
Dissertation
Lifting the Curse: Distribution and Democracy in Petro-States. Expected Defense June 2008.
Abstract: While the empirical correlation between fuel exports and authoritarianism has become conventional wisdom, influencing both academics and policy-makers, the answer for why fuel exporters tend to be more authoritarian has remained elusive. My dissertation examines this question using a multi-method approach, including statistical analysis of 166 countries from 1965-2001, a formal model of government distribution, and an in-depth case study of Kazakhstan. I find that income from fuel exports is generally stabilizing, especially for authoritarian regimes, while fuel dependence is destabilizing, especially for democracies. The primary reason for this is the importance of government distribution in fuel exporting countries. In countries which have high per-capita fuel export income, fuel revenues are stabilizing for authoritarian regimes as they provide the resources for maintaining support. In countries which are heavily dependent on fuel exports in the economy, but have a relatively low per-capita income from those exports, the increased importance of distribution in the economy results in greater instability in democratic regimes, since it increases the temptation for both government and opposition parties to lock in their share of relatively scarce resources through exclusionary politics. Based on this, policy recommendations are made for methods of distribution that produce incentives more consistent with democratic governance.
Committee: Marcus Kurtz (chair), Timothy Frye, Janet Box-Steffensmeier, and Richard Gunther.
Refereed Journal Publications
"Fragments of Economic Accountability and Trade Policy," 2007, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 2: 145-169. [Link]
Abstract: While there has been a prodigious amount of literature on trade policy written in the past two decades, very little of that literature has dealt with countries in economic transition or non-democratic regimes. There has also been a lack of work dealing with state interests in trade policy beyond realpolitik discussions of national security. This paper seeks to fill some of these gaps through a study of two samples: one of liberalization in 25 post-Communist countries between the years 1991 and 1999 and the other of 124 countries from around the world in 1997. The study concludes that a key element in the choice between free trade and protectionism is the level of “fragmentation of economic accountability.” Such fragmentation consists of two major components: 1) the existence of a strong capitalist class that is independent of the government; and 2) the dispersion of political power among actors both inside and outside the government. Where the government is more accountable to a wide range of interests, policies are more likely to be aligned with market mechanisms, encouraging the adoption of reforms, including the liberalization of trade policy. This paper builds on the conclusions of Frye and Mansfield (2003) in several ways: (1) it embeds political fragmentation into a larger theoretical framework of economic accountability of government institutions; (2) it introduces the importance of state ownership in shaping government interests; (3) it introduces an idea of social, not just institutional, accountability; and (4) it proposes a statist view of trade policy that is lacking in the present literature.
"A Colorless Election: The 2005 Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan and What it Means for the Future of the Opposition", 2006, Problems in Post-Communism, Vol. 53: 46-58. [Link]
Abstract: The elections on 4 December 2005 in Kazakhstan were notable for the calm atmosphere that prevailed before, during and after the elections. Indeed, the most surprising result of the elections was not the victory of President Nazarbayev, or the 91 percent of the vote he officially received, but just how weak the opposition was both before and after the election. This paper evaluates the reasons for the apparent weakness of the opposition in Kazakhstan. In particular, it looks at the largest policy and social barriers to political competition, and suggests some new areas of research in understanding Kazakhstani politics and attitudes towards democracy. It also suggests the circumstances under which the opposition might gain a stronger footing in Kazakhstani politics. However, political transition in Kazakhstan is more likely to be the result of long-term demographic processes than a near-term "revolution."
“Mixed Electoral Systems, Super Presidentialism, Candidate Recruitment and Political Party Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan”, with John T. Ishiyama, 2001, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 8: 1177-1191. [Link]
Abstract: Since the collapse of the USSR many scholars have pointed to the weakness of the political parties in the former Soviet Union. Some scholars have argued that this weakness is due to an overly strong presidency, referred to as "superpresidentialism." This study compares the reach and gravity of political parties in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. It finds that superpresidentialism does not provide a consistent explanation for the strength of the political party systems in these countries. Instead, the structure of the electoral system in the first election correctly predicts the relative strength of party systems.
“Writing Rights: Factors Influencing the Strength of Rights Clauses in Post-Communist Countries”, with John T. Ishiyama, 2001, The Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29: 1-29. [Link]
Abstract: This study contributes to the research on institutional design by looking at the strength of rights clauses in post-Communist countries. It finds a strong correlation between the number of rights guaranteed in the constitutions of 22 post-Communist states and the competitiveness of elections. The results support the contention that uncertainty about political outcomes causes constitutional designers to strengthen checks on government authority and limit majoritarian institutions.
