When Means Change Ends: The Scientific Constitution of Peacebuilding, 1990-2010[1]

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the second half of the twentieth century, two often overlooked, but quite stunning, ideas were created and embedded in international society. First, the international development regime was founded on the idea that a small group of international experts could aid the modernization of postcolonial societies in accordance with a universal theory of economic progress.[2] Second, the international peacekeeping and peacebuilding regime was premised on the idea that peace could be established with modest help from small groups of lightly armed troops and bureaucratic administrators. In the post-Cold War era, this first generation model of peacekeeping, in which UN troops are placed between consenting parties, was replaced by a more complex, 'multidimensional,' second generation model of peacebuilding which could be deployed in societies still at war. These multidimensional missions aimed to establish the conditions for sustainable peace with programs for economic development, demobilization and disarmament campaigns, and the creation of government institutions.

These changes are usually explained by the rise and dominance of liberal norms. On this view, the dominance of American power and the collapse of the socialist world's alternative theory of society bolstered the authority of western democratic capitalism. This account is compelling because most scholars believe that liberal norms concerning basic human rights, cooperation, democracy, and economy dominate the cultural content of the international system.[3] However, there are elements of the development and peacebuilding regimes that

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[2] McCarthy 2007.

[3] Wendt 1999; Ikenberry 2001; Frederking 2003.

cannot be explained by the rise and dominance of liberal norms. The very notion that a state, nation, economy, or society can be *built* depends on a technical discourse that legitimates the *construction* of human society. These ideas rely on beliefs and cultural norms that are rooted in the scientific and technological constitution of international society. [4]

I argue that changes in development and peacebuilding discourse are indicative of the effects of scientific discourse on international society. Ernst Haas suggests two ways to understand the role of science in international politics. First, scholars can investigate how epistemic communities translate consensual knowledge into policy via successful coalitions with powerful political coalitions.[5] We now know a great deal about how epistemic communities work and under what conditions they are likely to be effective.[6] However, Haas also states that science is important because it changes the discourse of politics:

> "change in human aspirations and human institutions is caused mostly by the way knowledge about nature and about society is married to political interests and objectives… as scientific knowledge becomes common knowledge and as technological innovation is linked to institutional tinkering, the very mode of scientific inquiry infects the way political actors think. Science, in short, influences the way politics is done. Science becomes a component of politics because the scientific way of grasping reality is used to define the interests that political actors articulate and defend. The doings of actors can then be described by observers as an exercise of defining and realizing interests informed by changing scientific knowledge about man and nature."[7]

On this second view, scientific knowledge acts as "a shaper of worldviews." Haas suggests that over time "the intellectual commitments of the seventeenth-century scientists and mathematicians penetrated the way political economists and their disciples in governments began to see the world."[8] This process can be thought of as institutional change that unfolds on both the macro-level of international society and the micro-level of international organizations.

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[4] Barnett 2006; Sending 2009; Buhta 2008.
[5] Haas 1990, 28, 40-42
[6] Haas 1992; Adler 1992; Parson 2003.
[7] Haas 1990, 11.
[8] Haas 1990, 22.

In other work, I more closely model the macro-level process of change which involves mapping the changes in the deep structure of international discourse.[9] In this paper, I concentrate on the micro-level process of organizational change.

Here, I investigate how 'scientific inquiry infects the way political actors think' in the peacebuilding discourse. This process often unfolds in a dynamic I call means-ends capture: importing scientific means to solve problems constrains and changes political ends. For example, the rise of the economic sciences in the World Bank during the 1970s and 1980s set off a change in the goals of the development regime. The early poverty reduction campaigns of the World Bank in the 1960s gave way to a scientific and technical conception of development as economic growth, defined in terms of quantitative GDP indicators. As we shall see, though key elements of scientific discourse have filtered into the *means* of peacebuilding, the *ends* resist scientific pressures. This is puzzling when compared to the case of the World Bank. Why has peacebuilding discourse been able to resist scientific means-ends capture?

I argue that means-ends change observed in the UN Department of Peacekeeping discourse from 1990 to 2010 were driven primarily by two factors: the power of scientific discourse and the quality of feedback processes. I think of means-ends capture as 'unguided' learning that unfolds when an organization depends on scientific representations of its social and material environment. I make this argument in two steps. First, in the next section (II) I specify the content of scientific discourse and argue that scientific means put pressure on scientific ends. Second (III), I explain what unguided learning is and how it contributes to means-ends capture. I then present evidence from a discourse analysis performed on UN peacekeeping documents. I conclude (V) by clarifying the argument and discussing its implications for peacebuilding policy and the limits of social construction.

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[9] This is the project of my dissertation which traces scientific discourse in international politics from 1550 to 2010.

II. SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE AND POLITICAL RATIONALITY

My argument depends on a discourse approach to politics. This means I think language and talk can explain political outcomes. Most linguistic theories posit arguments as *causal* forces that provide information, rhetorically trap opponents, or change actors' preferences in politically important negotiations and conversations.[10] By contrast, I think argumentation and communication are *constitutive* of political and social order in its entirety.[11] I define discourse as the underlying signs, symbols, concepts, principles, and values that meaningfully order social reality. I believe that evidence of discourse can be found in "[e]verything that is said or written in a given state of society, everything that is printed or talked about and represented today through electronic media."[12] Discursive practices "situate ordinary practices of life and define the social fields of action that are imaginable and possible."[13] Thus, discourses define actors' interests and their beliefs about how these can be achieved. Since it contains authoritative terms, relations and positions, discourse creates a 'normative slope.' Some arguments are harder than others because they must argue 'uphill', as it were, against the 'discursive slope.'[14] On this view, discourse is not powerful because it competes with material power and self-interests in important negotiations and conversations. Rather, it is powerful because it "produces" the social world in both visible and invisible ways and because in the long run arguments that follow the slope of discourse will be more persuasive than others and that this has a probabilistic effect on social outcomes.

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[10] Checkel 2001; Risse 2001; Schimmelfennig 2003; Müller 2004; Mitzen 2005; Krebs and Jackson 2007.
[11] I take this to be the main argument of Habermas 1984. See Taylor 1991. For a related point in an IR context, see Albert, Kessler and Stetter 2008.
[12] Angenot 2004, 200.
[13] Barnett and Duvall 2005, 55.
[14] Taylor 1985 [1967], 73.

I draw this understanding of social reality from Habermas' argument in Theory of Communicative Action. There Habermas argues that social order is simply not possible without language and meaning. Language is necessary because it allows actors to coordinate their actions and agree upon plans of action.[15] Even social relations that are infused with power relations and beholden to the self-interests of the participants depend on the ability to engage in argumentation oriented to a consensus about how to go on in a situation. To give orders, one must be understood. To coordinate action, actors must exchange reasons and come to an agreement about taking one course of action or another.

This understanding of discourse implies that discourse has a structure that might be identifiable. But, what is the structure of discourse? Constructivists tend to lump all aspects of discourse together. But this does not allow us to understand how certain forms of social knowledge affect other forms, because they all co-exist in the same "bubble."[16] For the purposes of theory building, it makes sense to divide discourse into different levels that will allow us to explain why some scientific ideas are so powerful:

1. Information and Beliefs: beliefs about the state of the world and how to solve problems within it. It includes cognitive beliefs about the proper techniques and methods to solve problems as well as theories, facts, models, and representations.
2. Constitutive Ideas: constitutive rules that form the basis of organizations and culture as a whole.[17] Values and constitutive ideas also delimit the available roles and identities agents can adopt. They make legitimate interests and preference rankings possible. Finally, this level includes the values and norms that form the basis of shared culture, ideologies and meaningful narratives that motivate people in everyday life.
3. Logic of Action: the historically constructed 'social disposition' of individuals and other agents.[18] The idea here is that social structures "affect not only actor interests but also the ways actors connect their preferences to policy choices."[19] Therefore, both procedural and substantive rationality are social constructed.

