

The Institutional Roots of Popular Mobilization: State Transformation and Rural Politics in Brazil and Chile, 1960–1995

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The past thirty years in Latin America have produced tremendous transformations of the state's role in society, both in the scope of its activities and the extent of its presence. Sometimes this has led to the state's unprecedented expansion into the far reaches of economic and social life, other times to its retreat from direct institutional presence in favor of indirect market-mediated linkages to society. The impact of these transformations on associational life and the quality of political participation has to some extent been obscured in recent scholarly work on democratic transition and consolidation, important as these issues are.¹ This paper explores how the transformations in the deeper "structural linkages" between state and society have affected political organization and mobilization in rural Brazil and Chile. In so doing, we contend that institutions not normally seen as central to democratic politics are in fact crucial to understanding political participation and mobilization.

What are these institutional patterns and why do they matter? By structural linkages we mean the gamut of productive, social, and regulatory functions of the state that help define the boundaries between public and private, including the systems of labor relations, social welfare, and land tenure.² These deep linkages help shape interests in society and provide (or deny) resources to contending social actors. Unlike political linkages, they need not change with regime transitions. Democratization changes the institutional mechanisms through which elites are selected and opens up new avenues through which social groups can make claims on the state. But, especially in cases of pacted or negotiated transition, transformations at the regime level are attained precisely by freezing other state institutions created under authoritarianism.³

We argue that new structural state-society linkages forged under military rule shaped political participation and mobilization in the post-authoritarian countryside of Brazil and Chile (after 1985 and 1989, respectively). In particular, we argue that the different forms these structural linkages took in the two countries contributed decisively to distinct political outcomes—the dramatic increase in popular mobilization in Brazil, which succeeded in placing agrarian issues at the center of national debate, and the virtual collapse of a formerly potent rural union movement in Chile. We elaborate precisely how military-era state reorganization of labor relations, land tenure, and social provision contributed to these very different political outcomes after democratization.

Scholars have by and large taken one of two positions on the more general question of how state structures and policy initiatives affect civil society. The first holds that a “large” or vigorous state can disrupt the bases for associational life and “crowd out” civil groups. State-society relations are a zero-sum game from this perspective, and gains for one come at the expense of the other.⁴ The second position holds that state and society are “mutually constitutive” and reinforce each other. Proponents of this position suggest that a strong state can, under certain circumstances, foster associational activity and help create the bases for a dense civil society, which in turn increases the efficacy of state action. The central concern of these scholars is to identify the conditions under which state-society relations lead to a strengthening of democracy or development.⁵ Our position is closest to the second group of scholars.

Brazil and Chile offer a particularly good paired comparison through which to explore these issues. The military governments in Brazil (1964–1985) and Chile (1973–1989) both carried out extensive agricultural modernization projects that in each case succeeded in creating internationally competitive agro-export sectors. Both countries experienced a significant reengineering of state institutions in rural areas and agrarian change. Upon democratization, the Brazilian countryside experienced an unprecedented level of mobilization, and new rural movements succeeded in forcing agrarian issues to the forefront of political debate. In contrast, the Chilean countryside was quiescent and politically invisible. Yet it was Chile in the pre-authoritarian period, not Brazil, that had one of Latin America’s most highly-organized and politicized agrarian sectors, and therefore had a strong social and institutional legacy of popular mobilization on which to build. By comparison, few regions in Brazil had a tradition of popular mobilization prior to military rule.

How do transformations in state-society structural linkages help us account for the scope of popular organization in Brazil and its collapse and irrelevance in Chile? The different paths to economic modernization pursued by the military in Brazil and Chile—developmental and neoliberal, respectively—created very different parameters for agrarian mobilization in the post-authoritarian period. Specifically, the developmental and neoliberal models produced different state structures and systems of labor relations, which had polar effects on

the bases of rural associational life and collective action. The developmental model in Brazil established an interventionist state in rural areas, which included a corporatist system of labor relations, a broad-based program of social provision, and increased state regulation of land. This institutional configuration facilitated the expression of collective identities around new issues brought into the public domain, and provided rural social groups with critical material and organizational resources. In contrast, neoliberalism in Chile produced a minimalist state heavily reliant on market forces, including a pluralist and highly decentralized system of labor relations, a privatized pension system, and an efficient new land market. The state's retreat from economic and social spheres eroded vital material and organizational resources in rural communities and undermined collective identification by taking many agrarian issues off the political agenda and "privatizing them."

The new structural linkages forged under military rule—a time when each state enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from popular pressures—were carried over into the democratic regimes in both Brazil and Chile. The transition pacts negotiated by political elites left intact the development models pursued under military rule. As a result of this institutional carryover, Brazilian rural movements found urban allies who competed for rural support around the new agrarian issues, while in Chile agrarian issues continued to be excluded from the political agenda and urban parties did not bid against each other for rural support. In both cases the rural sector remained important in national political dynamics. In Brazil, rural issues were forced onto the national political agenda. In Chile, the absence of rural mobilization was crucial to the stability of democratic politics.⁶

AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO POPULAR MOBILIZATION

The institutional approach we take in this paper focuses on the impact of different patterns of structural state-society linkages on popular mobilization. We suggest that the form of state "penetration" of society and the types of structural linkages created to different sectors influence whether and how movements organize. The state's role in economic regulation and social provision influences three critical dimensions of collective action. These are: the bases for group solidarity and identity formation, the level of material and organizational resources available to rural actors, and the availability of urban allies. We contrast our explanation with approaches that focus on regime dynamics and the social legacies of past mobilization.

The state's influence on popular mobilization occurs through several mechanisms. The state provides a target for mobilization, favors and protects particular forms of political actions while discouraging others, and plays a key role in delimiting the range of issues around which social groups organize. For example, the legal framework it establishes and the specific policy initiatives it undertakes bring certain issues into the public sphere, but not others. As it ad-

vances into or retreats from policy areas, the national political agenda widens or narrows, in effect defining and redefining critical parameters of the political arena itself. In so doing, the state defines the issues around which rural social groups may coalesce, and delimits the bases on which rural movements can forge alliances with urban political actors.⁷

More concretely, the provision of physical infrastructure (roads, telephone service, railways) and public transportation reduce the cost of collective action and contribute importantly to organizing efforts on a regional, and especially national, scale.⁸ Finally, direct state support for local organizing efforts can have a critical impact. State elites have frequently encouraged and subsidized a variety of associational forms in order to create new political allies or enhance the efficacy of state action. States have offered organizational support, access to resources and subsidies, and even a degree of protection from repression by local political elites. Corporatist labor regimes, with varying degrees of state control, have been an extreme example of such efforts in Latin America, but a variety of other forms outside the system of labor relations can be identified as well.⁹

Our attention to state institutions does not imply that regime change does not have an important impact on popular mobilization in developing countries. Numerous studies have shown how the easing of repression and opening of political space with democratization contributed to the emergence of new social movements. However, the cases of Brazil and Chile suggest that democratization is only a piece of the puzzle, and alone cannot account for which social groups mobilize, around what claims, and in what types of movements. For example, the comparatively greater vitality of the post-transition Chilean political parties does not explain our outcome; it is in Brazil, with its inchoate party system, that mobilization emerges. We therefore focus on how the new institutional arrangements created with the modernization of agriculture affected the ability of social groups to coalesce and engage in collective action.

In the analysis that follows each case begins with a brief overview of the pre-coup period, then goes on to examine the political and institutional framework the two militaries erected to implement their respective development models. We look at how changes wrought in the areas of land reform, labor relations, and social provision affected the capacity of rural social groups to organize and mobilize. We pay particular attention to their impact on peasant access to resources and local organization, group solidarity, and the availability of elite allies. The analyses culminate with an interpretation of the interplay between the new political environment in the transitions to democracy and the reemergence of rural popular movements.

BRAZIL: DEVELOPMENTALISM AND POPULAR MOBILIZATION

The military in Brazil (1964–1985) pursued a developmentalist model that established a highly interventionist state in rural areas. The new model repre-

sented a shift from the previous import-substitution strategy to a protected but export-promoting approach that sought to redefine the country's insertion into the international economy and foster national integration. In the countryside, the new developmental model had three prongs: the creation of an export-oriented agro-industrial sector, national territorial integration, and the incorporation of formerly excluded rural social groups. While the developmental state had been firmly implanted in urban areas in the 1930s and 1940s, in the countryside the traditional pattern of oligarchic domination had remained in place up until the coup. The new model therefore brought profound changes in the role and structure of the state in rural areas. These changes laid the foundation for the emergence of several national rural movements and an unprecedented popular mobilization in the democratic regime. The new movements in turn sought to expand the role of the state in the countryside, enhance its capacity to deliver services and regulate rural labor relations, and strengthen its agencies responsible for agrarian reform.

On the one hand, the military's effort to institutionalize state control over rural labor through a corporatist labor regime created a new institutional space within which rural groups could organize and gain access to unprecedented resources. On the other hand, the state's expanded role in rural social and economic life, along with agrarian legislation enacted in the early 1960s, brought an array of agrarian issues into the public domain, creating new bases on which movements could build collective identities transcending regional specificities. In addition, during the democratic transition, political actors from the far left to the far right, including prominently the progressive wing of the Catholic Church, sought to mobilize rural allies around these new issues, placing them at the center of national political debate.

