

Majority or Bust: The Influence of Redistricting on Party Finance Strategies

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Abstract: The “redistricting cycle” in modern American politics makes it especially valuable to be the legislative majority party in states with legislative control of redistricting. Parties might thus contribute money to candidates with the specific goal of gaining control of the redistricting process. If so, one should observe patterns traditionally referred to as “offensive” and “defensive” strategies: majority parties seeking to protect their majority by supporting incumbents and minority parties seeking to obtain a majority by supporting challengers. This study examines the contributions made by 75 party organizations in 28 states between 1996 and 2004 and finds that offensive and defensive patterns are mostly limited to states with legislative control of redistricting and years immediately prior to the Census. Moreover, findings suggest that patterns of strategic party giving are quite asymmetric: there is strong evidence that minority parties are offensive, but considerably weaker evidence that majority parties are defensive.

INTRODUCTION

"This is very important to us. I mean, next to the presidential election, really, what happens in these redistricting contests is more important to us than any other set of elections in the country." Tom Cole, chief of staff for the Republican National Committee, discussing the 2000 state legislative elections. (Storey, 2000)

In 2000, the national Republican and Democratic Parties focused unprecedented resources on state legislative races because the results of those races had important implications for redistricting, and by extension, control of the U.S. House. But, from the perspective of state parties, an infusion of national money was not necessary to inspire an intense interest in gaining or maintaining state legislative majorities. After all, the linkage between the redistricting process and legislative composition is far more direct in state legislature redistricting: the party which controls the process draws *all* the districts rather than the districts for one single delegation, as is the case in Congressional redistricting.

This intense focus on pre-redistricting elections can be seen as one implication of the “redistricting cycle”, the patterns arising in the post-*Baker v. Carr* era in which the redistricting process is predictable at regular intervals (Cox and Katz, 2002). The power to control the redistricting process makes majority party status in a legislature at the start of the decade more valuable than it might otherwise be.

In this paper, I ask whether the desire to control redistricting is reflected in the strategies of the party organizations that contest state legislative elections. The seeking of majority party status in legislatures is generally thought to fuel different strategies by majority and minority party organizations: all else equal, majority parties will be more supportive of incumbents and minority parties will be more supportive of challengers and open seat candidates (Dwyre and Stonecash 1992; Herrnson 1996). These patterns, referred to respectively as “offensive” and “defensive” strategies are often treated as universal, except in states with no inter-party competition (Gierzynski 1992). However, if gaining control of

redistricting is a major consideration in party strategy, such invariant accounts of party strategy seem less than satisfactory.

Assessing the impact of the redistricting cycle requires the adoption of a longitudinal perspective that the literature on party finance has largely neglected. While previous studies have found some evidence that *levels* of party spending increase in elections surrounding redistricting (Moncrief 1998), most studies of party strategy have treated data from multiple elections as cases of the same phenomenon. The implicit assumption of these studies is that temporal factors such as the redistricting cycle do not matter, an assumption made explicitly in Clucas (1992), who while recognizing the argument that optimal strategies *could* be different throughout the redistricting cycle, ultimately believes strategies will not vary because “control of the Assembly is likely to be decided over a series of elections.” (p. 281)

I argue that the redistricting cycle motivates systematic temporal patterns in party strategy. Parties will act offensively and defensively when redistricting is imminent and when the state legislature is the main arena for the redistricting process. In states without legislative control of redistricting, and in elections more distant from redistricting, offensive and defensive patterns will not be a systematic feature of electoral politics.

Studying party strategies across states and over time also makes it important to resolve some existing measurement issues in the study of party finance. The measurement strategy herein (1) allows majority and minority party contribution patterns to be compared in a single multivariate analysis; (2) allows open seat candidates to be treated as a separate class of candidates instead of pooling challengers and open seat candidates together as “nonincumbents”; and (3) accounts for the possibility that previous margins of victory may be a biased indicator of district-level competitiveness.

Using this measure, I analyze the contribution patterns of 75 party organizations in the lower house chambers of 28 state legislatures during the period from 1996-2004. The state legislatures offer meaningful variation in both competitiveness and the role of the legislature in the redistricting process. By highlighting the importance of institutional and temporal factors, I establish that offensive and defensive contribution strategies are not a universal feature of party behavior, but rather a departure from normal party behavior which only occurs under specific strategic conditions.

The paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss previous examinations of offensive and defensive contribution strategies and theorize why conditions related to redistricting should influence patterns of party contributions. Second, I discuss some of the measurement issues that pertain to modeling offensive and defensive strategies, and potential sources of systematic biases. Third, I discuss the dataset for this paper. Finally, I present results and discuss avenues for future research.

OFFENSE-DEFENSE THEORY AND THE REDISTRICTING CYCLE

In describing the contribution strategies of party organizations, early work (e.g. Jacobson 1985-86) noted that party organizations face a collective action problem: convincing safe incumbents to forego financial support in order to build the size of the party, and thus maximizing the “efficiency” of party campaign contributions (i.e. channeling money to candidates in competitive races). A number of national (Glasgow 2002), single-state (Stonecash and Keith 1996), and comparative state studies (Gierzynski 1992) of party finance established that to varying degrees, party organizations have become capable of instituting such efficient strategies.

A major impetus for this increased efficiency was the changing functional roles of party organizations, and specifically the rise of legislative caucus campaign committees (hereafter, LCCs) which came into prominence in the 1980s and 1990s (Gierzynski 1992; Rosenthal 1995; Shea 1995). LCC's and other new party organizational structures helped solve this collective action problem by insulating decision-makers from the pressures of incumbents.

While electoral prospects are enhanced by targeting contributions to the most competitive races, such "seat maximization" strategies (Jacobson 1985-86) are not the only decision rules that parties might follow. Party loyalty has often been seen as a potential basis for receiving party contributions (Leyden and Borrelli 1990), although others have failed to find such patterns (Schechter and Hodge 2001). Other studies have examined campaign professionalism (Francia et al. 2003; Herrnson 1989), seniority (Stonecash 1988; Stonecash and Keith 1996), and leadership positions (Thompson and Cassie 1992) as reasons candidates receive party contributions.

Another possibility is that parties will not merely consider individual races independently, but instead pursue a macro-level strategy where the goal is winning control of the legislative chamber. While this idea has its roots in the literature on Congress (e.g. Herrnson 1989), a most explicit elaboration of the logic can be found in Gierzynski's (1992) study of state LCC's. He argues that a party's status in the legislature will influence the way party organizations allocate money to candidates. Majority parties will seek to protect their majority by pursuing a "defensive strategy" of protecting seats they already hold, while minority parties will seek to obtain a legislative majority by pursuing an "offensive" strategy of targeting seats they do not hold. Similar ideas are referred to elsewhere as "party maximizing strategies" (Clucas 1992), "additive versus protectionist strategies" (Thompson,

Cassie and Jewell 1994) or described without a label (Stonecash 1988). Hereafter, I refer collectively to these ideas as Offense Defense Theory (or, ODT).

