

**Supranational Identity, Democratic Attitudes, and Political Participation:  
The Case of Moldova**

Ryan Kennedy  
Ph.D. Candidate  
Ohio State University  
kennedy.310@polisci.osu.edu  
<http://polisci.osu.edu/grads/kennedy>  
Word Count: 9,694

(Draft: Comments Always Welcome)

**Abstract:** Individuals self-categorize within an international context, and this supranational identity, in turn, shapes expectations for their own government and involvement in the political system. Thus, those individuals who view their country as "European" and have greater levels of trust in "Western" sources of information tend to be more supportive of individual rights, have a more participatory view of politics, and be more politically active. This study builds on the foundation of social identity theory for this hypothesis and tests it in the case of Moldova. Moldova is an excellent case for testing, both because of the patchwork of identities resulting from its mixed historical legacy, and because of the salience of and level of conflict over supranational association. A 2004 survey of political attitudes in Moldova is analyzed, using both maximum likelihood and non-parametric matching methods. The analysis finds support for the effect of Western identity, even when controlling for selection effects due to demographic and other identity characteristics. The effect is also stable across a wide range of attitudes and activities.

\* Prepared for presentation at the 2007 conference of the ISA-Midwest, St. Louis, MO. This research was funded by a Fulbright research fellowship in Moldova and an Ohio State University SBS Survey Research Fellowship. Thanks to Srdjan Vucetic for comments on an early version of this draft.

“Because...we’re European.”

In my ten months in Moldova doing interviews on the political system, I received variations on this response more times than I ever anticipated.<sup>1</sup> The answer was given by both elites in the capital city of Chisinau and by farmers in the outlying agricultural regions. Versions of this answer were given in response to a wide variety of questions, dealing with everything from the competitiveness of Moldova’s politics and the influence of European institutions on Moldova’s decision-making to the political difference between Moldova and other states with similar economic and social issues (and within Moldova itself, see e.g. Solovyev and Zygar, 19 September 2007).<sup>2</sup>

At first, this answer was frustrating, since I was expecting to hear about the role of Moldova’s parliamentary institutions, its privatization program, or even the actions of particular leaders. I did receive some variations of all these responses. But, again and again, the “Europeanness” of Moldova was cited as a primary reason for the steps it has taken in political and economic liberalization, however adequate or inadequate the speaker felt those steps to be.

This study utilizes theories of social identification from the social psychology literature to take a more systematic look at the phenomenon represented in these interviews. Far from just being the result of demographic characteristics, “European” and “Western” identity has an independent impact on people’s support for democracy, level of political concern, local and national political efficacy, and their participation in political activity. This is because individuals evaluate their own government and their relationship with it against stereotyped characteristics of

---

<sup>1</sup> This study is based, in part, on ten months of field work in Moldova as part of a Fulbright research grant. During my time in Moldova, I conducted 58 formal interviews (not including informal interactions), worked with faculty and staff of the State Institute for International Relations of Moldova (IRIM) and CREDO, and attended several conferences of Moldova-EU interaction. These interviews and interactions included current and former government officials, opposition group leaders, academics, journalists, NGO administrators, and a wide range of other Moldova citizens.

<sup>2</sup> During a conversation with a Moldovan colleague, for example, I suggested that Moldova and Georgia shared a number of common interests, especially in their relations with Russia, NATO and the EU. She immediately responded by arguing, “The big difference between Moldova and Georgia is we are European, and they are not.” A sentiment that would be highly offensive to a large number of Georgians.

governance in their country's ingroup. These results are robust, even when accounting for important demographic factors and selection effects. Even more interestingly, these results may provide a foundation for theories of cultural and geographic influence that have heretofore had difficulty explaining dynamics and establishing causality.

### **Culture, Geography, and Identity**

Several theories have been put forward to explain differences in political expectations and participation. Cultural and historical legacies have been among the most popular. Religion is an oft-cited a reference-point, as are differences in political rule at key points in history. Catholicism has alternatively been seen as a detrimental (Davis, 1951; Inglehart, 1988)<sup>3</sup> and positive force (see Whitefield, 2001)<sup>4</sup> for liberal political attitudes, depending on the time and location being analyzed. Other scholars have pointed to historical legacies during the Reformation (see e.g. Evans and Whitefield, 1998 on Czechoslovakia), the inter-war period (see e.g. Katchanovski, 2006; Kuzio, 2007 on Moldova and Ukraine) or even the Middle Ages (see e.g. Putnam, 1994 on Italy).

Several difficulties arise in these explanations. From a data standpoint, because systematic survey instruments for analyzing culture across countries have only become available in the last forty years, comparable data from these early periods is sketchy at best. This makes identification of the old culture difficult (Whitefield, 2002). Another problem is the tendency for the same culture groups to adopt very different political attitudes over time. For example, Northern Italy, which is highlighted by Putnam (1994) for having a positive culture for

---

<sup>3</sup> Davis (1951, p. 240) states the classic case succinctly: "Catholicism attempts to control so many aspects of life, to encourage so much fixity of status and submission to authority, and to remain so independent of secular authority that it invariably clashes with the liberalism, individualism, freedom, mobility, and sovereignty of the democratic nation."

<sup>4</sup> This is mostly in the post-Communist cases of Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland). However, even in Latin America, some Catholic-based popular empowerment movements did take place in the 1970s and 1980s.

democracy derived from experiences in the Middle Ages, was also the foundation of support for Fascism. Similarly, the same “Moldovan” identity that is identified by Evans and Whitefield (2000; see also Katchanovski, 2006) as liberalizing, was a source of support for Romanian Fascism during World War II.

Additionally, these conceptions of political culture still have difficulty addressing the criticism leveled by Moore (1966). Cultural explanations often turn to social patterns in the past, such as local governance and limited liberalism, for explanations of current behavior. Yet most of these experiences are long since forgotten by present generations, which have undergone their own socializing experiences. As Moore (1966, p. 486) succinctly states, "The assumption of inertia, that cultural and social continuity do not require explanation, obliterates the fact that both have to be renewed anew in each generation, often with great pain and suffering." They also do not explain the, often large, differences in attitudes between generations. In post-Communist countries, for example, younger generations are, across countries, more liberal in their outlook (Kitschelt, 1992).

Geographic explanations have recently become a promising area of study on democratization. Some have noted strong cultural patterns in the support of democracy. Katchanovski (2006) notes large and sustained differences in the level of support for democracy between people in Western and Eastern Ukraine and between people in Western and Eastern Moldova. He explains these differences in terms of cultural legacies from different historical experiences, especially during the inter-war and Russian imperial period. Kopstein and Reilly (2000) take a less cultural approach to explaining geographic diffusion in post-Communist countries. They argue that interactions, what they call “stocks and flows,” between countries create pressures for or against democratization. In statistical models, they note a strong geographic component to the pattern of democratization. Countries located near, and who have

greater economic interaction with, another state, tend to have a similar political system to that state.

These explanations have a similar problem to the cultural explanations. Those that rely on explaining current geographic attitude patterns based on historical experiences have all of the same difficulties of cultural and historical explanations, with the additional complication introduced by migration. Explanations that rely on economic and social interactions between geographically proximate entities have difficulty establishing what content in those interactions is important and how this translates into similar political attitudes.

Ethnic identity has also been utilized to explain political attitudes. Fearon (1999) defines identity as "(a) a social category defined by membership rules and (alleged) characteristic attributes or expected behaviors, or (b) socially distinguishing features that a person takes a special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential (or (a) and (b) at once)" (p. 36). While an almost limitless number of identities are available to the individual, it is most often invoked in comparative politics in reference to "ethnic" identities, whose membership is determined by either real or perceived "descent-based attributes" (Chandra, 2006, p.400). The work on the effects of these identities, especially in the post-Communist context, has been large and diverse. The presence and strength of competing ethnic identities is associated with civil war and violence (Horowitz, 1985; Monroe et. al., 2000), weak democratic institutions (Roeder, 1999), political party development (Kristin Birnir, 2007), and the development of political cleavages (Evans and Whitefield, 2000).

Ethnic identity has had an obvious effect on many areas of life in these transition societies, but some problems arise in its generalization. Some "ethnic" identities are difficult to identify or separate. In Moldova, Evans and Whitefield (2000) identify a cleavage between Russians and Moldovans. But the concept of a "Moldovan" ethnic identity is problematic, even

among those who consider themselves Moldovan. For some, being Moldovan is an ethnic identity inherently tied to being and speaking Romanian. For others, Moldovan is a broader identity, based on an integrated history and encompassing Russian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Romany roots. Ethnic identity in the breakaway region of Transnistria is even more problematic. One would have to look very hard to find “descent-based attributes” that can be associated with “Transnistrian” identity (King, 2001). Yet these identities seem to have an effect on political outcomes, as witnessed by the very different political attitudes in Eastern and Western Moldova (Katchanovski, 2006).

