

politics, nonetheless, agreed that the key was that in contrast to prior democratic thrusts that threatened a Jacobin outcome and thus mobilized a strong rightist backlash and polarized French politics, the Third Republic "was conservative—the regime that divides us the least!"⁷¹

This is something that Latin Americans learned late in the twentieth century. Not justice and revenge but merciful healing and a limit on the mistreatment of losers—even monsters—is a political prerequisite of stable democracy, which requires reconciliation and political peace.⁷² A study of the East Asian experience might have helped politicians and analysts learn the virtues of a grand coalition earlier. Instead, the myth of clashing interests in a political market place where the "outs" defeat the "ins" and the "ins" and "outs" are continually changing place was misunderstood as the essence of democracy, while Japan and its emulators were dismissed and ignored as anomalies.

Even in the West, the importance of conceiving the consolidation of democracy as a matter of consensus building (not conflict among individuals, groups, and articulated interests) is making a dent, especially after the smooth and successful transition to democracy in Spain during which the king played such an obviously important role. The building of consensus from within elites is crucial to a peaceful and strong institutionalization of democracy. Since all analysts supposedly learned that lesson in watching the tragic fate of Weimar Germany, they should not have to relearn it in the possible disintegration (or integration by an iron fist) of Leninist and post-Leninist states in the 1990s.

Hence Japan's democratization via a grand conservative coalition reflects not Japanese uniqueness but a rich case study to use in rethinking democratic consolidation. This book finds in East Asia's experience general lessons for democratization.

Democracy is not the antithesis of a strong state. Democracy actually is enhanced by effective state institutions. The state should be analyzed by disaggregating and studying its diverse institutions in order to comprehend what kind of state institutions help or hinder democratization. A professional civil service helps; administration by politically loyal cronies hurts. Financial mechanisms that promote competitive efficiency help; subsidizing the enterprises of political cronies hurts. A market orientation helps; negating the market hurts. Policies of social equity help; polarization undermines democratization.

This does not mean that East Asia is truth embodied. Because citizens have notions of equity and because the grand conservative coalition has Cronyist tendencies, wealth, status, and power distribution may come to seem somewhat arbitrary and unjust to a citizenry concerned with rules of the game and equity if the initial conservative consensus is not open to accommodating diverse publics. Democratization requires ever more inclusion and

can be undermined by narrow, selfish money grubbing. Even with large annual wage increases for workers in late-1980s Korea, the vulgar consumption of the newly rich seemed arrogant and left most Koreans feeling that an extreme injustice was occurring. In wartime situations, citizens can be asked to share a sacrifice. But if the friends of the regime continue to luxuriate, they will seem frauds and the legitimization of the rulers will be undermined. In addition, Korea changed its merit exam system three times. It looked like cronyism. If system fairness is not settled and if jobs do not exist in harmony with educated skills, alienated intellectuals can become maximalist challengers to the regime, as happened in Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, despite extraordinarily rapid economic growth.

A similar combination of rapid economic growth with pervasive political dishonesty delegitimizes China's dictatorship in the 1990s and keeps open the possibility of another democratic breakthrough. The East Asian experience does not support the conventional wisdom about socioeconomic development delivering an easy transition from wealth to democracy. Equity is decisive.

Leninist state power holders cannot readily reform the institutions of the state to promote growth with equity. Breakthrough from a status-based command system "always appears deplorable to a majority of those who witness it . . . [who then] dislike and distrust . . . monied men who enriched themselves by constraining . . . [all] to conform to the dictates of the market."⁷³ A mobilizable antimarket, anti-democratic poison, brewed as a Leninist potion, makes most helpful financial facilitation by international actors who soften the traumatic pains of a democratic transition. Consequently, as Arase and Sato argue in this volume, financially endowed Japan can do much for the democratic cause in Asia.

In China, or other Leninist states, economically effective institutions have to be built, but the regime cannot build them without undermining the bases of its own power; therefore, farmers are not allowed to own, sell, or rent land and gargantuan money-losing state enterprises that devour the people's wealth but provide sinecures for networks beholden to power holders are maintained too long. Preventing thorough economic reforms because of political limits, as occurred from the 1950s in Hungary and Yugoslavia, may eventually produce both economic and political crises for China's Leninist regime. For a period starting in the 1950s in Hungary and Yugoslavia, economic growth was possible, as in post-Mao China, but eventually rigid, skewed, and unaccountable Leninist systems blocked further equitable progress.