The subsequent literature has largely failed to confirm the universality of these claims. Gierzynski (1992) offers mixed support for ODT, finding that in some states, majority parties supported incumbents and minority parties supported nonincumbents. However, in pooled models, this pattern was found for only one of the three years in question.¹ Gierzynski (1992) also offers one prerequisite condition for ODT to hold: he theorizes (p. 29) and finds (p. 107) that patterns consistent with ODT do not exist in states with little interparty competition. Thompson, Cassie and Jewell (1994) also find evidence consistent with ODT in the competitive states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and less evidence in the less competitive state of North Carolina. Subsequent comparative work, however, is largely nonexistent.

Longitudinal work, while comparatively rare in the party finance literature, has also offered insights into party contribution strategies. In addition to majority and minority party status, parties may also be influenced by electoral conditions in the present election (Gierzynski 1992). Parties facing strong electoral conditions will be more offensive, and those facing poor conditions will be more defensive. Other longitudinal studies have also examined parties' capacity to adjust to district-level changes across elections (Stonecash and Keith 1996). However, the election year itself has not been treated as an important factor in extant studies.

Because of the redistricting cycle, neglecting temporal factors in the study of party finance strategies may be a serious oversight. Since obtaining or maintaining majority party status is the purported motivation for offensive and defensive strategies, it follows that changes in the value of majority party status should be associated with changes in the

prevalence and magnitude of these strategies. And as the previously cited remarks of Tom Cole illustrate, control over the redistricting process is one of the most valuable benefits of being the state legislative majority party.² Losing a redistricting battle is likely to have negative implications not just for the party in the legislature, but for every dimension of the party in that state, including the state party organization's recruitment, fundraising, and mobilization efforts. And while there is still debate in the academic literature about parties' ability to take advantage of the redistricting process (see McDonald 2004 for a review of this debate), the fact that parties believe such advantages exist is ultimately what matters.

As such, I argue that party organizations will pursue offensive and defensive strategies in states where control of redistricting is at stake. Majority party organizations will be more protective of incumbents in such states, compared to states where redistricting is conducted by a partisan or nonpartisan commission. Conversely, minority party organizations will be more aggressive in targeting incumbents in states with legislative redistricting, compared to states with non-legislative redistricting. These predictions are summarized in the Redistricting Control Hypothesis.

Redistricting Control Hypothesis: The magnitude of contribution biases, as predicted by Offense Defense Theory, will be greater in states with legislative control of redistricting.

Since redistricting occurs regularly following each Census, the salience of the redistricting process may be greater as this period approaches. The belief that party competition intensifies as the redistricting cycle concludes is widely held (Moncrief 1998; Rosenthal 1995) if not systematically examined, so the contention that party strategy might vary is not without foundation. However, parties' increased motivation to regain their majority does not equate to an increased ability to compete. Since the end of the redistricting

cycle features entrenched incumbents and hesitant potential challengers (Hetherington, Larson and Globetti 2003), parties may have to adjust their contribution strategies.

While Clucas (1992) argues that control of redistricting inspires party strategy throughout the decade, I argue that elections closest to redistricting are the only ones in which a party can reasonably conclude they will control redistricting with certainty. Thus, majority parties will be especially protective of incumbents as redistricting approaches, and minority parties will be especially aggressive toward majority incumbents. However, these patterns will only exist in states with legislative redistricting; in states with non-legislative redistricting, the imminence of redistricting will not influence party finance patterns. These predictions are summarized in the Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis.

Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis: In states with legislative redistricting, the magnitude of contribution biases, as predicted by Offense Defense Theory, will be greater when there are fewer remaining election cycles before the decennial Census.

While legislative control of redistricting offers potential power to the majority party, the actual redistricting process varies widely across states, even among those in which the locus of control is the legislature. States vary in terms of whether the bill goes through the normal legislative process, and whether a commission serves as a “backup” if the legislature fails to meet a deadline (McDonald 2004). Redistricting legislation is also constrained by divided government, Voting Rights Act requirements, and traditional redistricting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for jurisdictional lines (Winburn 2008).

Given these differences across states, I expect that majority parties will be more protective of incumbents when the majority party faces few restrictions in the redistricting process, and will adopt a more muted defensive strategy in states where the majority party faces many obstacles to partisan gerrymandering. Likewise, I expect minority parties to target

incumbents aggressively in states with few redistricting restrictions, and to do so less dramatically when the redistricting process is constrained. These predictions are summarized in the Redistricting Leverage Hypothesis.

Redistricting Leverage Hypothesis: The magnitude of contribution biases, as predicted by Offense Defense Theory, will be greater in states with fewer legal and institutional constraints on the redistricting process.

MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN OFFENSE DEFENSE THEORY

Before describing the data and models that will be used to assess these three hypotheses, I consider a number of methodological issues related to the measurement and modeling of party finance strategies. First, I assess the methods used in previous studies to create an indicator of offensiveness and defensiveness. Second, I consider the ambiguities surrounding the treatment of candidate types: incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates. Third, I demonstrate that the use of district-level competitiveness measures in previous studies may bias findings in favor of ODT. Finally, I describe the construction of a dependent variable that alleviates these concerns.

Measuring Party Contributions

Findings consistent with ODT have often resulted from studies of Congress and single state legislatures. As a result, demonstrating the existence of these patterns has taken precedence over measuring their magnitude. In the most comprehensive comparative study of party finance strategies, Gierzynski (1992) addresses this shortcoming and models party strategies as a contribution bias or “bonus”: that candidates of one type will receive, all else equal, a certain quantity more money than candidates of another type. He compares strategies across different organizations and states by transforming each district-level

contribution into a proportion of all spending by the organization. This value is then used as the dependent variable in an OLS model for each organization, specified as follows:

$$\text{PROPORTION} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{COMPETITION} + \beta_2 * (\text{COMPETITION})^2 + \beta_3 * \text{NONINC} + e$$

where:
COMPETITION = the previous margin of victory in the district
NONINC = whether or not the candidate receiving the contribution was an incumbent

Using this approach, the β_3 coefficient for each organization is used to assess an organization's strategy. Positive values indicate that, controlling for competitiveness of the seat, the organization is more likely to support non-incumbents. Since ODT predicts that minority parties will behave in this manner, models of minority party behavior should in theory produce positive values and models of majority party behavior should produce negative values.

In practice, however, the coefficients in majority party organization models are not consistently negative. This can be seen in Table 1, in which I replicate Gierzynski's (1992) findings using this paper's dataset. I conduct separate regressions for each state and retain the coefficients on the variable nonincumbent. Rather than observing negative coefficients for majority parties, I observe coefficients that are considerably smaller, but mostly positive.³ This finding is consistent with Gierzynski (1992) and ostensibly consistent with the spirit of ODT, but the lack of symmetry means that any multivariate analysis would have to separately model majority and minority party strategies.

****INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE****

Using these coefficients as indicators of party strategies presents other methodological concerns. In many organizations, the number of candidates is small (ranging from 40 in Alaska to 203 in Pennsylvania), and there are many zero contributions. Modeling

this data requires a choice between an OLS model which is inconsistent in the face of many censored observations and a Tobit model, which as a maximum likelihood model, has poor small sample properties (Long, 1997).⁴

Defining Candidate Types: Incumbents and Open Seat Contests

ODT is also somewhat ambiguous in its predictions regarding the types of candidates that majority and minority parties will support. Gierzynski, due in part to his focus on LCC's, defines candidates as caucus members or caucus "outsiders." Incumbents thus represent one type of candidate, while challengers and open-seat candidates comprise a second type. However, if the central question is a party's desire to protect or acquire majority status, the relevant distinction may be between seats currently held by the party and seats currently held by the opposition. In other words, while open seat *candidates* may be more like challengers, open seats may be seen as "Republican" and "Democratic" seats.

Thus, a minimum of two dummy variables is needed to suitably partition candidate types. One might use the variables "nonincumbent" and "open seat" to stay faithful to Gierzynski's original interpretation, or one might use the variables "majority-held seat" and "open seat" to give more weight to the question of which party currently holds the seat. If one chooses the former, there is no longer one coefficient that can be utilized as a measure of consistency with ODT. If one chooses the latter, the coefficient on the variable "majority-held seat" could be used to assess consistency with ODT.

However, an additional problem might arise from the fact that all open seats are different in meaningful ways from incumbent-held seats. A party's performance in open seat races is tied to long-term partisanship and candidate qualities (Jacobson 2001), while the retired incumbent's previous margin of victory may be of little value as a predictor. Since the variable "previous margin" measures competitiveness with less error in incumbent-held seats

than in open seats, the greater the proportion of open seats in a legislature, the more likely we are to mistakenly infer strategic behavior consistent with ODT when the organization is simply responding to competitiveness-driven factors.⁵

Competitiveness and the Assessment of Party Strategies

The use of the variable “previous margin” to measure district-level competitiveness introduces more problems in longitudinal analyses within a state. Previous margin of victory is merely correlated with the concept of “competitiveness,” not a proxy for it. When previous margin is used as a sole measure of competitiveness, statewide shifts in partisan voting patterns have the potential to create systematic biases.

To see why this is, imagine that the Democratic Party sees its fortunes improve throughout the state, between elections, by an average of five percent. In this case, a district where the Democrat won by five points will no longer be as competitive as a district where the Republican won by five points; instead, it will be as competitive as a district where the Republican previously won by *fifteen* points. If we regress the variables “previous margin” and “incumbent” on party contributions, the variable “incumbent” will take on a negative value, *even if the true value of “incumbent” is zero*. This is because a case which takes on a given value of “previous margin” will be considerably less competitive if it is held by the Democrats (and thus an incumbent seat from the perspective of the Democratic Party).

Moreover, with respect to ODT, the net effect of these biases is to find in favor of ODT. The majority party, for a variety of reasons, is more likely to hold a majority of the competitive seats.⁶ One explanation for this trend is the redistricting process: in states with partisan gerrymanders, the majority party by design holds more competitive seats while the minority party wins districts “packed” with their supporters (Owen and Grofman 1988).

Since partisan gerrymanders diminish in effectiveness over time (Basehart and Comer 1991), the majority party is disproportionately likely to *suffer* the partisan tide in the next election. Thus, there will be a systematic bias toward observing results consistent with ODT, particularly in states with partisan gerrymanders.

Measuring Contribution Strategies

For the reasons described above, I choose not to use coefficients from organization-specific regression models as the measure of each organization's contribution strategies. Instead, I adopt a summary statistic that retains the important characteristic of accounting for district-level competition. The measure is created in three steps: (1) Calculating a district-level measure of competitiveness; (2) Calculating the expected number of competitive seats among majority party-held, and minority party-held seats; and, (3) Comparing the percentage of money given in seat types to the percentage of competitive seats within these types.

In order to arrive at this measure, I first address the problems associated with using previous margin of victory as a proxy for competitiveness. As an alternative to merely using previous margin, I attempt to more thoroughly re-create the information environment party organizations face during the campaign season. They cannot know the final electoral margin, but they know long-term voting patterns of the district, the financial strength and candidate quality of the opposing candidate, and state and national party trends.

Using separate pooled regressions for all incumbent-held seats and open seats, I regress actual election results on these competitiveness factors to estimate the probability that a race will be competitive, defined as a race in which the final margin is less than 60-40%.⁷ I then use the predicted probabilities from these models to produce a district-level measure of the **probability of competitiveness**. Full details on the construction of this

measure can be found in Appendix A. Compared to **previous margin**, this measure is much more highly correlated with the actual margin of victory (.716 vs. .416) and more accurately predicts which races would be competitive (74.8% vs. 58.9%).⁸

Based on this measure, I now calculate the **expected number of competitive seats** in our two categories of interest, seats held by the majority party and seats held by the minority party, by simply summing across the district-level probabilities. If competitiveness were the only factor in contribution strategies (i.e. the party strategy was neither offensive nor defensive), the following proportions would be equal to each other:

$$\frac{\text{Money contributed in majority seats}}{\text{All money contributed}} = \frac{\text{Expected \# of competitive majority seats}}{\text{Expected \# of all competitive seats}}$$

By taking the difference between these two proportions, I calculate the **majority seat overprovision**, the difference between the percentage of money the organization contributed in majority seat races and the percentage it “should” have contributed in these seats. Positive values are consistent with Offense Defense Theory, which predicts that *both* parties will give more money in races for seats currently held by the majority party.

As such, this dependent variable satisfies the goal of being able to analyze all organizations’ behavior in a single model. In addition, all values fall on a (-1, 1) scale regardless of the amount or distribution of party spending, so values can be compared across organizations. Finally, the inclusion of other competitiveness indicators allows for a more accurate assessment of competitiveness when electoral conditions have changed, and the separate modeling of incumbent-held and open seats accounts for the fact that previous electoral results are differently informative in these two types of races.

In comparing the values of **majority seat overprovision** to the coefficient-based approach, the results are broadly consistent with each other, but there are differences in the magnitude of offensive and defensive patterns in individual cases. Among minority parties, the correlation between the two measures is 0.71, and among majority parties it is -0.66. Moreover, for eleven organizations for which Gierzynski's approach identifies a statistically significant offensive or defensive pattern, the variable **majority seat provision** identifies the opposite pattern.

Lastly, I compare the coefficient values produced by the replication of Gierzynski's work with the values of **majority seat overprovision**. I conduct a bivariate regression of the two sets of values and take the residuals, and find strong support for the claims made in the previous sections regarding open seat prevalence and partisan tides. The values based on Gierzynski's approach are significantly more positive in states with more open seats ($p < .001$) and in states with greater electoral volatility⁹ ($p < .04$), indicating that, as expected, his approach may make Type I errors in support of ODT under these conditions.