Problems also exist in explaining why particular “ethnic” identities are associated with particular political attitudes. Scholars point to ethnic identity as a salient focal point for organization in societies facing high uncertainty during transition (Evans and Whitefield, 2000; Kristin Birnir, 2007), but this does not explain the attitudinal outcomes of these identities. Why, for example, are Russians often considered a force for economic and political conservatism? A-priori linkages between ethnic identities and political attitudes are difficult to explain without reference to some underlying cultural or historical context.

This is not to belittle the contribution of these theories to our understanding of political phenomena. All of these theories have demonstrated strong explanatory value in a number of contexts. Some of these have been foundational to whole areas of social science study and influenced public-policy. Yet all of them suffer from problems in explaining how identity and culture impact current political attitudes and why the results of these identities change over time.

### **Social Identity Theory and Mental Maps in Supranational Identity**

This study builds on the approach of social identity theory (SIT) to explain how individuals evaluate political phenomena in post-Communist societies. Social identity is roughly

equivalent to the first part of Fearon's (1999, p. 36) definition of identity as a social group "defined by membership rules and (alleged) characteristic attributes or expected behaviors." Within this definition, a social group is "two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves, or, which is nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be members of the same category" (Turner, 1982, p.15). This approach is somewhat different from the usual conceptions of political culture, since culture explanations usually aggregate individual attitudes and characteristics, acquired through socialization and education, to national attributes. As such, modern studies of culture in political science have tended to be reductionist in their approach. Social identification reverses the focus, looking at the "group within the individual" (Hogg and Abrams, 1998, p. 3).

Just as we categorize objects and experiences, so to do we categorize ourselves and others -- the process of self-categorization (Turner et. al. 1994; Hogg and Abrams, 1998; Turner and Hogg, 1987). Individuals self-categorize within groups for several reasons. First, group behavior is a method by which humans attempt to simplify experience and direct behavior, without which we would become overwhelmed by a world full of stimuli. Second, group behavior fulfills individual desire for self-esteem. Individuals derive positive re-enforcement and self-esteem from "good behavior" as defined by group norms.

Individuals self-categorize on a number of levels, some of which will be more relevant depending on the context. As individuals seek self-definition at different levels, they make favorable comparisons with their "ingroup," as compared with other "outgroups." As a result, the most basic finding of SIT is that individuals tend to favor other member of their "ingroup" when assessing motivations, character qualities, and distribution of goods. These results hold in many different types of groups, even when those groups are assigned to individuals on a random or trivial basis.

SIT has been applied in numerous studies in international relations. While not always explicitly invoked, SIT is foundational to many of the studies of ethnic identity discussed in the previous section, especially as it is invoked to explain conflict and discrimination among ethnic groups (Horowitz, 1985). Other scholars have invoked it to explain relations among states. Mercer (1995) argues for an SIT foundation to realist theory. Hermann and Kegley (1995) make the claim that SIT can explain the decreased likelihood of democracies to fight each other, since they are members of the same ingroup.

Here is where this study departs from previous SIT studies in political science and psychology. The basic contention of this study is that individuals do not just self-classify themselves and other individuals, but also the groups of which they are a member. These supra-group identities are a natural extension of SIT. If individuals, for example, self-categorize as Presbyterians, they may also, depending on the context, categorize the behavior of their smaller group within those of a larger group, such as protestantism. These supra-group categorizations can be contested within the group, and have implications for how the individual evaluates group action. For example, a member of Greenpeace who views the organization as part of a broad-based, political movement will have very different expectation for group behavior from someone who views the organization as part of a more radical protest movement. This supra-group classification may make a difference in whether or not the individual believes the organization should support the Democratic party in elections, should support a more radical candidate, or should focus on protests outside of the political process.

For this study, the relevant comparison is on the supranational level -- how the individual classifies state in which they live within the international context. A useful heuristic for explaining this is the idea of "mental maps." Individuals have a number of different images or "mental maps" associated with their country (Henrikson, 1980; Liotta, 2005). On the simplest

level, individuals will recognize the states that neighbor their country, the relative size of their country (although even this is often distorted by traditional cartography), and the general shape of political borders. Beyond cartographic representation, however, there exists a whole range of geographic terminology that has little relation to what is represented on a map. Terms like “Western,” “European,” “Modern,” “First World,” “Asian Tigers,” and “Developing World” all carry some geographic referents, but the boundaries of these referents are much fuzzier than lines on a map. These mental maps include a number of institutional, security, economic, cultural, religious and political identities (Liotta, 2005). They also carry norms of desirable behavior.

The debate over who is “European” exemplifies the characteristics of these mental maps. Geographers debate over where the cartographic lines of Europe should be drawn. While usually referred to as one of seven continents, some geographers argue that Europe cannot be correctly classified as a separate entity, since there is no body of water separating it from Asia. For them, Europe is simply a peninsula of Eurasia or Africa-Eurasia. Even those who define Europe as a separate continent have difficulty defining its physical boundaries, often stretching the boundaries far enough east to include large parts of Kazakhstan (cite \_\_\_\_). That few people in the world can correctly identify the physical boundaries on Europe is beside the point. Geographic considerations aside, saying a country is “European” brings with it a number of stereotypes that deal with much more than location.

Returning to the responses of my interviewees in Moldova, when they said that they were “European,” there was a geographic element, referring to their border with the European Union, but there was also a normative association being made. “Europeanness” for these respondents indicated expectations of “good” national behavior and outcomes. While these norms were not always consistent between individuals, they usually included some concept of open and

democratic conduct of political affairs, and involvement in the project of European integration through the institutions of the European Union (Schimmelfinnig, 2001).

This supranational identity has implications for how the individual views the government of their state and how they behave politically. In positing this, the focus is less on ingroup/outgroup relations, which have been the focus of previous IR studies, and more on who the individual classifies as the ingroup and the associated stereotype of "good" group behavior. To the extent that the individual associates the state in which they live with a particular supranational identity, and have a positive view of that identity, they will likely derive positive self-esteem from their state's fulfilling the standard of ingroup behavior. I am not the first to argue that supra-national identities might be important. Hymans (1997) builds off a basic SIT finding that the more minimal a group is the more likely it is to exhibit strong ingroup favoritism (e.g. Brewer, 1999) to argue that identities may be most powerful in "the case of seeming culturally "thin" supranational identity categories such as the 'civilized world' or the 'club of democracies,' whose apparently large effects on policy are otherwise difficult to explain" (p. 14-15).

Supranational identity helps explain a number of empirical observations. Bendix's (1978) concept of model or reference societies is especially relevant from this perspective. In his classic treatise on the shift from the authority of kings to popular sovereignty, he contends that political change is driven, at least in part, by a process of modeling. Individuals have expectations of their own state which are built on the experiences and performance of other states. As such, the ideas and ideology that shape political behavior in one state may be adopted by citizens in another state. Bendix (1978, p. 271) primarily attributes this to perceptions of competition in economic and military development:

"In comparison with some or all advanced countries, the educated minority or

intelligentsia sees its own country as backward. This is a troubled perception, for it identifies strength if not goodness with alien forces and sees weakness if not evil in the land of one's birth. In this setting, ideas are used to locate and mobilize forces which will be capable of effecting change and thus redressing this psychologically unfavorable accounting."

Yet, even in a competitive situation, a number of identities can be seen as desirable, depending on the frame of reference. Returning to the case of Moldova, the "European" identity is far from hegemonic. Many argue that Moldova is a part of "Eurasia" insofar as this refers to close association with the former Soviet states, and especially Russia. These individuals make a number of arguments in favor of the Russian, Belorussian or some other political and economic model. For example, some point to the relative stability in Russian politics recently as opposed to instability in Ukraine or Moldova.<sup>5</sup>

While similar to cultural and historical explanations, SIT departs from other explanations of political attitudes in its flexibility. Cultural and historical explanations of political attitudes and behavior usually treat them as schemata which are passed from generation to generation. Schemata are "highly organized and generalized structures in memory that guide cognition and memory recall" (Monroe et. al, 2000, p. 423). Although usually implicit in the argument, cultural explanations assume that the individual inherits a set of beliefs about the self, usually through some form of socialization, that shape political attitudes and beliefs. The resulting schemata have predictable political outcomes. For example, those socialized into greater levels of social participation (civil society) or with higher levels of inter-personal trust are more supportive of democratic norms (see Putnam, 1994; Inglehart, 1988 respectively). Supranational identity is much more flexible, with the relevant identity depending on context, disagreement

---

<sup>5</sup> Sometimes these frames of reference lead individuals to assume facts that are not well-supported. For example, in Gagauzia a factory manager conveyed his belief that life expectancy in Russia was higher than in the United States, a contention that is not supported by any public health statistics of which I am aware.

over the content of group norms and/or socially relevant models, as well as changes in ingroup stereotypes.

