Research in International Politics
2005 Autumn Presentation Schedule:
October 28th
Massimo Morelli (with Matthew Jackson)
Title: "War, Transfers, and Political Bias" (Download a Copy)
Abstract: We examine the incentives for countries to go to war as they depend on the
comparison between how much their pivotal decision-makers have at risk and how much they stand to gain from a war.
How this ratio compares to the country at large is what we term "political bias." If there is no political bias
(a case that we loosely relate to a "pure democracy"), then there are always payments that one country
would like to make to the other that will avoid a war. If there is a
bias on the part of one or both countries, then war can result and in
some cases cannot be prevented by any transfer payments. We also
examine how stability among many countries depends on bias, as well as
the importance of alliances in achieving stability.
