

Political Science 711
Winter, 2003

Professor Caldeira
2140 Derby Hall
Caldeira.1@osu.edu

SEMINAR ON ORGANIZED INTEREST GROUPS

Organized interests in great diversity and numbers--unions; business, professional, and trade associations; citizen groups; public interest law firms; political action committees; peak associations; non-profits; think tanks; corporations; governments at the local, state, and national level--play major roles in the shaping of American politics and policy-making. These "organized interests," or "interest groups" in the more common parlance, take part in the mobilization of various slices of elite and mass publics and in virtually every political institution and facet of government. Tocqueville in **Democracy in America** had it right when he described Americans as a nation of joiners and emphasized the remarkable associational capacity of the United States.

For reading in this course, I assemble a packet of materials from journals and books. The packet of readings should be ready very soon. I will order the following from SBX in short order--or better yet, you can order and purchase them less expensively on Amazon or ABE--for later in the course:

- Goldstein, Kenneth M. 1999. **Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America**. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kollman, Kenneth. 1998. **Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies**. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gerber, Elizabeth. 1999. **The Populist Paradox**. Princeton University Press.

Participants in this seminar who have no prior acquaintance with the literature on interest groups might read Jeffrey Berry's **The Interest Group Society**, John R. Wright's **Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence** or Scott Ainsworth's **Analyzing Interest Groups: Group Influence on People and Policies** as preludes to and preparation for our discussions in this seminar. They are excellent introductions for those who have had no contact with materials on interest groups

I expect several things from you in this seminar. First, I expect you to attend every meeting and to come prepared to engage in discussion, to pose questions, and to answer questions. Minimally, you should go through the assigned readings; and preferably, examine some of the suggested entries. Second, for each meeting, you should prepare a short summary, no longer than a page, of the readings, in which you note the research question or questions, why it or they are important, the author's theoretical perspective, the hypotheses, and the results. You should view these short assignments as a means of gathering your thoughts and of preparing for discussion. Third, for our final class, prepare a five-seven page proposal for an original paper on some aspect of interest groups. Our weekly readings and your summaries and discussion of them ought, over the course of the term, to give you a good sense of what makes an interesting and important research question. This final exercise is an opportunity for you to display what you have learned.

In computing your final grade, I will use the following weights: participation in class (twenty percent), summaries (forty percent), and research paper (forty percent). Please come to every seminar prepared, submit all assignments on time, pursue your final paper with all of

the diligence and thoroughness we have a right to expect from any scholar.

I hope you will at some time in the quarter familiarize yourself with some of the major resources in the study of interest groups. Several journals and newspapers cover the workings of interest groups in some detail. In this group I include **National Journal**, **Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report**, and **The Legal Times of Washington**. For the activities of organized interests in Congress, see Congressional Information Service's summaries of hearings and testimony, some in hardback and others on microfiche. There are many good sources on the expenditures of political action committees; and, of course, the Federal Election Commission assembles tapes of all contributions and expenditures. Newsletters and direct mail from interest groups provide important evidence on their activities and messages; some libraries stock some of the better known newsletters, but much of this sort of information resides in archives in scattered places.

On January 9th, the first full meeting, we will take up and begin to discuss the readings under Section II.

I. The Study of Interest Groups: Scope of the Subfield (for your information; read on your own)

How have political scientists defined interest groups? What are the costs and the benefits of the various ways of conceptualizing interest groups? Why did political scientists largely ignore interest groups for long? And why the recent focus of attention on the study of interest groups? What are the weaknesses in interest groups as a focus of study? What are the most profitable avenues of inquiry? The least fruitful? What may we say with confidence about interest groups? In which areas do we least understand the role and influence of interest groups?

Required reading

- Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leech. 1998. *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Loomis, Burdette, and Allan J. Cigler. 1998. Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics. In Allan J. Cigler and Burdette Loomis (eds.), *Interest Groups Politics*. 5th edition. Washington: CQ Press, 1995. Pp. 1-35.
- Cigler, Allan J. 1991. Interest groups: A subfield in search of an identity. In William J. Crotty (ed.), *Political Science: Looking to the Future*. Volume 4. Pp. 99-135. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Salisbury, Robert H. 1975. Interest groups. In Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *The Handbook of Political Science*. Volume 4. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Latham, Earl. 1952. The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory. *American Political Science Review* 46:376-397.
- Greenstone, J. David. 1975. Group theories. In Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *The Handbook of Political Science*. Volume 4. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Moe, Terry M. 1981. Toward a broader view of interest groups. *Journal of Politics* 43:531-543.
- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Bentley, Arthur F. 1908. *The Process of Government*. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press.

Latham, Earl. 1952. *The Group Basis of Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

II. The Formation and Maintenance of Interest Groups, I

How do organized interests come into being? Why do individuals join organizations? In response to social and economic disturbances? At the behest of political entrepreneurs? Does the existence of governmental programs encourage the growth of interest groups? Is collective action possible in the absence of coercion? Can collective action occur in the absence of selective incentives? Do different kinds of organizations use different means to resolve the problem of collective action? Have the mechanisms for mustering collective action changed over time? The following required readings offer some classic responses to these and related questions.