SIT explanations of political attitudes also depart significantly from rationalist explanations of political behavior. Most Moldovan citizens are well aware that their chances of joining the European Union are slim to none for the next 20 to 30 years. Yet the influence of European institutions has been very strong. In the drafting stages, Moldova's constitution was heavily influenced by recommendations from the Council of Europe. Later, President Luchinski would criticize the constitution for being "European, not Moldovan" (quoted in Botsan, 2001, p. 13). The Council of Europe still has the ability to review legislation from Moldova before it is passed by the Parliament. Moldova has also placed itself under the jurisdiction of the European Court for Human Rights, even though the court has ruled against Moldova 70 times, costing the country 800,000 Euros in fines.

From a rationalist perspective, these concessions can only be explained by conditionality associated with the receipt of EU aid and preferential treatment, perhaps in conjunction with norms (Kelly, 2004). Yet the influence of these institutions started very early in the post-Communist transition, while EU aid has only recently increased substantially (Kennedy, January 2007). Additionally, moves towards Europe by Moldova have entailed concrete costs in its economic relations with Russia (see Kennedy, 4 April 2007). To give just one example, in 2006, Russia banned the import of Moldovan wine, supposedly based on health concerns. That only Moldova and Georgia were affected by the ban and that these wines continued to be imported into the US and EU, which have more stringent food standards and enforcement, belied these health concerns, but the ban was very costly to the Moldovan economy. Moldova is still heavily dependent on Russia economically, both as a target for most Moldovan exports and as the main provider of natural gas and oil. This raises some doubt about economic explanations for the

extent of Moldova's move to Europe after the collapse of Communism. In Moldova at least, the demand for the restrictions and conditions associated with European Union membership seems to be far outpacing the supply of concrete economic gains or even the prospect of integration.

The influence of European institutions is better explained by the performance of the supranational identity. Holding a "European" identity, at least in the current context, also entails the expectation that the government should perform certain actions associated with that identity. The content of that performance is influenced by the institutions and decisions of other European actors, particularly EU oversight bodies for democracy and human rights. This helps explain the continued adoption and amendment of legislation based on Council of Europe recommendation, as well as the ceding of sovereignty to European courts.

This section has drawn from the social psychology literature on identity to provide a causal mechanism for cultural, historical, and geographic explanations of political attitudes and behavior. From this perspective, the concrete history, geography and language of a country matters insofar as it influences individual self-narratives and self-categorization. Individual's supranational identities associated with the state in which they live shape expectations for what constitutes "good" action in the political sphere. They are also responsive to the evaluation of others within the group, and to changes in the content of the identity over time. Many empirical implications can be drawn from this, some of which will be addressed below.

### **Testing Identity**

Looking at the effects of supranational identity is not a straightforward process. To establish causality between individual worldview and political attitudes requires the ability to correctly identify the important aspects of the worldview. Traditionally this has been done in one of two ways. Social constructivists primarily analyze narratives – the stories people tell -- to

establish worldview (see Patterson and Monroe, 1998). Narratives, often taking the form of political discussions in print or public forums, provide a rich resource for re-constructing self image, but collecting a broad enough range of narratives to draw generalizable inferences on the effects of an individual's worldview is extremely difficult. In social psychology the primary method for analyzing SIT claims has been experiments on minimal groups -- those established through random or trivial assignment (e.g. Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et. al, 1971). This method makes a strong case for the causal influence of group membership, but it has difficulties with generalization and application to specific real-world contexts. Recently, some political scientists have utilized field experiments as a way to test the implications of SIT in specific real-world group contexts (e.g. Whitt and Wilson, 2007). However, a method for achieving experimental control in the supranational group context has yet to be developed.

This study utilizes surveys instead of narratives or experiments. This choice has some well-known pitfalls. Most importantly, the construction of the survey questions involves choices about the nature of individual worldview which might or might not coincide with the individual's true worldview. By limiting the context of the question, as well as the range of response, the individual's worldview is made to conform with the pre-existing views of identity of the researcher, instead of being defined by the individual (Schlag, 2005).

Despite this limitation, surveys have at least two important advantages. First, they yield comparable data across individual respondents. This is important if there is to be a systematic discussion of the effects of supranational identity, and if it is to be of practical use to policy-makers. Second, random survey methods guarantee the inclusion of individuals who might normally be missed by narrative analysis. Not everyone, in fact only a small portion of the population, participates in public narration which is readily accessible to researchers. Thus, the

narratives of non-politically-active and underprivileged groups may be systematically underrepresented in narrative studies.

In many ways, survey, narrative, experimental, and participant research are all mutually supportive. Survey research that is not informed by field research and exposure to self-narrative in the area of study is likely to result in inappropriate questions, while narrative and field research without the simplifications involved in survey analysis will always be limited in its scope and application.

This study looks specifically at the case of Moldova. Moldova is an interesting test case for these theories, as well as for establishing the scope and importance of identity in large part because its identity is so contested. As discussed above, what it means to be “Moldovan” can vary substantially depending on who is being asked. Moldova is a checkerboard of languages and cultures. “Moldovan,” which is a dialect of Romanian, is the state language, but the population of the current country includes large populations of Russian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Gagauz (a dialect of Turkish), and Romany speakers. The country’s location in central Europe and its lack of natural defenses has led to its repeated invasion, first by the Romans, and later by the Austro-Hungarians, Ottomans, Romanians and Russians. Moldova’s history as an independent state is very brief, lasting for a period of weeks during the inter-war period. Today’s boundaries of Moldova are largely a Soviet creation, including not only what is traditionally considered Bessarabia, but also portions of Ukraine (now Transnistria) carved out by the Soviets to stake their claim on land then controlled by Romania (see King, 2000).

The result is that “Moldovan” is a heavily contested identity. For the purposes of this analysis, this is highly desirable, since this contestations means that the concepts of “Europeanness” and “Westernness” of Moldova are not universally accepted, nor are they completely determined by, even if they overlap with, other underlying national identities.

Historical and cultural self-categorization is likely to be varied, making it much easier to establish the effects of self-categorization.

Data is drawn from the “opinion barometer” survey conducted in April-May 2004 by the Institute for Public Policy of Moldova (IPP) (IPP, 2004). These surveys have been conducted yearly by the IPP since January 2001 using funding from the Soros Foundation. The April-May 2004 survey was selected because it is the latest survey in which the questions utilized in this analysis were asked.

The questions utilized in this survey are listed, along with their Romanian translation, in Appendix 2. To operationalize the holding of a “European” categorization for Moldova, respondents were asked what they thought the prior orientation of their country’s foreign policy should be (*EU Priority*). Those who responded that integration with the European Union was most important were assigned a 1, while other responses, including “don’t know,” were assigned a 0. “Western” orientation is operationalized in a more indirect manner. Respondents were asked if they trusted “Western media” as a source of information (*Trust Western Media*). The argument for this measure is that those who have some level of trust in Western reporting are also those who are most likely to self-categorize along stereotypes of “Western” behavior.<sup>6</sup> Both of these measures are rough indicators of the underlying concepts, and reflect the necessary compromises involved in using pre-existing surveys, but they can serve as a first cut at analyzing how individual self-categorization influences political attitudes and expectations.

---

<sup>6</sup> “Western” media is a somewhat ambiguous term. For some this could include MTV and other media that is widely distributed in English through cable channels. Some European cable networks, including EuroNews, broadcast with a Russian voiceover. Radio provides several other outlets for Western-provided news in Romanian and Russian, through BBC and RFE/RL broadcasts. The internet also provides an outlet for exchange of information outside of the Moldovan, Russian and Romanian channels. Nevertheless, access to these news outlets is not unlimited, especially in villages, and this is reflected in the large number of “don’t know” responses. Thus, those who respond that they do trust Western media are either responding out of a general worldview of Western as good, or actively seek out Western outlets of information. As such, this question should reflect a high level of positive association with “Western” culture.