DATA AND METHODS

To assess the above hypotheses, I examine the allocation of party money to state legislative candidates in the period from 1996 to 2004, excluding the 2001-2002 elections.¹⁰ The party finance data in this study were compiled from the website of The Institute on Money in State Politics (www.followthemoney.org). A party organization was included in the analysis if it met two criteria: first, that the organization contributed money to lower house legislative candidates in at least two elections, one of which was 1999-2000 (the cycle prior to redistricting). Second, in at least two of these years the organization's contributions constituted at least 1% of all spending by lower house candidates of that party.¹¹

In total 75 organizations in 28 states were included, yielding a total of 232 observations.¹² These organizations include both legislative campaign committees (LCC's) and state party organizations (SPO's).¹³ In states where one party has two qualifying organizations, I analyze them separately, since cooperation and interdependence among them is low in many states (Shea 1995). A full list of the organizations included can be found in Table 2. Descriptive statistics and sources for all data can be found in Table 3.

INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE

Independent Variables

Next, I turn to the key predictor variables required to test the three hypotheses advanced in this paper. In order to assess the Redistricting Control Hypothesis, I create a dummy variable **control**, which takes on a value of '1' if the legislature is the primary venue for state legislative redistricting, and a '0' otherwise (based on McDonald 2004). The Redistricting Leverage Hypothesis is tested with the measure **leverage**, which incorporates information about redistricting institutions, rules, constraints and actors. A full description of this measure's construction and the values of this measure for each state can be found in Appendix B. Values range from 0 to 7, with '0' indicating a complete absence of legislative involvement in redistricting, and '7' indicating that a legislative majority likely has the authority and the ability to gain advantage from the redistricting process.

To test the Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis, I first create a measure, **imminence**, which counts the number of elections between the current election and redistricting. Thus, the 2000 elections (1999 in Virginia) receive a '0', the 1998 elections receive a '1,' the 1996 elections receive a '2,' and the 2003-2004 elections receive a '3'. Since the hypothesis asserts that the imminence of redistricting will only influence contribution patterns in states with legislative control of redistricting, I interact this measure with the

redistricting control and leverage measures. I expect a negative coefficient on each these interactions, indicating that party organizations will act more consistently with ODT as redistricting approaches, but only in states with control of redistricting (or in states with more leverage over redistricting.)

Other than the redistricting-related variables, I include a number of control variables to model party finance strategies. The most important of these is legislative competition. As previously noted, Gierzynski (1992) asserts that ODT will only hold in states where there is enough competitiveness that the minority party might plausibly win a majority in the current election. Assessing competitiveness of a state legislature requires attention to two separate meanings of competitiveness: the difference between the seat shares of the two parties, and the amount of district-level competitiveness (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 2002).

To calculate the measure **chamber competitiveness**, I first dichotomize the district-level measure **probability of competitiveness** at 50%. If the probability of the seat being competitive is at least 50%, I treat that seat as being “in play,” so to speak. All other seats are assumed to be safe for the party which currently holds them. I then calculate the percentage of seats in play that the majority party must win in order to maintain a legislative majority. Thus, if the majority party can lose all of the seats in play and still retain a majority, the **chamber competitiveness** score is zero.

This measure is preferable to a traditional “seat share difference” measure in a number of ways. First, it accounts for the fact that winning 5% of the seats in a 40-seat legislature is generally easier than winning 5% of seats in a 200-seat legislature. Second, it accounts for the prevalence of competitive seats: winning even a small number of seats may be impossible in a legislature with few competitive seats. Third, it implicitly accounts for long-term trends in state partisanship. In the late 1990s, for example, Republicans in

California and Democrats in Florida were not as competitive as the still-modest seat share differences might imply. Realistically, these parties had no chance of regaining the majority. By incorporating district-level and candidate information into a measure of chamber competitiveness, these trends are implicitly captured through factors such as candidate “quality” (i.e. fundraising prowess in this case).

In addition to its role as a prerequisite condition for ODT to hold, **chamber competitiveness** may also influence party finance strategy among organizations in competitive states. Thus, it is also included as an independent variable in the models that follow.¹⁴ I also include a number of control variables to account for institutional, electoral, and organizational factors that might influence an organization’s propensity to fund candidates in a certain way.¹⁵

Although the dependent variable has been constructed such that I can include majority and minority party organizations in the same model, it is still important to determine whether there are difference between the two. As such, I include a dummy variable **majority party** if the organization is of the same party as the legislative majority in the lower house. I also include a dummy variable, **tied party**, to represent state-years in which legislatures were evenly split between the two parties (NV 1996, IN 1998, WA 2000). To reflect further divisions among the types of organizations, I also include dummy variables for **Republican** organizations and for **LCC’s**.¹⁶

Finally, I include three measures that reflect an organization’s financial resources. Parties with higher levels of **total party spending** may have a greater capacity to implement offensive and defensive strategies, or have a greater belief that such strategies will make a difference. Thus, I include a continuous measure that expresses the organization’s spending as a percentage of all spending for that party’s candidates. On the other hand, the party’s

spending power relative to the other party may be more important than its absolute spending power. Parties with a financial advantage may be more likely to believe their offensive or defensive strategies will be consequential, while parties at a disadvantage may find themselves responding to the other party's strategy rather than adopting their own. Thus, I include a dummy variable **spending advantage** if the party organization spent at least twice as much money as the other party's organization(s), and a variable **spending disadvantage** if the party organization spent less than half as much.

RESULTS

I begin assessing the evidence regarding the Redistricting Control Hypothesis by examining the distribution of the variable **majority seat overprovision** among states with and without legislative control of redistricting. Recalling that positive values are consistent with Offense Defense Theory, a two-sample difference of means test indicates that the difference between states with legislative control of redistricting (mean = .061) and those without (mean = -.017) is statistically significant ($p < .01$). Given the negative mean value in the latter category, one might immediately question whether ODT holds when legislative control of redistricting does not exist in a state.

Turning to multivariate analysis, I present a total of six models that assess the effects of redistricting factors on party strategy. I begin by assessing the effects of legislative control of redistricting and then turn to the more nuanced measure of redistricting leverage. Next, I consider whether, contrary to existing findings, these patterns extend even to states with uncompetitive legislatures. In the remaining models, I separately model contributions to incumbent-held seats and open seats, in order to shed further light on the aforementioned ambiguities of ODT with respect to candidate types.

I begin by examining both the Redistricting Control Hypothesis and the Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis by regressing **majority seat overprovision** on the key redistricting variables as well as election and organization-related control variables. The Redistricting Control Hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between the dummy variable **control of redistricting** and the dependent variable. The Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis predicts a significant and negative interactive effect between **control of redistricting** and **imminence of redistricting**. In states with legislative control of redistricting, parties should act more consistently with ODT when there are fewer elections before the next redistricting cycle. As noted earlier, organizations are only included in this model if **chamber competitiveness** is nonzero.

Model 1 in Table 4 presents the results of an OLS model, offering support for the Redistricting Control Hypothesis due to the positive coefficient on the variable **control**. Due to the presence of the interactive term, however, this coefficient cannot be interpreted as the unconditional marginal effect (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005). The calculation of marginal effects of the interactions for this and the following model can be found in Table 5. The results indicate that in states with legislative control of redistricting, party organizations are more likely to act consistently with ODT, compared to states without legislative control of redistricting. This difference, however, is only statistically significant in the two election cycles prior to redistricting. The magnitude of the effect is 12.3% in the election immediately prior to redistricting, indicating that party organizations in these states will give 12.3% more money to candidates in seats held by the majority party, compared to organizations in states without legislative control of redistricting. Given that overall mean of majority seat overprovision is 3.6%, this is a very sizable difference.

****INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE****

Model 1 also offers support for the Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis. The interaction terms indicates that a one-unit change in **imminence** has a statistically significant effect on party allocation patterns in states with legislative control of redistricting. In states with other venues for redistricting, no such effect exists, and in fact the coefficient is in the opposite direction. Concerning other variables in the model, there is little evidence that organization type, party, or budget-related factors influence the propensity to support candidates in majority-held seats.

The substantive meaning of these effects depends on a number of factors, including levels of party spending in the state and the number of competitive seats. Consider the case of the Nevada Republican Assembly Caucus, which acted in line with ODT, adopting a somewhat offensive strategy in 1998 and a more aggressive offensive strategy in 2000, and based on the fitted values from Model 1, is predicted to be the most offensive organization in the dataset. In 2000, the model predicts a 14.2% majority seat overprovision, meaning that even though the majority Democratic Party held 68.9% of the competitive seats, the Republican Caucus was predicted to direct 83.1% of the money toward those races. Compared to a “neutral” strategy, the average Republican candidate in a Democratic-held seat was predicted to receive given an additional \$4,272. On the other hand, if Nevada were a state with no legislative control of redistricting, the model predicts a bonus of only \$597, compared to a neutral strategy. Thus, in 2000, the presence of state legislative redistricting was worth \$3,577 to Republican candidates in Democratic seats. In the second column of Table 5, the size of this bonus is given for differing hypothetical values of the main variables of interest: control of redistricting and year.

Next, I turn to the Redistricting Leverage Hypothesis, to assess whether organizations act more consistently with ODT when the value of controlling redistricting is

greater. Model 2 in Table 4 presents results of an OLS model identical to Model 1, except that the dichotomous measure **control** is now replaced with the variable **leverage**.

Model 2 offers support for the Redistricting Leverage Hypothesis and additional support for the Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis. The main effect on **leverage** is significant and positive, and in concert with the interactive effect, implies that a single unit increase in redistricting leverage leads to an increase in the dependent variable of 3.2% in the election closest to redistricting, and 1.8% in the penultimate election before redistricting. Earlier in the redistricting cycle, however, the effect of redistricting leverage on the dependent variable is not statistically discernible from zero.

The somewhat puzzling finding here is the fairly sizable positive coefficient on the variable **imminence**. The positive coefficient implies that in states with little leverage in the redistricting process (leverage = 0), organizations are more likely to act consistently with offense/defense theory *earlier* in the decade. While this finding was not predicted by the above hypotheses, it may be plausible in that elections are generally more competitive early in the redistricting cycle. In states where redistricting control is less valuable, there may be an even greater onus on parties to act strategically early in the decade, before competitiveness evaporates completely.

The remaining variables in Model 2 behave similarly to those in Model 1. Model 2 does, however, find that parties with less money to spend than their counterparts are less likely to act consistently with ODT.¹⁷ Once again, the substantive effects implied by this model are illustrated in Table 5 using the Nevada RACC in 2000 as an example. In elections immediately prior to redistricting, the model implies that Republican candidates in Democratic-held seats will receive a “bonus” of \$5,106 and that a single unit increase in redistricting leverage is worth \$965 to them. For a state with Nevada’s substantial control

over redistricting (leverage=6), the size of this bonus will decrease by \$1,357 in each election earlier in the decade.

Since one of the assertions associated with ODT is that such patterns only emerge in competitive legislatures, I turn next to Model 3, which presents a duplicate of Model 2 for states which were classified as uncompetitive. If control of redistricting demonstrated a similar effect in uncompetitive states, this might cast doubt on the validity of the measures or models in question. But as expected, control of redistricting and imminence are irrelevant to patterns of party finance in these states. The three redistricting variables are jointly insignificant ($F= 0.89$, $p=.453$) and only the spending variables are significant.

Incumbents, Challengers, and Open Seats

Next, I consider the questions raised earlier regarding the role of incumbent-held and open seats in ODT. If parties are systematically favoring a certain type of candidate, is the key distinction between incumbents and “caucus outsiders” (i.e. open seat candidates and challengers) or is the key distinction between seats the party holds and seats the party does not hold? Up to this point, I have assumed the latter.

To consider other possibilities, I present separate models that analyze each party organization’s contributions to incumbent-held and open seats. Using techniques analogous to the creation of the variable **majority seat overprovision**, I create two new dependent variables. One focuses only on seats contested by an incumbent, and thus compares an organization’s propensity to support incumbents or challengers. The other compares an organization’s propensity to fund candidates in open seats they previously held versus open seats previously held by the other party.¹⁸

Model 4 in Table 4 presents results of an OLS model identical to Model 2, except that the dependent variable has been changed to **majority seat overprovision in incumbent-held seats**. The results of Model 4 are quite similar to those in Model 2, especially with regard to support for the Redistricting Leverage Hypothesis and the Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis. The coefficients on the two main variables of interest, **control of redistricting** and **control of redistricting * imminence** are statistically significant and of similar magnitude. Thus, support for incumbents and challengers seem to be strongly driven by redistricting-related considerations.

Turning to the two other significant variables from Model 2, we can see that **spending disadvantage** not only retains its negative sign, but its magnitude has increased twofold. More notably, the variable **majority party** is now statistically significant and negative, and very sizable in magnitude. This indicates that minority parties are acting more consistently with ODT, while majority parties are not acting consistently with ODT at all. Holding other variables at their means, minority parties over-support challengers by 8.9% relative to incumbents, but majority parties do not over-support incumbents. Rather, on average, they over-support challengers by 3.0% compared to what is justified by competitive factors. To the extent that deciding between incumbents and challengers lies at the heart of offensive and defensive strategies, this finding casts serious doubt on the second half of ODT.

In Model 5, the dependent variable **majority seat overprovision in open seats** is used to assess whether parties make a concerted effort to retain the seats that were previously “theirs” or whether, given that open seat candidates are caucus outsiders, all open seats are treated alike. Model 5 offers some evidence that the Redistricting Leverage Hypothesis and Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis apply equally to open seat races.

Although somewhat smaller in magnitude, both **control of redistricting** and **control of redistricting * imminence** are significant in the expected direction. However, the model fits the data very poorly and is not close to being statistically significant ($F = 0.98$, $p = .465$).

Undoubtedly, this is because open seats play a very different role in career and springboard legislatures. In career legislatures, open seats are a rarity, and there are likely too few open seats to gauge any patterns that might exist among contributions to these races. As such, I assess the same patterns in states that are above the median (i.e. greater than 25.8%) in terms of the percentage of competitive seats that are open seats.¹⁹ The final column of Table 4 presents the results of this model.