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[15] Barnett and Duvall 2005, 45-48; Habermas 1987, 119-126.
[16] Adler and Bernstein 2005, 296
[17] Scott 2008.
[18] The debate in IR posits three ahistorical 'logics.' I think, instead, we should just be open to the many possibilities and alternatives that history presents to us.
[19] Kowert and Legro 1996, 463.

4. Episteme and Ontology: The episteme is comprised of the fundamental ideas about what counts as knowable, and how one should go about understanding and building knowledge about the world. An ontology governs the existence of and character of objects. Ontologies are closely related to language, since languages delimit the bounds of the sayable.

In this schema, the deeper levels are most powerful because a) higher level concepts depend on connections to lower ones for meaning and elaboration, and b) lower level concepts are more widely shared. This captures an important intuition that underlies most social theory: some concepts are more important than others because many other concepts depend on them and many people share them.

Particular communities and institutions of have relatively autonomous local discourses that are embedded in larger societal discourses. Academic discourse, for example, has many features of its own, but it cannot escape the power and influence of concepts that circulate in society as a whole. Similarly, peacekeeping discourse is relatively autonomous from that of international society. However, changes in international society will eventually filter into and change the deepest levels of peacekeeping discourse, which in turn exerts pressure on the means and ends of peace operations.

Classical Scientific Discourse and Scientific Rationality

What is science? Science is an 'essentially contested concept' and so defining it will raise ire from one corner or another.[20] In this section I defend a historical and discursive conception of science. I define it as the institutionalized practice of seeking reliable knowledge about the world.[21] I operationalize 'science' historically as a set of discursive practices that emerged in the

[20] Connolly 1993.

[21] In defining 'science' this way I am following not scientists, but historians of science, who, recognizing the term is anachronistic, use it to refer to "disciplined inquiry into the phenomena and order of the natural world." (Park and

aristocracy of early modern Europe but has now been institutionalized in universities and corporations all over the world. Scientific discourse has accumulated concepts and practices from the days of natural philosophy to quantum physics and has been extended beyond the natural sciences to include mathematics, engineering, medicine, linguistics, and economics. Despite this diversity, I think the central elements of modern scientific discourse 'hang together' and can be identified in a short review of the history of science. Two models of knowledge dominate the history of science: a deductive, mathematical model I call 'mechanism' and an 'empiricist,' experimental model.[22] Both of these models have epistemic claims, ontological claims, and ideologies that shape politics.

The first model originated in 17th century natural philosophy as the 'mechanist tradition' associated with Hobbes, Descartes, and Newton. It possesses a deductive episteme that starts with "fundamental assumptions" about the ultimate units of reality and derives explanations of macro phenomena from them.[23] Second, this tradition is committed to ontological reductionism. The early mechanists posited a world made up of fundamental units called "corpuscles." Only the interaction of corpuscles could explain physical and natural phenomena. Thus, mechanists saw the world and universe as a giant clock, in which interlocking gears drive all movement and motion.[24] Today, the atomistic and methodological individualist assumptions of science carry on this reductionist tradition. Finally, mechanism is ideologically 'Rationalist' in the sense that it was infused with the desire to use knowledge to re-order and change the world, to make it more 'rational.' This underlies what James Scott calls the 'high modern' ideology of science:

Daston 2006, 2-3). Mine is admittedly only one way of capturing the influence of science on politics but it serves our purposes here.

[22] Kuhn 1977.

[23] Gaukroger 2007, 355.

[24] Gaukroger 2007.

the idea that science can and should be used to transform the natural and social world.[25]

The empirical, experimental model is distinct from and often in debate with mechanism. Pre-modern empiricism, championed by Francis Bacon, was typified by the discipline of natural history, which catalogued the species of animals and rocks, but did not seek to explain their properties.[26] First, the empiricist tradition is epistemically skeptical. It is primarily concerned with establishing matters of fact before all else. Since the empiricist tradition grows out of natural history it retains an ontological commitment to categorization and classification. The natural histories of geology, botany, and zoology were historically disciplines that catalogued rather than explained nature. Finally, ideologically, the empirical-experimental tradition defines itself as an objective method. This dates back to the 16th and 17th century, but the most interesting developments have transpired in last 100 years. Since the late 19th century positivist claims to objectivity have transformed the empiricist discourse, sharply demarcating 'facts' from 'values'. Before then, it was rare to see scientists claim to be value-free. Objectivity was a claim about the character of the individual scientist, not a claim about the features of the work itself.[27]

The six features of scientific discourse highlighted above — epistemic commitments to mathematical deductive and skeptical empiricism, ontological commitments to reductionism and classification, and ideological commitments to objectivity and Rationalism — capture the structure of what I want to call the 'classical discourse of science.'[28] This discourse is powerful

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[25] Scott 1998.
[26] Gaukroger 2007, 356.
[27] Daston and Galison 2007.
[28] I borrow the term but not its content from de Jong and Betti 2010. Ideally, the discourse of science would be uncovered via an original discourse analysis. One could undertake a discourse analysis of scientific texts and meta-analyses of science drawn from a particular historical period and thereby develop a sociological conception of science that is bounded within its particular historic context. However ideal it is, I am neither qualified nor able to perform the discourse analysis of scientific texts and so I built this model of the classical discourse of science from secondary sources in the history and sociology of science.

because it infiltrates the deepest levels of social discourse. This in turn strengthens and legitimates the use of scientific and technical concepts at higher levels of discourse.

For instance, these deep discursive elements put pressure on political problem-solving means. The mechanist and empiricist traditions legitimate i) certain forms of knowledge and ii) ways of representing the world:

> i) scientific problem-solving employs objective, general knowledge. This is in contrast to practical rationality which seeks to ground action in particular contexts.
> ii) scientific problem-solving sees its objects as discrete units or atoms that can be easily controlled and manipulated.

First, empiricism demands that decision-making be done without reference to 'subjective' or 'metaphysical' claims. Rationalism encourages policy makers to employ general knowledge widely. Second, both traditions encourage the study of discrete subjects and rationalism encourages their manipulation. When policy makers seek to use scientific methods in social and political situations, they have to change the way they see those objects. The people and cultures to be studied and controlled must be subjected to the same practices as the phenomenon in the laboratory. These pressures on means are not as neutral as positivists have argued. Because they draw on and come with connections to epistemes and ontologies, they have tacit pressures on political ends.

Moreover,the classical discourse of science makes overt demands on the i) content and ii) form of political ends:

> i) scientific ends will be abstract, objective and amoral, rather than moral or value-laden.
> ii) scientific ends will be calculable and quantifiable. This is in contrast to qualitative/linguistic values like justice and equality which are easily contestable and dependent on cultural contexts.

First, especially after positivism, scientific are supposed to achieve 'objective,' value-free ends. Of course, one of my central arguments is that this claim, that the ends will be objective and value-free, is wrong, because classical scientific means contain some moral presuppositions

and axioms hidden within them. Namely, modernist beliefs in scientific and technological progress are often implied or overtly stated. Second, since scientific methods need to be checked for effectiveness, the ends they achieve must be measurable. Often these ends are not supposed to be ends-in-themselves, but proxies for things we value. However, in time, these proxies often turn into ends-in-themselves.

These effects of classical scientific discourse, I want to argue, change 'substantive political rationality' itself. The natural and physical sciences were first imported into political practice to adjust means to political ends. But importing methods developed in the natural and mathematical sciences had effects on political ends too. Thus, scientific discourse changes rational action in politics by altering the political discourse around means and ends.[29] The result is the constitution of a new form of instrumental rationality: classical scientific rationality.



Figure 1. Classical Scientific Rationality

[29] This argument is inspired by Amadae 2003. Amadae argues that rational choice theory constitutes a new event in the history of rationality, rather than a mere extension of an ahistorical instrumental rationality.