Several attitudes and behaviors are expected to be affected by the stereotypes associated with “European” and “Western” categorization. First among these is an association with liberal democracy and free expression. Respondents were asked about the acceptability of five restrictions on public political action in order to establish a stricter order in society. For each response in which the individual indicated that the restriction was unacceptable, that person was assigned a point. This was added together to form a five-point scale of support for individual rights, with a five indicating complete support.

Respondents were also asked for their level of concern for political affairs and for the extent to which they felt they could influence local and national politics (political efficacy). The expectation here is that respondents with greater association with Western values of political participation will also have a more active view of themselves in the political system (Almond and Verba, 1963). To establish their level of political concern, individuals were asked to rank how concerned they were about politics from “very much” to “not at all.” These responses were converted into a five point scale, with a 5 indicating the highest level of political concern. Political efficacy at the local and national level was measured by asking respondents the extent to which they believed that people like them could influence important decisions on that level of government from “very much” to “a very small extent.” These were then ranked on a scale from 0 to 4, with 4 indicating the highest level of influence and a 0 indicating a response of “don’t know.”<sup>7</sup>

Political participation is measured by looking at a very specific form of political participation, participation in protest action (defined as a strike, demonstration, picket, petition, claim, hunger strike, blocking traffic). Respondents were asked if they had participated in any of these actions since 2001, and whether they would be potentially willing to participate in such

---

<sup>7</sup> “Don’t know” was ranked below “to a very small extent” because it implies a level of disinterest or unawareness of political influence that is thought to be even greater than those who are at least aware of a small extent of influence.

actions at some point in the future. Here again, the expectation is that individuals who associate with a Western model of participatory democracy will be more likely to take, or be willing to take, concrete political action to influence government decisions. Those who indicated that they had participated in a protest action were assigned a 1 for the variable *protester*, while those who indicated that they might be willing to participate in the future were assigned a 1 for *potential protester*.

In all of these variables, non-response was relatively low, but because listwise deletion is a cumulative problem and can result in biased findings, the multiple imputation algorithm developed by King et. al. (2001) was utilized.<sup>8</sup> This produces five datasets with different imputed values for the missing variables, reflecting the level of confidence in prediction of missing values.<sup>9</sup> All of the models reported here are combinations of the five datasets, with standard errors corrected to reflect the uncertainty in the values of missing variables.<sup>10</sup>

### **The Effect of Identity on Political Attitudes and Behavior**

The first cut at analyzing the relationship between identity and political attitudes utilizes ordinal and binomial logit models. Controls are introduced to take into account whether the respondent is male, lives in an urban center, whether the respondent is protestant, the level of the respondent's education, the respondent's age, whether Romanian is the primary language spoken in the home, and the level of the respondent's income, measured both by the possession of certain luxury goods and by their reported household income from the previous month (see Appendix I). These variables are introduced to control for demographic characteristics that have

---

<sup>8</sup> Values were calculated using the *Amelia* program (see Honacker et. al., 2007)

<sup>9</sup> Missing values for these variables were forced into their ordinal values. This practice, while not supported by all practitioners, allows some level of consistency in measurement.

<sup>10</sup> Models for multiple imputed datasets were run using the associated *Clarify* functions (see Tomz et. al., 2001).

been identified as important in the formation of liberal cleavages in post-Communist countries (see Kitschelt, 1992).<sup>11</sup>

The results from Table 1 and Table 2 provide some initial support for the hypotheses laid out above. Table 1 presents the results of the ordered and binomial logit models, while Table 2 reports the mean simulated probability of a response along with the 95 percent confidence intervals (see King et. al., 2000).<sup>12</sup> In Model 1, responding that EU integration should be the main priority of Moldova's foreign policy has a statistically significant ( $p = .000$ ) and positive relationship with the number individual rights the respondent believes should be protected, even at the cost of stability. Trusting Western media also has a positive relationship with support for democracy, but it falls slightly short of traditional standards of statistical certainty ( $p = .126$ ). The simulations in Table 2 suggest that a person who does not believe EU integration should be the priority and does not trust Western media has about a 44.7 percent chance of deeming three or more restrictions as unjustified (give or take 9.3 percent). A person who does believe that the EU should be the prior orientation of the country and trusts Western media, on the other hand, has about a 59.9 percent chance of giving the same response (give or take 11.7 percent).

**[Table 1 About Here]**

Model 2 shows a similar pattern with the level of political concern. Both the priority of EU integration and trust in Western media are statistically significant and positively related to the level of political concern expressed by the individual ( $p = .000$  and  $p = .039$  respectively). The simulations suggest that an individual who does not believe the EU is the main priority and does not trust Western media has a 14.2 percent chance of expressing "much" or "very much" interest in politics (give or take 3.9 percent). A person who does believe the EU is prior and

---

<sup>11</sup>While not reported in this paper, the models were also run with the other dependent variables in the model to test whether the priority placed on EU integration was just part of an overall correspondence of liberal attitudes (Whitefield, 2002). Their inclusion did reduce the coefficient for *EU Priority* marginally, but it remained very significant both statistically and substantively in all models.

<sup>12</sup>Values of Table 2 are calculated using *Clarify* (see Tomz et. al., 2001).

trusts Western media has a 25.7 percent chance of expressing this level of interest (give or take 6.7 percent).

**[Table 2 About Here]**

Model 3 looks at the individual's political efficacy in local government. In this model, responding that the EU is prior is statistically significant and positively related to efficacy ( $p = .000$ ), while trust in Western media does not reach normally accepted levels of certainty ( $p = .140$ ). The simulated parameters show that, in general, Moldovans do not think that they have much say in their local government, but about 11.1 percent of those with a stronger Western orientation say that they can influence local government to a "great" or "very great" extent (plus or minus 3.5 percent). This compares to only 5.9 percent of those without this orientation. In Model 4, which looks at national efficacy, the results are very similar. Both EU priority and trust in Western media are statistically significant ( $p = .000$  and  $p = .043$ ). An individual with both characteristics has approximately an 8.5 percent chance (plus or minus 3.3 percent) of believing that like individuals have a "great" or "very great" influence on national level politics, while an individual without these characteristics has only about a 3.9 percent likelihood of the same response.

The last two models look at an individual's actual or potential participation in a protest activity. Model 5 asks if the individual would potentially participate in a protest. Viewing the EU as a priority has a substantial effect ( $p = .003$ ), while the results for views of Western media is more ambiguous ( $p = .337$ ). An individual with a positive view of both the EU and Western media has about a 20.1 percent chance of participating in a protest (give or take 7.8 percent), compared to an 8.1 percent chance for those who do not share this outlook. Reported participation in a protest since 2001 shows a similar relationship. In this case, giving EU entry priority is still very statistically significant ( $p = .003$ ), while trust in Western media is marginally

significant ( $p = .067$ ). The simulation results suggest that about 17.1 percent of individuals with both characteristics have participated in a protest (plus or minus 7.2 percent), while only 7.3 percent of those without these characteristics have carried out the same actions.

All of these results suggest a strong and consistent relationship between Western orientation and a wide range of political attitudes and behavior. This is especially true of the proxy for “European” identity. Even more interestingly, these variables perform as well or better than all of the traditional control variables. Only the respondents’ levels of education and gender have comparable explanatory power. These results, however, are just suggestive. The next section utilizes some more tools to help establish both the robustness of these results and the causal direction.

### **Matching Analysis of Identity**

In this section the results from above are analyzed using non-parametric matching procedures. This is done for three reasons. First, it is likely that there is some selection into the categories of our main independent variables. For example, younger individuals with higher education may be more supportive of EU integration. Matching addresses this problem by pairing individuals in the control and treatment group along similar demographic lines, limiting the confounding effect of these characteristics. Second, since individuals are non-randomly assigned to treatment and control categories, causality is problematic. Matching allows some approximation of experimental design by limiting the most visible and systematic differences in the treatment and control groups. Finally, several scholars have expressed concern about model dependency. Matching is a standardized method for limiting the model dependence of results (Ho et. al., 2007).

