-free votes, and (d) examine which member attributes are associated with support on party-influenced votes *above and beyond* the baseline rates of voting with the party absent party influence.[2] Using this procedure, we explain who responds to their party in the House of Representatives between 1973 and 2006. Although many factors affect party responsiveness, we focus on the role of ideology, controlling for other considerations.

In so doing, we uncover strong support for the theory of party calls. The main effect of party on roll call voting is not the targeting of moderates on close votes, and it is not a constant effect across all members. Rather, in vote after vote, in Congress after Congress, the role of party is to issue a clarion call, a call to set aside other considerations and join with the party. Those who heed this call are the members who can do so at the lowest cost and at the highest gain, specifically the ideological extremists for whom a vote with the party tends to not be as much of a sacrifice of other considerations as it might be for more cross-pressured moderates.

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[1] In an early step in this direction, Roberts and Smith (2003) study how differences among representatives (e.g., being from the South, being of the "new breed," or being moderate) contribute to party polarization. Canes-Wrone, Rabinovich, and Volden (2007) explore member-specific voting in their assessment of the classic "marginality hypothesis."

[2] The clear correlation between ideology and partisan voting has long been known, and can be demonstrated systematically. For example, Carson et al. (2010) study accountability in party unity voting; in so doing, they instrument for party unity with roll call ideological extremism and show that the two are highly correlated. What is crucial to our study, however, is controlling for the baseline propensity of voting with the party (based on ideological or other considerations) in order to determine which members of Congress join with the party *even more strongly* upon hearing the party's call to action.

Theory and Hypotheses

For at least thirty years, the spatial model has dominated theories of legislative behavior. Among the virtues of the spatial model is its limited and explicit set of assumptions. In the model, legislators make decisions solely based on policy, and policies are represented by points in a space, most commonly a single line running from "left" to "right." Each legislator has a favorite policy, or *ideal point*, and her preferences over policies are based on their proximity to this point. Given these assumptions, a legislator's vote on any particular roll call is perfectly determined by her ideal point and the points in the ideological space associated with voting Yea and Nay. Suppose for the sake of illustration that the Yea position is right of the Nay position. Then the model predicts that a legislator will vote Yea if and only if her ideal point is to the right of the cutpoint between the Yea and Nay positions.

But the classic spatial model is as notable for what it lacks as for what it includes. Krehbiel (1993) famously calls attention to a key omission: the spatial model lacks parties. To include parties in the spatial model, we must make an assumption about how parties affect legislators' vote choices. The simplest and most common such assumption is that the party offers a constant lump-sum inducement to any party member (or perhaps any legislator, regardless of party membership) who votes in the party's preferred direction.[3] Returning to the illustration from above, suppose that the party prefers its members to vote Yea. The constant inducement assumption implies a shift in the behavior of legislators near the middle. Some legislators now vote Yea but would have voted Nay in the absence of such an inducement. Specifically, these legislators have ideal points just to the left of the original cutpoint between Yea and Nay.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

[3] We can easily extend this assumption to the setting with competing parties if we regard this inducement as the difference between the amounts offered by the two competing parties.

The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates this prediction. In each panel of the figure, the horizontal axis represents ideological space, and the vertical axis measures the probability that a legislator will vote in the direction preferred by the party trying to exert influence (here assumed to be the party on the right). For simplicity, we illustrate the concepts here with a single party exerting influence. The two lines in each panel then capture the relationship between ideology and the probability of voting with the party both with and without party influence. The solid line represents this probability with party influence; the dashed line, without.

In the classic spatial model of the top panel, the probability of voting with the party jumps from 0 to 1 as soon as a legislator's ideal point exceeds a cutpoint. The effect of party involvement is to shift the pivotal cutpoint from the non-party-influenced c_0 to the party-influenced c_P by making the rightist Yea position more attractive. Upon doing so, legislators near the median (between c_P and c_0) switch from voting Nay to voting Yea, and the party moves from defeat to a narrow victory. Thus, the classic spatial model yields the following hypothesis:

Responsive Moderates Hypothesis: *Responsiveness to party decreases in ideological distance from the median.*

This hypothesis is consonant with much work on parties in Congress. In the classic spatial model, the floor median in the House is pivotal, crucial to overcoming gridlock (Brady and Volden 2006, Krehbiel 1998). Scholars often search for party effects by focusing on moderates. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001), for example, argue that "[p]arty discipline generally involves getting moderates to vote with extremists" (p. 676). Moderates may respond to the party more than extremists simply because extremists have nowhere else to go.

While the classic spatial model generates a useful hypothesis about who is most greatly influenced by political parties, the model is overly deterministic, generating a *certainty* of

expected voting patterns to the left or right of cutpoints that may be better represented in *probabilistic* terms. In moving from theoretical to empirical examinations, such probabilistic expectations become clearer. For example, ideal point estimation techniques such as those of Poole and Rosenthal (1985) or of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) are built on a version of the spatial model that includes the possibility of error, in the form of "random utility." In substantive terms, members of Congress base their legislative behavior on district pressures, interest group lobbying, personal preferences, institutional maintenance concerns, and views about good policy (e.g., Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1973), as well as on partisan or ideological concerns. Therefore, each member should be conceived of as having a probability of voting with her party on any particular issue.[4] Formally, in addition to policy-based preferences, each legislator also receives an unobservable, random shock to her utility from voting a particular way.[5] Given this assumption, each legislator has some probability of voting against the position dictated by her ideological leanings alone. This probability decreases the further a legislator's ideal point is from the cutpoint of the available policy options, as she moves from near indifference to a strong preference for one policy over the other. Not only does this overall prediction differ from that of the classic spatial model, but party influence is also predicted to have a different effect in the random utility setting. Because all legislators may now vote against the party with particular probabilities, an inducement has the potential to affect many legislators, not just those with ideal points near the midpoint.

[4] This probability does not capture legislators' "mistakes" so much as the vast number of possible reasons why any particular legislator might vote Yea or Nay on any particular roll call.

[5] Specifically, in the formalized version of the model in Supplemental Appendix A, we assume that each legislator gets an additive random utility shock ε for voting Yea. For simplicity, we assume ε *is* uniformly distributed with mean 0. Thus, the shock has the potential to tilt a legislator either toward Yea (if ε is positive) or toward Nay (if ε is negative).

The middle panel of Figure 1 illustrates this prediction of the random utility model with constant party influence across members. The dashed line represents the probability of voting with the party absent influence, and the solid line represents that probability with influence. In contrast to the classic spatial model, the prediction of the constant inducement assumption in the random utility model is that the effects of party influence are widespread. Again, the cutpoints c_0 and c_P are illustrative, with a majority of legislators to the right of c_0 voting Yea absent party influence and a majority to the right of c_P voting Yea in response to party influence. However, the effect of party influence here is not deterministic in changing the exact votes of moderates, but probabilistic. Moreover, because the inducement is assumed to be constant across members, party influence is predicted to be constant as well, yielding the following:

No Ideological Responsiveness Hypothesis: *Responsiveness to party is not associated with ideology.*

This hypothesis does not mean that liberals and conservatives vote with the Republicans equally, regardless of ideology. As the middle panel of Figure 1 illustrates, conservatives will vote with Republicans more frequently both with and without party influence. Rather, this hypothesis suggests that there will be no ideological explanation for voting with the party *above and beyond the baseline rate of voting with the party absent party influence*.

Of course, this hypothesis could obtain for other reasons. If parties are unable to influence their members, then little responsiveness is expected from any members whatsoever.[6] Another possibility is that parties do exert pressure on their members, but, because parties only need support on close votes, because close votes are uncommon, because only a few legislators are

[6] By its nature, this hypothesis takes the form of a null, against which the others are tested.

targeted on any such vote, and because the targeted group may vary from vote to vote, statistical tests are simply incapable of perceiving such direct party influence (Smith 2007, 85).

That said, we question the assumption that the benefit of voting with the party is constant across members. In keeping with the random utility model, we assume that, without any party influence, every legislator has some probability of voting with the party. However, we conceptualize party influence not as a payment (e.g., Groseclose and Snyder 1996) nor as pressure on particular members, but as a *call* to all members to vote with the party. Party calls may be issued for a variety of reasons, such as to build the party's brand name, by associating it with particular positions (e.g., Snyder and Ting 2002, Woon and Pope 2008). Party calls may be issued in a variety of forms, ranging from use of the whip system (e.g., Burden and Frisby 2004, Meinke 2008), to caucus meetings (Sinclair 1995), to notes, flyers, or (more recently) emails informing members of the party's position (Carson, Crespin, and Madonna 2012).[7]

When the party calls on its members, the importance of all other considerations diminishes somewhat, as members decide whether to heed the call. The utility for voting with the party depends on the value of the party brand to a legislator. Members for whom other considerations are not salient (legislators from non-farm districts in voting on agricultural policy, for example) may be more likely to heed the party's call. Members for whom the party's brand name produces electoral value, such as Democrats from districts packed with Democratic voters, likewise heed the call. Such an effect distinguishes the theory of party calls from the classic spatial model, and is entirely consistent with recent works noting that political parties are

[7] The signal by party leaders is akin to the "bell cows" strategy that Trent Lott used as party whip when he served in the House. He used a small group of "natural leaders" to signal how the party wished members to vote, "much as a rancher bells the lead cow so the herd can follow" (Lott 2005, 82). Future work examining specific coordination mechanisms may be fruitful. Carson, Crespin, and Madonna (2012) offer a good start in this direction with their study of majority leader position statements, yielding results consistent with the theory of party calls.

endogenous, designed for the general benefit of their members (Patty 2008, Volden and Bergman 2006).[8] If the benefit for voting with the party increases with ideological extremity, then, when the party calls, the members most ideologically predisposed to the party's position go along, while those who are ideologically torn hold firm to their former commitments.