Required readings

Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process*. Pp. 45-108. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1, 3, 7.

Salisbury, Robert H. 1969. An exchange theory of interest groups. *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13:1-32.

Clark, Peter B., and James Q. Wilson. 1961. Incentive systems: a theory of organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6:129-166.

Walker, Jack L. 1983. The origins and maintenance of interest groups in America. *American Political Science Review* 77:390-406.

Hansen, John Mark. 1985. The political economy of group membership. *American Political Science Review* 79:79-96.

Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. 1995. The population ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the natural regulation of interest group numbers in the American states. *American Journal of Political Science* 39:1-29.

Skocpol, Theda, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson. 2000. A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Volunteerism in the United States. *American Political Science Review* 94:527-546.

Crowley, Jocelyn Elise Crowley, and Theda Skocpol. 2001. The Rush to Organize: Explaining Associational Formation in the United States, 1860s-1920s. *American Journal of Political Science* 45:813-829.

Ainsworth, Scott H., and John Anthony Maltese. 1996. National Grange Influence on the supreme Court Confirmation of Stanley Matthews. *Social Science History* 20:41-62.

Ainsworth, Scott H. 1995. Electoral Strength and the Emergence of Group Influence in the Late 1800s: The Grand Army of the Republic. *American Politics Quarterly* 23:319-338.

Recommended readings

Chamberlin, John. 1974. Provision of collective goods as a function of group size. *Ameri-*

- can Political Science Review 68:707-716.
- Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1995. Interest representation and democratic gridlock. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20:531-552.
- Bendor, Jonathan, and Dilip Mookerjee. 1987. Institutional structure and the logic of ongoing collective action. *American Political Science Review* 81:129-154.
- Johnson, Paul Edward. 1991. Organized labor in an era of blue-collar decline. In Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis (eds.), *Interest Group Politics*. 3rd edition. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Moe, Terry M. 1980. *The Organization of Interests*. (Chapters 2 and 3.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cook, Constance E. 1984. Participation in public interest groups. *American Politics Quarterly* 12:409-431.
- Brown, Clyde. 1989. Explanations of interest group membership over time. *American Politics Quarterly* 17:32-53.
- Godwin, R. Kenneth, and R. C. Mitchell. 1982. Rational models, collective goods, and non-electoral political behavior. *Western Political Quarterly* 35:160-180.
- Marwell, Gerald, and Ruth E. Ames. 1979. Experiments on the provision of public goods: interest, group size, and the free rider problem. *American Journal of Sociology* 84:1335-1360.
- Margolis, Howard. 1990. Dual utilities and rational choice. In Jane J. Mansbridge (ed.), *Beyond Self-Interest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Margolis, Howard. 1981. A new model of rational choice. *Ethics* 91:265-279.
- Mitchell, Robert C. 1979. National environmental lobbies and the apparent illogic of collective action. In Clifford S. Russell (ed.), *Collective Decision-Making*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Marwell, Gerald, Pamela Oliver, and Ralph Prahl. 1988. Social networks and collective action: a theory of the critical mass. III. *American Journal of Sociology* 94:502-534.
- Nownes, Anthony J., and Grant Neely. 1996. Public interest group entrepreneurship and theories of group mobilization. *Political Research Quarterly* 49:119-146.

III. The Formation and Maintenance of Interest Groups, II

We continue reading on and discussion of the problems of forming and maintaining political organizations. What mixture of benefits must organized interests offer members in order to retain their dues and to obtain their support for political action? How do these incentives and benefits differ across organizations? Why do some members remain in an organizations and others leave? What sorts of problems do democratic and other forms of governance pose for the maintenance of organized interests? How do different kinds of organizations handle the problem of governance?

Required readings

- Moe, Terry M. 1980. A calculus of group membership. *American Journal of Political Science* 24:593-632.
- King, David, and Jack L. Walker, Jr. 1992. The provision of benefits by interest groups in the United States. *Journal of Politics* 54:394-426. See Chapters 4 and 5 in *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*.
- Knoke, David. 1988. Incentives in collective action organizations. *American Sociological Review* 53:311-329.

- Rothenberg, Lawrence. 1988. Organizational maintenance and the retention decision in groups. *American Political Science Review* 82:1129-1152.
- Johnson, Paul Edward. 1998. Interest Group Recruiting: Finding Members and Keeping Them. In Allan J. Cigler and Burdette Loomis (eds.), *Interest Groups Politics*. 5th edition. Washington: CQ Press, 1995. Pp. 35-62.
- Johnson, Paul Edward. 1990. Unraveling in democratically governed groups. *Rationality and Society* 2:4-34.
- Leighley, Jan. 1996. Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation. *Journal of Politics* 58:447-463.