Nearest neighbor matching was selected for several reasons (see Ho et. al., 2007). First, it produced the best balance of the standard matching methods.<sup>13</sup> Second, it is the method of matching about which there has been the most discussion and development. Finally, it will be the most intuitive method for most readers. Nearest neighbor matching utilized propensity scores, which measure the probability of an individual being assigned to the treatment group based on the selection variables, to pair respondents. Those with the closest propensity scores are matched. As per the suggestions of Ho et. al. (2007), exact matching was used for most of the dummy variables, and both treatment and control units outside the support of the distance measure were discarded.<sup>14</sup> Appendix 3 gives the results of this matching procedure, as well as a demonstration of the improvement in balance. After matching, the matched data was re-analyzed using the binary and ordinal logit models laid out above. Doing this makes these results “doubly robust” and gives more precise measures of uncertainty than a simple comparison of means (Ho et. al., 2007). The protestant variable was dropped for matching purposes.<sup>15</sup>

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of analysis on the matched data for EU priority. As reported in Appendix 3, the balance on the distance measure is improved by about 30.75 percent, while 193 observations were either dropped or unmatched. Across all six models in Table 3, identifying EU integration as the priority for Moldova’s foreign policy is a very significant predictor of attitudes and behavior. The simulations based on the results suggest that individuals who believe that EU integration is Moldova’s most important foreign policy goal are approximately 12.1 percent more likely to deem three or more anti-democratic actions

---

<sup>13</sup> I am not including genetic matching in this (see Sekhon, 2007). Genetic matching did produce better matching on the EU variable. However, it also dropped nearly 40 percent of observations on the trust Western media variable, with minimal improvement in balance over the nearest neighbor matching presented here. This was too much loss of data to trust the resulting analysis. Matching utilized the R program MatchIt (Ho et. al, 2007b)

<sup>14</sup> Discarding observations outside of the convex hull was not feasible as the matching model did not converge.

<sup>15</sup> Not only was this variable not significant in previous models, but the very small number of protestants in the sample made it difficult to match propensity scores.

unacceptable. Similarly, they are 11.6 percent more likely to show “much” or “very much” political interest. Efficacy on both the local and national level is also significantly higher. Individuals who view EU as the priority are 13.1 percent more likely to show “small” to “very great” levels of local efficacy and 10.3 percent more likely to show “small” to “very great” levels of national efficacy. Finally, those who view the EU in this manner are 8.7 percent more likely to potentially participate in a protest and 5.2 percent more likely to have already participated in a protest.

**[Tables 3 & 4 About Here]**

Tables 5 and 6 present the results of matching for trust in Western Media. As reported in Appendix 3, the matching procedure improves balance on the distance measure by 90.92 percent, while 481 observations were either dropped or unmatched. These results are a little more equivocal. Trust in Western media remains a statistically significant predictor of the level of political concern ( $p = .036$ ) and national efficacy ( $p = .044$ ), but it is no longer statistically significant for protest participation ( $p = .151$ ). The simulation parameters for these results suggest that individuals who trust Western media are approximately 5.9 percent more likely to show “much” or “very much” concern for politics and 6.8 percent more likely to show “small” to “very great” national political efficacy.

**[Tables 5 & 6 About Here]**

The robustness of these findings to the matching procedure suggests that these results are not dependent on the choice of statistical model, nor is the relationship between Western orientation and political attitudes the spurious result of demography. While the limitations to the data remain, this should help assure the reader that the identity aspect associated with individuals’ national self-categorization is driving their political expectations.

## Conclusions

At a minimum, the results of this analysis are tantalizing. The measures utilized to look at an individual's "European" and "Western" supranational identity have a strong and consistent relationship across a broad range of political attitudes and behaviors, ranging from the level of political concern to actual protest participation. These findings appear to be very robust and independent of the respondent's nationality, age and education. All of this suggests that supranational identities play an important role in shaping people's expectations of the political system and their view of themselves in that system.

The most exciting aspect of this finding is that it has broad implications across studies of comparative democratization. Looking at supranational identity may help to explain geographic clustering of democratization, as well as why different geographic clusters have behaved differently over time (but still in a manner similar to each other). The SIT approach to analyzing the shape of political attitudes may also help to explain some of the shortcomings in previous cultural research. While it does not produce a series of indicators that can be blindly applied across states, as the relevant supranational identity will be dependent on country context, this paper has suggested an approach to explaining political attitudes and behavior that can be fruitfully tested and applied elsewhere. SIT also helps to explain why the demand for binding EU participation far outstrips the supply of concrete economic gains from that participation.

These findings also have policy implications. Both supranational identities and their content can change over time through interaction. This suggests that there is a more concrete basis to policies of "cultural diplomacy" or "soft-power" than has been admitted by policy-makers. Donald Rumsfeld famously commented that he did not know what "soft-power" means. The argument made in this paper, that supranational identity affects political expectations, suggest as well that these expectations are inter-subjectively shaped. As such, exchange and

communication policies, as well as the general public view of actions taken by another state, can not only shape the individual's attitude towards another state, but their expectations for their own state. With democracy promotion a key goal of US foreign policy, these results suggest that the falling US soft-power influence since the Iraq war may also have repercussions for global patterns of democracy.

The European Union should also take note. Recently, some EU member states have strictly ruled out Moldova's entry until the Transnistria dispute is resolved, or have set an arbitrary timeframe (usually 20 to 30 years) in which further EU expansion will not take place.<sup>16</sup> Both of these can have a chilling effect on Moldova's domestic reform agenda, as any proposal for a short-term Transnistrian settlement would likely rule out Moldova's entry in the EU for the indefinite future (Kennedy, 3 May 2007) and arbitrary time frames only provide incentives for delay of reform. Not only that, but these conditions undermine EU influence by hinging integration on the issues where Russia has, by far, the most leverage (Kennedy, 2007). The EU should instead be setting clear and attainable goals, along with some integration incentives for their fulfillment (even if those do not include full membership).

All of this being said, there is still a lot more work to be done. The measures utilized in this paper remain rough. Surveys which address the issues of supranational identity and political attitudes more directly need to be conducted. Field work and corresponding surveys also need to be extended outside of Moldova to begin drawing the boundaries of generalization. Nevertheless, the prospect for a contingent, causal, and dynamic explanation of political expectations is important for comparative politics.

---

<sup>16</sup> Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, who said shortly before a Russia-EU summit, "Neither Georgia nor Ukraine nor Moldova has any prospect for joining the EU." Similarly, Vaclav Klaus, president of Czech Republic, argued that it "would be unwise to accept Moldova's EU membership before solving the Transnistria issue" (Cooper, 22 August 2007).

## Works Cited

- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. (1963). *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bendix, Reinhard. (1978). *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Botsan, Igor. (2001). "Development of Moldova's Politics Since 1991." (in Russian). Working Paper: Moldova State University.
- Brewer, Marilynn B. (1979). "In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis." *Psychological Bulletin*, 86(2): 307-324.
- Brewer, Marilynn B. (1999). "The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?" *Journal of Social Issues*, 55(3): 429-444.
- Chandra, Kanchan. (2006). "What is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9: 397-424.
- Cooper, Jason. (22 August 2007). "EU Membership for Moldova Tied to Transdniester Settlement, Independence." *The Tiraspol Times*: <http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/1166>.
- Davis, Kingsley. (1951). "Political Ambivalence in Latin America." In Asher Norman Christensen. *The Evolution of Latin American Government: A Book of Readings*. New York: Holt Publishing.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. (1998). "The Structuring of Cleavages in Post-Communist Societies: The Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia." *Political Studies*, 46(1): 115-139.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. (2000). "Explaining the Formation of Electoral Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies." In Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Ekkehard Mochmann, and Kenneth Newton (eds.). *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe: The First Wave*. Berlin: Edition Sigma.
- Honaker, James, Gary King and Matthew Blackwell. (2007). "Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data." Available online: <http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia/docs/amelia.pdf>.
- Henrikson, Alan K. (1980). "The Geographical 'Mental Maps' of American Foreign Policy Makers." *International Political Science Review*, 1(4): 495-530.
- Hermann, Margaret G. and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (1995). "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology." *International Studies Quarterly*, 39(4): 511-533.

Ho, Daniel, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Elizabeth Stuart. (2007). "Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference." *Political Analysis*, 15: 199-236.

Ho, Daniel, Kosuke Imai, Gary King and Elizabeth Stuart. (2007). "MatchIt: Nonparametric Preprocessing for Parametric Causal Inference." Available online: <http://gking.harvard.edu/matchit/docs/matchit.pdf>.

Hogg, Michael A. and Dominic Abrams. (1988). *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes*. London: Routledge.

Horowitz, Donald. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hymans, Jacques E. C. (1997). "Applying Social Identity Theory to the Study of International Politics: A Caution and an Agenda." Presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA.

Ingelhart, Ronald. (1988). "The Renaissance of Political Culture." *American Political Science Review*, 82(4): 1203-1230.

Institute for Public Policy, Moldova. (2004). *Public Opinion Barometer, April-May 2004*. Available online: <http://www.ipp.md/>.

Katchanovski, Ivan. (2006). *Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova*. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.