The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates this prediction, based on the formalization provided in Supplemental Appendix A. As in the above two panels, the dashed line represents the probability of voting for the party's preferred position absent party call or influence. However, the solid line now increases much more sharply as the ideal point of a legislator becomes more extreme, and the difference between the probabilities of voting for the party's position with and without a call is largest for those at the far right. Notably, for some legislators, the probability of voting for the party's preferred position decreases when the party calls, as some members may gain from distancing themselves from their party (or especially from the opposing party) on particular issues. Put another way, the costs of voting with the party are much lower for extremists than for moderates who would more likely be voting against their constituents.[9] As before, c_P and c_0 again illustrate the points beyond which a majority (in expectation) vote Yea with or without party influence, respectively. However, because the party is motivated not only by winning the vote at hand, but also by establishing a brand name that may serve the party electorally and for years to come, party calls need not be limited to close votes that require party influence for victory. With respect to ideological positions, the party calls model generates the following hypothesis:[10]

[8] Unlike these works, however, we find the effects of party calls to hold regardless of majority party's size, as documented in Supplemental Appendix D.

[9] Because moderates benefit much less from party calls than do extremists, parties may need to compensate them in other ways, consistent with Jenkins and Monroe (N.d.).

[10] Other, possibly nonlinear, patterns between ideology and responsiveness are explored and rejected in Supplemental Appendix B.

Responsive Extremists Hypothesis: *Responsiveness to party increases in ideological extremism, with liberals more likely to respond to Democratic calls and conservatives more likely to respond to Republican calls.*

Ultimately, the theory of party calls rests on three assumptions that differ from the canonical spatial model. First, consistent with empirical assessments of ideological ideal points, we incorporate a random utility assumption, because voting in Congress is probabilistic and complex rather than determined solely by a cutpoint on a line. Second, consistent with theories of party brand names, we allow the benefits of party voting to vary across members, because members from liberal districts benefit more from voting with Democrats than do members from conservative districts. Third, party influence is not limited to winning close votes; rather party calls are issued broadly, even when they do not affect the specific vote outcome at hand.

Empirical Approach

To test the above hypotheses, it would be useful to know which votes involved party calls or pressure and then to examine the ideological nature of the responses to those party actions. However, due to the varied means at the disposal of party leaders and due to the fact that party calls need not be solely (or even mainly) on particular types of votes (such as close votes over which there are recorded whip counts), such a research strategy must be refined. Thankfully, the above competing hypotheses can instead be assessed in terms of which members support the party at a greater rate in the presence or absence of a high degree of partisan voting. To do so, we merely need to separate votes into those that are highly partisan and those with lower partisan activity, and then to examine member support rates across those two types of votes.

This research strategy, while theoretically straightforward, is not without its own challenges. The classic approach to discerning when party influence is relevant for roll call

voting was to simply isolate "party votes," those where a majority (or more) of one party opposed a majority of the other party, and to compare those votes to all others. "Party support scores" or "party unity scores" are also easily generated by looking at how frequently each member voted with her party leader or with most of her party. Yet such measures are problematic. Party votes may occur simply because of an alignment of ideological preferences. And party support scores do not account for how frequently a member would *already* support the party *absent* party influence, merely based on ideology or other factors.

What we seek, therefore, is a way to isolate votes with significant party influence above and beyond ideological alignment, and then to measure the degree to which members are responsive to the party as revealed by their votes with the party across party-influenced votes and votes without such influence. While isolating such votes and measuring differential response rates is difficult, scholars who have been trying to discern *whether* parties matter have made significant advances upon which we build (e.g., Snyder and Groseclose 2000).

Specifically, we apply a three-stage process to test the above hypotheses. First, we discern which votes in the House of Representatives exhibit a significant party effect, above and beyond baseline voting patterns that arise naturally from ideological dispositions of members. Second, we use these sets of "party-influenced" and "party-free" votes to measure how frequently members vote with their co-partisans on these two sets of votes. Third, we use these support rates to explore the association between members' party support on "party-influenced votes" and their ideological positions, controlling for their party support on "party-free votes" and other factors. Each stage presents challenges, and thus we discuss each in detail.

Identifying Party-Influenced Votes and Generating Party-Free Ideal Points

The main challenge in identifying which votes are subject to partisan influence and which are not comes from determining how members would naturally vote in the absence of party

influence, based on their ideological preferences. Measuring such ideological ideal points based on members' overall voting patterns and then using those ideal points to analyze the votes themselves is problematic in its circularity. However, without accounting for ideology, the underlying voting patterns of members cannot be well explained. We seek to overcome these problems by generating a set of ideal points that are based on "party-free" votes, and then using those ideal points to assess who votes with the party on "party-influenced" votes.

We develop and deploy an iterative procedure to identify the set of party-influenced votes and estimate party-free ideal points.[11] Following Snyder and Groseclose (2000), we start by classifying all lopsided votes as an initial candidate for the set of party-free votes, and all close votes as an initial candidate for the set of party-influenced votes. The partition of roll call votes into close and lopsided categories has been criticized for biasing ideal points (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001), and accordingly, our process does not depend on this criterion for very long. Instead, the first step of each iteration is to use the Bayesian model developed by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) to estimate ideal points using only the candidate set of party-free votes.[12] The second step is to identify a new candidate set of party-influenced votes by fitting a series of logistic regression models.[13] For each roll call, we regress legislators' votes on our newly estimated "party-free" ideal points and a binary indicator for party. We then use the coefficient on party for each roll call vote to determine whether the vote was party-influenced.

[11] The technical details of this approach are characterized in Supplemental Appendix C.
[12] We use the Bayesian model because of its flexibility and its parsimonious representation of the spatial model (Clinton and Jackman 2009).
[13] The logistic model is appropriate for this sort of binary setting and does not suffer from biasing the results in favor of finding party support as does a linear regression model (Cox and Poole 2002). Because separation (i.e., one regressor perfectly predicting the outcome) becomes a problem, we apply a penalized likelihood logistic regression model (Zorn 2005). More generally, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001) offer a series of critiques of the Snyder and Groseclose (2000) procedure, which we seek to overcome in our approach, as detailed in Supplemental Appendix C.

A roll call vote is included in the new candidate set of party-influenced votes if the coefficient on party is statistically significant at the threshold of $p = 0.01$.[14] Such votes may arise from activities of *either* or *both* parties, a distinction that affects neither the theory of party calls nor the tests of hypotheses. All other votes are included in the new candidate set of party-free votes, and the process repeats, with new "party-free" ideal points estimated and new sets of party-influenced and party-free votes identified. Of course, any threshold used to label some votes as party-influenced and some as party-free will result in classification errors. For example, there may be many votes on which parties played a significant role, but not one detected with 99% confidence. However, for our purposes, it is sufficient to define a set of votes on which the party influence was *relatively greater* than for the other set. The method used here does just that.