Recommended readings

- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Jack L. Walker. 1988. Survey research and membership in voluntary associations. *American Journal of Political Science* 32:908-928. See also 34:662-670 (1990).
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry A. Brady. 1995. Participation's not a paradox: The view from American activists. *British Journal of Political Science* 25:1-36.
- Curtis, James E., Edward G. Grabb, and Douglas E. Baer. 1992. Voluntary association membership in fifteen countries: a comparative analysis. *American Sociological Review* 57:129-152.
- Smith, V. Kerry. 1985. A theoretical analysis of the "green lobby." *American Political Science Review* 79:132-147.
- Dawes, Robyn, John Orbell, Randy F. Simmons, and Alphons J. C. VandeKragt. 1986. Organizing groups for collective action. *American Political Science Review* 80:117-xxx.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry A. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Browne, William P. 1977. Organizational maintenance: the internal operation of interest groups. *Public Administration Review* 37:48-57.
- Johnson, Paul Edward. 1987. Foresight and myopia in organizational membership. *Journal of Politics* 49:678-703.
- Rothenberg, Lawrence. 1991. Agenda-setting at Common Cause. Pp. 131-149. In Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis (eds.), *Interest Group Politics*. 3rd edition. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Moe, Terry M. 1980. The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups. (See especially Chapter 4, "Internal Politics," pp. 73-112.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Knoke, David. 1990. *Organizing for Collective Action: The Political Economies of Associations*. Hawthorne, New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Marsh, David. 1976. On joining interest groups. *British Journal of Political Science* 6:257-272.
- Hardin, Russell. 1982. *Collective Action*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Chong, Dennis. 1991. *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rothenberg, Lawrence. 1989. Putting the puzzle together: why people join public interest groups. *Public Choice* 60:241-257.

IV. Interest Groups and Lobbying in the Legislature

Political scientists have put forth a number of competing notions of how, whether, and to what extent the lobbying of organized interests makes a difference in the legislature. Some scholars, along with reformists, see interest groups as determinative on many issues and legislators as relatively malleable objects of influence. Others envision an extremely limited role of interest groups and lobbyists, mainly as providers of information for legislators. Still others fall somewhere between these polar views of the role and impact of lobbying in the legislature. One of the chief questions here is what functions lobbyists provide for legislators, and vice versa? Has the relationship between lobbyists and legislators changed over time? How? Why? We take up the question of money, briefly, but deal with it more fully in a later section.

Required readings

- Truman, David. 1951. *The Governmental Process*. Chapters 11 and 12. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter. 1963. *American Business and Public Policy*. Pp. 321-400, 433-444. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
- Denzau, Arthur T., and Michael C. Munger. 1986. Legislators and interest groups: how unorganized interests get represented. *American Political Science Review* 80:89-106.
- Wright, John R. 1990. Contributions, lobbying, and committee voting in the U. S. House of Representatives. *American Political Science Review* 84:417-438.
- Smith, Richard A. 1995. Interest group influence in the U. S. Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20:89-140.
- Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1994. Counteractive lobbying. *American Journal of Political Science* 38:25-44.
- Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leach. 1996. The multiple ambiguities of "counteractive lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science* 40:521-542.
- Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1996. Theory and evidence for counteractive lobbying. *American Journal of Political Science* 40:543-564.
- Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leach. 1996. Good theory deserves good data. *American Journal of Political Science* 40:565-569.
- Richard L Hall. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." Paper prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., August 31-September 3, 2000.
- Hojnacki, Marie, and David Kimball. 1999. The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee. *Journal of Politics* 61:999-1024.
- Hojnacki, Marie, and David Kimball. 1998. Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress. *American Political Science Review*. 92:775-90.
- Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1998. Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate. *American Journal of Political Science* 42:499-523.
- Hansen, John Mark. 1991. *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Read assigned portions.
- Caldeira, Gregory A., Marie Hojnacki, and John R. Wright. 2000. The Lobbying Activities of Organized Interests in Federal Judicial Nominations. *The Journal of Politics*. 62:51-69.
- Baumgartner, Frank, Jeffrey Berry, Beth Leech, Marie Hojnacki, and David Kimball. 2000. *Advocacy and Policy Argumentation*. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 31-September 3, 2000.

Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leech. 2000. Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics. *Journal of Politics* 63:1191-1213.