After restricting the sample to these “springboard” legislatures, I again find strong support for the Redistricting Leverage Hypothesis and the Redistricting Imminence Hypothesis. This indicates that parties are indeed “possessive” (Stonecash and Keith 1996) when it comes to open seats in legislatures. As such, analysis of party finance patterns should probably not treat all open seat candidates the same, as Gierzynski does, but should also consider the previous occupant of the seat in predicting support for an open seat candidate. Model 6 also shows no significant relationship between majority party status and the dependent variable. While majority party organizations do not seem to act in accordance with ODT in terms of allocating money to incumbents and challengers, they do seem to share this trait of seat possessiveness with minority parties.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this paper, I set out to determine whether the institutionalization of the “redistricting cycle” in American politics influences the strategic behavior of party organizations. Party organizations, particularly since the rise of legislative campaign

committees, are highly influential in state legislative elections, not only as direct financial contributors, but also as providers of party services (Francia et al. 2003). If party strategies are increasingly directed not toward seat maximization, but rather toward attaining control of redistricting, competition in state legislative elections may be fundamentally altered.

In examining party finance patterns, I began with the oft-encountered supposition that majority parties will tend to protect incumbents while minority parties will tend to support challengers. I presented a measurement strategy for the assessment of offensive and defensive contributions patterns that overcomes the shortcomings of previous comparative studies and proves more conducive to tracing the effects of institutional factors on contribution patterns. I also argue that attention to candidate types, and particularly the classification of open seats, is an important theoretical and empirical concern in the study of party contribution strategies. While findings indicate that the variation in contribution strategies is most dramatic in incumbent-held seats, I also find a pattern of open seat “possessiveness” that has been hinted at in previous studies but never examined systematically in a comparative state study.

Based on the findings in this paper, Offense Defense Theory appears to describe the behavior of political parties in states where the redistricting process is directly linked to the outcome of legislative elections. It can be inferred that parties are indeed cognizant of the value of controlling the redistricting process, and that this recognition does indeed influence decision-making. However, while there is significant support for ODT in states where legislative redistricting exists, evidence for this pattern in other types of legislatures is scant.

While the findings here indicate that party finance strategies are responsive to the redistricting cycle, they also demand a reconsideration of ODT itself. While at first glance, the findings in the previous section offer convincing albeit conditional support for the

fundamental claims of ODT, a deeper inspection suggests that the theory may be only half right. When open seats are taken out of the equation, evidence indicates that minority parties *do* support challengers more than is justified by competitiveness factors, but that majority parties do *not* excessively support incumbents. Given mixed findings in previous works, this finding is not entirely surprising, but due to the novel methodology of this paper, it is more likely that such results do not stem from measurement problems.

Perhaps the reason that majority parties do not over-support incumbents can be understood through a simple thought experiment. Take for example, a legislature with 55 majority party seats and 45 minority party seats, with twenty competitive seats being contested in the current election: ten majority party seats and ten minority party seats. In order to win a majority, the minority party must win six of the majority's seats; thus, it cannot afford to devote too many resources to protect its own vulnerable seats. The majority party, on the other hand, must hold onto only *one* of its own seats in order to maintain a majority; it therefore has much more leeway to devote resources to minority party-held seats. In short, while ODT predicts symmetry between majority and minority party strategies, no such symmetry exists in overall electoral strategy. A minority party must assume much more risk to obtain a majority than a majority party must assume to maintain a majority.

Although I focus in this paper on control of the redistricting process as an influence, future work should assess whether the financing activities of parties are related to the institutional and electoral value of majority party status. Although redistricting is an important power the majority party possesses once a decade, majority party legislators in every session may have policy, power, and fundraising advantages. While some work (e.g. Kim and Phillips 2009) has attempted to quantify the value of majority party status, their conclusions are limited to a small number of states and a narrow definition of value.

Future comparative analysis of organizational strategies should also assess whether parties adjust their strategies within the election season. Is there evidence that parties shift strategies within campaigns in response to, for example, changes in the presidential race or the popularity of the governor? While a few previous studies (e.g. Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe and Bartels 2005) have examined such patterns, these studies have been at the Congressional level and have not directly addressed ODT.

Finally, the influence of the redistricting cycle also suggests an emerging pattern in which some elections are inherently more consequential than other, not due to current issues or policy agendas, but merely due to the year in which they occur. Such a pattern is certainly anomalous and perhaps troubling in a democracy, and the full implications of the redistricting cycle demand attention from both positive and normative scholars.

Endnotes

¹ However, the years under study (1982-1986) were in the earlier part of the redistricting cycle. In addition, Gierzynski notes that his study occurred when many of the party organizations in question were just beginning to professionalize; subsequent studies (Rosenthal 1995; Shea 1995) have chronicled this continuing development.

² This paper focuses on the value of majority party status as it relates to control of the redistricting process. However, the value of majority party status may differ across states in a variety of ways, including the ability to pass policy, the powers of majority party leadership (Clucas 2001) and the ability of members to fundraise (Kim and Phillips 2009).

³ These differences remain when the cases are narrowed to competitive states only. The definition of competitive state used in this paper will be discussed in the next section.

⁴ In a companion paper, I model party finance strategies using a multilevel tobit model that allows for predictor variable coefficients to vary as a function of state-level and organization-level characteristics. However, a comparable model would be unsuitable here because I am interested in the actual contribution strategies of each individual organization, not in random-effects estimates that “borrow strength” from similar types of organizations.

⁵ Moreover, since the states in which there are many open seats tend to be “springboard” legislatures such as California (Squire 1988) and/or term-limited legislatures, we might mistakenly infer that these institutional factors influence party strategy.

⁶ Indeed, evidence from the dataset used in this paper shows that across all states and years, the majority party holds 57% of seats that were competitive at the last election, and 60% of seats that are competitive in the long-term based on the district normal vote.

⁷ A similar measure was constructed with competitiveness defined as margins less than 55-45%. This measure fared no better than previous margin of victory in terms of predicting competitive races. On the other hand, the measure created with the more generous

definition of competitiveness correctly predicted 75% of competitive outcomes, compared to the 59% predicted by using previous margins of victory.

⁸ Moreover, by using only information the parties might have had during the campaign, this approach minimizes the risk of reversing the direction of causality, as one might do if they used the actual margin of victory as a proxy for competitiveness.

⁹ Specifically, the measure used is the percentage of seats that changed hands.

¹⁰ The 2001-2002 elections, held immediately following redistricting, are excluded because modeling party strategy in post-redistricting elections must account for partisan change and constituency change within districts. These additional variables render the data from these elections incomparable with the election data used in this paper.

¹¹ All models were rerun using 2% of spending, rather than 1%, as the cutoff for inclusion. All main results were robust to this change, and in fact, evidence regarding the three main hypotheses was often stronger using the more restrictive inclusion criterion.

¹² Most states not included in the analysis had low levels of party spending during the time period in question or due to a lack of data availability. Other states were excluded due to multimember districts (NC, NJ), four-year terms (AL), or runoff elections (LA).

¹³ While other party organization types exist, money from LCC's and SPO's comprises more than 85% of all party contributions (Gierzynski and Breaux 1998).

¹⁴ Using the traditional measure of seat share difference does not affect the main results. This includes models in which the cutoff for a competitive chamber is 60%-40% of the seats, and ones in which the cutoff is 65%-35%.