For each Congress from the 93rd to the 109th, we iterate this procedure until it stabilizes.[15] Once put into practice, the process quickly moves from the initial lopsided and close subsets into new and stable categories.[16] Significant partisan voting blocs emerge in nearly half of all votes, above and beyond what can be explained by simple ideological similarity.[17]

[Insert Table 1 about here]

Table 1 reports cross-tabs of roll call votes comparing our categorization with existing vote categorizations, combining data from all seventeen Congresses we analyze. First, while parties do influence their members on many lopsided votes and fail to exert influence on many close

[14] This threshold divides votes into nearly equal halves. Other thresholds yield substantively similar results on the hypothesis tests below.
[15] Although it would be theoretically possible to build tests of our hypotheses into these individual vote analyses with variables capturing relative responsiveness based on ideological positions, such inclusion of such measures at this stage raises difficulties in cleanly separating party-free from party-influenced votes. We therefore conduct individual-level hypothesis tests once these different types of votes emerge from our iterative procedure.
[16] Implicit in this empirical approach (and in the above theory building) is an alignment of members in a single dimension. We comment on possible multidimensionality in the conclusion.
[17] Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001) and Snyder and Groseclose (2000) likewise find sizable numbers of party-influenced votes using their approaches.

votes, the close/lopsided distinction seems to be a good starting point. About 69% of lopsided votes are classified as party-free, and 66% of close votes as party-influenced. A chi-squared test indicates that a significant positive relationship exists between close votes and party-influenced votes ($\chi^2 = 1764.0$, $p < 0.001$). Likewise, there is a statistically significant pattern of greater party influence on procedural votes than on substantive votes ($\chi^2 = 33.8$, $p < 0.001$), consistent with earlier scholarship (e.g., Jenkins, Crespin, and Carson 2005). Finally, there is a statistically significant relationship with *CQ*'s "party unity votes" ($\chi^2 = 1601.9$, $p < 0.001$).[18]

Table 1 serves two main purposes. First, the table provides evidence that the classification scheme used here is capturing an underlying set of votes that exhibit party influence. The validity of the classifications made here is evaluated positively by the high degree of correlation between our approach and the traditional beliefs that party influence is greater on close votes, on procedural votes, and on commonly-labeled "partisan votes." Second, the table provides initial evidence in support of the theory of party calls over the classic spatial model of party influence. The classic model predicts influence only on close votes, in the rare instances where such influence is exerted to change the outcome.[19] Instead, consistent with party calls, party influence is evident on nearly half of all votes, even relying on a strict 99% confidence interval for labeling a vote as party-influenced. Moreover, thousands of these votes are lopsided, substantive, and/or "consensus" votes according to previously used criteria. That is, they are votes where party calls may be relevant and useful, but where classic patterns of targeted party activities to win the vote at hand are likely irrelevant or ineffective.

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[18] Cross-tabs comparing our classification approach to that of Cox and Poole (2002) shows a significant positive relationship as well ($\chi^2 = 645$, $p < 0.001$). In contrast, the correlation between party influenced votes and whip count votes identified by Larry Evans (e.g., Evans and Grandy 2009) is not statistically significant, perhaps indicating that party calls extend well beyond the limited number of relatively close votes that require whip counts.

[19] King and Zeckhauser (2003) offer compelling evidence that this sort of activity does exist, by way of "hip-pocket votes," even if it may not be the most pervasive form of party influence.

In addition to classifying votes into party-influenced and party-free, the set of party-free votes from the last iteration of our classification procedure is used to estimate a final set of ***Party-Free Ideal Points***, which is scaled with mean 5.0 and standard deviation 1.0 and ranges from 0 for the most liberal members to 10 for the most conservative members.[20] Although we only utilize the party-free votes to generate these ideal points, they seem to be tapping into the same underlying ideological dimension as revealed using procedures that include all votes; but the ideal points generated here simply are not biased (as significantly) toward also capturing party-influenced ideological considerations. For example, our Party-Free Ideal Points correlate highly with Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) first-dimension NOMINATE scores.[21]

Measuring Baseline Rate and Responsiveness Rate

We now wish to assess not *whether* members were influenced by party activities on any given vote, but *who* was influenced the most on average across votes. For each legislator, we calculate the percentage of the time that the legislator voted with her party on the sets of party-free and party-influenced votes identified above.[22] We label these variables ***Baseline Rate of Voting with the Party*** and ***Rate of Responsiveness to Party Influence***, and refer to them as the "Baseline Rate" and "Responsiveness Rate," respectively.[23]

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[20] Altering the mean and variance of this measure has no effect on the substantive interpretation of results below, but the scaling used here does ensure that all ideal points are positive and eases the interpretation of results.

[21] Correlation coefficients vary between a low of $|\rho| \approx 0.873$ for the 93rd Congress and a high of $|\rho| \approx 0.984$ for the 103rd, with the median correlation across our Congresses being 0.972.

[22] We also re-ran our analyses using the party leader's and party whip's positions to determine the position of the party, yielding similar results to those discussed below.

[23] The Baseline Rates average about 84.8% across members, and the Responsiveness Rates average about 83.4%. At first, this seems implausible, with rates of support for the party position being higher absent party influence. However, this odd finding reflects the high correlation between lopsided and party-free votes. Baseline Rates may be higher than Responsiveness Rates because vast majorities of both parties took the same position on many highly lopsided votes. Inspecting support rates on the subsets of party-free and party-influenced votes in which parties

Examples of members and their voting rates can help illustrate this approach. James Traficant (D, OH-17) was an independent thinker in Congress who engaged in unprecedented levels of floor amendment activity across a wide array of issues, deriving his positions from sources legal, illegal, and extraterrestrial.[24] Unsurprisingly, he had among the lowest baseline rates of support for his party throughout his tenure (about 35%). But on party-influenced votes, he came much more into line with the party, setting aside his other concerns and voting with Democrats about two-thirds of the time. In contrast, Ron Paul (R, TX-14) had a generally high baseline level of alignment with his party (voting with Republicans about 70% of the time) given his libertarian leanings. However, on party-influenced votes, he was unswayed, holding strongly to those libertarian principles (voting with the party about half the time).[25] While nearly all members fit between these two, these archetypes show the behaviors captured by our measures. What we wish to explore is whether those who follow the party on party-influenced votes (relative to their baseline rate of support) tend to be the moderates, as expected by the canonical error-free spatial model, or the extremists, in line with the theory of party calls.

Testing Hypotheses

The dependent variable for the analyses is the Responsiveness Rate, developed and discussed above.[26] Given our focus on the differing responsiveness across members with

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took opposing positions confirms this conjecture, with a substantial reduction in the average Baseline Rate and a slight *increase* in the average Responsiveness Rate.

[24] Often ending his floor speeches with the *Star Trek* phrase "Beam me up," Traficant was convicted on federal corruption charges in 2002.

[25] In addition to his unsuccessful campaigns for President as a Republican, Paul has been the presidential nominee of the Libertarian Party and affiliated with the Tea Party movement.

[26] Although one may be interested in the *difference* between the Responsiveness Rate and the Baseline Rate, using such a difference as the dependent variable in our analysis is likely to be problematic. Due to the differing nature of votes with and without party influence, these rates are not immediately comparable. Conducting regressions with Responsiveness Rate as the dependent variable and Baseline Rate as an independent variable allows for the baseline rate to be properly accounted for, without forcing its coefficient to take a value of one (which would be

different ideological positions, the key independent variables are derived from the Party-Free Ideal Points. However, responsiveness to party could be a function of numerous considerations. Therefore, we incorporate a large number of control variables as part of the analysis, falling into four categories.[27] First, we include a member's Baseline Rate to anchor our inferences about responsiveness. Failing to do so would merely show the standard alignment between ideology and partisanship, without any ability to discern an *added* effect of responsiveness to party calls, thus producing a bias toward the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis.

Second, we control for district-level variation using three variables: the ***Presidential Vote Share*** won by the Democratic candidate for president in the member's district in the most recent previous election, an indicator for whether a member was from the ***South***, and the ***Vote Share*** won by the member herself in the previous election. Third, we control for personal characteristics, including indicators for whether a member was ***Female***, ***African-American***, ***Latino***, a ***Freshman***, or a ***Retiree*** at the end of the term, and a measure of ***Seniority*** equal to the number of terms a member served up to and including the current term.[28] Finally, we include institutional variables, including indicators for whether a member was a ***Party Leader***, a member of a ***Power Committee***[29], ***Speaker***, or a ***Committee Chair***, as well as a measure of a member's ***Best Committee*** assignment based on the ordinal rankings of Groseclose and Stewart (1998). All variables, their descriptions, data sources, and summary statistics are given in the Appendix.

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assumed upon using the difference in rates as the dependent variable). As reported below, such a control variable is indeed an important predictor of the responsiveness rate, and its coefficient is found to be statistically distinct from one.

[27] Regressions that also include the amount that members receive in campaign contributions from the party and its members' political action committees (available in recent Congresses) show no significant differences in support for the hypotheses from the results discussed below.

[28] In an alternative specification, we also included the squares of the Vote Share and Seniority variables to account for possible nonlinear effects, but these did not alter the substantive impact of our results. Similarly, we estimated alternative models without the African-American indicator variable for Republicans, yielding no substantive changes to our results.

[29] These are coded to include Appropriations, Budget, Ways and Means, and Rules.

The effects of our main independent and control variables differ across parties, and so we estimate models that isolate members by party and use ideological independent variables constructed for each hypothesis.[30] First, to test the Responsive Moderates Hypothesis, we use ***Distance from Floor Median***, the absolute difference between a legislator's Party-Free Ideal Point and that of the median legislator.[31] Second, ***Ideological Extremism***, used to test the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis, is simply Party-Free Ideal Point for Republicans and Party-Free Ideal Point multiplied by -1 for Democrats.[32] All models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors.[33]

Results

We conduct analyses separately for each Congress from the 93rd (1973-74) through the 109th (2005-06). Given the statistical strength of the findings in nearly every Congress (as reported below), it is unsurprising that a pooled analysis (not reported here due to space considerations) also shows the same results. But first, we offer detailed results for a selection of three of the seventeen Congresses we studied: the 97th (1981-1982), 102nd (1991-1992), and 107th (2001-2002), spanning the decades of our study.