Recommended readings

- Thompson, Margaret S. 1986. *The Spider Web: Congress and Lobbying in the Age of Grant*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Flemming, Roy, Michael MacLeod, and Jeffrey Talbert. 1998. Witness at the the Confirmations? The Appearance of Organized Interests at Senate Hearings on Federal Judicial Appointments, 1945-1992. *Political Research Quarterly* 51:583-617.
- Kollman, Ken. 1997. Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional Committees. *American Journal of Political Science* 41:519-544.
- Austen-Smith, David. 1993. Information and influence: lobbying for agendas and votes. *American Journal of Political Science* 37:799-833.
- Evans, Diana. 1996. Before the roll call: Interest group lobbying and public policy outcomes in House committees. *Political Research Quarterly* 49:287-304.
- Ainsworth, Scott, and Itai Sened. 1993. The role of lobbyists: entrepreneurs with two audiences. *American Journal of Political Science* 37:834-867.
- Smith, Richard A. 1984. Advocacy, interpretation, and influence in the U.S. Congress. *American Political Science Review* 78:44-63.
- Leyden, Kevin M. 1995. Interest group resources and testimony at congressional hearings. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20:431-440.
- Potters, Jan, and F. VanWinden. 1992. Lobbying and information asymmetries. *Public Choice* 74:269-292.
- Jackson, John E., and John W. Kingdon. 1992. Ideology, interest group scores, and legislative votes. *American Journal of Political Science* 36:805-823.
- Smith, Richard A. 1988. Interpretation, explanation, and lobbying: interest group influence in the U.S. Congress. Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association.
- Smith, Richard A. 1989. Interpretation, pressure, and the stability of interest group influence in the U.S. Congress. Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association.
- Kingdon, John W. 1981. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. 2nd edition. Chapter 5. New York: Harper and Row.
- Batcheller, John. 1977. Lobbyings and the legislative process: the impact of environmental constraints. *American Political Science Review* 71:242-263.
- Evans, Diana M. 1991. Lobbying the committee: interest groups and the House Public Works and Transportation Committee. In Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis (eds.), *Interest Group Politics*. 3rd edition. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press. Pp. 257-276.
- Hayes, Michael T. 1981. *Lobbyists and Legislators*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Pertschuk, Michael. 1986. *Giant Killers*. (Case studies of public-interest lobbying on regulation of tobacco advertising, the MX, the Voting Rights Act, and others.) New York: W. W. Norton.
- Ainsworth, Scott. 1989. Lobbyists as interest group entrepreneurs: a model of strategic interactions. Presented at the Annual Meetings of the Southern Political Science Association.

V. Money, Political Action Committees, and Congress

The role and influence of money in politics are two of the classic questions in the study of American politics in general and interest groups in particular. Do political contributions purchase influence in Congress? If so, how does this linkage work? If not, why does not money buy influence? If it does not buy influence, does it buy anything? Access? Legitimacy? How do political action committees allocate contributions? Does the pattern of allocation have consequences for the political influence of interest groups in Congress? Does way in which political action committees raise money constrain their ability to make a difference in the legislative process? Do some kinds of organizations enjoy advantages over others in putting money to good use in Congress? Can organizations use other resources as a substitute for financial wherewithal?

Required reading

- Wright, John R. 1985. PACs, contributions, and roll-calls: an organizational perspective. *American Political Science Review* 79:400-414.
- Wawro, Gregory. 2001. A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Votes. *American Journal of Political Science* 45:563-579.
- Hojnacki, Marie, and David Kimball. 2001. PAC Contributions and Lobbying Contacts in Congressional Committees. *Political Research Quarterly* 54:161-180.
- Wright, John R. 1989. PAC contributions, lobbying, and representation. *Journal of Politics* 51:713-129.
- Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. Buying time: moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees. *American Political Science Review* 84:797-820.
- Grier, Kevin B., Michael C. Munger, and Brian E. Roberts. 1994. The determinants of industry political action, 1978-1986. *American Political Science Review* 88:911-926.
- McCarty, Nolan, and Lawrence Rothenberg. 1996. Commitment and the Contribution Contract. *American Journal of Political Science* 40:872-904.
- Romer, Thomas, and James M. Snyder. 1994. An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions. *American Journal of Political Science* 40:872-904.
- Wright, John R. 2000. Interest groups, congressional reform, and party government in the United States. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25:217-235.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, John M. De Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2002. Why Is There so Little Money in U. S. Politics? National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Krozner, Randall S., and Thomas Stratmann. 1998. Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence From Financial Services' Political Action Committees. *American Economic Review* 88:1163-1187.
- Stratmann, Thomas. 2002. Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation. *Journal of Law and Economics* 45:345-373.

Recommended

- Evans, Diana. 1988. Oil PACs and aggressive contribution strategies. *Journal of Politics* 50:1047-1056.
- Snyder, James. 1990. Campaign contributions as investments: the U.S. House of Representatives, 1990-1986. *Journal of Political Economy* 98:119-1227.
- Snyder, James. 1992. The market for campaign contributions: evidence for the U.S. Senate. *Economics and Politics* 5:219-240.