Figure 1 shows how scientific rationality is different from practical rationality, experimental rationality and technical rationality. All of these are still purposive or instrumental rationalities. On Habermas' definition, they retain "a view to the realization of an end."[30] Thus, they are separate from norm-guided action or action oriented to reaching understanding.[31] For example, practical rationality is an instrumental rationality, it is oriented to a goal or to success, but it is not the same type of rationality that the economists have in mind. Practical rationality is the exercise of reasoned deliberation to decide how to go on in a given situation.[32] This form of action requires choosing ends via deliberation, rather than maximizing pregiven ends.[33] Furthermore, judgment must be exercised in a particular case, and so draws on a local context of background norms, not on generalizable knowledge or decision axioms. Practical rationality is still oriented to a goal, only the goal is not exogenous to reasoning and deliberation. Technical rationality employs contextual knowledge oriented to solving the problem at hand, rather than building knowledge that will enable us to solve every problem. Experimental rationality is inspired by John Dewey who advocated submitting our moral values to experimental testing. [34]

Thus, many forms of rationality are possible and the form of rationality we see today is a contingent product of political interaction with the classical model of science. Had the social and political understanding of science been different, there may have been a different set of pressures on the means and ends of politics. To the extent that scientific rationality infiltrates peacebuilding discourse, the development is not inevitable or natural, but depends on a particular understanding of what counts as scientific.

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[30] Habermas 1984, 85.
[31] Risse 2000.
[32] Haslam 1991; See also Bernstein 1983.
[33] Wiggins 1980.
[34] Dewey 1929.

The Institutionalization of Scientific Discourse

Since the seventeenth century, actors have been importing scientific methods into political institutions to solve problems and legitimate technocratic rule.[35] In early modern Europe, scientific methods were first imported to build forts and ships. However, as the above section shows, even if the functional ability of science explains why it was imported in the first place, it cannot explain how science transforms political ends. In general, this dynamic should be puzzling to political scientists who, perhaps due to a strong faith in the fact/value distinction, have not seriously studied the possibility that values are endogenous to means.[36]

'Organization' is not synonymous with 'institution.' My definition of institution includes both formal organizations like a corporation or charity group, formal rules like laws, and informal customs and conventions. Thus, institutional change takes place through alterations in the formal and informal rules that shape behavior. Sociologists describe this as a process of 'institutionalization,' following Berger and Luckmann's argument that practices and ideas become powerful when they are sedimented in institutions.[37] Institutionalization is the embedding of practices and ideas in formal or informal procedures, rules, norms, and values.[38] Sociologists model institutionalization, following Berger and Luckmann, in four stages:[39]

1. Innovation: New problems, feedback from experience, or external pressure (from states and the global public sphere) create the impetus for change. Discursive entrepreneurs either invent new ideas or copy policy from other organizations and put them on the table. Internal deliberation selects the best arguments as solutions to the problem at hand.

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[35] Wuthnow 1979.
[36] Whitford 2002 and Stewart 1995 have picked up on this theme implicit in Dewey and Horkheimer and Adorno's work. Of course, the work of integration theorists suggests something like this. Cf. Mitrany 1966; Deutsch 1958, etc.
[37] Berger and Luckmann 1966.
[38] Hall and Taylor 1996. In IR, institutionalization is usually synonymous with 'formalization,' or incorporation into a treaty or IO. I see institutionalization as a social process that "infuse[s] with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand" (Selznick 1992, 233).
[39] Tolbert and Zucker 1999 [1996]. My terms are, however, different. Berger and Luckmann have three stages: Externalization, Objectivation, and Internalization. (1966, 61)

2. Rule-creation: chosen innovations are incorporated into rituals and habits or encoded in documents and operational procedures.
3. Justification and Legitimation: New policies are justified with reasons and evidence drawn from the discourse. Members are socialized to follow new norms. These social and argumentative processes make the new rules seem 'objective' and 'real.'
4. Naturalization: rules are most effective when they are "taken as part of the natural order of the universe" or "regarded as given."[40] Linking concepts to the deepest levels of discourse makes them seem 'natural.'

Ruggie explains that this process of translating ideas into social facts "transforms behavior by channeling it in one direction as opposed to all others that are theoretically possible."[41] More germane to our problem here, Katzenstein explains that institutionalized ideas create "prefabricated action channels that establish links between the values individuals hold and the problems they seek to solve."[42]

Since human agents need to communicate to engage in collective action and since they yearn to make sense of their actions, new practices give rise to new theoretical and legitimatory discourses that explain and justify the phenomenon. These justifications import tacit scientific ideologies. For example, you cannot defend climate science without calling on the enlightenment narrative of science's triumph over irrationality. In time, these ideologies are genuinely believed by some who internalize the values and reproduce them in communicative action with other actors. Others make no conscious effort to engage with the ideology, but they are habituated and come to take it for granted. New practices are also theorized: discursive entrepreneurs build abstract and general knowledge that operationalizes and explains the institutional innovation. This not only "invests the structure with both general cognitive and normative legitimacy" but makes the innovation understandable and transferable to other

[40] Adler 1997, 201; Hopf 2002b, 409.
[41] Ruggie 1998, 2.
[42] Katzenstein 1996, 19.

institutions.[43] Successful institutions can now be diffused on the basis of knowledge and argumentation, instead of just on imitation. In time, importing scientific means into political institutions thereby changes political ends. This process is likely to spread scientific discourse in international society science enjoys widespread authority.[44] It has proven itself capable in multiple domains and its concepts tap into the deepest levels of our shared discourses.

III. UNGUIDED LEARNING: LEGIBILITY AND DELIBERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS

A central cause of means-ends learning then is the power of classical scientific discourse and the pressures it puts on the form and content of ends which are embedded in politics by institutionalization processes. In this section I introduce a second set of causes that hinge on the ability of an organization to learn. To preview my argument, the intuition here is that institutionalization is less likely to unfold in organizations that have strong feedback mechanisms that keep them on track.

What is learning? Learning is the deliberate change of (or the development of new) beliefs, norms, and rules in response to experience or new information.[45] To learn, an organization must incorporate feedback from experience into the next round or planning and policy development. Learning then is a special case of institutionalization in which actors try to improve their performance. Most accounts of learning allow for some distinction between simple learning, a change in means, and complex learning, a change in ends.[46]

When changes in means lead to new constraints on the way actors think about ends, simple learning tumbles into complex learning. That is, the effect scientific means on political ends is

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[43] Tolbert and Zucker 1999, 177.
[44] Meyer et al 1997; Drori et al 2003.
[45] I draw on various sources for this definition: Deutsch 1963, 92; Hall 1993, 278; Levy 1994, 283-84; Checkel 2001, 561.
[46] Deutsch 1963, 92; Levy 1994, 286. Haas (1990, 3) restricts his definition of learning to the latter.

an example of learning. But we must recognize that something has gone wrong here: means-ends change is *deliberate* learning that has *unintended* consequences. My argument below hinges on this distinction between intentional or reflective learning and unintentional or unguided learning. The idea here is similar to the distinction drawn between adaptation and learning. For Levy, adaptation is belief change that would have happened to any actors with the same preferences and information.[47] For Levy, this is not learning because learning engages the unique perceptions and worldviews of the agents. I like this distinction because it shows that some institutional change is more deliberate, reflective, and intentional than others. However, since both intentional and unintentional learning are cognitive processes on my account, I choose different language to describe them. In sum, learning that is intended to change *something*, but changes or constrains means and ends *unintentionally* constitute unguided learning. In the remainder of this section I outline two causes of means-ends capture or unguided learning: dependence on scientific representations and poor quality deliberations.

Unguided learning and the ability to represent the world

Consider the ability of an organization to represent and interpret its social and material environment and incorporate this knowledge into planning. This ability to represent and interpret the environment depends on features of both the organization and the social and material environment. On the one hand, it depends on the capacities and theories of the organization. Its feedback system must have a means for collecting information about the changes an organization's policies are inducing. This could be done by conducting surveys of those affected, interviewing the organization's on-the-ground employees who have to implement the policy, or collecting data on relevant variables. On the other hand, the

[47] Levy 1994, 297.

applicability of these means to the environment depends on its features. As we shall see, some social and material environments are more amenable to certain kinds of representation and interpretation. The natural sciences are more successful than the social sciences in part because the natural sciences model an unconscious material reality. The social sciences, by contrast, must model and predict the behavior of conscious human agents.