Working
Papers Under Review
"Re-Conceptualizing
the Social Requisites of Democratization: A Conditional Probability
Analysis of Modernization Theory." [Link]
Abstract: Economic development has been thought to promote democracy on two levels: first, making democratic transitions more likely (the endogenous link), and, second, making democracies more stable (the exogenous link). While the latter link has gained widespread acceptance, the former is still very controversial. This paper argues that the debate is largely caused by conceptual flaws in understanding democratic transition, specifically the failure to separate out factors that cause a transition from those that make democracy a more likely outcome of transition. The endogenous link between democracy and development is re-conceptualized as a conditional probability problem, suggesting that when a transition takes place, it is more likely to be democratic in wealthy states. The study contends that such an understanding is consistent with previous findings and theory on modernization and provides a more convincing explanation of the dynamics of the transition process. It then tests this conception of modernization using binary time-series cross-section and sample selection models in a dataset spanning 143 countries from 1950-1990. The results demonstrate that economic modernization has a limited effect on the probability of an authoritarian regime’s collapse, but a large effect on the probability that, given such a collapse, a democratic regime will be established in its place.
"Survival and Accountability: An Analysis of the Empirical Support for 'Selectorate Theory.'" [Link] [Online Appendix I] [Online Appendix II]
Abstract: This note re-examines the empirical support for one of the most influential explanations of leadership tenure, “selectorate theory,” by testing for consistency across key regime categories. I find that the measure used for winning coalition size is correlated with the destabilization of leaders in democracies and the stabilization of leaders in non-democracies. I also find that the measure of selectorate size is dependent on two factors: (1) the effect of military regimes; and (2) the timeframe being analyzed. When these are included in the study, the measure of selectorate size produces contradictory results. These findings question the current measures of selectorate theory concepts, and redirect further studies on leadership survival. They also have interesting implications for the study of legislatures and military involvement in authoritarian regimes.
Additional Working Papers
"Oil and Political Stability: Explaining the Variety of Political Outcomes in Petro-States." (to be submitted for review in the Fall) [Link]
Abstract:Although the negative relationship between fuel exports and democracy is quickly becoming conventional wisdom, heavy debate remains over the causal mechanisms that lead to this outcome. One of the largest and most fundamental areas of controversy is whether fuel exports provide resources for and allow the establishment of institutions that make authoritarian regimes more stable, or whether dependence on these resources causes instability and civil war. This study contends that fuel exporting states experience a wide variety of regime outcomes, and that this variety can largely be explained by differentiating between those states that are both dependent and rich from fuel exports and those that are just dependent. Using data on 166 developing countries from 1965 to 2001, this paper shows that revenue from fuel exports is generally stabilizing, but that dependence is destabilizing. These results are strongest for fuel export income in promoting authoritarian stability, and for fuel dependence in destabilizing democratic regimes. Similarly, fuel export income decreases the probability of civil war, while fuel dependence increases this probability.
"Institutions for Political Survival." [Link]
Abstract: This article extrapolates from theories of democracy and the literature on duration of political regimes to explain the institutional sources of leadership survival. These hypotheses are then tested using a data from the tenures of 2,296 leaders in 167 countries from 1869 to 2001. The analysis finds that measures of the level of democracy, coherence of institutions, the relationship to the military, government transition, and the legitimacy of succession have significant effects on the probability of leadership survival. Three findings are especially robust. As time in office increases, leaders in more competitive regimes, military regimes, and regimes with incoherent institutions have substantially less stability in office, even when controlling for numerous other internal and external factors. The results reveal a much more nuanced view of how these variables interact with time in office; an effect not anticipated in previous literature. Taken together, they provide a foundation for further studies on leadership survival, and suggest variables beyond just the presence/absence of democracy.
"Identity and Political Attitudes: The Case of Moldova." (to be presented at the ISA-Midwest annual meeting) [Link]
Abstract: Individuals develop identities within an international context, and this, in turn, shapes expectations for their own government and involvement in the political system. Thus, those individuals who view their country as "European" and have greater levels of trust in "Western" sources of information tend to be more supportive of individual rights, more critical of their own country's politics, and more politically active. This study provides a social psychological foundation for this hypothesis and tests it in the case of Moldova. Moldova is an ideal case for testing, both because of its mixed historical legacy and the patchwork of identities that have resulted from that legacy. A 2004 survey of political attitudes in Moldova is analyzed, using both maximum likelihood and non-parametric matching methods. The analysis finds support for the effect of Western identity, even when controlling for selection effects. This effect is stable across a wide range of attitudes and activities. The results provide the beginnings of a micro-foundation for geographic and cultural explanations of political development, a more dynamic explanation for historical trends in attitudes and participation, and an interesting impetus for further exploration.