Brazilian rural movements entered the democratic period with an extensive organizational base and important political allies and, in contrast to Chile, rapidly emerged as national political actors. By the time Brazil held direct presidential elections in 1989, several national rural movements had organized a series of agricultural strikes and mass protests over such diverse issues as agrarian reform, agricultural credit and prices, social security, and health care.¹⁰ The largest of the new movements was the corporative *Movimento Sindical dos Trabalhadores Rurais* (Rural Workers' Union Movement), with over eight million members and thirty-two hundred unions. Smaller but often more highly mobilized movements, such as the new unionism movement associated with the labor entity *Central Única dos Trabalhadores* (CUT), the Movement of the Landless (MST), and the Rubber Tappers' Movement, represented hundreds of thousands more.

The countryside of the pre-coup period provides a benchmark from which to examine the changes wrought under military rule and their impact on rural political activity. The political alliance that sustained the state prior to the coup was built on an accommodation between modernizing urban sectors and the lo-

cally hegemonic rural oligarchies. The regulation of land and rural labor relations, as well as agricultural policy, resided in the hands of regional oligarchies ensconced in state-level government. Existing rural labor legislation, which allowed for unions and set a minimum wage, was not enforced. Instead, rural social relations were regulated by various forms of clientelism, superimposed on a wide array of land tenure arrangements. Social security and public health care, access to which urban workers had gained in the 1930s, also did not reach the countryside.¹¹ The structural linkages between the national state and the countryside therefore remained tenuous, and the post-war developmentalism did not reach far beyond urban centers.

In the years immediately prior to the 1964 military coup this picture changed somewhat. The political polarization in urban areas spilled over into the countryside, and the state, fearing that the archaic agrarian sector posed a critical bottleneck to economic development and a breeding ground for agrarian radicalism, sought to extend its authority into rural areas. A limited agrarian reform initiative was stymied by conservative rural elites, but regulation of rural labor advanced with the Rural Workers Statute (ETR) of 1963, which extended the urban corporatist labor regime to the countryside.¹² Fueled in part by these initiatives, a small number of regionally-based peasant mobilizations developed. At the time of the military coup, however, only an estimated half million people had joined unions, roughly four percent of the agricultural labor force.¹³ There was only one significant (sector-wide) strike in agriculture in 1963, in the northeast's sugar industry, and it rigorously followed the letter of the new labor legislation.¹⁴ The famous peasant leagues were already in decline. Unlike Chile during the same period, the movements that developed in Brazil therefore were limited in size, regional in scope, and generally moderate in their demands and ideological orientation.¹⁵

Military Rule and Agrarian Developmentalism (1964–1985)

The Brazilian military oversaw a vertiginous expansion of the state's role in the countryside. The post-1964 alliance among the military state-elite, national, and international business sectors led to a basic shift in the previous ISI development model. The first four years of military rule were consumed by efforts at inflation control and economic stabilization, but after 1968 the state took a lead role in redefining Brazil's entry into the global economy.¹⁶ A cornerstone of this effort was the expansion of the developmentalist state into the countryside to foster the modernization of agriculture. The specific form this expansion took, and its efficacy, varied by region and sector, but the regulation of land and labor, and the provision of social welfare and agricultural credit, were brought into the state's purview for the first time.¹⁷

The foremost concern of the state-elite was the development of a competitive and diversified export-oriented agro-industry that could help redefine Brazil's insertion into the international economy and fuel a new cycle of economic

growth. The expansion of the agricultural frontier into the Amazon region was expected to result in additional gains in agricultural production, as well as exploitation of its untold mineral wealth. Provision of ample and heavily subsidized credit, the federalization and expansion of agricultural research and extension services, and investment in physical infrastructure such as highways all underwrote the modernization of agriculture. Agricultural policy, however, was inevitably intertwined with national integration—that is, with the economic integration of sparsely settled regions and the extension of the national state’s reach across national territory, including areas where the authority of local and regional oligarchies prevailed. The military therefore attempted, with varying levels of success, to centralize authority out of the hands of the oligarchies and create new bureaucratic machinery in rural areas to circumvent existing state and local government.

The incorporation of rural workers, broadly defined, into an institutionalized relationship with the state, and the regulation of rural labor relations, were central components of the military’s agrarian policies. The military stimulated rural unionization, which it saw as a means of diffusing the potential threat from the left, slowing the flow of rural-to-urban migration, and strengthening the national state in rural areas where it had heretofore been largely absent. The military used the labor legislation enacted prior to the coup, the ETR, to extend the corporatist labor regime to rural areas. The law created a new legal category—*rural worker*—which included wage laborers, sharecroppers, and small farmers, and allowed for two types of territorially-based unions: “rural worker unions” (*sindicato dos trabalhadores rurais*) and “employer unions” (*sindicatos rurais*). In return for extensive state control, the legislation provided a stable revenue source—the union tax—and a representational monopoly, which greatly facilitated unionization.¹⁸ It also extended a number of new labor and social rights to rural labor. The military expected unions, on the one hand, to deliver a social wage in the form of social security and health services and, on the other, to teach members their rights under national law, thereby creating citizens, and petition for the implementation of legislation through the labor courts.

A central component of the military’s strategy to draw the rural population into the state-sanctioned union movement was the expansion of social security and health care. Social security had been extended to the countryside by law in 1963, but, as with most previous rural legislation, had not been implemented. In 1971, the military created PRORURAL, a program that gave rural workers a limited form of social security, health care, and other social benefits such as funeral-service subsidies (a major expense for the rural poor) for the first time. Benefits were hardly generous—retirement pensions, for example, were half the minimum wage—but, when combined, medical and dental care, retirement and disability pensions, and other services amounted to a substantial social wage. Rural unions played a prominent role in delivering the new benefits, by

the early 1980s holding half of all the medical contracts and a large number of dental contracts. Within two years of its implementation almost a million people were receiving pensions, and by the early 1980s three million received some form of benefit from the program.¹⁹

State regulation of land expanded almost immediately after the coup with passage of the Land Statute of 1964. The statute's primary concern was the modernization of agricultural production, and it substantially expanded the state's authority over land titles and land tenure contracts, making them public and national decisions rather than the private concern of local elites. In addition, the Land Statute called for agrarian reform, providing a critical legal benchmark that different groups would later invoke in their claims for reform.²⁰ For the state-elite, asserting federal control over land was critical not only to the rationalization of land tenure, but also to the integration of the final and greatest frontier region—the Amazon, which covers over a third of national territory. The National Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization (INCRA) became the state's bureaucratic instrument for land matters in the 1970s, and would henceforth be a common target of rural movements making land claims and demanding agrarian reform.

Organizing under Authoritarian Rule

Several national, rural, popular movements emerged under authoritarian rule. The largest of the movements was the Rural Workers Union Movement, which was built within the confined institutional space created by the developmental state and corporatist labor regime, which together provided both an extensive organizational infrastructure and resources, as well as a coherent ideological framework. The movement focused primarily on rural wage labor issues, such as wage levels and enforcement of labor legislation, and on the expansion of the new social welfare system. Labor legislation specified in detail how unions should be organized, who could be members, and through what channels they could make claims. The union tax and PRORURAL contracts provided unprecedented resources.

The movement reinforced its multiple linkages to the state in several ways. It built an inclusive class-based identity around the legal category of 'rural worker' in order to replace an array of regional identities and link together diverse rural strata. At the core of the identity was the struggle for massive and immediate agrarian reform, a demand carefully formulated to match the language of the Land Statute of 1964. Barred from mobilizing in the 1968–1978 period, the movement sought to draw the state into mediating rural labor relations, fighting the arbitrary power of landowners by bringing cases before the labor courts and petitioning for implementation of national legislation. As the level of state control diminished after 1979, the movement expanded its repertoire and emphasized the use of strikes in the context of well-organized wage campaigns. The strikes also sought to activate the movement's linkages to the

state—the strikes rigorously followed the restrictive law enacted by the military in 1964 (changed only in 1988), and aimed to provoke state intervention and arbitration of the collective bargaining process.²¹

The movement grew rapidly, and by 1980 had 2,254 unions and twenty-one state federations (see Table 1). Membership reached almost seven million.²² The strength of the movement and the extent of its mobilizational capacity were considerably smaller than its size suggests, however. The movement had a progressive national leadership with strong support in a number of regions, but a majority of rural unions were primarily concerned with delivering services on behalf of the state.²³ The movement's resource dependence on the state left it vulnerable as well.

A number of important social movements emerged alongside the corporatist union movement in the 1979–1985 period. Most of these movements emerged out of the popular organizing work of the progressive wing of the Catholic Church. The church's organizing work was shaped in basic ways by the new structural linkages binding the developmental state and rural communities, including the legally sanctioned channel for small farmer and agricultural worker representation—the existing corporative rural workers' movement. The Church became deeply involved in popular organizing in part as a reaction against the military's agrarian developmentalism, and especially the violent process of national integration of the Amazon region. Highly critical of the state-regulated union movement, the clergy focused much of their energy on organizing opposition movements to win control over local unions; this step was seen as the first of a series that would help rebuild the left and lead to the radical transformation of Brazilian society from below. They created a radical political-religious identity that nonetheless drew on the legal definition of rural workers. As the transition to democracy advanced during the 1980s, various social movements grew out of these Church efforts, including the new unionism affiliated with CUT, the Movement of the Landless, and the Movement of Families Affected by Dams. These movements organized around a variety of issues, but small farmers' and landless families' access to land stood out, and agrarian reform was a central demand.

