Ohio State University
Department of Political Science

Judicial Politics, Processes, and Policy-Making
Political Science 715
Autumn 1998

Gregory A. Caldeira
2186 Derby Hall
614-297-9964
614- 292-9649 (AJPS)
caldeira.1@osu.edu
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/gcald/

Courts and judges, as Tocqueville and many others have argued, perform central roles on the stage of American politics and public policy. Though a number of scholars, members of the bar, and citizens believe that judges and courts have gone too far in making societal choices, no one--not even the staunchest defenders of judicial power--disagrees with the assertion that judicial institutions are now involved in a broader range of issues than ever before. In the last two decades, judges on appellate and trial benches have reapportioned entire legislatures; administered prisons, hospitals, railroads, and mental institutions; sent children on long bus rides and nullified the principle of seniority in industry, both to achieve racial integration; prohibited political patronage on the ground that it infringes on freedom of expression; and many, many other things.

We know a great deal about what courts and judges have said, because custom, and sometimes law, requires that occupants of the bench provide reasons and links with previous decisions, i.e., precedents. That rhetorical product, and the doctrine nested and announced within it, constitutes the primary object of study for academic lawyers in the United States. If one picks up any issue of any major law review, one will find at least a half dozen relatively competent studies of this or that doctrine--its origins, development, implications. In the better law reviews, one may well even find some speculation about how judges arrived at such a choice and what, if any, impact it might have. Rarely do lawyers and law professors mar these pages with systematic evidence. Thus the empirical study of courts, law, and judicial behavior has fallen upon social scientists--for the most part, political scientists. We grapple with such issues as: What impact do courts have on society? How do judges make decisions? Why do people go to court, or more often, why do they fail to use the law? Why do some decisions have significant consequences when others appear to make no difference at all? Since about 1955, political scientists and others have amassed a great deal of descriptive information about courts, law, and judicial behavior and a less, but still significant, amount of theoretical knowledge.


This seminar has several purposes. First, I hope to introduce you to the "state of the art" in one segment of studies of judicial politics. Second, we will touch upon a series of specialized topics, major nodes of controversy in the subfield. Political Science 716 covers the research on many aspects of decision-making in appellate, especially federal, courts; in Political Science 715, we investigate the work of courts as makers of public policy and a number of residual topics. Third, as we move through the material, I want two of you in each class to prepare a short memorandum on the readings for that day and then to take particular responsibility for leading our discussions. This will take up some of your time, but I think you will profit in the long-run. You might also want to use one as a rehearsal for your final paper. Fourth, having mastered the general literature as well as more focused fields of inquiry, you will choose a topic on which to do a substantial piece of writing for a final paper.

I expect all students enrolled in the seminar to attend all meetings and to arrive in class prepared to ask and field questions and to discuss the current week's readings in the same manner as any good political scientist. Early in the term each student should choose a topic to delve into in more detail. You should then prepare a memorandum to me in which you tell me what you are going to do in your final paper. That paper (60 perent), the memoranda (20 percent), and your participation (20 percent) in the seminar will serve as the bases of your grade in this course. 

I have included after most weeks' required reading an extensive, though not exhaustive, bibliography of recommended articles and books. These cassettes of "literature" are your most probable point of departure in search of an individual project; but you may be interested in topics not covered here and should in such case consult me.

Here is a list of the sections: 

Lawyers in Courts and Politics (September 29, October 1)
Deciding to Litigate (October 6)
Organized Interests and Litigation (October 8, 13)
Winners and Losers (October 15)
Choosing Judges (October 20, 22)
Inter-court Relations (October 27, 29)
Do Courts Make a Difference? (November 3)
Courts, Executives, and Legislatures, Part I (November 5)
Courts, Executives, and Legislatures, Part II (November 10, 12)
Public Opinion and the Courts (November 17, 19)
High Courts in Transnational Settings (November 24)
High Courts in Non-U.S. Settings (December 1, 3)

The required and recommended readings for these units follow. You will find the required readings in a packet designed for the course; Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (University of Chicago, 1991); and Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution (University of Chicago, 1998). The latter two will be available at SBX.