"On the Clock: Event History Modeling in the Study of Comparative Politics." [Link]
Abstract: While the study of leadership survival across countries and political systems has become a central part of comparative politics, international political economy, and international relations, surprisingly little discussion is dedicated to the challenges in empirically modeling leadership tenure. These models are expected to have unobserved heterogeneity on at least two levels: (1) the leader's country and (2) the nominal regime category in which the leader serves. These problems can result in substantially biased results. Unfortunately, the literature thus far has limited itself to two tools for dealing with this, shared frailty and stratification respectively. This is largely because the event history literature draws heavily from biostatistics, where these are the standard best practices. While these tools are appropriate for a large range of data and are very efficient, they also carry some assumptions that will not always hold, especially for data in comparative politics. This paper suggests the use of several other tools, which are not common practice in event history, to test these assumptions. Scholars in comparative politics can use these tools to verify their results or raise important questions about their variables and measurement. The potential shortcomings of current practice and the utility of these robustness checks are demonstrated through a re-analysis of “selectorate theory” as an explanation of leadership tenure.
"Trade, Trains and Transnistria: Russian Influence in Moldova." [Link]
Abstract: With Russia's new found confidence in asserting its influence in the "Near Abroad," the small, landlocked country of Moldova has become, in many ways, the canary in the mine for Russia's policy. Russia's influence is exerted in Moldovan domestic politics through two main vectors: (1) economic influence; and (2) influence in the breakaway region of Transnistria. This influence complicates Moldova's aspirations for EU integration and undermines Western attempts to encourage further democratic and economic reform. Western policy-makers must take this into account by crafting a long-term strategy for Moldova, that encourages reform, while also approaching Moldova's integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions in a framework that draws less on the choice between "East" and "West," and more on building a stable and prosperous Moldova.
Analysis Pieces
"Moldova: Contrary forces favour policy short-termism," 8 August 2007, Oxford Analytica. [Link]
"Moldova: Press freedoms
remain problematic," 18 July 2007, Oxford Analytica. [Link]
"Moldova: Local Elections Show National Trends," 28 June 2007, RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova Report, 9(15). [Link]
"Moldova: Communists lose ground in local elections," 25 June 2007, Oxford Analytica. [Link]
"Moldova: Voronin pins hopes on encouraging investors.", 14 May 2007, Oxford Analytica. [Link]
"Talk of Transdniester Agreement Sparks Speculation.", 3 May 2007, RFE/RL. (also produced for radio presentation) [Link]
"Moldova/Russia: Reported Transnistria deal is unlikely.", 27 April 2007, Oxford Analytica. [Link]
"Counting Losses as Russian Wine Ban Lingers.", 4 April 2007, RFE/RL. [Link]
"Moldova/Romania: Visa row may result in looser ties.", 30 March 2007, Oxford Analytica. [Link]
"What's Behind Harsh Criticism of Romania?", 22 March 2007, RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova Report, Vol. 9, No. 1. [Link]
"Moldova: Government action hinders media freedom", 5 March 2007, Oxford Analytica. [Link]
"Moldova's Broadcast Privatization -- Reform or Censorship?", 22 February 2007, RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova Report, Vol. 9, No. 4. Re-published in The Moldova Foundation's Weekly News Bulletin, 27 February 2007, Vol. 3, No. 31. Re-published again in In Focus magazine. (also produced for online and radio presentation) [Link]
"An EU Invasion Waiting to Happen", 9 February 2007, RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova Report, Vol. 9, No. 4. (also produced for online and radio presentation) [Link]
"Tricky year begins for new EU neighbour", 11 January 2007, Oxford Analytica. [Link]
"Unprecedented Opportunities, Challenges Posed by $1.2 Billion Aid Package", 5 January 2007, RFE/RL Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova Report, Vol. 9, No. 1. [Link]
"Tirsapol line hardens ahead of negotiations", 21 December 2006, Oxford Analytica. [Link]
"Kazakhstan Learns to Love Borat", 29 November 2006, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. [Link]
"Vested Interests to Determine Kazakhstan's Presidential Race", with Ustina Markus and Nigmet Ibadildin, 30 November 2005, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. [Link]