Socio-economic Change and Mobilization. Much of the literature on peasant movements links mobilization to either disruptive socio-economic changes accompanying the modernization of the agrarian sector or a decline in standards of living. In Brazil neither explanation can account for the pattern of mobilization. First, popular mobilization followed a national pattern, and occurred both in regions where there was significant change and in ones where there was not. Second, mobilization occurred across a variety of social groups, from wage laborers to capitalized small farmers to landless families, which experienced the modernization of agriculture in very different ways. Groups that had gained and lost with the modernization all mobilized. Third, although there was a remarkable demographic shift from rural to urban areas, leaving only thirty-two per-

TABLE I
Rural Unionization in Brazil, 1960–1990

	<i>Unions*</i> (legally recognized)	<i>Union Membership**</i> (in thousands)	<i>Union Density***</i>
1963	270	—	—
1970	1,066	1,500	9.4%
1980	2,254	6,898	40%
1990	2,811	8,314 (1988)	43%

*The number of unions comes from IBGE *Sindicatos: Indicadores Sociais*. Vol. 4 (Rio de Janeiro, 1990), and Pearson, "Small Farmer," n. p., and represents a conservative estimate.

**The numbers for 1970 and 1980 come from estimates by Maybury-Lewis, based on CONTAG reports. The 1990 figure is from IBGE (1990). There is considerable discrepancy between the two sets of numbers—Maybury-Lewis, *The Politics of the Possible*, 219, for example, puts union membership in 1986 at 9,929,538.

***Union density calculations are based on the Agricultural Census. Using the Demographic Census the rate increases substantially: eleven percent in 1970, fifty-four in 1980, and fifty-nine in 1990.

cent of Brazilians in rural areas by 1980 (down from fifty-five percent in 1960), income for rural wage laborers and small farmers in the countryside rose during this period and poverty declined.²⁴ Between 1964 and 1980 the average family income in rural areas rose from eighty percent of the minimum wage in 1960 to 160 percent in 1980.²⁵ Finally, although land concentration increased during the 1960–1980 period, different regions experienced widely divergent patterns of change, and the relationship to rural mobilization is tenuous. Two important areas for the corporative union movement—the states of Pernambuco and São Paulo—experienced a decrease in land concentration as the number of small and large properties fell. Two important poles of Church-supported movement activity—Rio Grande do Sul and Pará—experienced land concentration, but in very different ways. In the former, the subdivision of medium-sized properties led to a rise in small holdings; in the latter to an increase in large holdings' average size (even though the share of medium-sized farms increased and that of small ones fell).²⁶

Rural Mobilization in the Democratic Regime (1985–1995)

The developmentalist model entered into crisis in the 1980s, a victim of oil shocks and the debt crisis. But the political pact that guaranteed the transition to democracy did not revise the state's role or alter its new institutional linkages to the rural sector. Hence, issues brought into the public sphere under the military regime became part of the new democratic political arena, as movements organized around them and national political actors competed for the new movements' support. As a result, the rural movements that emerged during

the 1970s and early 1980s were almost immediately integrated into the political alliances forming within the reemerging left. These alliances helped movements to establish themselves as significant political actors and to keep the rural issues around which they organized on the national political agenda.²⁷ Prominent among the issues around which movements mobilized and forged alliances were agrarian reform, labor relations, and social security.²⁸

The Rural Workers' Union Movement entered the democratic transition with an impressive organizational network and, despite important weaknesses, represented a desirable ally to political elites. The movement joined a diffuse center-left block that included among others the traditional left (including what was left of the communist parties) and the progressive wing of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB). The movement negotiated its support with the Democratic Alliance—the broad coalition that oversaw the transition and elected the first civilian president—in return for government support for a national agrarian reform program and the consolidation of a form of liberalized state corporatism similar to that which prevailed in urban areas in the pre-coup period. The movement's national leadership also defined an important role for itself within the labor movement. It was a critical actor in the process leading to the creation of the two rival national labor organizations, the CUT and CGT (Confederação General dos Trabalhadores).²⁹

Movements in the Church camp allied with the more sharply defined and militant left that created the labor central CUT and the Workers' Party (PT). In contrast to the Rural Workers Union Movement, this segment of the left refused to participate in the transition pact and stood in opposition to the new civilian (but conservative) government. Participation in the labor central and the party enabled the movements to place their demands in the political arena at the national level, including in Congress, and gave leaders national exposure.³⁰ In addition, various movement leaders were elected to local and national public office on the Workers' Party slate. In the case of the new unionism, the CUT played a critical role in unifying local and regional Church-sponsored groups into a single, ideologically coherent, national movement. Rural unionists had a significant presence in CUT as a result.³¹ In addition, after the Constituent Assembly of 1988, the Movement of the Landless (MST) emerged as the principal force behind agrarian reform, and has proven to be one of Latin America's most visible and successful popular movements. It has obtained significant concessions from both national and state governments.³²

Of the three areas of debate that we analyze, agrarian reform has been the most prominent and polemical in what was quickly dubbed the New Republic. The National Campaign for Agrarian Reform organized by CONTAG and various center and center-left politicians and civil associations succeeded in placing the issue in the AD's platform. As a result, one of the first acts of the new civilian government was to announce the National Agrarian Reform Plan in 1985. A strong conservative countermobilization succeeded in blocking the

government's initiative, but the issue remains high on the national agenda to this day.³³ It was one of the most hotly contested items in the Constituent Assembly in 1988, where pro-reform forces submitted popular amendments—later defeated—proposing national agrarian reform with 1.2 million signatures. Despite the legislative reversals, the MST has since 1988 succeeded in pushing the government into expropriating significant tracts of land for redistribution. Between 1985 and 1996 the government redistributed 8,715,531 hectares of land to 219,386 families.³⁴

The mobilization of rural movements around the issue of agrarian reform has had an important impact on how parts of the state are constituted in rural areas. The alliance between the Rural Workers' Union Movement and the Democratic Alliance, for example, led to the creation of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MIRAD) and a revival of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization (INCRA). At the end of the 1980s INCRA was abolished and authority for carrying out agrarian reform was transferred to the conservative Ministry of Agriculture. Continued mobilization and political pressure by pro-reform movements and allies, and particularly by the MST, led in the early 1990s to the resurrection of INCRA and the creation of a new Extraordinary Ministry for Land Policy, which became responsible for agrarian reform. These two entities have led to an ad hoc but growing role for the state in land redistribution.

The systems of labor relations, health care, and social welfare were also important arenas of popular organizing and mobilization. The rural union movement has focused primarily on the defense of rural labor rights and wages, and used the corporatist labor regime to force the state to intervene on its behalf in labor disputes.³⁵ Strike activity has been substantial, especially when compared to pre-1964 levels. Only a year after the military's exit from power, rural strike activity reduced production by five million person-days.³⁶ There were strikes in Pernambuco's sugar zone in every year during the 1980s but two, and in São Paulo a wave of strikes that began in 1984 paralyzed a significant part of that state's sugarcane plantations, and later spread to orange growers.³⁷ Health care and social welfare, which in the 1960s neither existed nor were on the national agenda, became central demands of rural movements during the 1980s and 1990s and contentious issues in national politics. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets during the 1980s, particularly in the south of Brazil, to demand the expansion of health care services, extension of social security to women, and parity in benefits with urban workers.³⁸ The height of this campaign came with the 1988 constitution and its implementing legislation in the 1990s, which finally gave male and female rural workers the same level of benefits as urban workers, and created a truly universal social insurance program for the first time. The number of people who received welfare support grew from zero in the 1960s to six million in 1993.³⁹

The rural movements in Brazil experienced serious crises at the end of the democratic transition in 1989, but nonetheless survived into the 1990s and

succeeded in keeping their issues on the national agenda. The new unionism movement recently merged with the Rural Workers' Union Movement, which affiliated with CUT. With support from the Movement of the Landless, they have succeeded in reversing some of the previous losses in agrarian reform and at least temporarily stymied government efforts to reduce rural social provision. The movements have also increased their representation in Congress and local government. What impact the current process of state reform under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso will have on the rural movements is not yet clear.

CHILE: NEOLIBERALISM AND DEMOBILIZATION

The Chilean military regime (1973–1989) imposed a neoliberal development model that dramatically reduced the state's direct role in the regulation and organization of the rural economy and society. Like Brazil, the agrarian component of authoritarian development strategy was geared toward entry into the global economy, a marked departure from the import-substitution path Chile had pursued since the Great Depression. In the process of transformation, export agriculture blossomed, while the direct ties between peasants, rural unions, and the state were severed. The transformation of the structural linkages between state and society from direct institutional presence to indirect market mediation changed the national political dynamics around which rural politics was constructed. In the countryside, despite sharp declines in living standards, this change prompted the atrophy of peasant organization and protest, and narrowed the scope of political contestation. As state-society linkages became indirect and market-based, both the capacity of the state to act in the countryside and of peasants to mobilize against the state declined.

The imposition of the neoliberal model required a redefinition of the state's role, rather than a simple retreat from former developmental and social functions. New institutions were created to govern land and labor markets, as well as to provide old-age security. With respect to land tenure, many provisions of the former agrarian reform law were replaced by a system of well-defined individual and alienable land titles, creating the legal and physical infrastructure of an efficient land market *de novo*. In the arena of labor relations, the former semi-corporatist peasant labor law was replaced with a pluralist labor code that at once fragmented peasants into distinct strata, weakened the ability of unions to bargain, and removed the state from the adjudication of labor conflicts. It was a legal framework designed to individualize workers. Finally, the military replaced the former entitlement-based public welfare system with a private pension scheme and narrowly-targeted anti-poverty relief, a change that led to marked decline in rural coverage.