- Grenzke, Janet M. 1989. PACs and the congressional supermarket: the currency is complex. *American Journal of Political Science* 33:1-24.
- Freundreis, John P., and Richard W. Waterman. 1985. PAC contributions and legislative behavior: Senate voting on deregulation. *Social Science Quarterly* 66:401-412.
- Chappell, Henry. 1982. Campaign contributions and congressional voting: a simultaneous probit-tobit model. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 62:77-83.
- Austen-Smith, David. 1995. Campaign contributions and access. *American Political Science Review* 89:566-581.
- Evans, Diana. 1986. PAC contributions and roll-call voting: conditional power. In Allan J. Cigler and Burdette Loomis (eds.), *Interest Group Politics*. 2nd edition. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Strathman, Thomas. 1992. Are contributors rational? Untangling the strategies of political action committees. *Journal of Political Economy* 100:647-664.
- Fowler, Linda L. 1982. How interest groups select issues for rating voting records of members of the U.S. Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 7:401-413.
- Gapoian, J. David. 1984. What makes PACs tick? an analysis of the allocation patterns of economic interest groups. *American Journal of Political Science* 28:259-281.
- Herndon, James F. 1982. Access, record, and competition as influences on interest group contributions to congressional campaigns. *Journal of Politics* 44:996-1019.
- Silberman, Jonathan, and Garey C. Durden. 1976. Determining legislative preferences on the minimum wage: an economic approach. *Journal of Political Economy* 84:317-329.
- Welch, William P. 1982. Campaign contributions and legislative voting: milk money and dairy price supports. *Western Political Quarterly* 34:478-495.
- Chappell, Henry. 1981. Campaign contributions and voting on the cargo preference bill. *Public Choice* 36:301-312.
- Langbein, Laura I. 1986. Money and access: some empirical evidence. *Journal of Politics* 48:1052-1062.
- Sabato, Larry J. 1984. *PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Sorauf, Frank J. 1988. *Money and American Elections*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Sorauf, Frank J. 1985. Who's in charge? accountability in political action committees. *Political Science Quarterly* 99:591-614.
- Schroedel, Jean. 1987. Campaign contributions and legislative outcomes. *Western Political Quarterly* 40:371-389.
- Wilhite, Allen. 1988. Union PAC contributions and legislative voting. *Journal of Labor Research* 9:79-89.
- Wilhite, Allen, and John Theilmann. 1987. Labor PAC contributions and labor legislation: a simultaneous logic approach. *Public Choice* 53:267-276.
- Austen-Smith, David. 1987. Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting. *Public Choice* 53:123-140.
- Berry, Jeffrey. 1978. On the origins of interest groups. *Polity* 10:379-397.
- Delaney, John Thomas, Jack Fiorito, and Marick F. Masters. 1988. The effects of union organization and environmental characteristics on union political action. *American Journal of Political Science* 32:616-643.
- Sabato, Larry J. 1984. *PAC Power*. New York: W. W. Norton.

VI. Grass Roots Lobbying and Activism

How, in contrast to motivating rank-and-file members, do interest groups mobilize activists? Do the motivations of activists differ substantially from those of the rank-and-file? Why do people become activists within an organization? Do the means of mobilizing activists create difficulties for the maintenance of rank-and-file members and for retaining credibility in the direct lobbying of Congress? What, in any, impact does grass roots lobbying have on congressional votes? Does this kind of lobbying add any value to direct lobbying? Does grass roots lobbying complement financial contributions?

Required reading

- Gerber, Elisabeth. 1999. *The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Goldstein, Kenneth M. 1999. *Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kollman, Kenneth. 1998. *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Langbein, Laura I., and Mark A. Lotwis. 1990. The political efficacy of lobbying and money: gun control in the U.S. House, 1986. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 14:414-440.
- Langbein, Laura I. 1993. PACs, lobbies, and political conflict: the case of gun control. *Public Choice* 77:551-572.

Recommended reading

- Godwin, R. Kenneth. 1988. *One Billion Dollars of Influence: Direct Marketing of Politics*. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishing.
- Fowler, Linda, and Ronald G. Shaiko. 1987. The grass roots connection: environmental activists and Senate roll calls. *American Journal of Political Science* 31:484-510.
- Rothenberg, Lawrence. 1988. The route to activism is through experience: contributor mobilization in interest groups. Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Western Political Science Association.
- Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. A signaling model of informative and manipulative political action. *American Political Science Review* 87:319-333.
- Wright, John R. 1989. Mobilizing citizens for collective action: organized interests and the nomination of Robert H. Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court. Presented at the John M. Olin Conference on Political Behavior and Institutions.
- Pertschuk, Michael, and Wendy Schaetzel. 1988. *The People Rising: The Campaign Against the Bork Nomination*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press.
- Schlozman, Kay, and John T. Tierney. 1986. Organized Interests and American Democracy. (Chapter 8, "Reaching Out to the Public," pp. 170-199.) New York: Harper and Row.
- Rosenau, James A. 1974. *Citizenship Between Elections*. New York: Free Press.
- Pertschuk, Michael. 1986. *Giant Killers*. (Case studies of public-interest lobbying on regulation of tobacco advertising, the MX, the Voting Rights Act, and others.) New York: W. W. Norton.
- Thompson, Margaret S. 1986. *The Spider Web: Congress and Lobbying in the Age of Grant*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- McFarland, Andrew S. 1984. *Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest*. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishing.
- McFarland, Andrew S. 1976. *Public Interest Lobbies*. Washington: American Enterprise

Institute.