 

 

I LAWYERS IN COURTS AND POLITICS

 

Lawyers play many roles in American society, many of them explicitly political, others implicitly so. For example, a good many of the lobbyists and representatives of organized interests are lawyers by training and some of them are in practice. In much of the legal system, lawyers mediate between institutions and laymen. How is the legal profession organized? Do lawyers actually make a difference in the outcomes of cases? What roles, in comparison to other professionals, do lawyers play in the representation of interests?

 

 

Required

 

Heinz, John P., and Edward O. Laumann.  1978.  The Legal Profession:  Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies.  Michigan Law Review 76:1111-1142.

Heinz, John P., and Edward O. Laumann, with Robert Nelson and Paul S. Schnorr.  1997.  The Constituencies of Urban Elite Lawyers.  Law & Society Review 31:441-472.

Nelson, Robert, and John P. Heinz.  1988.  Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington.  Law & Society Review 22:237-300.

McGuire, Kevin T.  1993.  Lawyers in the U. S. Supreme Court:  The Washington Community and Legal Elites.  American Journal of Political Science 37:365-390.

McGuire, Kevin T.  1995.  Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success.  Journal of Politics 57:187-196.

Monsma, Karl, and Richard Lempert.  1992.  The Value of Counsel:  20 Years of Representation Before a Public Housing Eviction Board. Law & Society Review 26:627-668 (1992).

 

Recommended

 

Macauley, Stewart.  1979.  Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws.  Law & Society Review 14:115-171.

McGuire, Kevin T.  1993.  The Supreme Court Bar: Legal Elites in the Washington Community.   Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Hagan, John, and Fiona Kay.  1995.  Gender in Practice: A Study of Lawyers’ Lives (1995)

Galanter, Marc, and Thomas Palay.  1991.  Tournament of Lawyers:  The Transformation of the Big Law Firm.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

Nelson, Robert L.  1988.  Partners With Power: The Social Transformation of the Large Law Firm.

Nelson, Robert L., John P. Heinz, Edward Laumann, and Robert H. Salisbury.  1987.  Private Representation in Washington: Surveying the Structure of Influence.  American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1987:141-202.

Kritzer, Herbert.  1990.  Let's Make a Deal:  Understanding the Negotiation Process in Ordinary Litigation.  Madison:  University of Wisconsin Press.

Kritzer, Herbert.  1990.  The Justice Broker:  Lawyers and Ordinary Litigation.  New York:  Oxford University Press.

Abel, Robert.  1991.  American Lawyers.  New York:  Oxford University Press.

Heinz, John P., and Edward O. Laumann.  1982.  Chicago Lawyers:  The Social Structure of the Bar.  New York:  Russell Sage Foundation.

Epstein, Cynthia.  1981.  Women in Law.  New York:  Basic Books.

Kessler, Mark.  1987.  Legal Services for the Poor:  A Comparative and Contemporary Analysis of Interorganizational Politics.  Westport, CT:  Green­wood.

Gilboy, Janet.  1981.  The Social of Organization of Legal Services to Indigent Defendants.  American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1981:1023-48.

Sarat, Austin, and William Felstiner.  1986.  Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office.  Law & Society Review 20:93-134.

Trubek, David M., et al.  1983.  The Costs of Ordinary Litigation.  UCLA Law Review 31:72-107.

Landon, Donald D.  1988.  LaSalle Street and Main Street:  The Role of Context in Structuring Law Practice.  Law & Society Review 22:213-236.

 

 

 

II DECIDING TO LITIGATE

Why do people and institutions choose to use the courts? Are the calculations of individuals and institutions different? Do some types of parties enjoy advantages over other kinds? Are Americans as disputatious as many critics and commentators would have us believe? What accounts for the rise and decline of litigation in societies? Do sociological or economic explanations provide a better account for the choices of individuals and institutions in litigation?

 

 

Required

 

Galanter, Marc.  1983.  Reading the Landscape of Disputes:  What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society.  UCLA Law Review 31:4-71.

Giles, Michael, and Thomas D. Lancaster.  1989.  Political Transition, Social Development, and Legal Mobilization.  American Political Science Review 83:817-834.