These institutional changes dramatically reduced the bases for collective action in what had been one of the best-organized and most militant peasantries on the South American continent. The reorganization of land and labor markets disrupted resources internal to the peasantry, while former publicly-provided

supports for mobilization were withdrawn. Changes in the structure of state institutions also fragmented the interests of the peasantry by heightening regional and socioeconomic differences. Furthermore, neoliberalism changed the very boundaries of the national political agenda, removing issues of historic importance to peasants such as agrarian reform, water rights, the availability of inputs and credit, and crop prices from the post-transition debate. This altered the dynamics of national partisan competition in the transition to democracy, reducing both the salience of democratic politics for peasants, and the availability of allies. Efforts to spark organization—often by the very same leaders from the earlier period of mobilization, and with outside and NGO support—have been unsuccessful in this new political terrain. Bereft of allies and lacking internal resources, rural social groups were unable to reconstitute even a shadow of the militant movements of the 1960s and early 1970s. Ironically, after the democratic transition in Chile, peasant politics became a markedly quiescent and elite affair.

In the case of Chile, the benchmark from which to assess the impact of the military's development model on rural mobilization is markedly different from that of Brazil. During the 1960s and early 1970s successive reformist governments dramatically expanded state presence in rural areas. In response to stop-go spurts of growth and accelerating inflation, governing elites sought to enlarge internal markets for import substitutes by increasing peasant production and living standards. Serious agrarian reform, the expansion of social security to rural areas, and state regulation of rural labor relations brought the national state to the countryside in an effort to meet domestic food needs, expand markets, and save foreign exchange.⁴⁰

The entry of the state into the countryside produced a highly competitive political dynamic that encouraged rural mobilization.⁴¹ First, the Peasant Unionization Law (Ley 16.625) of 1967 established important connections between the state and rural workers.⁴² The law set out the basic organizational structure of the union movement and funded it through a two percent tax on wages, levied on employers. The tax revenue was then channeled to the competing peasant union confederations—two leftist and two Christian Democrat—in proportion to their membership. Importantly, all categories of rural worker—landless and landholding, permanent and temporary alike—were under its terms simply “agricultural workers,” and were grouped together within a single geographic area, the *comuna* (roughly equivalent to an American county). The state actively encouraged the organization of the rural working class by providing access to unprecedented resources and facilitating the formation of collective identification across geographic regions and social categories. It also became directly involved through unionization drives run by the agricultural extension service (INDAP).

Second, agrarian reform legislation aimed at widening the internal market was passed in 1967 (Ley 16.640), virtually without peasant pressure, and became a key institutional resource that, coupled with the availability of urban allies,

played a central role in the ensuing mobilization.⁴³ The legislation raised expectations on the part of peasants, who, in response to the law, launched waves of direct action in an attempt to force expropriation. These mobilizations were supported by competing political parties (and their affiliated unions) as a way of expanding their rural support base.⁴⁴

Chilean peasants, as one of a very few politically-unattached voting blocs in a highly competitive electoral arena, became central actors in the dynamics of national political competition. Agrarian issues—from agricultural modernization to land reform—became central to national political conflicts.⁴⁵ Three distinct political forces courted peasant support—Christian Democrats, a left-wing splinter from the Christian Democrats, and a Socialist-Communist alliance.⁴⁶ Chilean peasants therefore organized and mobilized in unprecedented ways because of the ready availability of allies, the manner in which crucial institutions encouraged collective identification, and because of the state's presence and support for rural unions. Unionization, strikes, and land invasions rose dramatically (See Table 2).

Authoritarianism, Neoliberalism, and Demobilization (1973–1989)

In the period of military rule in Chile (1973–1989) a dramatic reorientation of national developmental strategy was imposed, eventually coalescing into one of the most extensive and coherent free market models found in the contemporary world. At the same time, mobilizational politics was severely repressed in rural areas (as well as urban). Many scholars have assumed that the lack of mobilizational activity in the succeeding years was a function of the harshly repressive policies imposed by General Pinochet. But the fact that unionization rebounded substantially in urban areas after democratization but not in rural ones points to the partiality of this account. We contend that rural demobilization was achieved in part through a decidedly different mechanism—the neoliberal transformation of the structural linkages between state and rural society.

Chilean neoliberalism targeted export markets as the fundamental source of domestic economic dynamism. As a consequence, national production was re-oriented toward primary products salable in foreign markets, and away from the costly and low-quality manufactured goods produced by protected Chilean industry.⁴⁸ In addition to traditional copper exports, this reorientation crucially included a substantial focus on nontraditional agro-exports (especially fruits, wines, and forestry products). To produce internationally-competitive products, the free importation of chemical inputs and/or productive technology was required, and former state monopolies on these goods were abolished and privatized. Similarly, the tariff barriers that had supported both manufacturing and traditional agriculture were reduced to a uniformly low ten percent level by 1979. Finally, state marketing boards for agricultural products were abolished. As a consequence, nontraditional agricultural output surged, and became an important component of foreign exchange earnings by the 1980s.⁴⁹

TABLE 2
Unionization, Strikes, and Land Invasions in Chile

<i>Year</i>	<i>Union Density</i> ⁴⁷	<i>Strikes</i>	<i>Land Invasions</i>
1964	0.7%	n.d	0
1967	n.d.	693	9
1968	24.3	648	26
1969	31.2	1127	148
1970	33.9	1580	456
1971	38.1	1758	1278

SOURCES: For union density, 1964–1969, data are from Patricia Provoste and Wilson Cantoni. *Descripción numérica de la organización sindical campesina chilena 1968–1969* (Santiago, Chile: Fondo de Educación y Extensión Sindical [FEES], 1971), 21–38; For 1970–1971, see Gobierno de Chile, *Segundo mensaje del Presidente Salvador Allende ante el congreso pleno* (Santiago, Chile: Gobierno de Chile, 1972), 278, 858; Scully, *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Chile* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), 156; Banco Central de Chile, *Indicadores económicos y sociales* (Santiago, Chile: Banco Central de Chile, 1989). For land invasions: Juan Carlos Marín, *Las tomas* (Santiago, Chile: ICIRA, 1972), 16, and Loveman, *Chile*, 286. For strikes, see Cristóbal Kay, “Agrarian Reform and the Transition to Socialism in Chile, 1970–1973.” *Journal of Peasant Studies* 2, no. 4 (July 1975), 424.

The transition to a free market agricultural model also required lowering the cost of labor and guaranteeing the security of private property. It was the way in which land and labor markets were transformed that dismantled state institutions, fragmented the peasantry as a class, and narrowed the political agenda in such a way as to exclude most rural issues, thereby closing peasants off from urban allies.

Unlike the situation in Brazil, where agricultural modernization brought with it improvements in living standards, Chilean neoliberalism was an economic calamity from the peasant perspective. From a comparatively low level of twenty-five percent in 1970, rates of rural poverty rose to 53.5 percent toward the end of military rule.⁵⁰ We will see below that this impoverishment was accompanied by an increase in land concentration. Of our two cases, the objective bases for peasant grievances and mobilization are strongest in Chile. But mobilization actually occurred in Brazil. The explanation lies in the way agro-export orientation was imposed and how these policies transformed the structural linkages between state and rural society.

The Land Market, Agrarian Counter-Reform, and Demobilization. The first step in the reorientation of agriculture was the creation of a substantial private agro-export sector. At the time of the coup, however, nearly forty percent of the best agricultural land in the country was held in state-owned land reform coops. The pre-coup agrarian reform had abolished corporate land ownership and severely restricted the size of private land holdings (Ley 16.640). The central issue, then, was how to get the sixty-three percent of agricultural land held by peasants—in the form of smallholding or on the coops—into capitalist hands

(see Table 3). The process began with a distribution of coop lands among peasants, former landlords, and sale at auction.⁵¹ Most of the land then slipped through peasant hands, as market forces reconcentrated it in efficient-sized capitalist farms. Thus, the land market for peasant parcels became the key mechanism in the transformation of the distribution of agricultural property.

It was the process of creating land markets themselves that weakened the bases for peasant collective action—it placed them in competition with each other, and created a serious fragmentation of interests. Importantly, the legal infrastructure necessary to support a private market in land had to be created from scratch, a process that was hardly politically neutral. The agrarian reform “normalization”—the transfer of collective property to individual hands—required the state to: (1) define and assign definitive title to collectively owned property; (2) provide the mechanisms under which it could be transferred from one individual to another; and (3) remove individuals who did not receive land from their former residences, as rights to dwellings and usufruct on the old haciendas were incompatible with a strong regime of individual private property. These rules provoked a dramatic change in rural social structure and geography, adding physical disarticulation of communities to the already fragmented rural social world.

The privatization of reform sector lands was based on a point system, subject to an exclusion of all individuals who had participated in land invasion (Decreto Ley 208 of 1973). But since at least seventeen hundred land invasions had occurred between 1970 and 1972, an enormous number of peasants found themselves dispossessed for political reasons.⁵² Thus, the first social differentiation introduced during the “normalization” of land tenure was the assignment of land only to “apolitical”—read conservative—peasants.