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[30] Chow tests show that we can reject the null hypotheses that there are no structural differences between majority and minority parties for each model within each Congress.

[31] For robustness, all of the ideological distance measures used to test the paper's main hypotheses are also re-created based on first-dimension NOMINATE scores rather than our Party-Free Ideal Points. This alternative yields no substantive differences in our findings.

[32] Each of these key independent variables imposes a particular structure on the form of the ideological variable and its relationship to estimated party responsiveness scores. In contrast, we ran Taylor-expansion-based models that included instead a fifth-order polynomial of the Party-Free Ideal Points, which allowed nearly any nonlinear effect of ideal points on responsiveness to be revealed. The results show a striking resemblance to those detailed below – very strong support for the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis above all others.

[33] A series of Breusch-Pagan tests shows that we can reject the null hypothesis of homoskedastic standard errors for almost every model we present here. Given the theoretical upper and lower bounds on the dependent variable, we also estimated tobit models for all equations, with results substantively similar to those discussed below.

Table 2 displays the results from separate models for these three Congresses by party, regressing Responsiveness Rate on Distance from Floor Median and the control variables. A negative coefficient on this distance variable would provide support for the Responsive Moderates Hypothesis, demonstrating that members near the floor median are most responsive to party influence, all else equal. However, the coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero in each case, providing initial evidence against the No Ideological Responsiveness and Responsive Moderates Hypotheses.

[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]

Table 3 presents alternative models of Responsiveness Rates for these three Congresses by party, replacing the Distance from Floor Median with Ideological Extremism. A positive coefficient on this variable would lend support to the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis, and this is indeed what we find ($p < 0.001$ in each case). This second set of models indicates that more ideologically extreme representatives heed party calls at a greater rate than do the more moderate members. For example, in the 107th Congress, Democrats who are one unit (equivalent to one standard deviation) more liberal than their co-partisans exhibit almost a 12% higher Responsiveness Rate, which is about equal to one standard deviation for the dependent variable.

Overall, the models designed to explain Responsiveness Rates fit the data well, explaining more than two-thirds of the variance in the dependent variable. Across all models and specifications, strong support emerges for the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis from the theory of party calls, coupled with strong evidence against the Responsive Moderates and No Ideological Responsiveness Hypotheses. Beyond the ideological distance measures, other independent variables also help to explain which members are most responsive to party calls on party-influenced votes. For example, the very significant coefficients on Baseline Rate of Voting with the Party show a strong positive relationship between those voting with the party

without being called upon and those voting with the party when called. Controlling for these natural coalitional tendencies is crucial because we wish to understand the *additional* support received on party-influenced votes above and beyond this baseline rate of support.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

We replicate our analyses for each party in each Congress from the 93rd through to the 109th (1973-2006). Figure 2 depicts the estimated coefficients and confidence intervals for Distance from Floor Median and Ideological Extremism that emerge from regression models similar to those in Tables 2 and 3. The top row includes only members of the majority party, while the bottom row is limited to the minority party. For each column, a single model is replicated across the 16 included Congresses. The 104th Congress, ushering in Republican control, is excluded from the figures as a significant outlier.[34]

The first column shows the results of models specified as in Table 2. Negative and significant coefficients would support the Responsive Moderates Hypothesis. Strikingly, however, the consistently positive coefficients decisively reject this hypothesis. Moreover, this first column litigates against the No Ideological Responsiveness Hypothesis. For the majority party, the 95% confidence interval includes zero in only 5 of the 16 Congresses, and the 50% confidence interval does so in only two. For the minority party, the 95% confidence interval includes zero for only the 109th Congress (2005-06).

The second column of Figure 2 replicates the models in Table 3 and displays the results for Ideological Extremism for each Congress. Consistent with the Responsive Extremists

[34] For example, whereas the coefficient on Ideological Extremism for the majority party in Figure 2 ranges from about 2.6 to about 14.0, that for the 104th Congress is 33.8, with a standard error of 3.7. Despite this larger coefficient size, the findings from this transitional Congress are altogether consistent with those of other Congresses, including support for the same hypothesis. The substantially larger coefficient sizes are intriguing and may be indicative of a greater heeding of party calls in the uncertain times following a change in party control of the House.

Hypothesis, the two panels show strongly positive coefficients on Ideological Extremism, statistically significant in all Congresses except the 98th (1983-84) for majority party members and the 109th for minority party members. These coefficients suggest an increase of 3% to 14% for majority party members and 2% to 14% for minority party members per unit of extremism.[35]

Put another way, consider a typical Congress, where the coefficient on Ideological Extremism takes a value of about 6.0 and the average Responsiveness Rate is 83%. Controlling for the baseline rate of support for the party, a member who is one standard deviation more moderate than the party median will heed the call of the party about three-fourths of the time. In contrast, a member one standard deviation more extreme than the party median will heed the call about nine out of ten times. Across the approximately 400 party-influenced votes in any given Congress identified in Table 1, this extreme member will respond to her party's calls on about 50 more votes than will her moderate co-partisan. Compared to the limited instances where votes are extremely close, each member is pivotal, and moderates are targeted and won over with concessions, the partisan effects uncovered here are substantial indeed.

Put simply, all else equal, for both the majority and minority parties, when party leaders seek support, extremists heed the call.[36] This is true even controlling for likelihood of voting

[35] We also conducted an out-of-sample test of our hypotheses, by replicating our analyses for the 111th Congress (2009-10). Results for this Congress mimic those from the 109th, with a coefficient on Ideological Extremism of 2.38 (t = 3.31) for the majority party and 1.35 (t = 1.78) for the minority party, once again supporting the theory of party calls. Given the growth of "Tea Party" membership in such recent Congresses, future work exploring responsiveness among party factions (such as Tea Party, Southern Democrats, or others) may be worthwhile.

[36] One may fear that the results found here would appear even absent party calls, merely due to party members sharing a common understanding of the benefits of voting together on particular issues that are partisan in nature. To address and explore this possible alternative, in Supplemental Appendix E we limit our analysis only to the procedural votes over which such position taking is less obvious, and find the same results – support for the theory of party calls.

with the party absent party influence. The findings are consistent across Congresses, seemingly unaffected by time trends, unified or divided government, and party control of Congress.[37]

Implications and Future Directions

In this paper, we isolate roll call votes that are highly partisan from those exhibiting low partisan behavior, controlling for natural ideological alignments. We show that ideological extremists vote with their party on these party-influenced votes much more frequently than do moderates, controlling for baseline rates of partisan voting absent party influence. This finding is consistent with the theory of party calls we advance. Of course, such a voting pattern could be consistent with other theories. However, one theory that the evidence is *not* consistent with is that built upon the classic spatial model, which predicts party influence to persuade fence-sitting moderates on close votes, and which has dominated the study of Congress in recent decades.[38]

In contrast to the classic model, we offer a new understanding of parties in Congress. Absent party influence, members of the House of Representatives often focus on many different considerations in deciding how to vote. Constituent and personal preferences, interest groups and campaign contributors, and even misunderstandings about the nature and content of the issues at hand, all combine to lead to messy patterns of roll call votes. Often, however, party leaders signal the party's preferred position, and ask members to support the party if they are

[37] One might wonder what explains the variation in the coefficients shown in Figure 2 across Congresses. To address this question, we conducted a meta-analysis by conducting pair-wise regressions of the point estimates of the coefficients of Ideological Extremism on party (Democrat or Republican), majority party status, a time trend, and the percentage of the Congress that were freshmen. In none of these cases did we find a statistically significant relationship, as detailed in Supplemental Appendix D. The appendix also shows a series of tests for whether artificial extremism based on the relative numbers of close and lopsided party-influenced votes in each Congress is driving our findings. The results dismiss this possibility.

[38] This is not to suggest that parties do not *also* pressure or induce member votes on specific bills of interest to the party. Persuasion (of moderates or others) may indeed be a second strategy of parties, following upon the more commonplace coordination activities uncovered here.

able to do so. Such a request, alone, may be sufficient to inform members about the issues at hand and to direct them regarding how to vote. Those best able to vote with the party are the members whose preferences most align with the party and who benefit the most from a strong, unified voice for their party. Such members are not typically the conflicted moderates, but the conservative Republicans and the liberal Democrats. Indeed, it may well be that these party calls explain a significant part of the close relationship between ideology and party voting.