Songer, Donald, Charles Cameron, and Jeffrey A. Segal.  1995.  An Empirical Test of the Rational Actor Theory of Litigation.  Journal of Politics 57:1119-1129.

Priest, George, and Benjamin Klein.  1984.  The Selection of Disputes for Litigation.  Journal of Legal Studies 13:1-55.

 

 

Recommended

 

Sarat, Austin, and Joel B. Grossman.  1975.  Courts and Conflict Resolution:  Problems in the Mobilization of Adjudica­tion.  American Political Science Review 69:1200-17.

Galanter, Marc.  1974.  Why the `Haves' Come Out Ahead:  Specula­tions on the Limits of Legal Change.  Law & Society Review 9:95-160.

Macauley, Stewart.  1963.  Non-Contractual Relations in Business:  A Preliminary Study.  American Sociological Review 28:55-67.

Ellickson, Robert C.  1991.  Order Without Law:  How Neighbors Settle Disputes.  Cambridge:  Harvard University Press.

Priest, George.  1980.  Selective Characteristics of Litigation.  Journal of Legal Studies 9:399-000.

Posner, Richard.  1985.  The Federal Courts:  Crisis and Reform.  Cambridge:  Harvard University Press.

Baird, Douglas C., Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker.  1994.  Game Theory and the Law.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

McIntosh, Wayne, "Courts and Socioeconomic Change," in John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson (eds.), The American Courts (1990), 281-303.

McIntosh, Wayne.  1983.  Private Use of a Public Forum:  A Long Range View of the Dispute Processing Role of Courts.  American Political Science Review 77:991-1010.

Miller, Richard E., and Austin Sarat.  1980-1981.  Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:  Assessing the Adversary Culture.  Law & Society Review 15:525-565.

Friedman, Lawrence M., and Robert V. Percival.  1976.  A Tale of Two Courts:  Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties.  Law & Society Review 10:267-301.

Ellickson, Robert.  1986.  Of Coase and Cattle:  Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County.  Stanford Law Review 38:623-687.

Engel, David M.  1984.  The Oven Bird's Song:  Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community.  Law & Society Review 18:551-582.

Wheeler, Stanton, Bliss Cartwright, Robert A. Kagan, Lawrence A. Friedman.  1980.  Do the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead?  Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts.  Law & Society Review 21:403-445.

Jacob, Herbert.  1989.  Another Look at No-Fault Divorce and the Post-Divorce Finances of Women.  Law & Society Review 23:95-116.

Wanner, Craig.  1975.  The Public Ordering of Private Relations.  Law & Society Review 8:421-440; 9:293-306.

Weitzman, Lenore J.  1985.  The Divorce Revolution.  New York:  Free Press.

Mnookin, Robert, and Lewis Kornhauser.  1979.  Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  The Case of Divorce.  Yale Law Journal 88:950-997.

Kagan, Robert A.  1984.  The Routinization of Debt Collection:  An Essay on Social Change and Conflict in the Courts.  Law & Society Review 18:323-371.

 

 

 

III ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND LITIGATION

Do organized interests dominate litigation? Do some organized interests enjoy an advantage over others? If so, why? Do the calculations of organized interests in using the courts vary across types of interest groups? How can we account for why some groups use the courts and others do not, or use them seldom? Does litigation spearheaded by organized interests have a greater impact than legal battles between individuals? To what extent and under what conditions do the lawyers of direct parties organize and orchestrate the participation of organized interests in litigation?

 

 

Required

 

Olson, Susan M.  1990.  Interest Group Litigation in Federal District Court:  Beyond the Political Disadvantage Theory.  Journal of Politics 52:854-882.

Scheppele, Kim, and Jack L. Walker.  1991.  The litigation strategies of interest groups.  In Jack L. Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America.  Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press.  Pp. 157-184.

McGuire, Kevin T.  1994.  Amici Curiae and Strategies for Gaining Access to the Supreme Court.  Political Research Quarterly 47:821-838.

Spriggs, James II, and Paul Wahlbeck.  1997.  Amici Curiae and the Role of Information in the Supreme Court.  Political Research Quarterly 50:365-386.