Scientific methods allow organizations to represent reality in terms of standardized, atomistic categories. This provides the precise and abstract knowledge that empowers experts to control societies. For example, Timothy Mitchell argues that mapping practices in colonial Egypt permitted experts to rule society and *make* an economy.[48] Morgenthau points out that once the world is filled with decontextualized and standardized objects it is a short step to the idea that political situations are all alike and they can be manipulated easily. He argues that 'scientific rationalism' leads political actors to believe that "Political maneuvering should be replaced by the scientific 'plan,' the political decision by the scientific 'solution,' the politician by the 'expert,' the statesman by the 'braintruster,' the legislator by the 'legal engineer.'"[49] Similarly, James Scott shows that the early modern state was unable to manipulate society because it could not 'see' or 'read' society. An illegible or 'unreadable' society makes intervention impossible:

> "An illegible society, then, is a hindrance to any effective intervention by the state, whether the purpose of that intervention is plunder or public welfare. As long as the state's interest is largely confined to grabbing a few tons of grain and rounding up a few conscripts, the state's ignorance may not be fatal. When, however, the state's objective requires changing the daily habits (hygiene or health practices) or work performance (quality labor or machine maintenance) of its citizens, such ignorance can well be disabling. A thoroughly legible society eliminates local monopolies of information and

[48] Mitchell 2002, 83-93.

[49] Morgenthau 1946, 29.

> creates a kind of national transparency through the uniformity of codes, identities, statistic, regulations, and measures."[50]

Scott argues that the state rendered its population legible or visible via scientific practices of metrical standardization, cartography, and the statistical classification of society. This in turn empowered the technocratic intelligentsia: "The rule of specialists and the new technological possibilities, particularly huge electric power grids, made possible a new social-industrial order that was both centralized and locally autonomous."[51] In time, these experts permitted and promoted an ideology that Scott calls 'scientific modernism':

> "a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws."[52]

Thus, the legibility of society empowered the rule of experts which in turn promoted modernist ideologies. This provides an explanation for means-ends capture in terms of an organization's ability to represent social reality.

In short, Scott and Mitchell's arguments imply that unguided learning is more likely when feedback processes allow experts to remain at a distance from the social and material reality they are supposed to be interpreting. Reflective learning requires feedback that reminds analysts what the original goal was and provides clear evidence of whether or not it is being achieved. However, technical abilities to represent the social and material reality of interest may allow proxy indicators to take on an air of objectivity that they do not deserve. For example, in order to measure success of a policy 'objectively,' the outcomes of the policy have to be

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[50] Scott 1998, 78.
[51] Scott 1998, 99.
[52] Scott 1998, 4.

measured in a neutral, usually quantitative manner.[53] This may require the use of proxy indicators (e.g., GDP stands in for quality of life) that become taken-for-granted and naturalized over time. Better feedback would remind analysts that this is just a proxy and that the real goal is something else. However, abstract feedback processes can isolate experts from the social reality they intervene in and thus permit means-ends capture.

Thus, policies may end up being calibrated to the data instead of to the actual material and social environment.

This last point illustrates that reflective or intentional learning depends not just on an organization's ability to represent the world, but on good quality deliberations. Counter-intuitively, epistemic communities are actually susceptible to deliberations that do not reflect deeply on policy goals. Goal-setting is more likely to remain connected to original purposes when the organization or society continually introduces new participants who are critical of the taken-for-granted organizational culture. Similarly, organizations and societies are more likely to be conscious of subterranean goal changes to the extent that they draw on the ideas of diverse groups of people. People from different professional and personal backgrounds are more likely to have access to different regions of discourse and therefore are more likely to bring different values and cosmologies to the table.[54] Deliberating about diverse ends in diverse groups denaturalizes more assumptions and thereby prevents the final stages of institutionalization. Turning this around, it is easy to see that the groups most susceptible to means-ends capture are small groups that are all socialized into the same way of seeing the world. Thus, epistemic

[53] Rouse 1987.

[54] Page 1996; Kollman 2000; Hong and Page 2001. This literature argues that diverse groups are better at coming up with solutions or new methods. My suggestion is that the same logic applies to coming up with good and maintaining good goals.

communities are more likely to be subject to these dynamics because their shared consensual knowledge has trained all their members to think in the same way.

Methodology and Research Design

My argument is that importing scientific means changes the deepest epistemic and ontological levels of discourse and this has an effect on the ends of politics. The key causal factors in this argument are the structure of scientific discourse in international society and the quality of organizational learning processes. How can we test this argument? My empirical work combines elements of a comparative case study design with discourse analysis. Discourse analysis serves the purposes of descriptive inference; it establishes the explanandum.[55] The research design and process evidence permit causal inference; they allow us to conclude that different learning processes are responsible for some of the variance observed.[56]

Comparative Case Study Design

The UN Department of Peacekeeping is the hard case for an argument about the rise of scientific rationality.[57] The easy case for the argument is a domain in which the reality of interest is a material one. For example, it is obvious that environmental politics depends abstract and general knowledge of discrete elements because environmental policy requires sound scientific knowledge.[58] After all, the underlying reality of interest is material, not social, and so is amenable to scientific study. The World Bank offers a tougher case because the underlying reality is social. Thus, it is less clear that scientific theory should work here. Peacekeeping is a

[55] King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 34, 55.
[56] King, Keohane, and Verba 1994,
[57] George and Bennett 2004, 121.
[58] Haas 1992.

tough case for similar reasons. Moreover, peacekeeping is a humanitarian task and so we would expect the discourses of human rights and liberalism to dominate its means and ends. Finally, peacekeeping is a fundamentally a security practice. Here, we would expect security and military concerns to dominate. If scientific rationality gains a foothold here, where we would not expect it, we can expect scientific rationality to be important in other places.

My research design borrows from the core idea of comparative case study design, though I do not offer a full blown second case. Instead, I use the alternative outcome in the World Bank to get some variation in outcomes and help think through the explanation for the observed outcomes in the peacebuilding case.[59] In the World Bank, scientific infiltration was far more extensive than in the UN Department of Peacekeeping. Comparative case study designs help scholars explain this kind of variation if the two cases are similar in crucial respects. If the two cases have different outcomes, but are alike in ways x,y, and z, then we can eliminate these as explanations for the variance.[60] The two cases here, the World Bank and the UN Department of Peacekeeping are similar in important ways. They both depend on member government funds, they tend to receive these funds from rich countries but disburse them in poor ones, and both have a humanitarian mission of sorts. That said, they are not similar enough to meet the stringent requirements of a controlled comparison.[61] However, looking closely at the evidence can help identify key causal paths even in the absence of controlled comparison.[62] Evidence of the organization's "process" can help to confirm the presence or absence of key causal factors

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[59] King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 108.

[60] In the technical language of case study analysis this is the "method of difference." This method "attempts to identify [similar] independent variables associated with different outcomes" and thus eliminate the independent variable as a complete explanation for the variance in outcomes. George and Bennett 2004, 153.

[61] The method of difference is subject to three very restrictive conditions: i) there is "deterministic regularity involving only one condition that is either necessary or sufficient for a specified outcome"; ii) "*all* causally relevant variables must be identified prior to the analysis"; and iii) cases must "represent the full range of all logically and socially possible causal paths." George and Bennett 2004, 155.

[62] George and Bennett 2004, 163.

that the overall comparison does not establish.[63]

Discourse Analysis

The explanandum here is change in peacebuilding discourse. Discourse analysis allows us to infer the discourse from its traces in linguistic evidence. [64] Since I believe that discourse is constitutive of all social reality, including text and artifact, I assert that traces of a discourse are evident in everything written, printed, and represented within its reach.[65] I expect that to the extent that scientific rationality has moved into peacekeeping discourse, these changes will be evident in the changing episteme and ontology of peacekeeping. Thereafter, the means of peacekeeping should reflect the new pressures introduced by theses deep changes. Technical and scientific means should be suggested and defended more frequently. Finally, the ends of politics should be increasingly generalizable, universal, 'objective' and calculable.