This revised narrative of how parties exert influence in floor voting resolves a number of questions that have puzzled scholars of parties in Congress. First, partisan votes are found much more frequently here and elsewhere (e.g., Snyder and Groseclose 2000) than would be expected were party influence limited to the targeting of moderates on rare close votes. We argue, instead, that the main role of parties on the floor involves cutting through the complexity of hundreds of roll call votes, signaling what position the party prefers, and asking members to join if they can. Such "party calls" are common, influential (at least on extremists), and therefore quite detectable. Second, because party influence is therefore not limited to moving the cutpoint between the parties, an approach such as McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal's (2001) two-cutpoint model may yield little evidence of parties, even as their party-switcher analysis finds strong support. Not only does our study call into question such earlier scholars' assumption that "only moderates need to be disciplined" (p. 677), but it also suggests that observable party effects have less to do with moving voting cutpoints consistently across members than with inducing those on opposite sides of the cutpoint to vote based on ideology, rather than on other considerations. Third, because both House and Senate leaders can engage in party calls, it is unsurprising that recent evidence suggests strong partisan activities in the U.S. Senate as well as the House (e.g., Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; and contributions to Monroe, Roberts, and Rohde 2008).

If the role of party on most votes in Congress is to issue a call that is then heeded by those members most aligned with the party's common goals, further empirical regularities should result as well. For example, first, recent research has questioned the claim of a single dimension structuring most votes in Congress (e.g., Crespin and Rohde 2010). Consistent with the theory of party calls, we suspect that voting is much more likely to be multidimensional on the party-free votes that we isolate than on the party-induced votes, on which the call of the party induces members to line up ideologically. We thus expect Wright and Schaffner's (2002) finding of lower dimensionality in partisan Kansas than in nonpartisan Nebraska to be evident also in the U.S. Congress, in comparisons between our party-influenced votes and all others. Second, neither the most extreme nor the most moderate members vote with the majority of their party all of the time. New insights may be gained by exploring whether responsiveness to party calls varies by which issues are most salient to members' districts, by which members receive campaign contributions from party leaders or interest groups, or by other considerations.

Further questions are more open-ended, but can be answered through our methodological approach. Why do party leaders issue a call for support on some votes and not on others? On which votes are the extremists most responsive? Does the pattern of who votes with the party affect the nature of the final policy chosen, making it more liberal or conservative? Among what we offer here are new tools (the isolation of party-free from party-induced votes, the generation of party-free ideal points, and the calculation of both a baseline rate of voting with the party and a rate of responsiveness to party influence) that may be of use in such explorations, and which, at least initially, offer new insights and new directions for future research.

Appendix: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables

Variables	Description	Dems Mean (S.D.)	Reps Mean (S.D.)
Rate of Responsiveness to Party Influence	Dependent Variable: Percentage of party-influenced votes in which a member voted with the party majority	82.63 (11.75)	84.32 (10.19)
Baseline Rate of Voting with the Party	Percentage of party-free votes in which a member voted with the party majority	85.31 (7.59)	84.19 (8.04)
Party-Free Ideal Point	Described in text	4.30 (0.64)	5.89 (0.56)
Distance from Floor Median	Absolute value of Party-Free Ideal Point minus that of the floor median	0.81 (0.55)	0.91 (0.60)
Presidential Vote Share[a]	Percentage of vote received by Democratic presidential candidate in previous election in member's district	53.53 (14.24)	41.08 (8.61)
South	Equals "1" if member's district is in the South (KY, OK, and confederate states)	0.34 (0.47)	0.31 (0.46)
Vote Share[b]	Percentage of vote received in previous election	70.39 (14.63)	66.31 (12.52)
Female[b]	Equals "1" if member is female	0.10 (0.29)	0.06 (0.24)
African-American[b]	Equals "1" if member is African-American	0.10 (0.30)	<0.01 (0.05)
Latino[b]	Equals "1" if member is Latino	0.03 (0.17)	0.01 (0.10)
Seniority[b]	Number of terms served by member in Congress	5.54 (4.22)	4.67 (3.39)
Freshman[b]	Equals "1" if member is in first term	0.14 (0.35)	0.17 (0.38)
Retiree[c]	Equals "1" if member retired at the end of the current Congress	0.05 (0.22)	0.06 (0.23)
Best Committee[d]	Equals 23 minus Groseclose and Stewart's (1998) ordinal ranking of best committee on which member served	15.47 (5.35)	15.63 (5.23)
Party Leader[b]	Equals "1" if member is in party leadership	0.01 (0.12)	0.02 (0.14)
Power Committee[d]	Equals "1" if member serves on Appropriations, Budget, Ways and Means, or Rules	0.26 (0.44)	0.26 (0.44)
Speaker[b]	Equals "1" if member is Speaker of the House	<0.01 (0.02)	<0.01 (0.04)
Committee Chair[d]	Equals "1" if member is a committee chair	0.06 (0.24)	0.04 (0.20)

Data sources:
[a]Constructed by authors based on data provided by Gary Jacobson.
[b]Constructed by authors based on *Almanac of American Politics*, various years.
[c]Constructed by authors based on data provided by Daniel Butler.
[d]Constructed by authors based on Nelson (1992) and Stewart and Woon (2005).

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Table 1: Classifying Types of Votes

93rd-109th Congresses (1973 – 2006)	Party-Free Votes	Party-Influenced Votes	Total
Lopsided Votes	5234	2322	7556
Close Votes	2302	4443	6745
Total	7536	6765	14,301

93rd-109th Congresses (1973 – 2006)	Party-Free Votes	Party-Influenced Votes	Total
Substantive Votes	5488	4626	10,114
Procedural Votes	2048	2139	4187
Total	7536	6765	14,301

93rd-109th Congresses (1973 – 2006)	Party-Free Votes	Party-Influenced Votes	Total
CQ Partisan Votes	3078	5015	8093
Consensus Votes	4450	1750	6200
Total	7528	6765	14,293

Table 2: Responsive Moderates in Three Congresses?

Independent Variables	Democrats			Republicans		
	97th	102nd	107th	97th	102nd	107th
Baseline Rate of Voting with Party	1.08***	1.36***	0.52***	0.66***	0.96***	0.37***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.03)
Distance from Floor Median	1.59*	4.25*	9.08***	7.36***	6.86***	1.99***
	(0.86)	(2.20)	(1.70)	(0.90)	(1.22)	(0.47)
Pres. Vote Share	0.15***	0.21***	-0.01	0.16**	0.15	0.11***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.03)
South	– 3.81***	– 4.41***	– 1.26	0.49	2.12**	– 0.58
	(1.17)	(0.89)	(1.09)	(1.04)	(1.02)	(0.47)
Vote Share	– 0.06*	– 0.06**	0.10	0.04	-0.005	– 0.04***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.024)	(0.01)
Female	0.42	0.05	0.03	– 4.06*	– 0.97	– 1.26
	(2.60)	(0.97)	(0.66)	(2.12)	(2.78)	(1.06)
African-American	0.12	– 3.06**	0.27	--	– 2.68*	– 1.59
	(2.27)	(1.36)	(1.44)		(1.45)	(1.11)
Latino	2.47	0.43	2.52**	--	– 4.33	1.00
	(2.59)	(1.45)	(1.13)		(3.08)	(0.82)
Seniority	-0.05	0.15	0.03	0.10	0.17	– 0.09
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.07)
Freshman	– 0.99	0.97	0.46	3.99***	1.99	0.41
	(1.60)	(1.48)	(1.46)	(1.21)	(1.57)	(0.54)
Retiree	0.29	– 0.06	1.41	1.66	– 0.14	0.92
	(1.16)	(1.19)	(1.60)	(1.84)	(0.97)	(0.68)
Best Committee	0.06	0.13	0.12	0.16*	0.006	0.10
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.107)	(0.07)
Party Leader	3.72***	– 0.46	1.80	3.60***	2.01	1.63***
	(1.46)	(1.08)	(1.57)	(1.19)	(3.60)	(0.59)
Power Committee	1.61*	1.27	– 1.05	– 3.74***	– 0.25	1.13***
	(0.91)	(1.06)	(1.63)	(1.22)	(1.20)	(0.44)
Committee Chair	2.43	0.73	--	--	--	1.01**
	(1.60)	(1.45)				(0.50)
Intercept	– 18.25***	– 50.52***	27.98***	2.20	– 20.44*	53.38
	(8.71)	(11.09)	(12.02)	(8.43)	(11.01)	(3.97)
n	235	264	209	187	163	216
R^2	0.79	0.74	0.49	0.62	0.71	0.66

Note: OLS estimates of coefficients (robust standard errors).
Dependent variable: Rate of Responsiveness to Party Influence.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Table 3: Responsive Extremists in Three Congresses