McGuire, Kevin T., and Gregory A. Caldeira.  1993.  Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court.  American Political Science Review 87:717-226.

Songer, Donald R., and Ashlyn Kuersten.  1995.  The Success of Amici in State Supreme Courts.  Political Research Quarterly 48:31-42.

Stewart, Joseph, Jr., and James F. Sheffield, Jr.  1987.  Does Interest Group Litigation Matter? The Case of Black Political Mobilization in Mississippi. Journal of Politics 49:780-798.

 

Recommended

 

Casper, Jonathan.  1970.  Lawyers Before the Supreme Court:  Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 1957-66.  Stanford Law Review 22:487-509.

Epstein, Lee.  1990.  Courts and Interest Groups.  In John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson (eds.), The American Courts.  Washington:  Congressional Quarterly Press.  Pp. 335-372.

Kessler, Mark.  1990.  Legal Mobilization for Social Reform:  Power and the Politics of Agenda Setting.  Law & Society Review 24:120-143.     

Wasby, Stephen.  1984.  How Planned is `Planned Litigation'?  American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1984:83-138.

Lawrence, Susan.  1990.  The Poor in Court:  The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press.

O'Connor, Karen, and Lee Epstein.  1984.  The Role of Interest Groups in Supreme Court Policy Formation.  In Robert Eyestone, ed., Public Policy Formation.  New York:  JAI Press.

Olson, Susan.  1981.  The Political Evolution of Interest Group Litigation.  In J. Gambitta et al., eds., Governing Through Courts.  Beverly Hills:  Sage.  Ch. 11.

O'Connor, Karen, and Lee Epstein.  1981.  Amicus Curiae Participation in the U.S. Supreme Court:  An Appraisal of Hakman's `Folklore.'  Law & Society Review 16:311-320.

Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright.  1988.  Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court.  American Political Science Review 82:1109-1129.

Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright.  1990.  Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court:  Who Participates, When, and How Much?  Journal of Politics 52:782-806.

Sorauf, Frank J.  1976.  The Wall of Separation:  The Constitutional Politics of Church and State.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press.

Kluger, Richard.  1976.  Simple Justice:  The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Search for Equality.  New York:  Knopf.

Tushnet, Mark V.  1987.  The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-1950.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina.

O'Connor, Karen.  1980.  Women's Organizations' Use of the Courts.  Lexington, MA:  Lexington Books.

Vose, Clement E.  1972.  Constitutional Change.  Lexington, MA:  D.C. Heath.

Epstein, Lee.  1985.  Conservatives in Court.  Nashville:  University of Tennessee Press.

Truman, David.  1951.  The Governmental Process.  New York:  Alfred A. Knopf.  Ch. 15.

Casper, Jonathan.  1972.  Lawyers Before the Warren Court.  Urbana:  University of Illinois Press.

O'Connor, Karen, and Lee Epstein.  1989.  Public Interest Law Groups.  Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press.

 

 

IV WINNERS AND LOSERS

Courts, like other political agencies, allocate scarce resources in society. And, as in other institutions, some kinds of people and institutions do better than others. Who are the winners and losers? Does who wins and loses vary across time, space, and type of court? What differentiates winners from losers? Do financial resources trump other kinds? Can "have nots" compensate for lack of money and political access?

 

 

Required reading

 

Galanter, Marc.  1974.  Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change.  Law & Society Review 9:95-160.

Wheeler, Stanton, Bliss Cartwright, Robert A. Kagan, and Lawrence M. Friedman.  1987.  Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead?  Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970.  Law & Society Review 21:403-445.

Sheehan, Reginald S., William Mishler, and Donald R. Songer.  1992.  Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court.  American Political Science Review 86:464-471.

 

 

 

V CHOOSING JUDGES

We employ a wide variety of methods for choosing judges in the United States. On the federal side, the president chooses and the Senate confirms. In some states, judges run as partisans; in others, governors, with little interference from the legislature, install their favorites. In systems in which judges are subject to election, on what criteria do citizens base their judgments? Do these criteria vary across systems? Normally, the Senate goes along with the choices of the president, but, at times, conflict over nominations arises. Under what conditions do the Senate and executive come into conflict? What accounts for the votes of senators?

