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Colloquium on Positive Political EconomyThe Colloquium on Positive Political Economy is a department speaker series that brings in faculty presenting cutting edge research focused on recent developments in positive political economy. These presentations are framed around: (1) the creation of formal models of political interactions, and (2) the testing of the predictions arising from these models, consistent with the recent NSF-sponsored Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) initiative. The seminars will cut across the subfields of American Politics, Comparative Politics, and International Relations. Moreover, the topics build bridges to faculty and graduate students in the economics Department. This series complements the growing educational opportunities available to our graduate students in various game theoretic classes offered by faculty in the economics and political science departments.
2006-2007 Speakers
December 1st John R. Wright Professor of Political Science The Ohio State University Friday, December 1, 2006 3:30-5:00 PM Spencer Room, Derby Hall Title: "Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference to Federal Agencies (Download a copy of Professor Wright's paper) Bio: Jack Wright has research and teaching interests in American politics, with emphasis on interest groups and their relations with Congress, the Supreme Court, and the federal bureaucracy. He is author of Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence (Allyn & Bacon, 1996), as well as numerous articles in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, and other leading scholarly journals. He has been the recipient of several research grants from the National Science Foundation. His current research investigates the activities of interest groups on advisory committees of the federal bureaucracy. He received his PhD from the University of Rochester, and taught at the University of Iowa and the George Washington University before coming to Ohio State in 1999. January 12th Clifford J. Carrubba Winchip Chair in Social Science Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science Emory University Friday, January 12, 2007 3:30-5:00 PM Spencer Room, Derby Hall Title: "A Model of Endogenous Development of Judicial Institutions" (Download a copy of Professor Carrubba's paper) Abstract: Why do sovereign governments create judicial institutions and grant these institutions the power to rule their actions invalid? Once such a court is created, under what conditions is that court able to rule against these governments and gain compliance with their rulings? Finally, how might the influence of the court change over time? This study presents a general theory of judicial institutions that provides a unified answer to these three questions. I argue that governments create judicial institutions to help solve collective action problems endemic to operating under a common regulatory regime. Once established, a court in its institutional “infancy” is capable of facilitating compliance with that regulatory regime’s rules but only consistent with the purpose for which the governments created the court. And finally, once the court has earned the trust of a government’s public, its ability to enforce the regulatory regime’s rules qualitatively expands. In demonstrating this last point, I derive how and why the public can rationally come to believe that supporting a court, given a conflict between its government and the court, would be in the public’s interest. Bio: Clifford Carrubba is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Emory University where he currently holds the Winchip Chair in Social Science. His interests include game theory, the politics of institutional design and change, and the European Union. His recent published work has examined coalition formation, legislative design, public opinion formation and the European Court of Justice, and has appeared in numerous political science journals including the British Journal of Political Science, the American Journal of Political Science, International Organization, Comparative Political Studies, and the Journal of Politics. His current projects focus on voting behavior in the European Parliament, European Parliament elections, and compliance in international regimes. He earned his Ph.D. from the Stanford University Graduate School of Business (Political Economics), and previously taught at SUNY-Stonybrook. Professor Carrubba's Presentation on 01/12/2007 - Windows Media File Professor Carrubba's Presentation on 01/12/2007 - MP3 File February 9 Adam Meirowitz Associate Professor of Politics Department of Politics, Princeton University Friday, February 9 2007 3:30-5:00 PM Spencer Room, Derby Hall
Title: "Secrecy and War: The Origins of Private Information" (joint work with Anne Sartori) (Download a copy of Professor Meirowitz's paper)
Abstract:
This paper shows why states, acting in their own self-interest, may create
informational
May 11 Nolan McCarty Professor of Politics and Public and International Affairs Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University Friday, May 11 2007 3:30-5:00 PM Spencer Room, Derby Hall
Title: "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?" (Download a copy of Professor McCarty's paper)
Abstract: Both pundits and scholars have blamed increasing levels of partisan conflict and polarization in Congress on the effects of partisan gerrymandering. We assess whether there is a strong causal relationship between congressional districting and polarization. We find very little evidence for such a link. First, we show that congressional polarization is primarily a function of the differences in how Democrats and Republicans represent the same districts rather than a function of which districts each party represents or the distribution of constituency preferences. Second, we conduct simulations to gauge the level of polarization under various “neutral” districting procedures. We find that the actual levels of polarization are not much higher than those produced by the simulations. We do find that gerrymandering has increased the Republican seat share in the House; this increase is not an important source of polarization.
Others to be announced Please contact Professors Craig Volden (volden@polisci.sbs.ohio-state.edu) or Alan Wiseman (wiseman.69@osu.edu) for further details, or if you would be interested in speaking in the colloquium series. |