The data in fact confirm what could readily have been predicted. By 1978, only a few years into the privatization, nearly thirty-seven percent of land reform beneficiaries had wholly or partially ceded their land.⁵³ This was not, however, a process of social differentiation among peasants. Rather, only 6.5 percent of these sales were to other peasants. Indeed, 89.3 percent of the sales went to the emergent capitalist sector, consisting of marketers, capitalist farmers, urban professionals, and public functionaries.⁵⁴ This group began to constitute the new capitalist, agro-export class fragment (see Table 3).

The building of land markets also changed the set of issues on the national political agenda. Accessory privatizations absolved the state of responsibility for the provision of vital productive inputs. These were now to be supplied “equally” (meaning at the same price for all) by the private sector. As much as ISI had forced agrarian issues onto the national political agenda, neoliberalism worked to take them off. Privatization of trade, production, and services made what had formerly been crucial public institutions and resources for peasants into private transactions. Just as importantly, it transferred to individual hands the shared goods of the land reform cooperatives, removing the final concrete reason for

TABLE 3
The Reorganization of Land Tenure under Military Rule
(Percent of agricultural land in basic irrigated hectares.)

<i>Farm Size Stratum</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1973</i>	<i>1976</i>	<i>1979^a</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1990s</i>
Minifundio	9.7	9.7	9.7	13.3	14.0	
Family Labor Farm	12.7	13.1	24.9	29.0	26.0	
Reform Sector	0.0	40.6	18.1	4.0	3.0	
PEASANTS	22.4	63.4	52.7	46.3	43.0	37.0
Capitalist Farms	22.2	36.6	43.4	36.3	31.0	
Large Agribusiness	55.4	0.0	2.9	16.9	26.0	
CAPITALIST	77.6	36.6	47.3	53.2	57.0	61.0

^aThese data were calculated by Jarvis working backward from property tax assessments, making the assumption that the value of a basic irrigated hectare was seventy-eight thousand pesos. For a justification, see Jarvis, *Chilean Agriculture*, 1021.

SOURCES: Adapted in part from Kurtz, "Free-Markets," 281. For 1965, see Instituto Nacional de Estadística. *IV Censo Nacional Agropecuario* (Santiago, Chile: INE, 1965). For 1973, see Luz Eugenia Cereceda and Fernando Dahse, *Dos décadas de cambios en el agro chileno* (Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Sociología. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 1980), 135. For 1976, see INE, *V Censo Nacional Agropecuario* (Santiago, Chile: INE, 1975). For 1979, see Lovell Jarvis, *Chilean Agriculture under Military Rule: From Reform to Reaction, 1973-1980* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1985), 10. For 1986 see Lovell Jarvis, "The Unravelling of the Agrarian Reform," in Cristóbal Kay and Patricio Silva eds., *Development and Social Change in the Chilean Countryside: From the Pre-Land Reform Period to the Democratic Transition* (Amsterdam: CED-LA, 1992), 199. For 1990s, see World Bank, *Chile: Estrategia para elevar la competitividad agrícola y aliviar la pobreza rural* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995), 35.

peasant producers to organize collectively—to manage these cooperatives. Alternatives to the market-provided inputs were systematically eliminated.

The establishment of land markets also definitively removed even the distribution of land—perhaps the archetypal agrarian issue—from the political arena by allowing land to pass through peasant hands. As a result, long-run reconcentration of holdings would be much harder to challenge. Reestablishment of the old hacienda-oriented patterns of land tenure would have kept the issue of land reform alive in future political debates. Instead, the military brought the process of land reform to its "natural" conclusion—it distributed the remainder of the land technically in compliance with many of the terms of the 1967 agrarian reform law. Having done so, future changes in land tenure would be "legitimate"; any reconcentration would simply be the result of voluntary market transactions.

Thus, the creation of institutions supporting agricultural private property and land transactions, in the Chilean context, provoked peasant differentiation, changes in social geography, and a serious fragmentation of interests. The creation of institutions of private property created individuals, just as the creation

of collective property had created meaningful social collectivities during the agrarian reform.

The State and Labor Relations: Restructuring and Demobilization. The creation of a flexible labor market in rural Chile first and foremost required a set of pluralist institutions to structure the contracting of labor and the organization of unions. The 1979 Labor Code provided the institutional framework for a pluralist replacement of the 1967 Peasant Unionization Law. These new institutional rules disrupted rural organization by: (1) undercutting the bases for collective identification; (2) dramatically reducing the efficacy, and therefore appeal, of unionization; and (3) removing the resources that formerly supported organization—in terms of both social and physical capital. When this was coupled with high levels of un- and underemployment, the fate of rural labor mobilization was sealed.

While peasant unionization did reemerge with legalization in 1979, the fragmentation and weakness of this movement mimicked the institutional fragmentation embodied in the new labor law. The rural labor movement was a declining shadow of its former self; as locals became disconnected from national confederations, membership consistently declined, unions divided by region and subsector, and, most critically, rarely managed to negotiate collective contracts.

How were existing interests and identities undermined by the changing labor institutions? Under the 1967 Peasant Unionization Law, the lowest level of organization was the comuna, and cultivators of any type—the sole exception was employers—would be joined in a single organization (Artículo 3). This was the only form of peasant union, and it was entitled to engage in collective bargaining with any of the employers within the comuna. In contrast to this very broad-based unionization of all rural cultivators under the catch-all phrase “agricultural worker,” the 1979 Labor Code produced dramatic fragmentation in organization and interest formation. First, it replaced the single geographic union local with three different forms of organization: enterprise unions, including only the workers on a single farm; inter-enterprise unions for linking workers employed by two or more different employers; and independent unions for workers not directly dependent on any employer.⁵⁵

Substantial additional distinctions between unions and types of members accompanied this fragmentation of organizational structures. First, of the three legal forms of unions, only enterprise unions were entitled to bargain collectively. Second, temporary workers—the newly dominant form of wage labor in the countryside—were not permitted to become members of enterprise unions and hence were excluded altogether from collective bargaining. Moreover, non-contiguous plots of land owned by the same individual constituted separate enterprises for unionization purposes (and a minimum of eight year-round employees was required for legal organization). Finally, open shops were compulsory, and any number of competing unions could be created within a single

enterprise. Legal structures heightened distinctions between permanent and seasonal workers, between unionized and nonunionized workers on a single farm, and between the landed and landless (the former typically entering “independent” unions, the latter enterprise and inter-enterprise unions).

The new legal structure also radically reduced the resources available for organization. While the 1967 law provided for generous compulsory funding of unions via a tax levied on employers, the 1979 law provided only for dues paid voluntarily and directly by union members. Direct governmental support—formerly coming from the agricultural extension agency (INDAP) and the union outreach and education fund (FEES)—was abolished. While the 1967 law even required employers to provide union halls (Art. 12), finding locations in which union activists could physically meet with workers became quite difficult after 1979.

Finally, changes in the labor code shattered the bargaining power of the unions. While under the 1967 law it became illegal for a firm to operate during the course of a legal strike (except for emergency tasks), the 1979 law put a sixty-day limit on strike action (this limit has since been abolished). Similarly, after 1979 unions no longer had exclusive jurisdiction. Employers are now permitted to bargain individually or with arbitrary groups of workers in hopes of dividing their labor forces, even on unionized farms (Libro III, Art. 90). They can also prevent legal strikes during the harvest, the only time such strikes are likely to be effective.

When this highly restrictive organizational structure was linked with the socioeconomic background conditions prevalent in Chilean agriculture, fragmentation and demobilization resulted. One critical aspect has been the emergence of a very large seasonal labor force.⁵⁶ When such an inherently unstable labor market was combined with a fragmented labor relations system, the vulnerability of rural workers surged. In particular, the liberalization of the labor market was accompanied by the closing-off of the escape valve rural-to-urban migration had provided since the 1940s—urban unemployment reached catastrophic levels in the early 1980s. Rural labor markets themselves became extremely competitive.⁵⁷ Individuals were divided from each other by variations in property ownership, type of employment, and access to the few remaining institutional resources (which favored permanent employees). Interests fragmented, and the bases of collective organization evaporated.

The generation of a new, mobile, employment-seeking stratum was not politically neutral. It is important to remember that a large proportion of those not receiving land reform parcels were expelled because of Decree Law 208, which excluded anyone who had previously participated in a land invasion. Rural employers were well aware of this, and considered these former coop members politically dangerous, frequently refusing to hire them.⁵⁸ ICIRA shows that only 22.4 percent of these ex-reform sector peasants found year-round employment: a further 25.1 percent found seasonal employment, with the remainder in various

conditions of disguised or open unemployment.⁵⁹ At the same time the cash shortage and low output levels prevented the new, individual peasant parcels from generating substantial levels of non-family employment.