 

 

Required reading

 

Dubois, Philip.  1984.  Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections:  A Multivariate Assessment.  Law & Society Review 18:395-436.

Hojnacki, Marie, and Lawrence Baum.  1992.  "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns and the Voters:  Economic Issues and Union Members in Ohio. Western Political Quarterly 45:921-948.

Baum, Lawrence.  1995.  Electing Judges.  In L. Epstein (ed.), Contemplating Courts.  Washington:  CQ Press.  Pp. 18-43.

Cameron, Charles, Albert Cover, and Jeffrey Segal.  1990.  Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees:  A Neoinstitutional Model.  American Political Science Review 84:513-524.

Overby, L. Marvin, Beth M. Henschen, Michael H. Walsh, and Julie Strauss.  1992.  Courting Constituents?  An Analysis of the Senate Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas.  American Political Science Review 86:997-106.

Segal, Jeffrey A., Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover.  1992.  A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting:  Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confir­ma­tions.  American Journal of Political Science 36:96-121.

Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright.  1998.  Lobbying for Justice:  Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate.  American Journal of Political Science 42:499-523.

 

Recommended reading

 

Goldman, Sheldon.  1997.  Picking Federal Judges.  New Haven: Yale University Press.

Maltese, John Anthony.  1995.  The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Silverstein, Mark.  1994.  Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme Court Nominations.  New York: W. W. Norton.

Shapiro, Martin M.  1990.  Interest Groups and Supreme Court Appointments.  North­western University Law Review 84:935-961.

Squire, Peverill, and Eric R.A.N. Smith.  1988.  The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters in Nonpartisan Elections.  Journal of Politics 50:169-179.

Slotnick, Elliot E.  1984.  Judicial Selection Systems and Nomination Outcomes:  Does the Process Make a Difference?  American Politics Quarterly 12:225-240.

Baum, Lawrence.  1988-1989.  Voters' Information in Judicial Elections:  The 1986 Contests for the Ohio Supreme Court.  Kentucky Law Journal 77:645-670.

Baum, Lawrence.  1987.  Information and Party Voting in Semi-Partisan Judicial Elections.  Political Behavior 9:62-74.

Baum, Lawrence.  1987.  Explaining the Vote in Judicial Elections:  The 1984 Ohio Supreme Court Elections.  Western Political Quarterly 40:361-371.

Watson, George, and John Stookey.  1995.  Shaping America: The Politics of Supreme Court Appointments.  New York: HarperCollins.

Hall, Kermit.  1979.  The Politics of Justice:  Lower Federal Judicial Selection and the Second Party System 1829-61.  Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press.

Schwartz, Herman.  1988.  Packing the Courts:  The Conservative Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution.  New York:  Scribners'.

Pertschuk, Michael, and Wendy Schaetzel.  1989.  The People Rising:  The Campaign Against the Bork Nomination.  New York:  Thunder Mouth's Press.

McGuigan, Patrick, and Dawn Weyrich.  1990.  Ninth Justice:  The Fight for Bork.  Washington:  University Press of America.

Bronner, Ethan.  1989.  The Battle For Justice:  How the Bork Nomination Shook America.  New York:  W. W. Norton.

Sheldon, Charles H., and Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr.  1990.  State Judicial Recruitment.  In John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson (eds.), The American Courts.  Pp. 161-188.

Goldman, Sheldon.  1990.  Federal Judicial Recruitment.  In John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson (eds.), The American Courts.  Pp. 189-210.

Dubois, Philip.  1980.  From Ballot to Bench:  Judicial Elections and the Quest for Judicial Accountability.  Austin:  University of Texas Press.

Watson, Richard A., and Rondal G. Downing.  1969.  The Politics of the Bench and the Bar:  Judicial Selection Under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan.  New York:  John Wiley.

McFeeley, Neil.  1987.  Appointment of Judges:  The Johnson Presidency.  Austin:  University of Texas.

Chase, Harold W.  1972.  Federal Judges:  The Appointing Process.  Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press.

