WORK IN PROGRESS

Tax Policy Centralization and Veto Players: Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s & 1990s.  This paper seeks to provide an explanation of changes in tax policy centralization taking the Argentine and Brazilian experiences during the 1980s and 1990s as the cases of analysis.  We make use of two different measures of centralization: central government taxation weight and level.  The former gauges the relevance of the central government with respect to the total amount of taxes collected; while the latter gauges at the capacity of the central government to collect taxes with respect to the economy as a whole.  We base our explanation on a contingent application of veto players theory.  This paper scopes the differential advantage, but not exhaustion, of central governments and partisan leverage in taxation matters in Argentina and Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s.  It underscores the complexity of the subject of study and becomes suspect of automatic a priori expectations.  Therefore, it strives to underscore relevant interaction and contingent characteristics (e.g., partisan alignment, discipline, and strength and leadership characteristics) embedded within a general theoretical framework.  We demonstrate that a reduction in the effective number of veto players occurred in Argentina (1989) and Brazil (1986-88), which help us explain the concurrent behavior in taxation in both cases.  Thus, by underscoring the prevailing interests during the reforms, executive-central government (Argentina) vis-à-vis legislative-sub-national governments's interests (Brazil), we are able to explain the greater Brazilian decrease weight-, but greater Argentine increase level-wise.

Tax Policy Progressivity, Centralization, and Veto Players: The Case of Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s & 1990s.  This paper seeks to provide an explanation of changes in tax policy progressivity taking the Argentine and Brazilian experiences during the 1980s and 1990s as the cases of analysis.  We make use of a composite measure of taxation progressivity: income taxation minus consumption taxation.  Furthermore, we make use of two different measures of taxation progressivity: progressive taxation weight and level.  The former gauges the relevance of progressive forms of taxation with respect to the total amount of taxes collected; while the latter gauges at the capacity of the state to collect progressive taxes with respect to the economy as a whole.  We base our explanation on a contingent application of veto players theory.  This paper scopes the differential advantage, but not exhaustion, of central governments and partisan leverage in taxation matters in Argentina and Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s.  It underscores the complexity of the subject of study and becomes suspect of automatic a priori expectations.  Therefore, it strives to underscore relevant interaction and contingent characteristics (e.g., partisan alignment, discipline, and strength and leadership characteristics) embedded within a general theoretical framework.  We demonstrate that a reduction in the effective number of veto players occurred in Argentina (1989) and Brazil (1986-88), which help us explain the concurrent behavior in taxation in both cases.  Thus, by underscoring the prevailing interests during the reforms, executive-central government (Argentina) vis-à-vis legislative-sub-national governments's interests (Brazil), we are able to explain the greater Brazilian decrease in progressive taxation, i.e., weight- and level-wise.

Tax Policy Reforms and Veto Players Reforms in Latin America (1977-1995).  This paper seeks to provide a quantitative analysis of the effects of veto players’s reductions on the probability of taxation changes taking place.  We demonstrate that reductions in effective veto players increase the probability of taxation changes taking place, but irrespective of direction or magnitude of change.  This is done by pursuing a pooled-time series analysis of fifteen Latin American countries during the time period of 1977-1995.  We test three different measures of tax policy reforms (Morley, Machado, and Pettinato, 1999 and Mahon, Jr., 2004) and three different measures of veto players (Henisz, 2000 and 2002 and Keefer 2002).  In addition, we propose a better way to measure tax policy reform and modify these veto players’s measures in order to attain analytical leverage of the subject of study.  Beyond the pooled-time series analysis, we analytically embed previous explanations of tax policy reforms in Latin America within a veto players’s perspective by the way of a narrative.  Therefore, espousing a research agenda for future elaboration and testing.  In addition, we propose other possible research agendas in order to study, quantitative and qualitatively, direction and magnitude of changes in taxation matters in contradistinction to the study of change per se as was pursued throughout this paper.

The Effect of Regional Cleavages within Racial Inclusionary Polities on Income Taxation Outcomes: The Cases of Argentina and Brazil.  This paper addresses, why Argentina historically has collected fewer taxes than Brazil, even though, according to the former level of economic development, the expectation would have been otherwise.  Recent scholarly work has categorized these two cases as racial inclusionary states in which regional cleavages have been important (Lieberman, 2003).  These categories have a negative impact on tax collections.  Nevertheless, they do not help us explain Argentina and Brazil differing taxation outcomes.  Hence, we take as a starting point Lieberman (2003)’s contribution of racial inclusion and regionalism in the definition of National Political Communities’ (NPC) negative impact on a state taxing capacity by studying two of such cases: Argentina and Brazil.  We argue that specifying two dimensions of regionalism (i.e., vertical and horizontal regional cleavage; see Gibson and Falleti, 2004) instead of just one dimension and its interaction with racial cleavages in their early state-building efforts helps explain their respective taxing predicaments today.  This is so, since this gives us information on how racial issues were mobilized and interacted with how their respective federal subunits were included or appeased (i.e., their respective power leverages).  Thus, by specifying differences among regional and racial cleavages NPCs’ crystallizations, we further generalize into the broader discussion of understanding the politics of taxation and taxation capacity of a state.  We underscore (and differentiate) Argentina’s 1853 constitution and Perón’s intervention with Brazil’s Empire, 1891 constitution, and Vargas regime in order to shed light on our taxation analytical puzzle in contemporary times.  Furthermore, proposing taxation hypotheses for future exploration based on race and regional cleavages’ specifications.  These are of importance in order to help us deepen our understanding of Latin American taxation outcomes and stop considering them as taxation “oddities.”  Hence, furthering our understanding of the intersecting effects of class, race, gender, and regional cleavages on state formation and taxing capacity.