Leninist China finds it impossible to implement reforms similar to those that Korea carried out in the 1960s. The military dictators in Korea purged the corrupt, crony bureaucracy of Syngman Rhee and built a technocratic civil service. They strengthened market-oriented financial systems that

rewarded economic winners, and they facilitated a rural dynamism of physically mobile, market-oriented peasant households. But beneficiaries of the Leninist power system in China are frightened to abandon the *nomesklaitura* (appointments at each level based on secret ties of personal loyalty), the soft-budget financing of money-losing state enterprises, and the control of physical mobility within the capacity of secret police power. Democratization away from Leninist contradictions may therefore take a most painful path.

Different kinds of states take different political paths in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. The East Asian, non-Leninist dictatorships had wealth-generating financial systems and technocratic civil services, and, in addition, were attached to rural societies of dynamic peasant households rather than to Leninist collectives or plantation latifundia. The democratic consolidation of Latin American states, where suitable financial, tax, administrative, and landholding systems are yet to be created, may therefore be more difficult than that of the transition in East Asia. This would suggest that the obstacles to democratization in Latin America are not, as some would have it, Catholic culture (versus northwest Europe's Protestant culture)⁷⁴ but institutional arrangements that any nation can build if it has the political will. A generalizable approach is more apt to provide useful policy prescriptions for democratization than is a culturally particularistic approach.

Cultural explanations seem persuasive at their moment of creation because they utilize the common prejudices of the time. But rationalizations of the superficially obvious will one day seem patently wrong, as when the democratization of Catholic countries explodes the thesis that only Protestants can democratize. By 1990 with Catholic Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil democratic, a Chinese, jealous of democratization in Catholic Poland, "asks: 'if the Poles can, why can't we.'" Political psychology offers an answer in China's lack of a nationally united church, making "Chinese people . . . different from the Poles. The Chinese lack the spirit of solidarity."⁷⁵ Culturalists thus invoke Catholicism as both facilitating and obstructing democratization, thereby yet again revealing the weakness of cultural explanations.

That Chinese democrats blame Chinese culture for the prolonged persistence of tyranny is not peculiarly Chinese. In mid-nineteenth-century France, after defeats of the democratic breakthroughs of 1789, 1830, and 1848, as mentioned in the Introduction, a similar cultural view prevailed. Napoleon Bonaparte concluded that his despotic "power derived in part from the history of France and the habits of the nation," its "absolutist tradition." Tocqueville, trying to understand how the *ancien régime's* principle of state centralization grew stronger in the French Revolution, concluded that the failure of liberty "revealed the permanence and prevalence of a despotic tradition in French public life." Yes, permanence. As China, the West too could wrongly see itself as inherently undemocratic. Chateaubriand's

epitaph for Napoleon was, "Daily experience makes plain that the French are instinctively attracted to power. They have no use for liberty."⁷⁶ In contrast, John Stuart Mill, who doubted theories of fixed natures, whether by gender, class, or nation, mocked the analysts "who think the French incapable of free government."⁷⁷

As liberty has come to the purportedly inherently, culturally, historically absolutist French, so it can come to the Chinese, or to any people. Democratization is not blocked by culture. Japan rapidly democratized after World War II even while authoritarian Japanese culture changed glacially. Consequently, this volume takes a political approach to democratization, challenging cultural approaches and arguing that political action is decisive and that the East Asian political experience is of global moment.

The process of democratization in Japan through a grand conservative coalition is generally illuminating. But that broad consensus did not emanate from Japanese culture. When the U.S. occupation tried to democratize militarist Japan at the end of World War II, the democratizers had to decide on how to treat the old elites contaminated by so many crimes in the eyes of democratic sufferers and challengers. Justice seemed to require a large purge. But then the imperatives of stability took over and the purge of the many gave way to the inclusion of most in a wide elite coalition. Japan may thereby have avoided the vicissitudes that threatened death to French democracy for a century after its revolution. If Japan's grand conservative coalition actually has much to teach about the institutionalization of democracy or a linkage of a legitimate polity to economic growth, then it is far from silly, and in no way mysterious, that shrewd politicians involved with democratization in Korea and Taiwan would try to emulate the post-World War II political successes of Japan, or that, subsequently, leaders in Moscow, Hanoi, and Beijing would likewise locate in Korea or Japan similar virtues worth emulating.