Grossman, Joel B.  1965.  Lawyers and Judges:  The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection.  New York:  John Wiley.

Schmidhauser, John.  1979.  Judges and Justices:  The Federal Appellate Judiciary.  Boston:  Little, Brown.

Abraham, Henry.  1984.  Justices and Presidents 2d ed.  New York:  Oxford University Press.

Segal, Jeffrey.  1987.  Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices:  Partisan and Institutional Politics.  Journal of Politics 48:998-1015.

Kagan, Robert A., Bobby D. Infelise, and Robert R. Detlefsen.  1988.  American State Supreme Court Justices, 1900-1970.  American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1984:371-408.

Schotland, Roy.  1985.  Elective Judges' Campaign Financing:  Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy? Journal of Law and Politics 2:57-167.

 

 

VI INTER-COURT RELATIONS

Judges and lawyers have amazingly well-developed mechanisms for communicating with one another. Precedent builds upon precedent, policy upon policy; precedents and policies decay over time. Jurisdictions rely on the experiences of other, similiar jurisdictions. In sum, then, judges and lawyers do not act alone; "judge and company," as Blackstone phrased it, make the law. What accounts for communication between and among judges? Do economic or sociological models provide a better explanation? How do innovations spread across jurisdictions? What is the relationship between patterns we might observe at the level of judges and courts and broader developments in litigation? That is, how, if at all, do patterns of communication contribute to the rise and decline of lawsuits and appeals?

 

 

Required reading

 

Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner.  1976.  Legal Precedent:  A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.  Journal of Law and Economics 19:249-307.

Shapiro, Martin.  1970.  Decentralized Decision-Making in the Law of Torts.  In S. Sidney Ulmer, ed., Political Decision-Making.  New York:  Van Nostrand.

Canon, Bradley, and Lawrence Baum.  1981.  Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations:  An Application of Diffusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines.  American Political Science Review 75:975-987.

Caldeira, Gregory.  1985.  The Transmission of Legal Precedent:  A Study of State Supreme Courts.  American Political Science Review 79:178-193.

Klein, David.  1996.  Explaining the Adoption and Rejection of Legal Doctrines in the U. S. Courts of Appeals.  Conference paper.

Songer, Donald R., Charles Cameron, and Jeffrey A. Segal.  1994.  The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions.  American Journal of Political Science 38:673-696.

McNollgast.  1995.  Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law.  Southern California Law Review 68:1631-1689.

 

Recommended reading

 

Landes, William M., Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine.  1998.  Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Court of Appeals Judges.  Journal of Legal Studies 27:271-332.

Baum, Lawrence.  1990.  Courts and Policy Innovation.  In John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson (eds.), The American Courts.  Pp. 413-433.

Sanders, Francine.  1995.  Brown v. Board of Education: An Empirical Reexamination of its Effects on Federal District Courts.  Law & Society Review 29:731-756.

Murphy, Walter F.  1962.  Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court Bureaucracy.  Journal of Politics 24:453-476.

Barrow, Deborah, and Thomas G. Walker.  1988.  A Court Divided:  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and Judicial Reform.  New Haven:  Yale University Press.

Tarr, G. Alan, and Mary Cornelia Porter.  1988.  State Supreme Courts in State and Nation.  New Haven:  Yale University.

Harris, Peter.  1985.  Ecology and Culture in the Communication of Precedent Among State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970.  Law & Society Review  19:449-486.

Carp, Robert.  1972.  The Scope and Function of Intra-Circuit Judicial Communication:  A Case Study in the Eighth Circuit.  Law & Society Review 6:405-426.

Caldeira, Gregory A.  1988.  Legal Precedent:  Structures of Communi­cation Between State Supreme Courts.  Social Networks 10:29-55.

Caldeira, Gregory A.  1983.  On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts. Political Behavior 5:83-108.

Mason, M. P.  1978.  Courting Reversal:  The Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts.  Yale Law Journal 87:1191-1218.

Merryman, John H.  1977.  Toward a Theory of Citations:  An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970.  Southern California Law Review 50:381-428.

Davies, Thomas Y.  1982.  Affirmed:  A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal.  American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1982:543-648.