How can this be measured? For my discourse analysis, I adopted methods of Hopf's study of Soviet identity to the case here.[66] First, I built a database of all the documents in the United Nations Peacekeeping Resource Hub from 1990-2010. I then created a sample of documents with manual (¼) and random selection (¾). I manually selected the central peacekeeping texts from 1990-2010 (the 'Agenda for Peace', the 'Brahimi Report', the 2003 'Handbook,' and the 'Capstone Doctrine,' etc.) and removed them from the database. I gave the remaining documents in the database a number and generated a list of random numbers, each of which corresponded to a specific document.

Second, I qualitatively analyzed this sample by reading the texts closely and writing notes

[63] Flyvberg 2006, 230.
[64] Milliken 1999.
[65] Angenot 2004.
[66] Hopf 2002a.

that answer 6 questions, 3 about means and 3 about ends. Within each set of 3 questions, I ask one about the episteme, one about ontology, and one about the substantive content of rationality:

Discourse Analysis Questions: Means

1.1) Episteme: What types of knowledge should be used to solve problems?
   a) what are the rules of logic? rules of inference? style of argument?
   b) what are the sources of evidence? sources of knowledge?
   c) how generalizable is knowledge gleaned from a given context?

1.2) Ontology: What are the objects in the world and how can they be changed?
   a) individuals/subjects conceptualized as:
   b) groups/peoples identified as:
   c) territories or lands seen as:

1.3) Rationality: What types of means should be used?

Discourse Analysis Questions: Ends

2.1) Episteme: What justifies the ends we have?
   a) is the world naturalized or open to questioning?
   b) how often are ends explicitly discussed?

2.2) Ontology: How do these ends fit into the world?
   a) what are the dominant metaphors and categories of thought that support ends?
   b) what relation do ends have to available means?

2.3) Rationality: What are the ends of action?

Recall that I am looking for evidence that means employ general knowledge of discrete elements to achieve calculable, objective, pregiven as opposed to value-laden goals. These questions link directly into this argument. They also help us to plot the discourse on figure 1, so we can describe whether the discourse has become more or less practical, technical, and scientific.

III. PEACEKEEPING DISCOURSE, 1990-2000

In the 1990s, UN peacekeeping began a transition from traditional peacekeeping, wherein lightly armed UN troops monitor and enforce a ceasefire, to complex, multidimensional operations that include training civilian police, building rule of law institutions, monitoring elections, and drafting constitutions. The need for the UN to adapt to these new tasks was first identified in the 'Agenda for Peace,' a 1992 report submitted to the United Nations Security Council by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.[67] His report is short on operational details but the main ends and means are clear. Boutros-Ghali posits a number of interrelated goals for UN peacekeeping: "international peace and security," "security, justice and human rights," and "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." The primary means to these ends are preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.[68] Notably, although Boutros-Ghali suggests that more information and more people are needed, he does not call for additional 'expertise,' technical or otherwise.[69] Indeed, he says just the opposite:

> "Experience has shown that the greatest obstacle to success in these endeavours is not, as widely supposed, lack of information, analytical capacity or ideas for UN initiatives, Success is often blocked at the outset by the reluctance of one or other of the parties to accept UN help.
>
> "The solution can only be long-term. It may lie in creating a climate of opinion, or ethos, within the international community in which the norm would be for member states to accept an offer of UN good offices."[70]

This reflects a general argument that the central barrier to peacekeeping success is 'will,' both of the warring parties and the international community. As he says elsewhere, "[i]f conflicts have gone unresolved it is not because techniques for peaceful settlement were unknown or inadequate. The fault lies in the lack of political will."[71]

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[67] UNSC 1995a. The report was supplemented by Boutros-Ghali in 1995.
[68] UNSC 1995a, 45-6.
[69] Cf. inter alia, UNSC 1995a, 16, 47, 49,
[70] UNSC 1995a, 13.
[71] UNSC 1995a, 52.

These ends and means are embedded in a thick social ontology wherein peace must be consolidated by building social bonds of trust. He places great store in confidence-building measures as key to addressing the root causes of conflict: peacebuilding projects must "not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence so fundamental to peace."[72] However, there are moments in which Boutros-Ghali exhibits a technical conception of the United Nations as a machine or tool:

> "One requirement for solutions to these problems lies in commitment to human rights with a special sensitivity to those of minorities, whether ethnic, religious, social or linguistic. The League of Nations provided a machinery for the international protection of minorities. The General Assembly soon will have before it a declaration on the rights of minorities. That instrument together with the increasingly effective machinery of the UN dealing with Human rights, should enhance the situation of minorities."[73]

However, such statements are the exception rather than the rule in the 'Agenda for Peace.' After all, Boutros-Ghali concludes that "the search for improved mechanisms and techniques will be of little significance unless this new spirit of commonality is propelled by the will to take the hard decisions demanded."[74] Thus, here, there is no evidence that peace- and state-building are conceived in technocratic terms.

These themes are widely evident in the discourse analysis between 1990 and 2000. The Secretary-Generals report on the UN observer mission in El Salvador predominantly suggests that the barrier was: "opposition from important pressure groups and continuing institutional fragility have forestalled decisive Government action."[75] In addition, the humanitarian goal of the mission is clear: "a democratic order where institutions for the protection of human rights and free discourse are being consolidated."[76]

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[72] UNSC 1995a, 61. Cf. 15, 45.
[73] UNSC 1995a, 44.
[74] UNSC 1995a, 40.
[75] UNSC 1995b, 16.
[76] UNSC 1995b, 15.

The 'lessons learned' report after the failure in Somalia contends that the success of peacekeeping missions depends on a "unity of purpose" and sufficient "political will."[77] Here, goals are rooted in a thick social ontology as the authors call for "support for the revival of associational life."[78] The goal of 'indirect peacebuilding' should be the "resurrection of a web of civic, professional, business, athletic and other associations."[79] The document argues that a central task of peace consolidation is rebuilding neighborhoods and. Closely related is the emphasis on local, contextual plans and activities that take into account "the needs of the local situation rather than being driven by budgetary or outside political considerations."[80] All of this lends credibility to the call for a "bottom-up approach to reconciliation and state-revival."[81] This report does not reproduce Boutros-Ghali's devaluation of expertise, suggesting that "expertise should be consulted during the planning phase" and that experts need the "capacity to gather, analyse and feed information to the responsible security, political, or humanitarian officials."[82] However, the experts called for are experts "on Somalia" that can help specify the exact "nature of the problem."[83] All of this shows that the document remains firmly within the domain of practical rationality (the bottom left of figure 1).

Kofi Annan's report on the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia argues that the failure of the UN to prevent the massacre of civilians in Srebrenica was due to the fact that the UN and its member states had no "political will to confront the menace defying it":

> "The community of nations decided to respond to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an arms embargo, with humanitarian aid and with the deployment of a

[77] UNDPKO 1995, §8. On humanitarian goals here see §10.
[78] UNDPKO 1995, §34.
[79] UNDPKO 1995, §34.
[80] UNDPKO 1995, §36.
[81] UNDPKO 1995, §37.
[82] UNDPKO 1995, §17. Cf. calls for "technical soundness" of plans and programmes, §42.
[83] UNDPKO 1995, §17

> peacekeeping force. It must be clearly stated that these measures were poor substitutes for more decisive and forceful action to prevent the unfolding horror."[84]

The peacekeeping mission in Eastern Bosnia was a "substitute" for "political consensus" amongst the member states and so was doomed to fail. Part of the problem, the report suggests, was that the UN tried too hard to be "impartial" in the face of actions that demonstrably violated the spirit of the UN Charter, and thus should have been stopped by the UN.[85] The 'impartiality' principle meant that initially, and for too long, the UN maintained a limited mission mandate: "the creation of an environment in which humanitarian aid could be delivered."[86] In the end, the problem demanded a "political/military solution" and not a "humanitarian solution."[87] This commitment to military and political solutions underscores a fundamental theme 1990s UN Peace Operations discourse: the humanitarian ends of peacekeeping are best served when backed by political and military support, not technical knowledge.