¹⁵ Gierzynski also discusses the use of national and state measures of partisan tides as a predictor of offensive and defensive strategies. Including a measure of national tides would be problematic here since we could not distinguish between year effects based on imminence and year effects based on national trends. Luckily, the years in question did not feature

sizable national tides. State tides are very difficult to assess, since measures based on public opinion, voting in other races, or shifts in registration patterns, suffer from numerous availability and comparability issues. All models included a measure based on the outcomes of upper chamber races in the state, which should be subject to the same trends but unrelated to contribution patterns by organizations in the lower chamber. Findings were not significant and did not improve model fit or affect other findings.

¹⁶ Another possibility is that LCC's and SPO's systematically differ in their propensity to support incumbents or challengers. If, for example, LCC's were more inclined to support challengers, then both majority party and minority party LCC's would be more likely to allocate money offensively, only the latter of which is consistent with ODT. To allow for this possibility, I also reran the models with an interaction between organization type and majority party status. These interactions never added explanatory value to the models.

¹⁷ In analyses not shown here, separate models analyzed majority and minority party organizations. Both subsets illustrated very similar patterns with respect to coefficient size on the redistricting variables. However, these models also revealed a stark partisan difference. The effects from the main models were driven largely by the Republican organizations, not by their Democratic counterparts. Finally, in comparing SPO's and LCC's, results were similar for both subsets with respect to the redistricting effects.

¹⁸ Of course, it is implausible that parties actually divide their funds among candidate types, and then allocate money to candidates within these types. These models are intended to gauge the source of strategic patterns, not to literally represent the mechanisms at work.

¹⁹ Using rates of legislative turnover (Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 2004) yields the same list of states.

Appendix A: Construction of Measure “Probability of competitiveness”

The dependent variable **majority seat overprovision** is based in part on a district-level measure of electoral competitiveness. This intermediate measure, **probability of competitiveness**, is created as follows: based on the actual election results, a district is coded ‘1’ if the final margin of victory was 20 points or less, which is a common criterion for competitiveness or “marginality” (Moncrief 1998), and ‘0’ if the final margin was larger than 20 points. Races were then divided into four categories: (1) incumbent-contested seats that were contested in the previous election; (2) incumbent-contested seats that were uncontested in the previous election (3) open seats, and (4) uncontested seats. Uncontested seats were automatically assigned a ‘0’ probability of competitiveness. For the remaining three race types, logit models were conducted with the actual margin of victory as the dependent variable. Independent variables included in the models were as follows:

- a. Incumbent-contested, previously contested races: previous margin, previous margin squared, Bush (2000) vote in the district, percentage difference in spending between the two candidates, and the level of spending by the challenger, normalized by state and year.
- b. Incumbent-contested, previously uncontested races: the Bush (2000) vote in the district, percentage difference in spending between the two candidates, and the level of spending by the challenger, normalized by state and year.
- c. Open seats: the Bush (2000) vote in the district, percentage difference in spending between the two candidates, and the combined level of spending by the two candidates, normalized by state and year.

Finally, predicted probabilities were generated for each district based on these models and were used for the district-level measure of **probability of competitiveness**.

Appendix B: Construction of Measure “Leverage”

To assess a party’s ability to translate majority party status into an advantage in the redistricting process, I consider: (1) whether the legislature is the primary actor in state legislative redistricting (weighed more heavily given its theoretical centrality); (2) whether there is a “backup” institution if the legislature fails to produce a plan; (3) whether the redistricting process features many or few constraints; and (4) whether control of the lower house will likely determine unified or divided government.

I also consider the fact that some states which do not have legislative control of state legislative redistricting do have control over congressional redistricting. While state legislators do not necessarily value this power, state party organizations (i.e. half the organizations in this study) are almost certainly interested in this power. States are coded as follows (values by state and year are listed in Table 2):

Legislative control of redistricting

2 = Legislative control exists; 0 = No legislative control exists.

Commission or other “backup” institution (Among states with legislative redistricting)

1 = Backup institution exists; 0 = No backup institution exists.

Restrictive rules, states with legislative redistricting only (based on Winburn 2008)

1 = More restrictive rules (above median); 0 = Less restrictive rules (below median).

Unified and Divided Government

1 = Control of lower chamber likely to produce/prevent unified government; 0 = Divided government likely regardless of lower house control.

Congressional Redistricting

2 = Legislature controls congressional redistricting--state has more than median number of Congressional seats (7 or more); 1 = Legislature controls congressional redistricting--state has less than 6 seats; 0 = Legislature does not control congressional redistricting.

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Table 1: Replication of Results from Gierzynski (1992)

<i>All Organizations</i>				
	Positive Coefficients (# Significant)*	Negative Coefficients (# Significant)	Mean	Median
Minority Party Organizations	87 (53)	24 (7)	0.158	0.150
Majority Party Organizations	71 (31)	38 (11)	0.064	0.050
Tied Legislature Organizations	11 (8)	1 (0)	0.121	0.105
<i>Competitive Organizations</i>				
	Positive Coefficients (# Significant)*	Negative Coefficients (# Significant)	Mean	Median
Minority Party Organizations	65 (42)	11 (3)	0.131	0.135
Majority Party Organizations	52 (22)	19 (4)	0.091	0.070
Tied Legislature Organizations	11 (8)	1 (0)	0.121	0.105

***Positive coefficients indicate that, controlling for previous margin of victory, an organization gave more money to non-incumbents than to incumbents. Negative coefficients indicate that the organization gave more money to incumbents. The number of significant coefficients indicates the number of organization models in which the difference between contributions to incumbents and non-incumbents was statistically significant at the .05 level (one-tailed)**

Table 2: List of Party Organizations and Redistricting Classification Scores*

State	Democrats		Republicans		Redistricting Scores	
	SPO	LCC	SPO	LCC	Control	Leverage
AK	--	96, 98, 00	96, 98, 00, 04	--	0	0
CA	98, 00, 04	--	00, 04	--	1	5 (98); 6 (00,04)
CO	98, 00, 04	--	98, 00	98, 00	0	2 (98); 3 (00, 04)
CT	--	00, 04	98, 00	00, 04	1	3
FL	98, 00, 04	--	98, 00, 04	--	1	4 (98); 5 (00, 04)
IA	98, 00, 04	--	98, 00, 04	--	0	1 (00,04); 2 (98)
ID	96, 98, 00	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00	96, 98, 00, 04	0	0
IL	98, 00, 04	--	00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	1	5
IN	--	96, 98, 00, 04	--	96, 98, 00, 04	1	6
KY	96, 98, 00, 04	--	96, 98, 00, 04	--	1	5 (00); 6 (96,98,04)
MI	00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	--	96, 98, 00, 04	1	5 (04); 6 (96,98,00)
MN	96, 98, 00, 04	--	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00	1	5
MO	98, 00, 04	--	98, 00, 04	--	0	2 (00,04); 3 (98)
NM	--	98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	1	5 (96,98,00); 6 (04)
NV	--	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 00	96, 98, 00	1	5 (96,98); 6 (00,04)
NY	--	00, 04	--	00, 04	1	6
OH	--	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	0	3
OK	--	--	00, 04	00, 04	1	3 (00); 4 (04)
OR	--	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 00	98, 00, 04	1	3
PA	--	98, 00, 04	98, 00, 04	00, 04	1	4 (04); 5 (98, 00)
SC	--	96, 98, 00	--	96, 98, 00	1	4 (96,98); 5 (00)
TN	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	--	96, 98, 00, 04	1	5 (96,98,00); 6 (04)
TX	98, 00, 04	--	98, 00	--	1	5
UT	96, 98, 00, 04	98, 00	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	1	6
VA	99, 03	99, 03	99, 03	99, 03	1	5
WA	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	96, 98, 00, 04	98, 00, 04	0	0
WI	--	98, 00	98, 00	--	1	5
WY	--	--	96, 98, 00, 04	--	1	3 (04); 4 (96,98,00)

*Years included in the dataset are listed in parentheses. See Appendix B for construction of measure 'leverage.'