This fragmentation, resource deprivation, and disempowerment is apparent in an examination of what little remains of the peasant union movement. Presently, organized workers are affiliated with five different national federations and confederations—two centrist and three leftist—with the majority of their membership attached to the moderate confederations.⁶⁰ Further, in a dramatic break with past practice, fully thirty-six percent of union members are unaffiliated with any national confederation at all, nor does any single confederation represent even twenty thousand workers.⁶¹

Social Provision and Interest Disaggregation. The final area of special importance in the rural sector was the privatization of social welfare and pensions. The private provision of pension services is depoliticizing because it makes the level of pension benefits a function of personal investment, which cannot be altered in obvious ways as a result of political pressure on the state. This is in marked contrast to the operation of the previous public defined-benefit system. In rural areas, political action was historically essential to the access of peasants to such state-provided social services. Such pressure, for example, was frequently used in order to force landlords to make their legally-required contributions to the former social security service. As such, political parties and unions were important mediators in the obtaining of pension benefits for rural workers.⁶² In general, the pension system was divided into separate funds, with different benefits according to broad occupational classifications. This provided an obvious incentive for broad-based collective organization around shared interests shaped by the structure of this state welfare institution. With the destruction of these institutions, both the incentive for collective organization and the facilitating conditions for collective identification were eroded—inequality and social fragmentation increased.⁶³

Despite the fact that employers are not responsible for paying for social security benefits, the privatized pensions system does build in strong dependencies on one's employer in the countryside. Participation is compulsory (and common) only for those with access to a year-round job, as suggested by the low coverage for temporary workers. But agricultural work, unlike most industry, is an inherently seasonal affair, and modern export agriculture much more so than traditional agriculture.⁶⁴ These permanent jobs are reserved for the most loyal workers, particularly since most of the protections against unfair dismissal have been removed from the labor law.⁶⁵ As a consequence, the low level of alternative employment helps employers transform economic power into political power in the countryside.

Given the low and uneven rural coverage rates and the "freedom" to choose between different pension plans, it is likely that most of the workers in any agricultural enterprise will not be covered by a pension plan, and those that are af-

filiated may be tied to different private funds. Thus, any conflicts that arise about pensions will involve only a fraction of the workers in a firm. And the sorts of issues that will be considered important will vary. In any event, the conflict will never be of a clearly collective character, as the employer is not the entity responsible for social provision. Whereas in the earlier period there was a homogenizing dynamic in the productive enterprises, under the current system there is an increasing degree of social differentiation.⁶⁶

Rural Politics and the Democratic Regime (1989–1995)

The transition to a democratic regime in 1989 did not bring dramatic changes to the countryside. There was little resurgence in rural unionization, and issues important to peasants were left off the national agenda. Even though the remaining peasant organizations—through their umbrella organization, the Comisión Nacional Campesina (CNC)—were mostly directly linked to the reformist Concertación alliance, which won the three post-transition Presidential elections, little response was made to peasant demands. This was due in part to an implicit understanding among the opponents of military rule that the fundamental elements of neoliberalism would remain undisturbed as part of the pact securing the transition to democracy.⁶⁷ The agenda-constricting impact of the neoliberal model therefore carried over into the democratic regime and severely constrained competition for rural support. Linked to this was a remarkable conversion of formerly reformist and radical parties—from the Christian Democrats to the Socialists—to orthodox policy positions.⁶⁸ Consequently, the state transformations imposed under military rule were largely unaffected by the democratization process.

By 1992, peasant unions represented a mere forty-four thousand workers, less than six percent of the agrarian labor force. While attempts were made to unify the constituent confederations at the national level—a broad alliance emerged spanning the spectrum from the Communists in the confederation El Surco to the Christian Democrats in the Confederación Nacional Campesina—they were unable to place any of their goals on the national political agenda. They demanded that their Concertación allies initiate: (1) the restitution of land lost by peasants during the military regime; (2) dramatic changes in the labor code, to change the organizational base of rural unions and bring temporary workers within their purview; and (3) a return to state ownership of processing and marketing industries for domestic food crops.⁶⁹ None of these issues attained anything like the importance they had in Brazil.

Instead, in agriculture, post-transition governments have been largely content with status quo policies inherited from the military. President Aylwin's (1990–1993) Agriculture Minister, Juan Agustín Figueroa, placed firm limits on the policies that the center-left Concertación would pursue in rural areas. While he recognized the importance of political participation via peasant unions, he was unwilling to propose changes in the labor code giving collective

bargaining rights to temporary workers. This was by far the largest segment of the labor force in the dynamic agro-export sector. Similarly, he deflected calls for greater stability of employment by arguing that agricultural modernization would correct that problem by itself. With respect to land reform, no return to expropriation was contemplated. Instead a small fund was set up to purchase and redistribute some land to peasants harmed under Decree Law 208 of 1973.⁷⁰ President Aylwin was similarly evasive on issues of importance to peasants.⁷¹ Peasant unions, despite their ties to governing parties, were unable to force the discussion of rural issues, much less the implementation of any serious reform.

Why are even reformist political parties unwilling to consider substantial changes in agrarian policy? The answer here is twofold. On the one hand, they are hemmed in by the constitutional provisions that were negotiated as part of the process of democratic transition. Most important here are considerations of property rights. While expropriation (e.g., land reform) is legal, in general full compensation must be made within five years—ten if the national interest is at issue—at an interest rate of eight percent, in addition to full readjustment for inflation.⁷² Given that legal challenges can intercede at many stages of the process, a return to substantial agrarian reform is politically impracticable, and fiscally impossible. Similarly, strong central bank autonomy prevents substantial deviation from liberal orthodoxy on the part of elected officials. On the other hand, the national-level success of market-oriented policies in generating growth has inhibited changes in the rural sector that would threaten market principles—most importantly in terms of the granting of subsidies, fixing prices, directly providing inputs, or raising tariffs. Since the introduction of most “rural” issues carries with it direct challenges to neoliberal principles, placing such issues on the national agenda raises negative political externalities that the Concertación government has no interest in facing.

With a dearth of political allies and a disrupted rural environment, peasant political mobilization has nearly disappeared. Peasant unions, long the principal mechanism for economic and political participation among cultivators, were devastated and have not recovered with democratic transition. The repression attendant upon the military coup brought the level of rural unionization down to 14.8 percent by 1981. By 1985, six years *after* unionization was legalized and repression was eased, rural union density had *fallen* to 7.1 percent of the labor force.⁷³ Nor did democratic transition reverse the decline. In 1992, after three years of democratic rule, only 5.4 percent of the agricultural labor force was enrolled in a union. This contrasts markedly with the urban experience, where legalization in 1979 stemmed the decline in unionization, and democratic transition brought with it a wave of union resurgence, returning organization in 1992 to the level it had reached in 1969. Non-agricultural union density was 14.7 percent in 1969, it fell to 8.8 percent by the mid-1980s, and returned to 14.7 percent after democratization.⁷⁴ Rural strikes, numbering over

a thousand by the early 1970s, dropped to single digits by the mid-1980s, where they remained into the 1990s. In the cities, however, strike activity expanded from roughly forty per year to over two hundred between 1985 and 1992.

Peasant unions were unwilling or unable to press their demands through strikes, while their urban counterparts managed to do this, at least at a reduced level, especially after the democratic transition. Organizational efforts continued—often led by the same leaders who had been so successful in the 1960s and 1970s. And outside resources were also sometimes provided from domestic NGOs and international sources. Nevertheless, in a context of social atomization and an unfavorable structure of political opportunities, rural leaders were unable to halt the persistent decline in organization.

CONCLUSIONS

Post-transition politics in the Brazilian and Chilean rural sectors have diverged dramatically. In Brazil, agrarian issues have taken center stage in national political debates and significant, mobilized peasant movements have emerged. In Chile, rural issues have lost their former political prominence, and what had been one of the most organized and mobilized peasantries on the continent lapsed into atomism and quiescence. We have sought to account for this transformation of rural politics with an explanation that focuses on state institutions and the structural linkages to societal actors. These linkages were largely unaffected by the transition to democracy, having been born in the developmental projects of the earlier military periods.

Military rulers in each country pursued an export-oriented economic strategy—a neoliberal one in Chile and a statist, developmental one in Brazil. The consequent changes to state institutions—particularly the expansion or contraction of the state's welfare role in the countryside, the regulation of land tenure, and the transformation of labor law—defined the resources and opportunities available to peasant leaders in important ways. The developmentalist state in Brazil provided the infrastructure that would undergird a very substantial expansion in peasant unionization and later, after corporatist controls were weakened, mobilization. The withdrawal of the state and its replacement by market forces in Chile removed key resources from an already-mobilized peasantry. The importance of such resources is highlighted by the rapidity with which the movement collapsed, and its continued decline after repression was ended. But the developmental model also affected the availability of urban allies and political resources for rural movements. The commitment to free markets by all major political actors in post-transition Chile dramatically narrowed the agenda of national politics in ways that excluded many formerly important agrarian issues. Bereft of issues to bring to rural electoral competition, reformist parties did not seek alliances with peasant organizations. The political costs of such alliances—attacking fundamental tenets of the neoliberal model—were seen as prohibitive. In Brazil, no such commitment existed. With the state

deeply involved in the economy, competing reformist parties had much to offer peasant voters. Agrarian issues took center stage as the left attempted to make inroads into a countryside long dominated by conservative, clientelistic elites.

Thus the constitution of state-society structural linkages is for us central to the understanding of mobilizational outcomes. In Chile from 1964 to 1973, the penetration of the state into the countryside at once increased its capacity to impose its will, but also served as a spur to mobilization from below that eventually pushed the state well beyond its initial goals. Under the military, state-society relations took on a more mutually deconstitutive character—as the state withdrew, it lost its former control over rural life (to the market), but also provoked the disarticulation of a formerly strong peasant movement. The story is similar in Brazil. When the state's linkages to rural society were weak before 1964, so was mobilization. But the state's efforts to impose control over the sector and expand formal citizenship ironically also opened up new incentives and resources, which led to an outpouring of popular mobilization during the democratic transition. While the new movement faced defeat over land reform in the 1988 Constituent Assembly, it did succeed in strengthening the progressive rural bureaucracy—INCRA—and accelerating the pace of land expropriation.