The Brahimi Report was a major review of UN Peace Operations charged with evaluating the changing climate of peacekeeping and making recommendations for future operations. The report mostly reproduces the main theme stated above. However, in subtle ways, the Brahimi report shows that the epistemic and ontological underpinnings of the peacekeeping discourse are in flux. In the same vein as the 'Agenda for Peace', the Brahimi report argues that political will and especially "the fundamental ability to project force" are necessary for peacekeeping success. But, "force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built."[88] Peacekeepers can "maintain a secure local environment"

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[84] UNGA 1999, 105.
[85] UNGA 1999, 107.
[86] UNGA 1999, 104.
[87] UNGA 1999, 106.
[88] UNGA 2000, viii.

but then peacebuilders must "work to make that environment self-sustaining" via civilian police training programs, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration campaigns and quick impact economic projects.[89] This conception of the peacebuilding model introduces a technical aspect to the task at hand: peace must be built in the space created by peacekeepers. This model is supported by a 'technical' means episteme that aims to employ peacebuilding "tools" to build the "foundations of peace."[90] These "complex" tasks require political will, but they also demand "expertise" from "military analysts, policy experts, and highly qualified information systems analysts."[91] UN agencies in the field require expertise not just to plan and build institutions but also to stay a head of developments: "without significant knowledge generating and analytic capacity, the Secretariat will remain a reactive institution."[92] Legal codes and civilian police institutions should be designed and overseen by legal and police experts.[93] These experts are no longer conceived of as local, national experts, but should be drawn from an experienced pool of international expertise. This provides evidence to support Sending's claim that the "authority of external actors… is not only derived from their humanitarian mandate, or the legal mandate from the UN charter, or from the resources that are marshalled… [but] from how peacebuilders claim to to *know* what needs to be done to prevent future conflicts, and to help build a liberal-democratic state."[94] Thus, this is evidence that the episteme of the peacekeeping discourse is shifting to support defenses of intervention rooted in 'expertise' and claims to superior knowledge ultimately legitimated by the authority of science.

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[89] UNGA 2000, viii-ix.
[90] UNGA 2000, 3.
[91] UNGA 2000, 12-13.
[92] UNGA 2000, 12.
[93] UNGA 2000, 14, 20.
[94] Sending 2009, 8.

The changes evident in the Brahimi report reflect epistemic developments I noticed elsewhere. One document suggests two elements of successful reconstruction: economic reform and civil society recovery. The emphasis on a thriving civil society seems to reproduce the thick social ontology uncovered earlier. However, here civil society is not conceived in terms of 'associational life,' but in terms of "social capital."[95] Social capital is defined as "the organizations, networks, and unwritten mores and rules that facilitate coordinated action and enable people to undertake cooperative ventures for mutual advantage."[96] This retains some of the earlier concern for social relationships as underlying peace consolidation, but it does so in a way that gives the appearance that this goal could be calculable and quantitative. After all, the concept 'social capital' depends on the analogy with 'private capital,' namely money. Conceiving of social relationships as 'capital' strips social ontology of its thickness, replacing the focus on confidence and trust building with economic recovery as the core task of peacebuilding. This is a clear move towards models that tacitly employ a scientific ontology composed of "discrete units or atoms" that are easily controlled and manipulated, and thus shows peacekeeping discourse moving up the means axis in figure 1.

IV. PEACEKEEPING DISCOURSE, 2000-2010

In the late 1990s, the UN Department of Peacekeeping took over the complete administration of East Timor and Kosovo. The challenges of state-building in these states had a drastic effect on the means discourse. There is a lot of continuity in the discourse, but there is evidence that the discourse is increasingly infiltrated by 'technological' ideas and norms. This reflects the demands for additional experts to solve the 'complex' problems posed by the

[95] WB/CCR 1998, 7-8.
[96] WB/CCR 1998, 8.

missions in East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ethiopia-Eritrea. But is also reflects changes in the underlying episteme and ontology of the peacekeeping discourse which increasingly privileges expert knowledge and deploys thin social ontologies of discrete units.

Continuity is evident in a few documents from the early 2000s. An International Crisis Group Report on Hutu Rebel Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration campaigns places a heavy emphasis on the the need for a "political consensus that is first subjected to an inclusive discussion."[97] The report argues that Kagame's Rwandan government must be "convinced" by the international community to end his support for the violence in Congo and to conduct a "political opening" that necessitates a "genuine national debate."[98] This argument for dialogic and communicative means is rooted in a thick social ontology that highlights the need for political reconciliation and reintegration premised on changing social relations. One report by a UN official in East Timor suggests that the mission there was successful because it was backed by legitimacy: "legitimacy based on the justness of the struggle; legitimacy based on the morality underpinning each of the UN-mandated missions; and the legitimacy of the basic 'right' of a small population of under one million people to determine their own future and to break free from the poverty cycle."[99] Both of these documents demonstrate that the focus on 'political' means persists in post-Brahimi era.

Similar continuities are also evident in Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno's 2002 speech. She argues, familiarly, that a lack of "political will" caused the setbacks of the mid-1990s and that peacebuilding now depends on filling the "commitment gap." Member states who must deliver clear, achievable mandates that address

[97] ICG 2003, 25.
[98] ICG 2003, ii.
[99] Smith 2004, 5.

"the root causes of conflict" and back them with the necessary resources.[100] However, her speech offers no evidence of the thick social ontology which peacekeeping discourse depended on in the early 1990s. Moreover, Guehenno's speech engages in cost/benefit analysis of the value of peacekeeping.[101] This is a problematic practice because the humanitarian goals of peacekeeping are not easily measured. Guehenno's speech reveals this when she attempts to assess the benefits of peacekeeping in terms that could be quantified. Namely, she argues that since failed states are breeding grounds for terrorism, peacekeeping is an investment in "stability and security" that can be traced to dollars and lives saved in the member states. As well, she suggests that peacebuilding addresses instabilities that perpetuate poverty in failed states, "forcing them to continue to rely on foreign aid."[102] This demonstrates not only that the high costs of complex missions strain political and financial commitments, but reveals the epistemic rules that underlie the peacekeeping discourse are increasingly technical and calculative. This illustrates tacit epistemic assumptions about the desirability and objectivity of 'calculability' and an ontological move to render all objects of peacekeeping in discrete terms amenable to scientific analysis. Change is also evident in Guehenno's contention that the twin goals of the UN mission in East Timor were to give the country democratic government and a "growing economy."[103] This demonstrates a marked departure from the usual humanitarian ends posited by UN documents in the 1990s. In short, Guehenno's 2002 speech indicates moves both along the means and ends axes toward scientific rationality.

This new emphasis on governance and development goals is also reproduced in the Peace Operations Year in Review 2003 report. Here, the old goals of providing humanitarian

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[100] Guehenno 2002, 3-6.
[101] Guehenno 2002, 9-11. Similar analyses can be found in UNDPKO/DFS 2009 and UNDPI 2004.
[102] Guehenno 2002, 10.
[103] Guehenno 2002, 5.

assistance, promoting human rights, and restoring the rule of law coexist with economic development. The report states that the experience of the UN in Kosovo "established progress in economic development as one of the basic standards to be met before final status discussions."[104] Similarly, in a 2004 report by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the UN Security Council, the goals of transitional justice initiatives are to "enhance human rights, protect persons from fear and want, address property disputes, encourage economic development, promote accountable governance and peacefully resolve conflict."[105] Calculable goals like economic development are established in the peacekeeping discourse alongside traditional humanitarian concerns by the mid-2000s.