- Hall, Donald. 1968. *Cooperative Lobbying*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Berry, Jeffrey. 1977. *Lobbying for the People*. Chapter on grass roots. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Birnbaum, Jeffrey H., and Alan S. Murray. 1987. *Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform*. New York: Vintage.
- Bronner, Ethan. 1989. *Battle for Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook America*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- McGuigan, Patrick B., and Dawn M. Weyrich. 1990. *Ninth Justice: The Fight for Bork*. Washington: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation.

VII. Interest Groups, Litigation, and the Courts

What kinds of organizations use the courts? What strategies and tactics do organized interests use in the courts? Do strategies and tactics of litigation vary across types of organizations and levels of courts? Why? Do interest groups use courts as an adjunct of other strategies of influence, such as lobbying, or do groups tend to specialize? Does the participation of organized interests shape the outcome of litigation? Why? Why would courts pay more attention to organized interests than to others? That is, what functions do interest groups provide for courts? Under what conditions?

Required reading

- Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1988. Organized interests and agenda-setting in the U. S. Supreme Court. *American Political Science Review* 82:1109-1128.
- Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1990. Amici curiae before the Supreme Court: who participates, when, and how much? *Journal of Politics* 52:781-806.
- Scheppele, Kim L., and Walker, Jack L. 1991. The litigation strategies of interest groups. In Jack L. Walker, Jr. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*. Pp. 157-184.
- McGuire, Kevin T. 1994. Amici Curiae and Strategies for Gaining Access to the Supreme Court. *Political Research Quarterly* 47:821-838.
- Spriggs, James II, and Paul Wahlbeck. 1997. Amici Curiae and the Role of Information in the Supreme Court. *Political Research Quarterly* 50:365-386.
- Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1999. Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici Curiae. In Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman (eds.), *Supreme Court Decision-Making*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 215-236.
- Epp, Charles R. 1999. External Pressure and the Supreme Court's Agenda. In Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman (eds.), *Supreme Court Decision-Making*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 255-279.
- Tauber, Steven C. 1998. On Behalf of the Condemned? The Impact of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on Capital Punishment Decision Making in the U. S. Courts of Appeals. *Political Research Quarterly* 51:191-219.

Recommended reading

- Stewart, Joseph, Jr., and James F. Sheffield, Jr. 1987. Does Interest Group Litigation Matter? The Case of Black Political Mobilization in Mississippi. *Journal of Politics* 49:780-798.
- Epstein, Lee, and C. K. Rowland. 1991. Debunking the myth of interest group invincibility

- in the courts. *American Political Science Review* 85:205-217.
- Schlozman, Kay, and John T. Tierney. 1986. *Organized Interests and American Democracy*. Chapter 14. New York: Harper and Row.
- Songer, Donald R., and Ashlyn Kuersten. 1995. The Success of Amici in State Supreme Courts. *Political Research Quarterly* 48:31-42.
- Olson, Susan. 1990. Interest group litigation in federal district court: beyond the political disadvantage theory. *Journal of Politics* 52:854-882.
- Epstein, Lee. 1990. Interest groups in the courts. In John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson (eds.), *American Courts: A Critical Assessment*. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Sheehan, Reginald, William Mishler, and Donald Songer. 1992. Ideology, status, and the differential success of direct parties before the Supreme Court. *American Political Science Review* 86:464-471.
- McGuire, Kevin T., and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1993. Lawyers, organized interests, and the law of obscenity: agenda-setting in the Supreme Court. *American Political Science Review* 87:717-728.
- Epstein, Lee. 1985. *Conservatives in court*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- McGuire, Kevin T. 1995. Repeat players and the Supreme Court: The role of experienced lawyers in litigation success. *Journal of Politics* 57:187-196.
- Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1990. The discuss list: agenda-setting in the Supreme Court. *Law & Society Review* 807-836.
- Tushnet, Mark V. 1993. *Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Olson, Susan. 1984. *Clients and lawyers: securing the rights of disabled persons*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- O'Neill, Timothy. 1985. *Bakke and the Politics of Equality: Friends and Foes in the Classroom of Litigation*. Middletown: Wesleyan University.
- Vose, Clement E. 1959. *Caucasians Only*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sorauf, Frank J. 1976. *The Wall of Separation: The Constitutional Politics of Church and State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Vose, Clement E. 1972. *Constitutional Change: Amendment Politics and Supreme Court Litigation Since 1900*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Kobylka, Joseph. 1991. *The Politics of Obscenity*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Orren, Karen. 1976. Standing to sue: interest group conflict in the federal courts. *American Political Science Review* 70:723-741.
- O'Connor, Karen, and Lee Epstein. 1981. Amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court: an appraisal of Hakman's folklore. *Law & Society Review* 16:311-320.
- O'Connor, Karen. 1980. *Women's Organizations' Use of the Courts*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Rabin, Robert. 1976. Lawyers for social change: perspectives on public interest law. *Stanford Law Review* 28:207-261.
- O'Connor, Karen, and Lee Epstein. 1983. The rise of conservative interest group litigation. *Journal of Politics* 45:478-489.
- Lawrence, Susan E. 1990. *The Poor in Court*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kobylka, Joseph. 1987. A court-created context for group litigation: libertarian groups and obscenity. *Journal of Politics* 49:1061-1078.
- O'Connor, Karen, and Lee Epstein. 1989. *Public Interest Law Groups*. New York: Greenwood Press.