 

 

VII       DO COURTS MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

 

Proponents and critics of judicial activism often seem to assume omnipotence on the part of courts.  Courts should fashion solutions to social, political, and economic problems.  If only courts would refrain from intervention, all would be well; legislatures, electoral politicians, and markets could work.  We political scientists, however, know all too well the perils of implementation and compliance.  It is one thing to adopt a policy; it is quite another to implement it; and yet another to bring about compliance with legal mandates.

 

 

Required reading

 

Rosenberg, Gerald.  1991.  The Hollow Hope:  Can Courts Bring About Social Change?  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.  Entire.

One or more critical reviews of The Hollow Hope.

 

 

Recommended reading

 

Canon, Bradley C.  1990.  Courts and Policy:  Compliance, Implementation, and Impact.  In John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson (eds.), The American Courts:  A Critical Assessment.  Washington:  Congressional Quarterly Press.  Pp. 435-466.

Johnson, Charles A., and Bradley C. Canon.  1984.  Judicial Policies:  Implementation and Impact.  Washington:  CQ Press.  Chs. 2, 3, 6.

Johnson, Charles A.  1987.  Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making:  Lower Federal Court Uses of Supreme Court Decisions.  Law & Society Review 21:325-340.

Gruhl, John.  1980.  The Supreme Court's Impact on the Law of Libel:  Compliance by Lower Federal Courts.  Western Political Quarterly 33:502-519.

Jenson, Carol E.  1982.  The Network of Control:  State Supreme Courts and State Security Statutes, 1920-1970.  Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press.

Tarr, G. Alan.  1977.  Judicial Impact and State Supreme Courts.  Lexington, MA:  Lexington Books.

Peltason, J. W.  1971.  Fifty-Eight Lonely Men:  Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation, 2d ed.  Urbana:  University of Illinois Press.

Johnson, Charles A.  1979.  Lower Court Reactions to Supreme Court Decisions:  A Quantitative Examination.  American Journal of Political Science 23:792-804.

Johnson, Charles A.  1981.  Do Lower Courts Anticipate the Changes in Supreme Court Policies?  A Few Empirical Notes.  Law & Policy Quarterly 3:55-68.

Dolbeare, Kenneth, and Phillip E. Hammond.  1971.  The School Prayer Decisions:  From Court Decision to Local Practice.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

Muir, William K.  1967.  Prayer in the Public Schools:  Law and Attitude Change.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

Gruhl, John, and Cassia Spohn.  1981.  The Supreme Court's Post-Miranda Rulings:  Impact on Local Prosecutions.  Law & Policy Quarterly 3:9-54.

Ekland-Olson, Sheldon, and Steve J. Martin.  1988.  Organizational Compliance with Court-Ordered Reform.  Law & Society Review 22:359-383.

Croyle, James.  1979.  The Impact of Judge-Made Policies:  An Analysis of Research Strategies and an Application to Products Liability Doctrine.  Law & Society Review 13:494-967.

Caldeira, Gregory A.  1981-1982.  Changing the Common Law:  Effects of the Decline of Charitable Immunity.  Law & Society Review 16:669-693.

Hansen, Susan.  1980.  State Implementation of Supreme Court Decisions:  Abortion Rates Since Roe v. Wade.  Journal of Politics 42:372-395.

Giles, Michael, and Douglas Gatlin.  1980.  Mass Level Compliance with Public Policy:  The Case of School Desegregation.  Journal of Politics 42:722-746.

Canon, Bradley C., and Dean Jaros.  1979.  The Impact of Change in Judicial Doctrine:  The Abrogation of Charitable Immunity.  Law & Society Review 13:969-986.

Horowitz, Donald.  1977.  The Courts and Social Policy.  Washington:  Brookings Institution.

 

VIII      COURTS, EXECUTIVES, AND LEGISLATURES, PART I

 

Too often political scientists have taken up courts, or other institutions, in isolation from one another.  And, yet, we all know how courts and other institutions constantly interact to produce public policy.  In recent years, economists and political economists have taken a hand to the question of the relationships between and among courts, agencies, and legislatures.  Some of the answers are interesting and insightful and at least direct us to an important set of phenomena.