That said, the episteme and ontology that underlie these goals has some interesting and stable features. Annan grounds UN goals 'collective agreement' or 'political consensus' as demonstrated by the wide adoption of UN standards and norms:

> "The normative foundation for our work in advancing the rule of law is the Charter of the United Nations itself, together with the four pillars of the modern international legal system: international humanitarian rights law' international humanitarian law; international criminal law; and international refugee law… These represent universally applicable standards adopted under the auspices of the UN and must therefore serve as the normative basis for all UN activities in support of justice and the rule of law."[106]

Thus, these standards "bring a legitimacy that cannot be said to attach to exported national models."[107] What is interesting here is that arguments for universals are easily legitimated by reference to 'nature' or 'objectively scientific' criteria. However, that is not done here. Instead, universals are legitimated with reference to an episteme and ontology that privileges agreement and adoption as the basis of values.[108]

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[104] UNDPI 2004, 18.
[105] UNSC 2004, 4.
[106] UNSC 2004, 5.
[107] UNSC 2004, 5.
[108] A similar tendency can be seen in UNGA 1999 and UNGA 2000.

In the same report on transitional justice by Annan, the barriers to effectiveness now include both old barriers like "lack of political will" and new ones like "domestic technical capacity."[109] This reflects the fact that the episteme and ontology on display here now have two dimensions. On the one hand, Annan argues for contextual means: "We must learn to eschew one-size-fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead, base our support on national assessments, national participation and national needs and aspirations."[110] On the other hand, in the very next sentence, Annan portrays peacekeeping and peacebuilding as political *and* technical tasks: "[e]ffective strategies will seek to support both technical capacity for reform and political will for reform."[111] Moreover, the contextual standards he calls for are to be determined by "[b]oth national and international experts," after all, "effective and sustainable approaches begin with a thorough analysis of national needs and capacities, mobilizing to the extent possible expertise resident in the country."[112] This demonstrates that the epistemic foundations of peacekeeping methods increasingly privilege technocratic knowledge.

The 2003 Peacekeeping Handbook betrays a similar ambivalence. The goal of peacekeeping is to "[m]onitor a ceasefire" and "[p]rovide a secure environment." But it is also to "[l]ead states or societies through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development."[113] The report also charges the political affairs office of peace operations with both political and technical tasks: "The fundamental concern of political affairs in a peacekeeping context is to understand the dynamics of the armed conflict that created the requirement for a peacekeeping operation, to follow closely the evolution of these dynamics and to develop strategies to help the parties in conflict resolve dispute through

[109] UNSC 2004, 3.
[110] UNSC 2004, 1.
[111] UNSC 2004, 1.
[112] UNSC 2004, 6.
[113] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 2.

peaceful means."[114] That is, central tasks include, on the one hand,"[e]stablishing contacts" and "[w]orking with diplomats to use the leverage of Member states."[115] Yet, on the other hand, technical tasks are also prominent: "[a]nalysing political developments," "[d]eveloping strategies," "[p]roviding policy advice" and "[c]onceptualizing, planning and establishing new political institutions."[116] Political affairs officers are "expected to maintain comprehensive knowledge of the overall situation" and should "continuously review and evaluate political developments."[117] These aspirations to updated and tested knowledge could be pulled from a scientific lab. The chapter on civil affairs argues that the increasing "complexity" of peacekeeping mandates demands a "range of specialized expertise" including professional from "political science, law, international relations, business administration, engineering, economics" etc.[118] At least four of these disciplines are dominated by scientific epistemes and ontologies. Despite these changes, the document falls short of advocating the use of universal, abstract knowledge. It states that political officers must be ready to "provide creative solutions" because presumably it is obvious that no two situations will be the same and that exhaustive knowledge and analysis is not really possible.[119]

The chapter also departs from the previous discussions of political will. While the chapter on the duties of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General retain respect for the 'art of diplomacy,' the chapter on civil affairs suggests that problems of political will can be solved with analysis.[120] Here, when the UN is confronted by those who "may try to obstruct the work of a mission," it "is the task of civil affairs to analyse problems and chart a way through the

[114] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 23.
[115] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 23.
[116] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 23.
[117] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 26.
[118] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 35.
[119] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 33.
[120] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 3.

obstruction."[121] This places inordinate faith in the power of analysis to deal with what is usually framed as a political problem. Moreover, the handbook encourages civil affairs to measure success against "established and quantifiable benchmarks."[122] Though this may not have been operationalized in the field, it signals once again that the underlying epistemes and ontologies are shifting.

Finally, analysis of the 2008 Peacekeeping "Capstone Doctrine" tempers some of these claims while supporting others. For instance, the document does not place great emphasis on 'expertise', preferring the language of "integrated planning" rooted in "an in-depth appreciation of the specific country setting."[123] Instead, the doctrine returns to the older means of maintaining political consensus and facilitating dialogue.[124] Yet, the Capstone doctrine does not bring back the thick social ontology that once accompanied the contextual means. Instead the plan is to "establish the necessary security conditions for the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance" and "maintain pressure on the parties to implement key institutional reforms."[125] This recalls Kofi Annan's characterization of the peacebuilding task as one of building interdependent institutions rather than restoring peoples' trust, confidence and the social fabric of society. Where local norms and individuals do enter the report, it is as a reminder to peacekeepers that their behavior has a 'social, economic and environmental impact' and so they should be aware that some behaviors "e.g.: employment of women in non-traditional gender roles, mixing and socialization amongst genders, drinking, gambling, inappropriate behavior, etc." make create "friction."[126] Thus, the report retains the impression that peacekeeping is a technical task where universal and well understood activities (DDR,

[121] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 39.
[122] UNDPKO/PBPU 2003, 43.
[123] UNDPKO/DFS 2008, 54.
[124] UNDPKO/DFS 2008, 20-23.
[125] UNDPKO/DFS 2008, 24.
[126] UNDPKO/DFS 2008, 82.

elections monitoring, human rights monitoring, and humanitarian assistance) can transition a society from war to peace.

V. CONCLUSION: LEARNING, MATERIALITY AND LEGIBILITY

The discourse analysis of the means and ends of UN peacekeeping has turned up some interesting results. Recall the changes in political rationality hypothesized: means employ objective, general knowledge of discrete elements to achieve calculable, neutral, pregiven as opposed to value-laden goals. The discourse about appropriate means or methods change significantly. There is a clear shift from Boutros-Ghali's pronouncements in 1992 and 1995 that expertise is less important than political consensus to the emphasis on expertise after 2000. This is a tacit call for more 'objective' knowledge.[127] Many of the experts called for are probably not 'scientists' but this still demonstrates the dominance of an underlying episteme that demands tested formal knowledge as a basis for action. In addition, there is a steady decline in the thickness of 'social ontology.' Where social ontologies are rich and textured, social bonds are constitutive of society. Peacebuilders first saw confidence and trust as essential in the mid-1990s, but these thick ideas are replaced by thin 'social capital' and by, at best, 'interdependent institutions' in the 2000s. This illustrates a move toward an ontology of 'discrete units or atoms that can be easily controlled and manipulated.'[128]

However, there is little incorporation of abstract, generalizable knowledge. Even where experts are called for, it is not clear that they will be employing 'universal models.' That said, the universal applicability of these institutions is taken-for-granted, which could count for

[127] This corroborates the main thrust of Sending's (2009) argument.
[128] This offers cautious support for Buhta's (2008) claim that peacebuilding is a domain of 'techno-politics.'

evidence of deductive scientific universalism.[129] But this could just as easily be evidence for Roland Paris' argument about the dominance of Western liberalism, and so should be taken with a grain of salt.[130]

There is also some change in the ends discourse toward epistemes and ontologies that privilege calculable and quantifiable ends. However, there is little movement in the ends themselves, except towards the incorporation of economic development and growth on par with humanitarian concerns. To some extent, this reflects the decline of thick social ontologies mentioned above, since thick ontologies would presumably support humanitarian goals due to their close relationship to real people and communities. Finally, the retention of a commitment to universal goals rooted in collective agreement rather than in natural or scientific categories is interesting.

The resistance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding to scientific means and ends is puzzling when compared to the case of the World Bank. Why has peacebuilding and peacekeeping been able to resist scientific means-ends capture? My argument is that the UN Department of Peacekeeping relies on direct, qualitative feedback from on-the-ground peacekeepers and peacebuilders. But first, I want to address some alternative explanations.