VIII. Interest Groups, Regulation, and Administrative Agencies

Reformers see bureaucracies and administrative agencies as fertile territory for the growth of influence on the part of interest groups. Years ago, after two decades of experience with the bureaucratic state and independent agencies, Marver Bernstein coined the "capture theory"; over time, organized interests capture the agencies created to regulate them. For some scholars on the right and left, the creation of some agencies has come in response to cries from industry for protection and reduction of uncertainty. Are regulatory forms and procedures more than just technical matters over which lawyers argue? Why does Congress choose some regulatory forms over others? How do interest groups help to shape the structure of agencies? Why would interest groups show concern about questions of access to the courts to challenge the decisions of administrative agencies?

Required reading

- McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1989. Structure and process, politics, and policy: administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies. *Virginia Law Review* 75:431-482.
- McNollgast. 1999. The political origins of the administrative procedure act. *Journal of Law Economics & Organization* 15: 180-217.
- Schwartz, A. 1999. Comment on 'the political origins of the administrative procedure act,' by McNollgast *Journal of Law Economics and Organization* 15: 218-221
- Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1995. A theory of strategic oversight: Congress, lobbying, and the bureaucracy. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 11:227-255.
- Balla, Steven J. 1998. Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy. *American Political Science Review* 92:663-673.
- Balla, Steven, and John R. Wright. 2001. Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy. *American Journal of Political Science* 45:799-812.
- Moe, Terry. 1985. Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB. *American Political Science Review* 79:1094-1126.

Recommended reading

- Snyder, Susan K., and Barry R. Weingast. 2000. The American system of shared powers: the President, Congress, and the NLRB. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 16 (2):269-305.
- Mashaw, Jerry L. 1990. Explaining administrative process: normative, positive, and critical stories of legal development. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6:267-298.
- Shapiro, Martin M. 1988. Who Guards the Guardians? *Judicial Control of Administration*. Chapters 2, 3, and 5. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Schlozman, Kay, and John T. Tierney. 1986. *Organized Interests and American Democracy*. Chapter 13. New York: Harper and Row.
- Landes, William, and Richard A. Posner. 1975. The independent judiciary in an interest-group perspective. *Journal of Law and Economics* 18:877-911.
- Moe, Terry M. 1987. An assessment of the positive theory of "congressional dominance." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 12:475-520.
- Moe, Terry M. 1990. Political institutions: the neglected side of the story. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6:213-261.

- Stewart, Richard. 1975. The reformation of American administrative law. *Harvard Law Review* 88:1667-1813 (selections).
- Moe, Terry M. 1989. The politics of bureaucratic structure. In John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (eds.), *Can the Government Govern?* Washington: The Brookings Institution. Pp. 267-330.
- Berry, Jeffrey. 1984. *Feeding Hungry People: Rulemaking in the Food Stamp Program.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Sunstein, Cass. 1986. *Factions, self-interest and the APA: Four lessons since 1946.* *Virginia Law Review* 72:271-296.
- Chubb, John. 1983. *Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bernstein, Marver. 1955. *Regulating Business by Independent Commission.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gormley, William T. 1989. *Taming the Bureaucracy.* Chapter 3 ("Interest representation," pp. 62-89). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Melnick, R. Shep. 1983. *Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act.* Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Wilson, James Q. 1989. *Bureaucracy.* Pp. 72-89 ("Interests"). New York: Basic Books.
- Moe, Terry M. 1987. *Interests, institutions, and positive theory: the politics of the NLRB.* *Studies In American Political Development* 2:236-299.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1986. *Legislator uncertainty, legislative control, and the delegation of legislative power.* *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 2:33-51.
- McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. *Administrative procedures as an instrument of political control.* *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.* 3:243-277.
- Sunstein, Cass. 1985. *Interest groups in American public law.* *Stanford Law Review* 38:29-87.
- Weingast, Barry, and Mark Moran. 1983. *Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control: regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission.* *Journal of Political Economy* 91:765-800.
- Weingast, Barry, and William Marshall. 1988. *The industrial organization of Congress.* *Journal of Political Economy* 96:132-163.
- Sunstein, Cass. 1991. *After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

IX. The Representation of Interests and Interest Groups

What kinds of organizations participate most often in American politics? Who represents interest groups? Does the nature of representation vary across type of organization? Do organized interests compete with one another, or do they participate alone? How fluid is the structure of interest groups? How fluid is the structure of representation? Do lobbyists constitute "middlepersons," people who bridge the gap between opposing interests, or do they typically represent one side in a policy arena? Do some representatives enjoy advantages over others? Why? Is experience in government--often cited as a route for lobbyists to influence--an appreciable advantage? What, if any, biases does the shape of representation bring to American politics?