By highlighting the importance of state structures for the fate of popular movements, the institutional approach to popular mobilization we have developed in this paper advances our understanding of the broader relationship between democracy and strategies of development. In particular, it helps expose instances when state action strengthens civil society, supporting the formation of what some scholars have called “social capital,” and when it undermines that civil society by eroding local networks and the bases for solidarity. In a very important way, the type of developmental approach taken by the state bounds the level of organization and political participation possible for popular sector actors.

NOTES

1. There is an extensive literature that examines the ways in which the institutional organization of democracy shapes the stability and character of post-transition politics. See, for example, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Juan Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism.” *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1990), and contributions to Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Jorge Domínguez and Abraham Lowenthal, eds. *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

2. Important contributions that have taken similar starting points are Jonathan Fox, “The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico.” *World Politics* 46 (January 1994); and Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, “State Structures and the Possibilities for ‘Keynesian’ Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda

Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Charles Tilly, "Social Movements and National Politics," in Charles Bright and Susan Harding, eds., *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), and *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Tilly and Tarrow both emphasize the influence of the modern nation-state on collective action. In this paper we seek to advance this line of thought, examining how specific forms of nation-state are connected to different patterns of collective action.

3. Preservation of important state institutions during democratization is often conceived in the democratization literature as the "price" to be paid for transition. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 62–63.

4. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), e.g., 513, was an early critic of state presence in associational life. See also pluralists like Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 221, and Seymour Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review* 59 (February, 1993). Both scholars make the autonomy of groups in civil society from direct state influence a defining characteristic of a democratic polity. Others, as politically disparate as Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 238–39, and Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), Ch. 17, worried about increasing state control over economic activity and how it interfered with the autonomy of associational life. Some social capital theorists make similar arguments. See Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), and James Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, Harvard University Press, 1990). In another work Putnam does suggest the possibility of state and society reinforcing each other. Robert Putnam, "The Prosperous Community," *American Prospect* 13 (Spring 1993), 35–42. In Latin America the surge of social movement activity during the late 1970s and 1980s has been linked by some scholars to the crisis of the "developmental state"—the decline of the state opens up new political space where autonomous social groups can organize. See Arturo Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez, eds., *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

5. See for example Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Francis Hagopian, *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Judith Tandler, *Good Government in the Tropics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); and the essays on "state-society synergy" in *World Development* 24, no.6 (1996).

6. On this point, see Marcus J. Kurtz, "Free-Markets and Democratic Consolidation in Chile: The National Politics of Rural Transformation" *Politics & Society* 27, no. 2 (June 1999).

7. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 66. See also J. Craig Jenkins, "Social Movements, Political Representation, and the State: An Agenda and Comparative Framework," in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

Press, 1995), 16–17; Alfred Stepan, “State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America,” in Evans et al., eds., *Bringing the State Back In*, 339.

8. Peter B. Evans, “Government Action, Social Capital and Development: Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy,” *World Development* 24, no.6 (1996), 1119–32.

9. Examples can be found in the U.S. extension service’s role in the emergence of the Farm Bureau early in the twentieth century, discussed in Patrick H. Mooney and Theo J. Majka, *Farmers’ and Farm Workers’ Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995), 68–74. This was clearly the case in Chile between 1967 and 1973, when the government’s Union Extension and Outreach Fund (FEES) provided material resources to peasant organizations, and the agricultural extension service (INDAP) directly promoted unionization. More recent examples include the Brazilian extension service’s support for agricultural cooperatives in Brazil examined by Tendler, and the food councils of state agency CONASUPO in Mexico discussed by Fox. See Tendler, *Good Government in the Tropics*; Jonathan Fox, “How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Rural Mexico,” *World Development* 24, no. 6, 1089–103.

10. In 1980 for example an estimated seven hundred thousand small farmers took to the streets to protest government agricultural policy, and close to a quarter million agricultural workers in the sugar industry went on strike. CONTAG, *As Lutas Camponesas no Brasil—1980* (Rio de Janeiro: Marco Zero, 1981); Candido Grzybowski, *Caminhos e Descaminhos dos Movimentos Sociais* (Petropolis: Vozes, 1987).

11. Rural labor gained the right to organize unions in 1944, but the law was rendered a dead letter by rural elites. In the ensuing twenty years there was little or no enforcement of the labor code provisions that applied to rural labor. Neale J. Pearson, “Small Farmer and Rural Worker Pressure Groups in Brazil,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Florida, 1967), 63; Robert E. Price, “Rural Unionization in Brazil” (mimeo, University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, 1964).

12. Peter Flynn, *Brazil: A Political Analysis* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 245.

13. Price, “Rural Unionization” (1964), 69; Shepard Forman, “Disunity and Discontent: A Study of Peasant Political Movements in Brazil,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 3, no. 1 (1971), 9; IBGE, *Censo Agropecuário, 1960* (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE).

14. The level of mobilization was significant only in northeastern Brazil, and particularly in the state of Pernambuco, where around a quarter million people joined rural worker unions and peasant leagues. The important state of São Paulo, for example, had an average of seven strikes in the eleven years preceding the coup, and most stoppages were of a single plantation. Cynthia Hewitt, “Brazil: The Peasant Movement of Pernambuco, 1961–1964,” in Henry A. Landsberger, ed., *Latin American Peasant Movements* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 396–97; Clifford A. Welch, “Rural Labor and the Brazilian Revolution in São Paulo, 1930–1964” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, Duke University, 1990), 325.

15. See Hewitt, “Brazil: The Peasant Movement”; Welch, “Rural Labor and the Brazilian Revolution”; Clodomir Moraes, “Peasant Leagues in Brazil,” in R. Stavenhagen, ed., *Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America* (New York: Anchor Books, 1970); José de Souza Martins, *Os Camponeses e a Política no Brasil* (Petropolis: Vozes, 1981).

16. Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Thomas Skidmore, “Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937–71,” in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) and “The Political Economy of Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1967–1970,” in Philip O’Brien and Paul Cammack, eds., *Generals in Retreat: The Crisis of Military Rule in Latin America* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1985).

17. Brazil's profound regional variation meant that the project took on different faces in different regions: in the southern half of the country, it was the capitalization of production and creation of agro-industry; in the center-west and north, the incorporation of new land into cultivation; in the northeast, the structural transformation of the archaic and uncompetitive sugar industry. See Skidmore, "Politics and Economic Policy Making," 12–13, and "The Political Economy of Policy;" David Goodman, "Rural Economy and Society," in Edmar L. Bacha and Herbert S. Klein, eds., *Social Change in Brazil, 1945–1985: The Incomplete Transition* (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1986); Stephen Bunker, *Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the Failure of the Modern State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

18. Price, "Rural Unionization in Brazil," 11–12, 66; Shepard Forman, *The Brazilian Peasantry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 20. Social security, an important part of the corporatist regime, was legally extended to rural workers in a separate law later that same year but only became effective during the 1970s, under military rule.

19. It was funded in such a manner as to transfer income from urban to rural areas, and rural workers did not pay into the program directly. Ministério do Trabalho e Previdência Social, *Informativo do Funrural* (Brasília, Brazil, 1973), 2, 7–8, Table 1; Ruda Ricci, "CONTAG e a Crise de Representação no Campo (1979–1985)" (Master's thesis, Department of Political Science, UNICAMP, São Paulo, 1993), 84; and James Malloy, *The Politics of Social Security in Brazil* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981).

20. Joe Foweraker, *The Struggle for Land* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 84–87, 90.

21. Almost without exception these ended with labor courts imposing new collective contracts. Anthony W. Pereira, *The End of the Peasantry: The Rural Labor Movement in Northeast Brazil, 1961–1988* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 67–8.

22. The share of dues paying members was significantly lower. Novaes, "CONTAG e CUT" (1991), 178–79; Maybury-Lewis, *The Politics of the Possible*, Appendix A; Tavares, "CONTAG."

23. A reasonable estimate places the share of such unions at over two-thirds of all unions in 1979. Peter P. Houtzager, "State and Unions in the Transformation of the Brazilian Countryside, 1964–1979," *Latin American Research Review* 33, no. 2 (1998); Grzybowski, *Caminhos e Descaminhos*.

24. Agriculture's share of economically active persons dropped from fifty-four to thirty-two percent, but it nonetheless remained the largest employment sector in the 1980s.

25. The median income, which is an indicator more sensitive to inequality of income distribution, went from fifty-eight to ninety-two percent. These figures do underestimate income levels because the census does not include subsistence production (for own consumption) and people often underdeclare their true income. The number of poor households fell from seventy-three percent in 1970 to sixty percent in 1987. Poor households are those with incomes below twice the cost of a "basic food basket;" indigent households below one basket. Because of the extraordinary level of inequality to start off with, the share of poor remained far higher than in much of Latin America. Rodolfo Hoffmann, "Vinte Anos de Desigualdade e Pobreza na Agricultura Brasileira," *Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural* 30, no.2 (April/June 1992), 98; Rodolfo Hoffman, "Distribuição de Renda na Agricultura," in Antonio Salazar P. Brandão, ed., *Os Principais Problemas da Agricultura Brasileira: Análise e Sugestões* (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 1992), 22; ECLAC, *Social Panorama of Latin America, 1994 edition* (Santiago: ECLAC, November 1994), 140; *Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994 edition* (Santiago, Chile: CEPAL, 1995), 46.