Independent Variables	Democrats			Republicans		
	97th	102nd	107th	97th	102nd	107th
Baseline Rate of Voting with Party	0.82***	0.83***	0.55***	0.58***	0.96***	0.37***
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.03)
Ideological Extremism	5.68***	13.98***	11.61***	8.92***	6.86***	2.62***
	(0.83)	(2.30)	(2.13)	(0.78)	(1.22)	(0.44)
Pres. Vote Share	0.04	0.11***	-0.10	0.02	0.15	0.08***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.02)
South	– 0.98	– 3.71***	0.21	– 1.00	2.12**	– 0.63
	(0.82)	(0.85)	(0.95)	(0.87)	(1.02)	(0.47)
Vote Share	– 0.01	– 0.05*	0.11	0.06*	– 0.004	– 0.03***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.024)	(0.01)
Female	– 0.39	0.74	– 0.51	– 1.74	– 0.97	– 0.87
	(1.96)	(1.06)	(0.66)	(1.27)	(2.78)	(0.86)
African-American	– 2.41	– 3.94***	0.05	--	– 2.68*	– 1.08
	(1.92)	(1.35)	(1.22)		(1.45)	(0.86)
Latino	2.11	0.43	2.77***	--	– 4.33	0.97
	(3.04)	(1.21)	(1.12)		(3.08)	(0.68)
Seniority	– 0.05	0.07	0.05	0.17	0.17	– 0.05
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.06)
Freshman	– 0.92	0.63	0.65	3.83***	1.99	0.47
	(1.38)	(1.35)	(1.52)	(0.97)	(1.57)	(0.51)
Retiree	– 0.28	– 0.36	1.27	1.38	– 0.14	0.86
	(1.29)	(1.09)	(1.58)	(1.64)	(0.97)	(0.53)
Best Committee	0.06	0.12	0.06	0.10	0.003	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.106)	(0.05)
Party Leader	4.46***	– 3.08	0.76	2.22***	2.01	1.41***
	(1.21)	(1.78)	(0.95)	(0.78)	(3.60)	(0.48)
Power Committee	1.59**	1.26	– 1.37	– 3.33***	– 0.25	1.27***
	(0.80)	(1.00)	(1.34)	(0.94)	(1.20)	(0.41)
Committee Chair	2.51*	0.60	--	--	--	0.97*
	(1.40)	(1.41)				(0.51)
Intercept	30.82***	63.62***	88.14***	– 28.62***	– 52.11***	42.15***
	(10.32)	(22.34)	(4.16)	(7.07)	(11.80)	(4.98)
n	235	264	209	187	163	216
R^2	0.84	0.77	0.66	0.76	0.71	0.69

Note: OLS estimates of coefficients (robust standard errors).
Dependent variable: Rate of Responsiveness to Party Influence.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Figure 1: Spatial Models of Party Voting



Figure 2: Ideology and the Call of the Party in the House of Representatives, 1973−2006



Notes: Coefficients with 50% and 95% confidence intervals for models of Responsiveness Rates on different ideological distances. The 104th Congress, which was elected in 1994, is excluded. Years indicate the start of each Congress. Included control variables are Baseline Rate of Party Support, Presidential Vote Share, Vote Share, South, Female, African−American, Latino, Seniority, Freshman, Retiree, Best Committee, Party Leader, Power Committee, and Committee Chair.

[Supplemental Appendices for Reviewers, To Be Made Available Online]

Supplemental Appendix A: Formal Derivation of Hypotheses

In the classic spatial model, legislators are assumed to cast votes based on their preferences over the status quo policy and the alternative bill under consideration. Both are represented by points in a single-dimensional ideological space, and each legislator has single-peaked preferences represented by an ideal point x and a utility function $u(x,z)$ for any policy z. Denote the status quo policy as q and the alternative bill as a, and without loss of generality, let $a > q$. This classic model predicts that a legislator votes for the alternative bill if and only if x is larger than some cutpoint c_0, where c_0 solves $u(c_0,q) = u(c_0,a)$. For example, if $u(\cdot)$ is the standard quadratic-loss utility function, $u(x,z) = -(x - z)^2$, the cutpoint is the midpoint of q and a, $c_0 = \frac{1}{2}(a + q)$.

The classic spatial model also makes sharp predictions about how legislators will vote under party influence. Assume that party leaders prefer outcomes further to the right (i.e., more positive), so these leaders prefer the alternative bill to the status quo. According to the classic model, party leaders influence roll call voting by offering some amount b to any legislator who votes with the party. As a result, the cutpoint shifts to the left. Formally, the cutpoint under party influence shifts to c_P, which solves $u(c_P,q) = u(c_P,a) + b$. In the quadratic-loss example, $c_P = \frac{1}{2}(a + q) - \frac{b}{2(a-q)}$. Because the second term is negative, $c_P < c_0$.

These two predictions about how legislators vote both with and without party influence are depicted in the top panel of Figure 1. Here, the probability of voting with the party leaders is as low as possible for all those legislators whose ideal points x are left of the relevant cutpoint. For legislators whose ideal points are larger than the relevant cutpoint, the probability of voting with the party jumps to its highest possible value. Thus, in the classic spatial model, the

legislators who are most responsive to party influence are the legislators near the middle of the distribution, those with ideal points between c_P and c_0 on any particular piece of legislation, thus generating the Responsive Moderates Hypothesis.

However, when scholars utilize empirical roll call data to estimate ideal points, they must account for cases in which the sharp predictions of the classic spatial model are violated. To do so, these scholars have amended the model to include a random utility component. In the random utility spatial model, both the status quo policy and the alternative bill add some random amount of utility to a legislator's payoffs. It is assumed that the random components have mean 0, so that in expectation the predictions of the random utility and classic spatial models are identical. But for any particular draw (i.e., for any legislator and roll call vote), there is positive probability that the legislator will vote with the party, and there is positive probability that the legislator will vote against the party. Because legislators further to the right gain higher utility from the proposal on the right, the probability of voting with the party on the right is increasing with a legislator's ideal point.

For example, suppose each legislator gets a uniformly drawn utility shock ε for voting with the party (i.e., for the alternative bill), where ε is drawn from the interval $[-½,½]$. This shock can be positive or negative, and therefore tilt the legislator toward or away from voting with the party. Without party influence, the probability that a legislator with ideal point x votes with the party (and for the alternative bill) is the probability that $u(x,a) + \varepsilon$ is larger than $u(x,q)$; that is, the probability that $\varepsilon > u(x,q) - u(x,a)$. In the quadratic-loss example, this probability is $p_0 = ½ - ½ (a - q) (a + q - 2x)$. For the legislator whose ideal point is exactly the indifference cutpoint from the classic spatial model (i.e. for $x = c_0$), the second term vanishes, and the probability of voting with the party is $p_0 = ½$. For legislators with $x > c_0$, in the direction of the

party leaders, the probability of voting with the party is larger than ½; and for those with $x < c_0$, the probability is less than ½.

When the party exerts influence in the random utility model, it is commonly assumed that this influence is constant across members. As a result, the probability of voting with the party shifts uniformly, just as the single cutpoint from the classic spatial model shifted. In the quadratic loss example with party influence, the probability of voting with the party in the random utility model is the probability that $\varepsilon > u(x,q) - u(x,a) - b$, or $p_{RU} = ½ - ½ (a - q) (a + q - 2x) + b$. Here, the effect of party influence is the same for each legislator: a constant shift in the probability of voting with the party, as shown in the middle panel of Figure 1. Here, party influence has the effect of shifting the probability of voting with party equally for all members, as characterized in the No Ideological Responsiveness Hypothesis.

We build our "party calls" model by amending the random utility model so that the effect of party influence, b, is not constant for all legislators. Instead, we assume that the benefit of voting with the party is a function of ideology, $b(x)$. Consistent with greater benefits for members more ideologically aligned with the party's goals, suppose that $b(x) = mx$, where $m > 0$ is the marginal benefit of voting with the party for each additional unit of ideological distance. In the party calls model, the probability of voting with the party when there is no party influence is the same as it was in the random utility model, p_0 from above. However, when there is party influence, the probability that a legislator with ideal point x votes with the party is $p_{PC} = ½ - ½ (a - q) (a + q - 2x) + mx$. The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates the difference between these two probabilities. Unlike in the earlier model, the difference is not constant across legislators. In fact, there may be some legislators for whom voting with the party is less likely when the party calls. These differences across members yield the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis.

Supplemental Appendix B: Alternative Hypotheses and Tests

The Responsive Moderates and Responsive Extremists Hypotheses predict monotonic associations between ideal points and responsiveness for members ranging from moderates at the floor median to extremists. In so doing, each is consistent with the party leadership representing the extremes of the party. However, the party leadership's position may best resemble the median of their party (e.g., Jessee and Malhotra 2010). If the party advances an agenda near the party median, leaders may have an easier time gaining the support of members near that party median than either more liberal or more conservative members. Such a scenario is characterized in the following hypothesis.

Responsiveness to Party Medians Hypothesis: *Responsiveness to party decreases in ideological distance from the median of the member's party.*

This hypothesis is consistent with some of the scholarly literature on the role of parties. For example, Volden and Bergman (2006) and Chiou and Rothenberg (2009) formulate models wherein the role of party influence is in moving members' induced ideal points toward the party median. Members already located near that median position are the easiest to bring on board. Those who are further from the party median may ignore party calls, fearing that if they then move out of step with their districts they may lose their reelection bids (e.g., Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007). Moreover, scholars and practitioners alike took note of former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert's view that his role was to advance agenda items supported by "a majority of the majority party," thus perhaps empowering the party median.