Required reading

- Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert H. Salisbury, and Robert L. Nelson. 1990. Inner circles or hollow cores? Elite networks in national policy systems. *Journal of Politics* 52:356-390.
- Salisbury, Robert H., John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, and Robert L. Nelson. 1987. Who works with whom? interest group alliances and opposition. *American Political Science Review* 81:1217-1234.
- Browne, William P. 1990. Organized interests and their issue niches: a search for pluralism in a policy domain. *Journal of Politics* 52:477-509.
- Salisbury, Robert H., and Paul E. Johnson. 1989. Who you know versus what you know: the uses of government experience for Washington lobbyists. *American Journal of Political Science* 33:175-195.
- McConnell, Grant. 1958. The Spirit of Private Government. *American Political Science Review* 52:754-770.

Recommended reading

- Salisbury, Robert H. 1984. Interest representation: The dominance of institutions. *American Political Science Review* 78:64-76.
- Scholzman, Kay, and John T. Tierney. 1986. Organized Interests and American Democracy. Chapters 3 and 4. New York: Harper & Row.
- Nelson, Robert L., John P. Heinz, with Edward O. Laumann, and Robert H. Salisbury. 1988. Lawyers and the structure of influence in Washington. *Law & Society Review* 22:235-300.
- Heinz, John, Edward Laumann, Robert Nelson, and Robert Salisbury. 1993. *The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Danelian, Lucig M., and Benjamin Page. 1994. The heavenly chorus: interest group voices on TV news. *American Journal of Political Science* 38:1056-1078.
- McGuire, Kevin T. 1993. *The Supreme Court Bar: Legal Elites in the Washington Community*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
- Peterson, Mark A. 1992. The Presidency and organized interests: White House patterns of interest group liaison. *American Political Science Review* 86:612-625.
- Gais, Thomas L., Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker, Jr. 1991. Interest groups, iron triangles, and representative institutions. Pp. 123-140. In Jack L. Walker, Jr. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*.
- Browne, William P. 1989. Access and influence in agriculture and rural affairs: congressional staff and lobbyist perceptions of organized interests. *Rural Sociology* 54:365-381.
- Browne, William P., and Won K. Paik. 1993. Beyond the domain: recasting network politics in the postreform Congress. *American Journal of Political Science* 37:1054-1078.
- Laumann, Edward O., John P. Heinz, with Robert L. Nelson and Robert H. Salisbury. 1985. Washington lawyers and others: the structure of Washington representation. *Stanford Law Review* 37:465-502.
- Nelson, Robert L., John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, and Robert H. Salisbury. 1987. Private representation in Washington: surveying the structure of influence. *American Bar Foundation Research Journal* 1987:141-200.
- Browne, William P. 1991. Issue niches and the limits of interest group influence. Pp. 345-370. In Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis (eds.), *Interest Group Politics*. 3rd edition. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- McConnell, Grant. 1966. *Private Power and American Democracy*. New York: Alfred A.

Knopf.

Wilson, James Q. 1973. *Political Organizations*. Pp. 305-326. New York: Basic Books.
Milbrath, Lester W. 1963. *The Washington Lobbyists*. Chicago: Rand-McNally.

X. Coalitions, Policy-Making, and Iron Triangles

Do iron triangles shape American public policy? Did they ever do so? To what extent has the role of iron triangles, or whatever term you wish to use, diminished? Why? What role do coalitions play in the mustering of organized interests? Why do organized interests form coalitions? Under what conditions? Are coalitions more influential than individual organizations? Why? How, in general, should we characterize the role and impact of interest groups in American politics?

Required reading

Wilson, James Q. 1973. *Political Organizations*. Pp. 261-280. New York: Basic Books.
Loomis, Burdette. 1986. Coalitions of interests: building bridges in the Balkanized state. Pp. 248-275. In Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis (eds.), *Interest Group Politics*. 2nd edition. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Hojnacki, Marie. 1997. Interest Groups' Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone. *American Journal of Political Science* 41:61-87.
Hula, Kevin. 1995. Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Forging Interest Group Coalitions. In Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis (eds.), *Interest Group Politics*. 4th edition. Washington: CQ Press.
Hojnacki, Marie. 1998. Organized Interests' Advocacy Behavior in Alliances. *Political Research Quarterly*. 51:437-59.

Recommended reading

Laumann, Edward O., and David Knoke. 1987. *The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy Domains*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Berry, Jeffrey. 1989. Subgovernments, issue networks, and political conflict. In Richard Harris and Sidney Milkis (eds.), *Remaking American Politics*. Pp. 239-260. Boulder: Westview Press.
Salisbury, Robert H. 1990. The paradox of interest groups in Washington--more groups, less clout. Pp. 203-229. In Anthony King (ed.), *The New American Political System*. 2nd edition. Washington: AEI Press.
Berry, Jeffrey. 1989. *The Interest Group Society*. (See the discussion on coalitions and coalition formation). 2nd edition. Boston: Little, Brown.
Browne, William P., and Won K. Paik. 1993. Beyond the domain: recasting network politics in the post-reform Congress. *American Journal of Political Science* 37:1054-1078.