Kelly, Judith Green. (2004). *Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kennedy, Ryan. ( January 2007). "Unprecedented Opportunities, Challenges Posed by \$1.2 Billion Aid Package." *RFE/RL Belarus, Russia and Ukraine Report*, 9(1): <http://www.rferl.org/reports/pbureport/2007/01/1-050107.asp>.

Kennedy, Ryan. (4 April 2007). "Counting Loses as Wine Ban Lingers." *RFE/RL*: <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/4/AF0610F8-0D72-4EB7-BFC0-008BC39328DE.html>.

Kennedy, Ryan. (3 May 2007). "Talk of Transdnestr Agreement Sparks Speculation." *RFE/RL Belarus, Russia and Ukraine Report*, 9(11): <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/5/823F0EDD-8518-4919-A6FE-6E7AB5945C4F.html>.

Kennedy, Ryan. (2007). "Trains, Trade and Transnistria: Russian Pressurepoints in Moldova." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, NY, NY.

King, Charles. (2000). *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

- King, Charles. (November/December 2001). "The Myth of Ethnic Warfare: Understanding Conflict in the Post-Cold War World." *Foreign Affairs*: 165-167.
- King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph and Kenneth Scheve. (2001). "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation." *American Political Science Review*, 95(1): 49-69.
- King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. (2000). "Making the Most of Statistical Analysis: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2): 341-355.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. (1992). "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe." *Political Sociology*, 20(1): 7-50.
- Kopstein, Jeffrey S. and David A. Reilly. (2000). "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World." *World Politics*, 53: 1-37.
- Kristin Birnir, Jóanna. (2007). "Divergence in Diversity? The Dissimilar Effects of Cleavages on Electoral Politics in New Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(3): 602-619.
- Kuzio, Taras. (2002). "History, Memory and Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Colonial Space." *Nationalities Papers*, 30(2): 241-264.
- Liotta, P.H. (2005). "Imagining Europe: Symbolic Geography and the Future." *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 16(3): 67-85.
- Mercer, Jonathan. (1995). "Anarchy and Identity." *International Organization*, 49(2): 229-252.
- Monroe, Kristen Renwick, James Hankin, and Renée Bukovchik Van Vechten. (2000). "The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3: 419-447.
- Moore, Barrington. (1966). *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Patterson, Molly and Kristen Renwick Monroe. (1998). "Narrative in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1: 315-331.
- Putnam, Robert D. (1994). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Roeder, Phillip G. (1999). "Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions." *Slavic Review*, 58(4): 854-882.
- Schimmelfinnig, Frank. (2001). "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." *International Organization*, 55: 47-80.

- Schlag, Pierre. (2005). "A Brief Survey of Deconstruction." *Cardozo Law Review*, 27(2): 741-752.
- Sekhon, Jasjeet S. (2004). "Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with Automated Balance Optimization: The Matching Package for R." Available online: <http://sekhon.berkeley.edu/papers/MatchingJSS.pdf>.
- Solovyev, Vladimir and Mikhail Zygar. (19 September 2007). "The Old Guard Wins in Transnistria." *Kommersant*. Available online: <http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=705753>. (last accessed 12/4/2006)
- Tajfel, Henri, M.G. Billig, R.P. Bundy, and Claude Flament. (1971). "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1(2): 149-177.
- Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, Gary King. (2001). "Clarify: Software for Interpreting Statistical and Presenting Statistical Results." Available at: <http://gking.harvard.edu/clarify/clarify.pdf>.
- Turner, John C. (1982). "Toward a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group." In Henri Tajfel (ed.). *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Turner, John C and Michael A. Hogg. (1987). *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Press.
- Turner, John C., Penelope J. Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam, and Craig McGarty. (1994). "Self and Collective: Cognition and Social Context." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20(5): 454-463.
- Whitefield, Stephan. (2001). *Liberalism, Conservatism and Religion in Russia*. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco.
- Whitefield, Stephan. (2002). "Political Cleavages in Post-Communist Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5: 181-200
- Whitt, Sam and Rick K. Wilson. (2007). "The Dictator Game, Fairness and Ethnicity in Postwar Bosnia." *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(3): 655-668.

## Tables

**Table 1: Ordered and Binary Logit Analysis (multiple imputation, unmatched)**

	Model 1: Support for Democracy	Model 2: Political Concern	Model 3: Local Efficacy	Model 4: National Efficacy	Model 5: Potential Protester	Model 6: Protester
Male	.269 (.010)	.721 (.000)	.332 (.003)	.198 (.063)	.323 (.048)	.163 (.221)
Urban	-.164 (.110)	-.198 (.065)	-.321 (.006)	.356 (.006)	-.022 (.460)	.594 (.009)
Protestant	.013 (.485)	-.272 (.216)	.068 (.421)	-.288 (.172)	.487 (.165)	.719 (.088)
Education	.153 (.000)	.258 (.000)	.167 (.000)	.123 (.001)	.259 (.000)	.221 (.000)
Age	-.119 (.020)	.112 (.048)	-.158 (.007)	-.200 (.002)	-.144 (.077)	-.076 (.250)
Romanian	-.320 (.005)	-.264 (.016)	.022 (.432)	-.150 (.122)	.006 (.490)	-.271 (.112)
Possession Index	.862 (.002)	.994 (.000)	1.001 (.001)	.888 (.003)	-.397 (.207)	.841 (.056)
Income	.000004 (.008)	-.000001 (.172)	-.000006 (.000)	-.000006 (.000)	.0000004 (.437)	.000003 (.124)
EU Priority	.467 (.000)	.516 (.000)	.574 (.000)	.529 (.000)	.961 (.000)	.675 (.003)
Trust Western Media	.152 (.126)	.228 (.039)	.136 (.140)	.228 (.043)	.086 (.337)	.319 (.067)
N	1116	1116	1116	1116	1116	1116

\* Values are logit coefficients with p-values (1-tailed) in parentheses.

**Table 2. Simulated Parameters for Full Data**

	Value	EU Priority = 0 Trust Western Media = 0	EU Priority = 0 Trust Western Media = 1	EU Priority = 1 Trust Western Media = 0	EU Priority = 1 Trust Western Media = 1	Expected Effect
Support for Democracy	0	.352 (.292-.424)	.317 (.251-.285)	.254 (.200-.311)	.226 (.176-.285)	-.126
	1	.096 (.076-.117)	.092 (.072-.113)	.083 (.064-.104)	.077 (.058-.098)	-.019
	2	.016 (.086-.125)	.105 (.085-.125)	.100 (.080-.121)	.096 (.076-.118)	.080
	3	.116 (.095-.136)	.119 (.097-.139)	.122 (.100-.143)	.121 (.099-.141)	.005
	4	.110 (.088-.132)	.117 (.093-.141)	.129 (.105-.154)	.133 (.109-.157)	.023
	5	.221 (.171-.277)	.248 (.190-.318)	.312 (.248-.382)	.345 (.274-.423)	.124
Political Concern	1	.232 (.179-.289)	.195 (.142-.258)	.154 (.117-.120)	.127 (.091-.174)	-.105
	2	.307 (.272-.342)	.288 (.244-.329)	.259 (.220-.298)	.232 (.187-.278)	-.075
	3	.319 (.276-.363)	.346 (.299-.391)	.372 (.331-.409)	.384 (.348-.421)	.065
	4	.104 (.077-.136)	.125 (.090-.163)	.154 (.118-.194)	.181 (.136-.231)	.077
	5	.038 (.026-.053)	.047 (.031-.068)	.061 (.042-.087)	.076 (.052-.108)	.038
	Local Efficacy	0	.152 (.113-.194)	.135 (.098-.183)	.092 (.067-.121)	.081 (.059-.107)
1		.544 (.506-.582)	.530 (.479-.576)	.472 (.419-.521)	.449 (.392-.506)	-.095
2		.246 (.200-.295)	.268 (.211-.327)	.337 (.287-.385)	.358 (.307-.409)	.112
3		.048 (.032-.065)	.054 (.036-.077)	.080 (.058-.108)	.090 (.064-.122)	.042
4		.011 (.006-.017)	.012 (.007-.020)	.019 (.011-.030)	.021 (.012-.034)	.010
National Efficacy		0	.154 (.112-.202)	.120 (.080-.170)	.097 (.070-.128)	.074 (.050-.104)
	1	.652 (.617-.682)	.635 (.586-.674)	.614 (.563-.659)	.573 (.503-.631)	-.079
	2	.155 (.115-.201)	.192 (.137-.254)	.225 (.178-.276)	.268 (.209-.329)	.113
	3	.033 (.022-.049)	.044 (.027-.066)	.054 (.035-.079)	.071 (.045-.103)	.038
	4	.006 (.003-.012)	.009 (.004-.017)	.011 (.005-.020)	.014 (.007-.028)	.008
	Potential Protester	0	.919 (.876-.952)	.912 (.849-.952)	.814 (.739-.876)	.799 (.704-.877)
1		.081 (.048-.124)	.088 (.048-.151)	.186 (.124-.261)	.201 (.123-.296)	.120
Protester	0	.927 (.880-.960)	.903 (.835-.950)	.869 (.801-.920)	.829 (.742-.901)	-.098
	1	.073 (.040-.120)	.097 (.050-.165)	.131 (.080-.199)	.171 (.099-.258)	.098

\*Values are calculated for a male, Romanian speaking, urbanite, non-protestant, of mean education, possession index and income.