However, the Responsiveness to Party Medians Hypothesis treats both the majority and minority party equally, arguing that each party targets its median members and then builds a

coalition outward. In reality, the majority and minority parties have vastly different abilities to advance legislation, with the majority party in a position to set the agenda and to scuttle proposals not supported by a majority of the majority party (Cox and McCubbins 2005). For the majority party, nearness to the majority party median is important; but for the minority party, leaders may have the easiest case to make among extremists who are far removed from the majority party's median. Thus responsiveness within both parties may be a function of how close the member's ideal point is to the majority party median.

Responsiveness to Majority Party Median Hypothesis: *Responsiveness to party decreases in ideological distance from the majority party median for majority party members and increases for minority party members.*

In essence, these two supplemental hypotheses stand in contrast to those in the body of the paper, and may be thought of as competing hypotheses. Most substantially, if these alternative hypotheses are true, the support found for the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis may simply be due to incorrect model specification. As such, a test of these alternative hypotheses serves to explore the robustness of support for the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis.

[Insert Figure B1 about here]

To test these alternatives, we once again return to our Party-Free Ideal Points to create two new distance variables, ***Distance from Own Party Median*** and ***Distance from Majority Party Median***, which are based on the absolute distance between the relevant median and the member's ideal point. These variables are then inserted (one at a time) in the regressions used to generate Figure 2, instead of the Distance from Floor Median or Ideological Extremism measures used there. The results of these new regressions for the main variables of interest are shown in Figure B1. The left column in the figure shows the coefficients on Distance from Own Party Median for the majority party (top panel) and the minority party (bottom panel) for each of the

Congresses analyzed. The Responsiveness to Party Medians Hypothesis predicts negative coefficients on Distance from Own Party Median. Contrary to this prediction, the estimated coefficient is nonnegative for members of the majority party in five Congresses (statistically significant in the 95th Congress); and it is nonnegative for members of the minority party in two Congresses. Thus, not only is there disagreement among the signs of the point estimates, on one occasion the coefficient is significant in the opposite direction from that hypothesized. In contrast, six of the sixteen Congresses show statistically significant negative coefficients for majority party members, with eight of sixteen Congresses doing so for minority party members. Thus the Responsiveness to Party Medians Hypothesis appears to be generally supported, but not nearly as strongly as the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis.

The second column of Figure B1 provides somewhat more supportive evidence for the Responsiveness to Majority Party Median Hypothesis, which predicts negative coefficients for the majority party and positive coefficients for the minority party on the Distance from Majority Party Median variable. By definition, this figure for the majority party is identical to that in the first column, for Distance from Own Party Median. For the minority party, however, consistent with the hypothesis, all sixteen Congresses show positive and statistically significant coefficients.

That said, the analyses reported in Figure B1 cannot fully discern among competing hypotheses in all cases. For instance, the results for the folded measure of Distance from Majority Party Median may be driven mainly by responsive extremists. For members of the minority party, there is indeed little difference between the analyses of Ideological Extremism and Distance from Majority Party Median, as nearly all minority party members are on the minority party's side of the majority party median.

To further adjudicate between the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis and the Responsiveness to Majority Party Median Hypothesis, therefore, we conduct one further set of analyses. For members of the majority party, there is a significant divergence in predictions between these two hypotheses. In particular, for members more extreme than the majority party median, their responsiveness to party calls should *increase* in extremism according to the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis and should *decrease* in extremism according to the Responsiveness to Majority Party Median Hypothesis. We therefore conduct further regressions similar to the Ideological Extremism models of Figure 2. Now, however, in addition to Ideological Extremism, we include Ideological Extremism interacted with an ***Extremist Indicator*** variable taking a value of one for members more extreme than their majority party median. Both the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis and the Responsiveness to Majority Party Median Hypothesis predict a positive coefficient on Ideological Extremism. In contrast, the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis predicts a zero coefficient on the interaction term, whereas the Responsiveness to Majority Party Median Hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient on the interaction, with a size about twice that of the coefficient on Ideological Extremism, to offset that main effect and indicate lower responsiveness among party extremists relative to those at the majority party median.

[Insert Figure B2 about here]

Figure B2 illustrates the coefficients and their confidence intervals for each of the 16 Congresses examined here. Consistent with both hypotheses, the first panel shows a strong positive coefficient on Ideological Extremism, statistically significant in all except the 98th Congress. The size of this coefficient suggests an increase of about 3% to 12% in voting with the majority party for each unit of extremism among majority party members. The second panel characterizes the change in this effect for members who are more ideologically extreme than the

party median. The finding is clear. This change is not only an order of magnitude too small to alter the sign of the main effect, it is also statistically indistinguishable from zero in all but three Congresses. Thus, early support for the party median based hypotheses seems to have been based on the effect of moderates being less responsive to party calls than are those at the party medians (and those more extreme).

In sum, the strongest overall support emerges for the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis. Exploring for additional nonlinearities in how Party-Free Ideal Points affect the Rate of Responsiveness to Party Influence dependent variable (up through a fifth-order polynomial) shows little evidence of nonlinear effects. Rather, consistent with the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis from the theory of party calls, conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats are the most responsive to party calls, even controlling for their high baseline rates of party responsiveness absent such calls.

Figure B1: Alternative Models of Ideological Distance and Responsiveness



Notes: Coefficients with 50% and 95% confidence intervals for models of Responsiveness Rates on different ideological distances. The 104th Congress, which was elected in 1994, is excluded. Years indicate the start of each Congress. Included control variables are Baseline Rate of Party Support, Presidential Vote Share, Vote Share, South, Female, African−American, Latino, Seniority, Freshman, Retiree, Best Committee, Party Leader, Power Committee, and Committee Chair.

Figure B2: Support for Responsive Extremists Hypothesis over Majority Party Median Responsiveness



Notes: Coefficients with 50% and 95% confidence intervals from regressions of Responsiveness Rates by majority party member on Ideological Extremism and the interaction of Ideological Extremism and an indicator for whether a member was an Extremist (i.e., more extreme than the majority party median). The positive coefficients in the first panel indicate that more extreme legislators have higher rates of Responsiveness to Party Influence, even after controlling for the Baseline Rate of Support. The coefficients near zero in the second panel indicate that this effect does not decrease for the most extreme members, supporting the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis and not the Majority Party Median Responsiveness Hypothesis. The 104th Congress is excluded. Years indicate the start of each Congress. All other controls are also included in the models.

Supplemental Appendix C: Details on the Process for Identifying Party-Influenced Votes

Before describing the two-step iterative process used to identify party-influenced votes, it is helpful to develop some technical notation. Label the set of roll call votes from a single Congress as R. At each iteration $t = 1, 2, 3, \ldots$, the procedure partitions R into subsets I_t and F_t, which represent "party-influenced" and "party-free" votes, respectively.

The first step in each iteration t is to estimate party-free ideal points based on F_{t-1}, the subset of votes that were categorized as party-free during the previous iteration. Let $x(F_{t-1})$ be the vector of ideal points estimated using votes in F_{t-1}, with entry $x_i(F_{t-1})$ for each legislator i. We use the *ideal* function from the R package **pscl** (Jackman 2009) to estimate $x(F_{t-1})$, and we use the close-lopsided criterion as an initial partition of R into I_0 and F_0.[a]

The second step is to use the party-free ideal points to identify a new partition of roll call votes.[b] Let y_{ij} be a binary indicator that equals 1 if legislator i voted Yea on roll call j, and equals 0 if i voted Nay.[c] We regress y_{ij} on $x_i(F_{t-1})$ as well as on D_i, a binary indicator for whether i is a member of the Democratic party. The generalized linear model we fit is:

$$y_{ij} \sim [i \text{ votes Yea on roll call } j]p_{ij} + [i \text{ votes Nay on roll call } j](1 - p_{ij}),$$

$$p_{ij} = \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_j + \beta_j x_i(F_{t-1}) + \delta_j D_i),$$

[a] Following Synder and Groseclose (2000), a vote is considered close if the percentage of recorded Yea votes was between 35% and 65%. All other votes are considered lopsided. Because some votes require supermajorities, we explored the impact of this assumption by altering the criteria for the close vs. lopsided distinction on a vote-by-vote basis for the initial groupings of votes. This alternative method resulted in similar final patterns of vote groupings and party-free ideal points in our explorations; thus we used the simpler 35-65 threshold.

[b] Another reason to look past the simple close/lopsided distinction in our search for party calls is that vote-buying may extend well past the 218th member (Groseclose and Snyder 1996). Wiseman (2004) provides empirical evidence on the extent to which single or multiple vote buyers are involved in legislative politics. Moreover, parties may well wish to vote cohesively to establish their brand name even on more lopsided votes.