26. IBGE, *Censo Agropecuário*, 1960 and 1980.

27. This claim is made by Leôncio Martins Rodrigues as well: "As tendências políticas na formação das centrais sindicais," in A. Boito Jr., ed., *O Sindicalismo Brasileiro nos Anos 80* (tao Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1991), 13–14.

28. Small farmers also mobilized around agricultural policy issues. In 1980, for example, an estimated seven hundred thousand soybean producers took to the streets in southern Brazil to protest a new export tax. In 1987 and 1988 tens of thousands of small farmers participated in impressive mass demonstrations and caravans to Brasilia to protest the government's economic policy.

29. It participated in the founding of the CGT in 1986, though it later abandoned that entity. At the founding congress, rural unions represented twenty-six percent of the total participating entities, and sixteen of twenty-two state-level federations affiliated to the CGT. Longtime president of the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers, José Francisco da Silva, became the vice-president of the CGT.

30. The peasant-worker alliance was an important and integral part of the founding logic of both the party and labor central, and both embraced various agrarian issues, such as radical agrarian reform (under the control of the workers), agricultural policy favoring small farmers, and parity in social benefits with urban workers. The Workers' Party was formed in 1979, the CUT in 1983.

31. In the labor entity's three national congresses during the 1980s, rural leaders represented over a third of the delegates. The vice-president of CUT has been a rural unionist from its founding in 1983 up until 1997. See Ricardo Antunes, *O Novo Sindicalismo* (São Paulo: Pontes, 1995).

32. João Pedro Stédile, ed., *A Reforma Agrária e a Luta do MST* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1997); Zander Navarro, "Democracy, Citizenship and Representation: Rural Social Movements in Southern Brazil," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 13, no. 2 (1994), 129–54.

33. Landowners organized their own popular movement, the UDR (União Democrática Ruralista), and a lobby in Congress called the Frente Ampla, which succeeded in blocking the government's national agrarian reform plan.

34. Sérgio Leite, "Assentamentos Rurais no Brasil: Impactos, Dimensões, e Significados," in João Pedro Stédile, ed., *A Reforma Agrária e a Luta do MST* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1997), 158–59.

35. To force state intervention, strikes aimed to paralyze entire agricultural sectors (such as sugar and orange production) in a region, rather than specific employers. Unions in several states developed their own forms of wage campaigns, with varying degrees of militancy and compliance with the corporatist legal requirements.

36. Ministério do Trabalho, UFRJ, *O Mercado de Trabalho Brasileiro: Estrutura e Conjuntura* (Brasília: MTb, 1987).

37. As a result, by the 1990s rural workers in over half-a dozen states had some form of rural collective contract; the number of agricultural workers with labor contracts (*carteira assinada*) reached 1.3 million, double that of 1979 (though still only twenty-six percent agricultural wage laborers). IBGE, *Anuário Estatístico, 1991* (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1991).

38. Social welfare and health care were the two principle issues around which the powerful Agricultural Workers' Federation of Rio Grande do Sul (FETAG-RS), in Brazil's southern most state, mobilized. Union involvement declined significantly over the course of the 1980s as a result of the unification of rural and urban welfare systems.

39. Guilherme da Costa Delgado, "Agricultural Familiar e Política Agrícola no Brasil" (Working Document, IPEA, Rio de Janeiro, June 1994), 19. IBGE, *Anuário Estatístico, 1994* (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1994).

40. Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 211.

41. Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 13, points out that Chile was at the time the single most statist economy in the hemisphere, with the exception of Cuba.

42. The Peasant Unionization Law replaced the earlier peasant labor law, whose terms were so restrictive as to effectively block any peasant unionization. Cristóbal Kay, "Political Economy, Class Alliances, and Agrarian Change in Chile," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 8, no. 4 (1981).

43. Solon Barraclough and Almino Affonso, "Diagnóstico de la reforma agraria chilena (noviembre 1970–junio 1972)," *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* 16 (April 1973), 73, makes it clear that the promotion of peasant organization was a crucial element of the Allende administration's political strategy.

44. Loveman, *Chile*, 280.

45. On the importance of peasants to political competition in the 1960s, see Timothy Scully, *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Chile* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 108; James Petras, *Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), Chapter 7, especially 256–58.

46. See Loveman, *Chile*, 280; and Emilio Klein, "Tipos de dependencia y obreros agrícolas en Chile," *Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe* 16 (June, 1974).

47. Proportion of agricultural wage-workers enrolled in a peasant labor union. Calculated as a percentage of the economically active population in agriculture.

48. Oficina de Planificación Nacional [ODEPLAN], *Chilean Economic and Social Development, 1973–1979* (Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Calderón y Cía., 1979), 33–35.

49. See Oficina de Estudios y Políticas Agrarias [ODEPA]. *Síntesis agro-regional* (Santiago, Chile: Ministerio de Agricultura, 1992).

50. Arturo León, "Urban Poverty in Chile: Its Extent and Diversity." Working Paper #8, Democracy and Social Policy Series. Trans. Judy Lawton (Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute, 1994), 10–11.

51. Departamento de Economía Agraria [DEA], *Panorama económico de la agricultura* (Santiago, Chile: Departamento de Economía Agraria. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 1980), 25. Roughly 51.6 percent was distributed as peasant parcels, with the remainder divided roughly equally between returns to landlords and auctions.

52. Marín, *Las tomas*.

53. Instituto de Capacitación e Investigación en Reforma Agraria [ICIRA], *Análisis de la situación de los asignatarios de tierras a junio de 1978* (Santiago, Chile: Ministerio de Agricultura, 1979), 116.

54. Cereceda and Dahse, *Dos décadas*, 117.

55. *Código de Trabajo de 1992*, Libro III, Artículo 5.

56. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. But given the climatic and technological characteristics of Chilean agriculture, there is widespread consensus that substantially more seasonal labor than permanent (year-round) is employed.

57. Lovell Jarvis, *Chilean Agriculture*, 89, suggests that fifteen percent would be a realistic unemployment rate for the agricultural sector. Carlotta Olavarría, *La asignación de tierras en Chile (1973–1976), sus efectos en el empleo agrícola* (Santiago, Chile: PREALC, 1978), 14, points to a typical combined level of un- and under-employment of between twenty and thirty-seven percent. Indeed, the mass expulsion of coop members during the counterreform probably renders these very conservative estimates.

58. *Ibid.*, 32.

59. This includes residing with friends or relatives who were able to obtain a parcel, work in the minimum employment program, retirement, open unemployment, etc. See ICIRA, *Análisis*, 22.

60. Before the coup, roughly twice as many peasants were associated with leftist unions as with centrist ones.

61. The logic of finance and resource allocation virtually required affiliation to a national federation or confederation in the 1967–1973 period. Unpublished data from the Ministry of Labor, 1992.

62. For an example, see Loveman, *Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919–1973* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press); such political mediation is exemplified by the actions of Deputy Andrés Aylwin, *Carta informe sobre experiencias sindicales campesinas* (Santiago, Chile: Cámara de Diputados, 1967).

63. Pilar Vergara, “Market Economy, Social Welfare, and Democratic Consolidation in Chile,” in William Smith, Carlos Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra, eds., *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 244.

64. Daniel Rodríguez and Sylvia Venegas, *De praderas a parronales: Un estudio sobre estructura agraria y mercado laboral en el valle de Aconcagua* (Santiago, Chile: GEA, 1989), 151–52.

65. *Código de Trabajo 1992*, Título V, Art. 3.

66. Sylvia Venegas, *Family Production in Rural Chile: A Socio-Demographic Study of Agrarian Changes in the Aconcagua Valley, 1930–1986* (Ph. D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Texas at Austin, 1987), Ch. 12.

67. See Kenneth Roberts, “From the Barricades to the Ballot Box: Redemocratization and Political Realignment in the Chilean Left,” *Politics and Society* 23, no. 4 (December 1995).

68. See Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksic, “Introduction: Transformation and Transition in Chile, 1982–1990,” in Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksic, ed., *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 15.

69. The complete analysis of the crisis of the peasantry and its political demands as expressed by the unions can be found in Comisión Nacional Campesina [CNC], *Renace la esperanza democrática en el campo* (Santiago, Chile: CNC, 1990), 13–17.

70. See an interview conducted by peasant union leaders with the Minister, transcribed in *Tierra: La revista del trabajador del campo* (1990), 7–11.

71. See *Tierra* IX, no. 2 (May–June 1991), 4–7.

72. *Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Expropiaciones*, No. 18.932, February 10, 1990. See especially Title IV, Articles 16–19.

73. Luís Salinas, *Trayectoria de la organización sindical campesina* (Santiago, Chile: AGRA Ltda, 1985).

74. For 1969 see Kay, “Agrarian Reformism,” 424. For the mid-1980s, calculated from Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social, *Estadísticas de la negociación colectiva* (Years 1992, 1991, 1990, and 1989) (Santiago, Chile: unpublished data). Agricultural labor force data (used in calculating union density) were taken from ODEPA, *Síntesis*, and Banco Central de Chile, *Indicadores económicos y sociales regionales* (Santiago, Chile: Banco Central de Chile, 1991).