\*\* Values are mean probabilities with the 95 percent confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 3: Ordered and Binary Logit Analysis (multiple imputation, nearest neighbor matching for *EU Priority*)**

	Model 1: Support for Democracy	Model 2: Political Concern	Model 3: Local Efficacy	Model 4: National Efficacy	Model 5: Potential Protester	Model 6: Protester
Male	.270 (.016)	.738 (.000)	.205 (.060)	.136 (.167)	.291 (.082)	.279 (.119)
Urban	-.142 (.165)	-.231 (.069)	-.325 (.014)	.435 (.008)	-.182 (.233)	.298 (.146)
Education	.160 (.000)	.238 (.000)	.136 (.001)	.084 (.028)	.264 (.000)	.269 (.000)
Age	-.071 (.137)	.157 (.010)	-.137 (.031)	-.178 (.015)	-.126 (.134)	-.123 (.172)
Romanian	-.345 (.010)	-.363 (.007)	-.075 (.317)	-.231 (.074)	.073 (.387)	-.228 (.190)
Possession Index	.670 (.026)	.968 (.002)	.727 (.016)	.575 (.052)	-.296 (.294)	1.070 (.036)
Income	.000004 (.009)	-.000002 (.129)	-.000006 (.000)	-.000005 (.001)	.0000007 (.395)	.000002 (.277)
EU Priority	.490 (.001)	.476 (.001)	.560 (.000)	.529 (.000)	.794 (.000)	.607 (.012)
Trust Western Media	.170 (.117)	.145 (.129)	.144 (.149)	.297 (.059)	.006 (.490)	.275 (.123)
N	923	923	923	923	923	923

\* Values are logit coefficients with p-values (1-tailed) in parentheses.

\*\* Exact matching is used for *Male*, *Urban* and *Trust Western Media*.

\*\*\* Treatment and control units outside the support of the distance measure are discarded.

**Table 4. Simulated Parameters for Matched Data for *EU Priority***

	Value	EU Priority = 0	EU Priority = 1	Expected Effect
Support for Democracy	0	.324 (.260-.397)	.227 (.172-.287)	-.097
	1	.100 (.077-.123)	.084 (.063-.105)	-.016
	2	.108 (.086-.130)	.100 (.078-.122)	-.008
	3	.124 (.100-.147)	.128 (.104-.153)	.004
	4	.117 (.092-.143)	.137 (.111-.163)	.020
	5	.227 (.174-.289)	.324 (.252-.404)	.097
Political Concern	1	.211 (.158-.280)	.143 (.102-.193)	-.068
	2	.306 (.267-.345)	.258 (.214-.307)	-.048
	3	.336 (.281-.386)	.383 (.336-.424)	.047
	4	.111 (.080-.147)	.160 (.120-.206)	.049
	5	.036 (.022-.054)	.056 (.036-.083)	.020
Local Efficacy	0	.155 (.113-.205)	.095 (.068-.131)	-.060
	1	.530 (.482-.576)	.461 (.404-.518)	-.069
	2	.254 (.199-.313)	.344 (.284-.396)	.090
	3	.049 (.034-.070)	.082 (.057-.110)	.033
	4	.011 (.006-.018)	.019 (.010-.031)	.008
National Efficacy	0	.147 (.103-.199)	.092 (.065-.124)	-.055
	1	.636 (.591-.672)	.588 (.528-.636)	-.048
	2	.171 (.126-.232)	.245 (.194-.306)	.074
	3	.039 (.024-.059)	.063 (.041-.092)	.024
	4	.007 (.003-.015)	.012 (.005-.024)	.005
Potential Protester	0	.910 (.855-.947)	.823 (.741-.885)	-.087
	1	.090 (.053-.145)	.177 (.115-.259)	.087
Protester	0	.926 (.870-.965)	.874 (.802-.928)	-.052
	1	.074 (.035-.130)	.126 (.072-.198)	.052

\*Values are calculated for a male, Romanian speaking, urbanite, of mean education, possession index and income, who does not trust Western media.

\*\* Values are mean probabilities with the 95 percent confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 5: Ordered and Binary Logit Analysis (multiple imputation, nearest neighbor matching for *Trust Western Media*)**

	Model 1: Support for Democracy	Model 2: Political Concern	Model 3: Local Efficacy	Model 4: National Efficacy	Model 5: Potential Protester	Model 6: Protester
Male	.207 (.106)	.827 (.000)	.414 (.007)	.330 (.028)	.243 (.163)	.127 (.343)
Urban	-.246 (.079)	-.130 (.237)	-.351 (.028)	.389 (.036)	.211 (.242)	.678 (.021)
Education	.152 (.002)	.244 (.000)	.184 (.000)	.116 (.013)	.218 (.004)	.172 (.023)
Age	-.104 (.138)	.136 (.109)	-.189 (.026)	-.187 (.036)	-.083 (.278)	-.066 (.335)
Romanian	-.273 (.063)	-.325 (.026)	.078 (.340)	-.197 (.157)	.026 (.462)	-.577 (.022)
Possession Index	.990 (.006)	.768 (.039)	.586 (.077)	.541 (.122)	-.577 (.189)	1.046 (.067)
Income	.000005 (.015)	-.000002 (.167)	-.000007 (.000)	-.000006 (.002)	-.000001 (.379)	.000004 (.070)
EU Priority	.449 (.021)	.550 (.001)	.428 (.013)	.380 (.024)	1.203 (.001)	1.083 (.004)
Trust Western Media	.150 (.176)	.276 (.036)	.093 (.312)	.299 (.044)	.093 (.355)	.277 (.151)
N	635	635	635	635	635	635

\* Values are logit coefficients with p-values (1-tailed) in parentheses.

\*\* Exact matching is used for *Male*, *Urban* and *Trust Western Media*.

\*\*\* Treatment and control units outside the support of the distance measure are discarded.

**Table 6. Simulated Parameters for Matched Data for *Trust Western Media***

	Value	Trust Western Media = 0	Trust Western Media = 1	Expected Effect
Support for Democracy	0	.243 (.175-.326)	.216 (.147-.299)	-.027
	1	.078 (.055-.104)	.073 (.051-.096)	-.005
	2	.102 (.072-.130)	.098 (.069-.126)	-.004
	3	.130 (.099-.161)	.129 (.099-.160)	-.001
	4	.134 (.101-.165)	.138 (.103-.170)	.004
	5	.314 (.223-.410)	.347 (.248-.443)	.033
Political Concern	1	.131 (.088-.185)	.103 (.065-.155)	-.028
	2	.234 (.185-.285)	.202 (.153-.258)	-.032
	3	.393 (.342-.440)	.399 (.353-.445)	.006
	4	.176 (.126-.234)	.210 (.151-.278)	.034
	5	.066 (.040-.104)	.085 (.052-.133)	.019
Local Efficacy	0	.067 (.041-.098)	.061 (.040-.091)	-.006
	1	.459 (.373-.539)	.443 (.364-.522)	-.016
	2	.363 (.293-.424)	.375 (.308-.432)	.012
	3	.093 (.058-.143)	.099 (.065-.145)	.006
	4	.019 (.008-.038)	.021 (.009-.039)	.002
National Efficacy	0	.078 (.049-.120)	.060 (.037-.092)	-.018
	1	.612 (.535-.676)	.565 (.479-.644)	-.047
	2	.232 (.167-.299)	.274 (.203-.341)	.042
	3	.066 (.036-.107)	.086 (.047-.139)	.020
	4	.011 (.003-.025)	.015 (.004-.034)	.004
Potential Protester	0	.771 (.677-.854)	.751 (.635-.845)	-.020
	1	.229 (.146-.323)	.249 (.155-.365)	.020
Protester	0	.843 (.737-.918)	.806 (.696-.891)	-.037
	1	.157 (.082-.263)	.194 (.109-.304)	.037

\*Values are calculated for a male, Romanian speaking, urbanite, of mean education, possession index and income, who believes that EU integration should be the Moldova's top priority.