[c] For each roll call vote, we discard all present votes and abstentions, but include all vote pairings.

where α_j is a roll-call specific intercept. We then use the party coefficient δ_j to create the new partition of roll call votes. A roll call vote j is included in the set of party-influenced votes I_t if the estimate of δ_j is statistically significant at the threshold of $p = 0.01$. All other votes are included in F_t.

Logistic regression is not the only available method to model these data, and this choice requires additional explanation. Snyder and Groseclose (2000) choose instead to use ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. However, there are problems with the OLS approach. Cox and Poole (2002) consider the hypothetical case in which there is no party influence on voting, and find that OLS yields errors correlated with the party caucus indicator. Essentially, this occurs if the "true" functional form for p_{ij} is curvilinear, since OLS fits a straight line. The problem is that, in this case, OLS yields statistically significant estimates of δ_j even when its "true" value is zero. Logistic regression addresses this problem, but runs into another that OLS sidesteps: the problem of separation. Any party-line roll call vote will be perfectly predicted by the party indicator and dropped from the analysis. To address this, we fit the model with a penalized likelihood correction that permits us to use logistic regression without discarding party-line votes. We thus fit each biased-reduced logistic regression using the brglm command from the R package **brglm** (Kosmidis 2007).

We iterate the procedure until a stable pattern emerges and persists. There is a non-negligible number of votes that do not settle into either category from each iteration t to $t + 1$, but there is near stability between iterations t and $t + 2$. Thus, we focus on changes between the latter two. In each iteration, we record the number of roll call votes that move from the set of party-influenced votes I_{t-2} to the set of party-free votes F_t, and the number that move in the opposite direction from F_{t-2} to I_t. At first, the total number of these changes decreases sharply. We continue the procedure until the number stops declining and at least 10 iterations have run.

To ensure that we have reached a stable categorization of votes, we then continue for an additional five iterations. Finally, we drop all votes that have not stayed in the same category over these last five iterations, in our ultimate classification of party-influenced and party-free votes and in our generation of the final set of Party-Free Ideal Points.

Supplemental Appendix D: Variation in Support for the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis

Our results necessarily reflect many underlying attributes of the Congresses we study. Therefore, it is natural to explore whether a particular feature that varies between parties or from Congress to Congress might explain the patterns of responsiveness we document. For example, do the results differ for Democrats and Republicans, for divided government, or over time? Because our research design utilized a series of cross-sectional analyses, we can investigate the effects of variables like majority party status or divided government by conducting a meta-analysis of our results. Thus, we analyze the coefficients from the final set of regressions, those illustrated in the rightmost column of Figure 2. Specifically, the dependent variable for the analyses in this supplemental appendix is the coefficient on Ideological Extremism for each party, in each Congress from the 93rd to the 109th (excluding the outlying 104th Congress).

We conducted a series of regressions, examining the association between our findings and a single independent variable in each case (see Supplemental Appendix D Table below). The independent variables we examined included three indicator variables: one for coefficients from models of Democratic legislators, one from models in years of divided government, and one from models of majority party legislators. We then examined the influences of the size of the majority party and the percentage of each party's members that were freshman legislators, and we looked for a time trend using the Congress number itself as an independent variable.

Finally, we conducted a series of tests to determine whether our findings are related to the proportion of close and lopsided votes in each Congress. We use this last set of variables to diagnose whether artificial extremism in the Rate of Responsiveness to Party Influence and Baseline Rate of Voting with the Party is driving our results – that is, whether these results are an artifact of our method. The concern is that large numbers of close party-influenced votes and large numbers of lopsided party-free votes may induce the appearance of extremists voting more

frequently with the party on the former votes relative to the latter, through a form of "artificial extremism" (Snyder 1992). If this is the case, such a problem should be more pronounced when there are more close votes among those labeled "party-influenced" and more lopsided votes among those labeled "party-free." To test for this possibility, we create four new variables.

Supplemental Appendix D Table:
Meta-Analyses of Ideological Extremism Coefficients

Independent Variable	Estimate	Std. Error
Democratic Party	0.66	1.13
Divided Government	1.06	1.21
Majority Party	– 1.74	1.09
Size of Majority	0.006	0.013
% Freshman by Party	0.12	0.09
Congress	– 0.01	0.11
Close Vote Ratio	– 0.30	0.31
Close Vote Ratio by Party	– 0.07	0.07
Relative Close Vote Ratio	– 0.05	0.07
Relative Close Vote Ratio by Party	– 0.01	0.04

Notes: Each row represents a separate OLS regression model of the coefficients presented in the final models from the paper (Figure 2), regressed on the variable indicated in the first column. For each model, n = 32.

First, ***Close Vote Ratio*** captures the number of close party-influenced votes divided by the number lopsided party-influenced votes. The next variable, ***Close Vote Ratio by Party***, is similar, but divides the number of close party-influenced votes by the number lopsided party-influenced votes in which the relevant party (Democrats or Republicans) made up a majority of those who lost the vote, to account for the possibility that some lopsided votes may induce artificial extremism by dividing moderates from extremists within the losing party (while the winning party is fairly united). We also calculated these ratios using party-free votes to make our last two variables. ***Relative Close Vote Ratio*** is the Close Vote Ratio divided by the same

ratio for party-free votes, and ***Relative Close Vote Ratio by Party*** uses the party-specific versions of these ratios. For each of these variables, a positive coefficient would mean artificial extremism may bias our results, with close party-induced votes leading to the appearance of responsive extremists.

As can be seen from Supplemental Appendix D Table, none of the variables is statistically significant at conventional (two-tailed) levels, indicating that the responsiveness of extremists to party calls is robust across Republican and Democratic Parties, over time, and across divided and unified government. The only results that come close to statistical significance are for Majority Party, indicating slightly greater responsiveness to party calls among extremists in the minority party, and for Percent Freshman by Party, which provides weak evidence that when there are large numbers of freshman legislators, extremists are even more likely to be disproportionately responsive to party influence.

The results for the artificial extremism variables are particularly stark. *None* of these variables exhibit a statistically significant relationship with our results; moreover, their signs point in an unexpected, negative direction. We conclude therefore that, while our results may reflect some small differences across Congresses, they do not depend significantly on artificial extremism in our measures.

Supplemental Appendix E: Procedural Votes Analysis (Exploring Counter-Factual)

In Supplemental Appendix D we explored, among other things, whether the larger proportion of close votes that were party influenced might explain particular patterns of responsiveness to extremists. Put simply, one may be concerned that the way votes are divided between party-influenced and party-free may artificially produce our results through some mechanism other than party calls.

As noted in Table 1, another distinguishing feature between party-influenced and party-free votes is that procedural votes tend to be somewhat more party-influenced than are substantive votes. One might be concerned about a distinction between these types of votes, for instance with the following counter-factual. Suppose party leaders play little role in developing party positions and issuing calls. Rather, party members simply know which issues resonate with their party voters and take partisan positions as a result. Where party leaders do play a role, then, is where issues are more complex and confusing, but that may not result in the broad patterns that we identify in Table 2 and Figure 2.

To explore the possibility that our results are merely an artifact of members knowing what resonates with their partisan voters, rather than responding to party calls, in this supplemental appendix we limit our analysis only to the (presumably more complicated) procedural votes on which voters' preferences and party positions may be much less immediately clear to members of Congress. If our Responsive Extremists Hypothesis is once again supported on the subset of procedural votes alone, we can have increased confidence that party calls are driving our results, rather than the results arising from members intuitively knowing what's in their own and the party's best interests.

[Insert Supplemental Appendix E Figure about here]

We here recreate the Rate of Responsiveness to Party Influence and the Baseline Rate of Voting with the Party to be percentages based not on *all* party-influenced and party-free votes in the Congress but just on the procedural votes. All other variables and model specifications remain the same. The Supplemental Appendix E Figure then replicates Figure 2 from the paper, for this revised analysis. Once again, the left half of the figure shows no support for the Responsive Moderates Hypothesis or the No Ideological Responsiveness Hypothesis. The right half of the figure shows continued support for the Responsive Extremists Hypothesis, with the coefficients in all Congresses and for both parties being positive and statistically significant. Compared to Figure 2, these coefficients tend to be somewhat larger, perhaps indicating that party calls are even more influential on procedural votes than on substantive votes. This seems to suggest that our main results arise not merely from party members intuiting the party-preferred position on substantive votes and taking their positions absent party calls.

Supplemental Appendix E Figure: Ideology and the Call of the Party on Procedural Votes



Notes: Coefficients with 50% and 95% confidence intervals for models of Responsiveness Rates (using only Procedural Votes) on different ideological distances. The 104th Congress, which was elected in 1994, is excluded. Years indicate the start of each Congress. Included control variables are Baseline Rate of Party Support, Presidential Vote Share, Vote Share, South, Female, African−American, Latino, Seniority, Freshman, Retiree, Best Committee, Party Leader, Power Committee, and Committee Chair.

References for Supplemental Appendices

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