Generalizing the achievement of East Asia for democracy and development promises emancipatory observations and projects hidden by Occidentalism. In consolidating democracy, wise politics is decisive. Former Argentine President Raul Alfonsín, from the perspective of stable democratization, was right in 1989 when he argued that "economic reform before political reform . . . has never succeeded."⁷⁸ Politics is primary. Chile and Taiwan, therefore, should be comprehended as countries in which democratization was made possible not by economic growth but by political struggles resulting in a compromise pact in which anti-democratic intransigents among elites and challengers began to be marginalized. That political peripheralization took centuries in France, despite socioeconomic indicators far in advance of numerous other societies. Politics, as with the anti-democratic force in France, is not an immediate reflection of some deeper economic reality. Democracy is not determined by economic preconditions.

Democratizers of a despotic state must prevail in political combat. This is

the first volume to collect scholarly results focusing on the political combat of East Asian democratization and then to comprehend the results in terms of general theory, the politics of the struggle to consolidate democracy. Of course, wise tactics do not guarantee democratic victory. The persistent charismatic authority of China's first-generation ruling group that emerged in 1949 from a popularly experienced nationalist conquest of dictatorial power is a political fact. The staying power of the dictatorial regime in China, of Kim Il Sung in North Korea, or of Fidel Castro in Cuba is readily explained by ordinary and temporary political factors, such as, in this case, the strength of charismatic authority. Explanations based on cultural givens are disputed throughout this volume.

The East Asian struggle to consolidate a democratic transition focuses on a politics of a broad conservative coalition and on political discourse that permits a broad national community, with democratic system loyalty (or true neutral apoliticality), from the state organs of coercion. Democratization is a political project. In South Korea, polarized political forces had great difficulty in building a broad national democratic consensus. As with competing Cold War military budgets, the anti-democratic intransigents bred and fed on each other. To break the impasse is a political project, a difficult and prolonged one, but a doable one.

This is the case also in Taiwan, where the legitimation of a quest for a Taiwanese identity can foster a narrow and exclusive communal identity. Cultural chauvinism can injure the inclusive democratic project. That, however, is also a global tendency, one that threatens democrats in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union where local chauvinists stigmatize others as foreigners. Given the passions of communalist and patriotic identities, politics is a precarious art in which social scientific generalizations do not easily translate into implementable political tactics.

Still, the workable policies explored in the following chapters offer action clues for political practitioners. Democratization in East Asia is a generalizable experience.

Since most people on the planet are Asian, since earth-shocking global events such as World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War all exploded in Asia, and since East Asia has been the most dynamic economic region on the earth since World War II, surely any general social theory that does not cover this crucial realm that embodies so much of what is central to twentieth-century experience would not be taken seriously.

And yet in 1990, a most brilliant sociologist concludes an essay, a shrewd survey of democracy, by ignoring East Asia, although ending with the afterthought that the essay's generalizations "must be necessarily tempered in light of such obvious counter cases as Taiwan, Republic of Korea, and Japan."⁷⁹ In contrast, the authors in this book contend that East Asia is central and cannot be peripheralized as "counter cases."

Yet so little has the weight of East Asian experience influenced social science theorists that another astute analyst of freedom, with no self-consciousness of the chauvinism involved in bracketing Japan from his set of studies, declared, "It is a truism that democracy in Japan exists within a cultural framework that is hard for the outsider to penetrate."⁸⁰ How can East Asia, an area so central to global developments, be so blithely dismissed by an ethical and sharp researcher as too mysterious to comprehend?

The scholarly works in this volume offer an important corrective to Western dismissals of East Asia's relevance. The thinking that informs this book originates in inclusive hypotheses, not merely that theory must include this Asia life world to be valid but that hypotheses premised on East Asian experience can be better policy guides to the consolidation of democracy than may be the self-understandings of Occidentalists. As one should dismiss proud Japanese who proclaim that Japan has won the economic game because it is Japan, inimitably Japan, culturally unique, likewise, one should be suspicious of theories insisting that the West created democracy because the West is singularly the West, culturally unique.⁸¹ Democracy, as this volume, is for all humanity.

Notes

1. Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 223.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 188. On the surface, Di Palma treated all the defeated Axis powers of World War II as exceptions to the general political rules for crafting a democracy. But, in fact, Italy is included in these rules, as Japan is not. According to Di Palma, the Communist Party facilitated the consolidation of democracy in Italy. It "was the top leadership of the Communist Party that convinced cadres and other political parties to form a wartime national unity government that included a monarchalist compromised by fascism" (p. 59). Di Palma made no similar inquiry into consensus building that included the Left in Japan. Masanori Nakamura's chapter in this volume offers that comparative inquiry.
3. Ian Buruma, "The Pax Axis," *New York Review*, (April 23, 1991): 25-39.
4. *Fair Eastern Economic Review* (November 1, 1990): 17. In fact, China is far less Confucian than South Korea.
5. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 4 (fall 1990): 82.
6. Anthony Quinton, "Idealists Against the Jews," *New York Review* (November 7, 1991): 38. See Paul L. Rose, *Revolutionary Antisemitism in Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
7. T. J. Pempel, ed., *Uncommon Democracies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. vii, 24, 32.
8. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 191.