First, one might argue that the main difference between the World Bank and the UN Department of Peacekeeping is that the former was dominated by an epistemic community of economic scientists.[131] This is certainly part of the story. Since economists have internalized scientific rationality, they employ general theories to quantifiable ends as a matter of course. However, I am not convinced that this explanation is complete because it does not explain why administrators and experts are empowered in the economic domain but not in other domains.

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[129] Sending 2009, 8.
[130] This tempers Barnett (2006) and Sending's (2009) argument that peacebuilding depends on universal models.
[131] Chwieroth 2007; 2008.

That is, it does not explain why the World Bank is able to make its environment subject to scientific manipulation and why its learning process falters.

Second, one could argue that the UN is subject to constant criticism and so is an unusually reflective organization that is always trying to engage its critics and 'learn lessons.' Ends change is prevented because many actors participate in the legitimation and naturalization phases of institutionalization. Again, this is certainly part of the story. However, this cannot explain all the variation in outcomes because the World Bank is also subject to this kind of scrutiny and it has used scientific rationality to defend itself in these fights.[132]

I think the difference then has to be explained by the organizations' different abilities to represent and interpret their environments. For example, one of the documents in my sample shows the learning process of the UN in action. In a report on the civilian police operation in Bosnia, two criminologists review a series of qualitative, open-ended interviews with the commander of the mission and a number of the officers who served under him.[133] The result is an analysis of the problems of civilian police monitoring that remains close to the concerns of everyday people and the idiosyncrasies of local conditions. The revealed ontology is thus relatively thick, as the officers emphasize the importance of building and maintaining the trust and confidence of 'the people' to the success of their operations. Moreover, the officers maintain a strong commitment to personal standards of justice. At one point, the commander of the mission defends a dubious interpretation of his mandate (on which he 'investigated' human rights abuses as opposed to simply 'monitoring' them) with a moving and personal statement of purpose: "someone has to care for the dead, someone has to speak for the dead, and we are

[132] Weaver and Lieteritz 2005.
[133] Chappell and Evans 1997.

civilian police, and our main role is to care for the people, living or dead."[134] Perhaps when relevant knowledge or 'expertise' is generated by local, on-the-ground administrators, it is less likely to become generalized and universal. Perhaps the tacit models and aims of the UN peace operations will remain in or continue to return to the domain of 'practical rationality' so long as feedback is solicited on this level.

To really see why the World Bank case is different though, we have to consider the characteristics of the social and material environment itself. After all, the subject of World Bank analyses, the economic well-being of individuals, seems just as amenable to qualitative interviews and moving statements from Bank officials. However, the World Bank does not employ these methods. Instead, the medium of money provides an abstract and readable representation of complex social and material exchange. Human consumption and exchange can be understood easily by economists because money translates the blooming and buzzing confusion of life into price information. The circulation of money is easily quantified and plugged into abstract models.[135] Thus, World Bank officials can test their theories and models against economic data stripped of its subjective and intersubjective meanings. This enables the impersonal 'universal model' to drive the learning process and encourage the maximization of quantitative ends. That is, institutionalization processes of legitimation and naturalization can change the original goals. Thus, quantitative indicators like GDP growth become ends-in-themselves.

By contrast, peacebuilding officials must confront real people and real guns and a reminder of the true values of peacekeeping are only as far away as an interview with those affected by war and strife. When this reality is translated into 'data' for analysis and learning, it retains a

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[134] Chappell and Evans 1997, 164, 157.
[135] Mitchell 2002, 83-93.

strong connection to the human impact of war and community involvement in security and the rule of law. The 'data' is mediated by the subjectivity of real people. Thus, what really drives means-ends capture in the World Bank is the absence of contextual, intersubjective feedback between outcomes and planning. One way of characterizing this difference is to say that the practices that the World Bank is interested in are more legible and thus more easily subject to scientific analysis and manipulation. It is simply harder to translate peacebuilding's reality into abstract theory.

Implications

The legibility framework I introduce here offers an explanation for the limited success of peacebuilding so far. On this view, the failure of peacebuilding is due to the illegibility of post-conflict societies. The implication then is that if the UN wants to change the 'daily habits' and 'work performance' of people in post-conflict societies, they have to employ experts to 'map' the population and the territory. But there are dangers to this approach, one practical and one normative. Practically speaking, one gets the impression from Annan's report on the fall of Srebrenica that during the Bosnian crisis, UN officials spent too much time looking at maps that abstracted from the realities on the ground, and therefore attempted to manipulate technically what could not be done without additional ground troops.[136] The maps made the crisis 'legible' and amenable to administration from afar, but this did not lead to success.

Normatively, it is not quite right to say that peacebuilding discourse is *not* amenable to scientific representation. Scott's study of early modern states shows that persistent and powerful actors can make social reality visible and manipulable by outside experts. However,

[136] UNGA 1999.

Scott's argument is that this has potentially disastrous effects and so scientific means should be employed with caution.[137]

To avoid the pathologies associated with means-ends capture, peacebuilders must resist the push for quantitative performance indicators and foster practices that generate qualitative, intersubjective feedback and encourage deliberation by diverse groups of people. Thus the solution to the problems of peacebuilding is not to empower a technical epistemic community that will rationally calibrate means and ends. My argument suggests that this form of technocratic policy fails on its own terms because the means we choose has important effects on the ends we desire.[138] Moreover, epistemic communities are just the kinds of actors my theory predicts will fall victim to this dynamic.

Of course, important political decisions should not be made in the absence of expertise. Instead of delegating to scientific experts, the analysis here suggests that we should incorporate their views into diverse deliberations. This prescription dovetails nicely with the normative argument that peacebuilding should focus on methods of transitional justice like truth and reconciliation commissions that encourage communication and deliberation. Michael Barnett suggests that peacebuilding doctrine should move away from the 'shock therapy' of liberalism to a republican "emphasis on deliberative processes" which allow "space for societal actors to determine for themselves what the good life is and how to achieve it."[139] Mark Drumbl argues that local participatory justice tribunals are the best institutions for dealing with post-genocidal societies because the shame-based procedures generate therapeutic discussion in communities.[140] These are calls for institutions that embody 'practical rationality' instead of

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[137] Scott 1998.
[138] Stewart 1986.
[139] Barnett 2006, 90.
[140] Drumbl 2002, 13. Cf. Joyce 2004 for a similar argument.

'scientific rationality.' In situations where the 'material reality' beneath scientific analysis are the people and the social bonds that hold communities and societies together, scientific means and ends are inappropriate and risk distorting the goals and values of those societies.

Thus, the case of peacebuilding is a cautionary tale about the potential limits of social construction.[141] On the one hand, social construction is limited normatively by the idea that if we go too far in trying to manipulate and change social reality, we may hurt our societies and our values. On the other hand, social construction is limited empirically by the characteristics of the social and material environment. My analysis here shows that some material realities are clearly more susceptible to social construction than others. Between a post-modernist optimism about the potential for social construction and a naive materialist determinism, there must be a number of middle positions that can be theorized. The study of science and politics is a fruitful ground for this kind of analysis because scientific discourse is better suited to transforming certain domains. This forces us to confront the relationship between the material and social world that scholars usually bracket. My argument here is that the economic domain is more amenable to scientific rationality because money is more legible than the roots of collective violence. But we should be careful not to interpret this to mean that the legibility of economic reality is a 'natural fact'. Rather, I think my analysis shows us how the 'material world' itself is a product of interaction between brute facts (or the 'rump materialism' of reality) and social facts. Rather, controlling and intervening in the world requires an understanding of how the 'material' world is actually an amalgamation of the social and material. This undermines *both* strategies of social construction that privileges solely ideational mechanisms of change and narrative of technological determinism that consign humanity to a future dominated by scientific and technological rationality.

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[141] Price 2008.

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All primary documents are available in the United Nations Peacekeeping Resource Hub: http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/

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