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources

Dependent Variables	Description	Mean	Standard Deviation
Majority Seat Overprovision ^a	Difference between proportion of money given to candidates in majority-held seats and proportion expected based on competitiveness factors	0.036	0.161
Majority Seat Overprovision in incumbent-held seats ^a	Same as above, incumbent-held seats only	0.036	0.200
Majority Seat Overprovision in open seats only ^a	Same as above, open seats only	0.004	0.205
Independent Variables			
Control ^b	Dummy = 1 if legislature controls redistricting	0.667	0.473
Leverage ^b	Scale = 7 if all conditions favor majority party's ability to make gains through redistricting process; 0 if legislative majority has no control over process	3.748	1.965
Imminence	Number of elections between current election and redistricting	1.296	1.167
LCC ^c	Dummy = 1 if organization is a legislative campaign committee; 0 if organization is a traditional state party organization	0.503	0.502
Republican	Dummy = 1 if organization is affiliated with Republican party	0.541	0.500
Majority party ^c	Dummy = 1 if organization is affiliated with current lower chamber majority party	0.447	0.499
Tied party ^c	Dummy = 1 if organization is in state with lower chamber evenly split between parties	0.075	0.265
Chamber competitiveness ^{c,d}	Percentage of competitive seats majority party must win to maintain majority	0.328	0.146
Total party spending ^e	Organization spending as a percentage of all spending by its party's candidates	0.086	0.066
Spending advantage ^e	Dummy = 1 if organization's party has at least a 2 to 1 spending advantage over the other party	0.245	0.432
Spending disadvantage ^e	Dummy = 1 if organization's party suffers at least a 2 to 1 spending disadvantage compared to the other party	0.201	0.402

^a Calculated by author. See Appendix A for details

^b Based on McDonald (2004) and Winburn (2008). See Appendix B for details.

^c Klarner (2003)

^d Carsey, Berry, Niemi, Powell and Snyder (2008)

^e The National Institute on Money in State Politics (www.followthemoney.org)

Table 4: Results from OLS models of majority seat overprovision

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Competitive States, Control Dummy	Competitive States, Leverage Scale	Uncompetitive States	Incumbent Targeting	Open Seat Targeting	Open Seat Targeting, Springboard States
<i>Election Characteristics</i>						
Chamber competitiveness	-0.122 (0.094)	-0.122 (0.093)	--	-0.206 (0.129)	0.003 (0.112)	0.136 (0.133)
Control	0.123 (0.032) **	--	--	--	--	--
Leverage	--	0.032 (0.008) **	0.004 (0.012)	0.038 (0.011) **	0.025 (0.012) *	0.049 (0.015) **
Imminence of redistricting	0.013 (0.018)	0.037 (0.022) *	0.027 (0.029)	0.056 (0.034)	0.038 (0.029)	0.091 (0.036) **
Control * imminence	-0.041 (0.024) *	--	--	--	--	--
Leverage * imminence		-0.014 (0.006) *	0.000 (0.007)	-0.017 (0.008) *	-0.014 (0.007) *	-0.031 (0.011) **
<i>Organization Characteristics</i>						
LCC	-0.000 (0.027)	0.004 (0.027)	0.006 (0.045)	0.007 (0.031)	-0.048 (0.036) *	0.021 (0.047)
Republican	0.013 (0.026)	0.014 (0.026)	-0.025 (0.049)	-0.009 (0.032)	0.027 (0.033)	0.055 (0.040)
<i>Year-Specific Org. Characteristics</i>						
Total party spending	-0.132 (0.209)	-0.170 (0.211)	-0.774 (0.404) *	-0.082 (0.235)	0.104 (0.274)	0.064 (0.355)
Spending advantage	-0.009 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.069 (0.050)	-0.060 (0.039)	-0.013 (0.038)	0.021 (0.046)
Spending disadvantage	-0.051 (0.038)	-0.067 (0.039) *	-0.067 (0.039) *	-0.138 (0.050) **	0.033 (0.053)	0.136 (0.061) *
Majority party	-0.037 (0.028)	-0.040 (0.028)	0.008 (0.044)	-0.119 (0.034) **	0.041 (0.032)	0.062 (0.040)
Tied party	0.033 (0.045)	0.046 (0.046)	--	-0.037 (0.068)	0.012 (0.057)	-0.122 (0.087)
Constant	0.043 (0.048)	0.010 (0.050)	0.092 (0.061)	0.074 (0.073)	-0.093 (0.062)	-0.286 (0.087)
N	159	159	73	159	157	80
R-Squared	0.109	0.113	0.203	0.182	0.065	0.209

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, one-tailed

Table 5: Interpretation of Interactive Term Marginal Effects

	Model 1		Model 2	
Effect of Redistricting on Majority Seat Overprovision	Effect of Change in Control (0,1)	Substantive Effect #	Effect of One Unit Change in Leverage	Substantive Effect
<i>By elections before redistricting</i>				
Imminence=0	0.123 **	\$3,577	0.032 **	\$965
Imminence=1	0.081 **	\$2,440	0.018 **	\$552
Imminence=2	0.040	\$1,204	0.005	\$141
Imminence=3	-0.001	- \$32	-0.009	- \$271
Effect of Time on Majority Seat Overprovision				
	Effect of One Unit Change in Imminence		Effect of One Unit Change in Imminence	
<i>By control of redistricting</i>				
Control=0	0.013	\$846	--	--
Control=1	-0.028 *	- \$390	--	--
<i>By redistricting leverage</i>				
Leverage=0	--	--	0.037 ^	\$1,115
Leverage=2	--	--	0.010	\$291
Leverage=4	--	--	-0.017	-\$533
Leverage=6	--	--	-0.045 *	-\$1,357

* p<.05, ** p<.01, one-tailed

^ p <.05, unexpected sign

Substantive effects are based on running example of the Nevada Republican Assembly Caucus, as discussed in the main text. The dollar amounts represent the amount of money a Republican candidate in a Democratic-held seat might gain or lose because of the organization's offensive or defensive strategy. In these hypothetical cases, all other variables are set to the values associated with this particular organization in 2000.