9. For a perspective on postwar Japan as "totalitarian state capitalism" "reconstructed much as under the fascist regime," see Noam Chomsky, *Detering Democracy* (New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 243-246.
10. Free elections in Guatemala and El Salvador in the 1970s and 1980s failed to do that.
11. Joseph Plath, *Eleanor: The Years Alone* (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 226.
12. See Chapter 2 in this volume.
13. Hideo Otake, "Defense Controversies and One-Party Dominance," in T. J. Pempel, ed., *Uncommon Democracies*, pp. 147, 158.
14. Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies*, pp. 342, 344.
15. Christopher Neck, *Actual* (April 1990); *World Journal* (April 6, 1990), p. 33.
16. Bruce Cummings, "The Revolution of '89 in West and East," in Daniel Chirot, ed., *The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), p. 118.
17. See the final chapter in this volume.
18. See Chapter 5 in this volume.
19. Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies*, p. 85.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
21. George Lichtheim, "Varieties of Revolutionary Experience," *Partisan Review* (summer 1964): 434. These "fundamental facts" are not obvious to scholars who actually find an intolerant Holland excluding Catholics from the rights of citizens, a Holland run by "narrow aristocratic oligarchies . . . [that] developed toward democracy only after Napoleonic occupation." Jack Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 483. Also, in Germany after 1928, it was north German Protestant peasants who were among the first to back Hitler while Catholic-identified parties (as socialist parties) opposed Hitler's election.
22. David B. Davis, *Revolutions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 45.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
24. James McPherson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press), 1991.
25. George Wiegell, "Catholicism and Democracy," in Brad Robert, ed., *The New Democracies* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), p. 31. The obvious contribution of Catholics to democracy has led some theorists to tout Christianity instead of Protestantism as the fount of democratization, forgetting prior theories that found authoritarian Catholic culture inherently anti-democratic. Actually, there is a politics within the church. Some of the political forces remain anti-democratic.
26. Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution," *Journal of Politics* 20 (1958): 5-43. This theory is applied to China in Edward Friedman, "Was Mao Zedong a Revolutionary?" in Bih-jaw Lin, ed., *The Aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis in Mainland China* (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 39-66.
27. Such action had roots in the prior reportorial heroism of Deng Tuo, Wang Ruoshui, and Liu Binyan and in films such as *Yellow Earth* and *River Elegy*.
28. Roger V. Des Forges, "Democracy in China," in Roger V. Des Forges, ed.,

China: The Crisis of 1989 (Buffalo: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 21-52.

29. Eli Sagan, *The Honey and the Hemlock: Democracy and Paranoia in Ancient Athens and Modern America* (New York: Basic Books, 1991), pp. 81, 82.
30. This theory and policy prescription are brilliantly argued in Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
31. Catholic Poles cite one of the longest historical traditions of opposition to tyranny. Africans point to ancient acephalous communities. Democratic Muslims remind Europeans how much Islam contributed to the European emergence. See Fatima Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1992).
32. At the time of the European breakthroughs to democratic republicanism, Athens was seen as a negative instance of cyclical decline into chaos and disorder facilitated by unvirtuous, unrestrained greed.
33. Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, *After the Nightmare* (New York: Knopf, 1986), p. 93, quoting He Weiliang.
34. Some scholars see themselves as keepers of the secret that the 1989 Chinese democracy movement was replete with nondemocratic forms of organization. Not wanting to aid the perpetrators of the June 4, 1989 Beijing massacre, the analysts keep silent, wrongly believing that the secret proves Chinese ignorant of and unready for democracy. Yet, in functioning democracies, as elitist theorists such as Mosca and Michels pointed out at the start of the twentieth century, parties, conventions, and nominating processes are virtually never democratic.
35. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
36. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.
37. M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 42ff.
38. Kenneth Maxwell, "Spain's Transition to Democracy," in Nils Wessell, ed., *The New Europe* 38, no. 1 (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1991).
39. See Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaulman, eds., *Debt and Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1989).
40. Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no. 2 (summer 1984): 217, 218. Italics added.
41. Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Larry Diamond, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. xix.
42. How far each actual democracy falls short of this goal should, in no small part, define its political agenda and its political health.
43. Ira J. Cohen, "The Underemphasis on Democracy in Marx and Weber," in Robert J. Antonio and Ronald M. Glassman, eds., *A Weber-Marx Dialogue* (Manttanville: Kansas State University Press, 1985), pp. 274-295.
44. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.
45. Koji Taira, "Japan's Modern Economic Growth: Capitalist Development Under Absolutism," in Harry Wray and Hillary Conroy, eds., *Japan Examined* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 34-41; Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance," in Frederick Deyo, ed., *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp.