\*\* Values are mean probabilities with the 95 percent confidence interval in parentheses.

### Appendix 1: Summary of Main Variables

Variable	Definition	Dataset Name	Distribution Summary (Pre-imputation)
Support for Democracy	Additive index of negative responses to five questions about what is acceptable to promote stability.	demsup	0/328 1/84 2/92 3/110 4/118 5/318 --/66
Political Concern	Level of concern about politics expressed by respondent.	polcnern	1/260 2/303 3/339 4/139 5/57 --/18
Local Efficacy	Level of influence respondent feels similar people have on a local level.	localinf	0/146 1/527 2/325 3/80 4/19 --/19
National Efficacy	Level of influence respondent feels similar people have on the national level.	natinf	0/176 1/666 2/193 3/47 4/9 --/25
Potential Protester	The individual is willing to participate in a protest.	protstpt	0/959 1/140 --/17
Protester	The individual has participated in a protest.	protest	0/1000 1/106 --/10
Male	The respondent is male.	male	0/674 1/442

Urban	The respondent lives in an urban area.	urban	0/655 1/461
Protestant	The respondent is protestant.	protstnt	0/1087 1/29
Education	Ordinal measure of the level of respondent's education.	educatin	1/97 2/172 3/252 4/276 5/17 6/79 7/223
Age	Ordinal measure of the respondent's age.	age	1/189 2/295 3/341 4/291
Romanian	The respondent primarily speaks Romanian at home.	romlang	0/403 1/713
Possession Index	Index of positive responses to household items the respondent owns.	possess	Range = [0,1] Mean = .490 Std. Dev. = .254
Income	Reported income (in Moldovan lei, capped at 99,999).	Income	Range = [200, 99999] Mean = 22518.8 Std. Dev. = 40911.5
EU Priority	The respondent feels that EU integration should be Moldova's top priority.	EUprior	0/572 1/521 --/23
Trust Western Media	The respondent trusts Western media sources.	Westrust	0/726 1/212 --/178

## Appendix 2: Questions, Translations, and Coding for Main Variables

- *Support for Democracy*

Is it permissible to undertake the following in order to establish a strict order...?

- A. To cancel elections scheduled for a concrete date.
- B. To forbid meetings and demonstrations.
- C. To establish censorship on the media.
- D. To dissolve the Parliament and to rule by decree.
- E. To restrict the possibilities of going abroad.

După părerea dvs., ar fi admisibil sau nu să facă următoarele pentru a stabili ordinea...?

- A. Să anuleze alegerile stabilite, planificate pentru o anumită dată.
- B. Să interzică mitingurile și demonstrațiile.
- C. Să stabilească cenzură pentru mass-media.
- D. Să desființeze parlamentul și să guverneze prin decret.
- E. Să limiteze posibilitățile de plecare peste hotare.

It is not admissible = +1

It is admissible/Don't know = 0

- *Political Concern*

To what extent are you concerned about politics?

În ce măsură vă interesează politica?

Very much = 5

Much = 4

Neither much nor little = 3

Little = 2

Not at all = 1

- *Local Efficacy*

To what extent can people like you influence important decisions to be taken at the local level?

În ce măsură oameni ca Dvs. pot influența hotărârile importante, care se iau la nivelul localității dvs.?

To a great very extent = 4

To a great extent = 3

To a small extent = 2

To a very small extent = 1

Don't know = 0

- *National Efficacy*

To what extent can people like you influence important decisions to be taken at the national level?

În ce măsură oameni ca Dvs. pot influența hotărârile importante, care se iau la nivelul întregii țări?

To a great very extent = 4

To a great extent = 3

To a small extent = 2

To a very small extent = 1

Don't know = 0

- *Protester*

Have you taken part in any protest (strike, demonstration, picket, petition, claim, hunger strike, blocking traffic) since 2001?

Dvs. ați participat la vreo acțiune de protest (greve, demonstrații, pichetare, petiții, reclamații, greva foamei, blocarea unor drumuri) după 2001?

Yes = 1

No = 0

Don't know = 0

- *Potential Protester*

Would you take part in any protest in the future?

Dar ați (mai) participa la astfel de acțiuni în viitor?

Yes = 1

No = 0

Don't know = 0

- *EU Priority*

Which should be the prior orientation of our country?

A. Integration into the European Union = 1

B. NIS Commonwealth = 0

C. Not to join any alliance/union = 0

D. I do not know = 0

După părerea dvs., care ar trebui să fie orientarea țării noastre?

A. Să ne integrăm în Uniunea Europeană = 1

B. Să rămânem în CSI = 0

C. Să nu facem parte din nici o alianță/ uniune = 0

D. Nu știu = 0

- *Trust Western Media*

How much do you trust in the news presented by the following mass media?

Western Media (TV, radio, print)

Câtă încredere aveți în știrile prezentate de următoarele mijloace de comunicare în masă?

Mass-media din Occident (TV, radio, ziare)

Total trust = 1

Some trust = 1

Some distrust = 0

Total distrust = 0

Don't know = 0

### Appendix 3: Analysis of Balance for Matched Data

Several methods of matching, including optimal and genetic, were utilized, but the nearest neighbor matching algorithm produced the best blend of covariate balance and minimal case loss in the dataset, especially for the *Trust Western Media* variable. This appendix provides some descriptive characteristics demonstrating the balance improvement from the matching procedure.

Table A.1 provides the mean difference and empirical quartile measures for the matched data for *EU Priority*, along with the percentage balance improvement achieved. Significant improvements are observed across all variables.

**Table A.1: Remaining Covariate Imbalance after Matching for *EU Priority***

	Mean difference	Mean difference (eQQ)	Maximum difference (eQQ)
Distance	.112 (30.75)	.112 (31.00)	.152 (25.04)
Male	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)
Romanian	.128 (15.91)	.128 (16.63)	1.000 (0.00)
Urban	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)
Education	.676 (23.33)	.676 (23.65)	3.000 (0.00)
Age	-.389 (28.03)	.389 (27.73)	1.000 (0.00)
Possession Index	.077 (18.70)	.077 (19.26)	.200 (0.00)
Income	2914.291 (48.47)	2914.300 (49.17)	97000.000 (1.02)
Trust Western Media	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)

	Control	Treated
All	583	533
Matched	460	460
Unmatched	92	70
Discarded	31	3

\* Values are the difference between treatment and control groups, with percent balance improvement in parentheses.

\*\* Exact matching is used for *Male*, *Urban* and *Trust Western Media*.

\*\*\* Treatment and control units outside the support of the distance measure are discarded.

Figure A.1 provides QQ plots of balance for both the matched and unmatched datasets on all independent variables. Observations closer to the 45 degree line are more balanced than those

further away. While some imbalance remains (only exact matching completely eliminates imbalance) significant improvements are apparent.

**Figure A.1: QQ Plot of Independent Variables for *EU Priority***




Table A.2 provides the same statistics of covariate imbalance for the matched data done for *Trust Western Media*. Again, all variables have substantial improvement in balance between treatment and control groups, even better than in the previous model.

**Table A.2: Remaining Covariate Imbalance After Matching for *Trust Western Media***

	Mean difference	Mean difference (eQQ)	Maximum difference (eQQ)
Distance	.005 (90.92)	.005 (90.25)	.022 (71.70)
Male	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)
Romanian	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)
Urban	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)
Education	.013 (97.93)	.058 (90.80)	1.000 (66.67)
Age	-.064 (72.49)	.064 (71.99)	1.000 (0.00)
Possession Index	.014 (82.59)	.015 (81.98)	.100 (50.00)
Income	3844.392 (33.25)	3867.543 (33.38)	97000.000 (1.02)
EU Priority	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)	.000 (100.00)

	Control	Treated
All	798	318
Matched	311	311
Unmatched	478	7
Discarded	9	0


\* Values are the difference between treatment and control groups, with percent balance improvement in parentheses.

\*\* Exact matching is used for *Male*, *Urban*, *Romanian*, and *Trust Western Media*.

\*\*\* Treatment and control units outside the support of the distance measure are discarded.

Similarly, Figure A.2 provides the QQ plots for the matched and unmatched data for the independent variables in the *Trust Western Media* dataset. While the matches are not perfect, a significant improvement can be observed compared with the 45 degree line.

**Figure A.2: QQ Plot of Independent Variables for *Trust Western Media***



Taken together, the above tables and figures should convince the reader that balance has been substantially improved through use of the nearest neighbor matching procedure. This balance should reassure the reader of the robustness of the conclusions reached in this study.