136-164. The social science literature on whether dictatorial or democratic states better facilitate economic development is inconclusive.

46. Even militarist Japan's economy was one of flexible production; therefore, in and of itself, flexible production does not create democracy. Democracy is not an automatic consequence of some economic moment; it must be won politically.

47. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Out of Africa: Topologies of Nativism," in Dominick LaCapra, ed., *The Bounds of Race: Perspectives on Hegemony and Resistance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 134-163.

48. Rey Chow, "Violence in the Other Country," *Radical America* 22, no. 4 (1989): 29.

49. Lillian Robinson, "What Culture Should Mean?" *The Nation* (September 25, 1989): 319, 320.

50. Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); Kwame Anthony Appiah, *In My Father's House* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

51. The cultural thesis still undergirds Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

52. Forgetting that most Americans when asked to sign the Bill of Rights pushed it away as foreign and subversive, analysts wrongly concluded that China's 1989 democracy movement had to fail because the people did not understand the meaning of democracy.

53. Michael Lindsay, "The Ideology of Chinese Communism," in George Hicks, ed., *The Broken Mirror* (Chicago: St. James Press, 1990), p. 228.

54. Asai Morofumi, "Japan's China Policy—A Pattern of Consistency," in Hicks, ed., *The Broken Mirror*, p. 306.

55. For a rejoinder, see Andrew Nathan, *China's Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

56. See Sun Kwang-zhe, "An Evaluation of the Chinese Theory that the People Are the Foundation of the State," *A Collection of Social Essays from Taiwan University* 36 (March 1988): 401-438, in Chinese.

57. Pang Pang (pseud.), *A Biography of Hu Yaobang* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Center for Chinese Studies, 1989), pp. 34, 59.

58. See Fang Lizhi, *Bringing down the Great Wall* (New York: Knopf, 1991).

59. Janos Kis, "Poland and Hungary in Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 1 (winter 1990): 76.

60. Vladimir Bukovsky, "Squaring the Soviet Circle," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 1 (winter 1990): 87.

61. See Crane Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution*, rev. ed. (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952).

62. Thomas Sowell, *Marxism* (New York: William Morrow, 1985), pp. 205-206.

63. Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 29.

64. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*.

65. Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies*.

66. Keith Michael Baker and Steven Laurence Kaplan, "Introduction" to Alan Forrest, *Soldiers of the French Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p. xviii.

67. Bernard Bailyn, *Faces of Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1990), p. 204.

68. Jerry Fresia, *Toward An American Revolution: Exposing the Constitution and Other Illusions* (Boston: South End Press, 1990). Fall 1990 South End Press publicity notice.

69. Jon Elster, "The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform," Working Paper, Conference on Constitutionalism and the Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, Hungary, June 18-20, 1990, p. 7.

70. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Era of the Marcsilles* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p. 47.

71. Emmet Kennedy, *A Cultural History of the French Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 377.

72. Lawrence Weschler, *A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers* (New York: Penguin, 1990).

73. William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 115.

74. Lawrence Harrison, *Under Development Is Only a State of Mind* (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1985).

75. Cheng Tiejun, "Critical Issues Facing the Overseas Chinese Democratic Movement," in Jia Hao, ed., *The Democracy Movement of 1989 and China's Future* (Washington: The Washington Center for Chinese Studies, 1990), p. 168.

76. Francois Furet and Mona Olouf, eds., *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 280, 1022, 285.

77. John Stuart Mill, "The subjection of Woman," in John Stuart Mill, *Three Essays* (London: Oxford University Press [1869], 1975) ch. 1.

78. Elster, "Necessity and Impossibility," p. 3.

79. Larry Sinowy and Alex Inkeles, "The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality," in Alex Inkeles, ed., *On Measuring Democracy* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. 152.

80. Raymond Duncan Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," in Inkeles, ed., *On Measuring Democracy*, p. 37. In that volume, the study by Ted Gurr et al. (pp. 69-104) on "The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy and State Since 1800" ignores Asia.

81. Yet in Gurr, loc. cit., cultural categories are decisive. English-speaking and Protestant countries are found conducive to democracy, although Latin American Catholic nations, including Portugal and Spain, are said not to be conducive to coherent democracy.