Required reading

 

Landes, William, and Richard Posner.  1975.  The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective.  Journal of Law and Economics 18:875-901.

Macey, Jonathan R.  1992.  Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies.  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8:93-125 (1992).  See also comments by Shepsle and Levine.

Spriggs, James, II.  1997.  Explaining Federal Bureacratic Compliance with Supreme Court Opinions.  Political Research Quarterly 50:567-594.

Spriggs, James, II.  1996.  The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact.  American Journal of Political Science 40:1122-1151.

Eskridge, William N., Jr., and John Ferejohn.  1992.  Making the Deal Stick:  Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Regulatory State.  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8:165-213 (1992).  See the comments by Knight, Rodriguez, and Strauss and Rutten.

 

 

Recommended reading

 

Ferejohn, John A., and Barry R. Weingast.  1991.  A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation.  Working Paper in Political Science, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1991.

Shapiro, Martin.  1968.  The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies.  New York:  Free Press.

Shapiro, Martin.  1989.  Who Guards the Guardians?  Judicial Control of Administration.  Athens:  University of Georgia.

Stewart, Richard.  1975.  The reformation of American administrative law.  Harvard Law Review 88:1667-1813 (selections).

McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast.  1989.  Structure and process, politics, and policy:  administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies.  Virginia Law Review 75:431-482.

Moe, Terry M.  1987.  An assessment of the positive theory of "congres­sional domi­nance."  Legislative Studies Quarterly 12:475-520.

Moe, Terry M.  1990.  Political institutions:  the neglected side of the story.  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:213-261.

Mashaw, Jerry L.  1990.  Explaining administrative process:  normative, positive, and critical stories of legal development.  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:267-298.

Moe, Terry M.  1989.  The politics of bureaucratic structure.  In John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (eds.), Can the Government Govern?  Washington:  The Brookings Institution.  Pp. 267-330.

Sunstein, Cass.  1986.  Factions, self-interest and the APA:  Four lessons since 1946.  Virginia Law Review 72:271-296.

Chubb, John.  1983.  Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy.  Stanford:  Stanford University Press.

Gormley, William T.  1989.  Taming the Bureaucracy.  Princ­eton:  Princeton University Press.

Melnick, R. Shep.  1983.  Regulation and the Courts:  The Case of the Clean Air Act.  Washington:  Brookings Institution.

Wilson, James Q.  1989.  Bureaucracy.  New York:  Basic Books.

Moe, Terry M.  1987.  Interests, institutions, and positive theory:  the politics of the NLRB.  Studies In American Political Development 2:236-299.

Fiorina, Morris P.  1986.  Legislator uncertainty, legislative control, and the delegation of legislative power.  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2:33-51.

McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast.  1987.  Adminis­trative proce­dures as an in­strument of politi­cal con­trol.  Journal of Law, Econom­ics, and Organiza­tion.  3:243-277.

Sunstein, Cass.  1985.  Interest groups in American public law.  Stanford Law Review 38:29-87.

Weingast, Barry, and Mark Moran.  1983.  Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control:  regulatory pol­icymaking by the Federal Trade Commission.  Journal of Political Economy 91:765-800.

Weingast, Barry, and William Marshall.  1988.  The industrial organization of Congress.  Journal of Political Economy 96:132-163.

Sunstein, Cass.  1991.  After the Rights Revolution:  Reconceiving the Regulatory State.  Cambridge:  Harvard University Press.

 

 

IX            COURTS, EXECUTIVES, AND LEGISLATURES, PART II

 

In this section, we deal with critical relationships between the executive branch, especially the Solicitor General, and the Court; and the state legislatures, frequent targets of judicial review, and the Court.  Is the SG appropriately an adjunct of the Court or a partisan the executive?  Empirically, which role does the SG most often adopt?  Several scholars have remarked about the connection between periods of the party system and aggressiveness on the part of the Court toward Congress, state legislatures, or both.  Under what conditions does the Supreme Court strike down the policies of state legislatures or of Congress?

 

 

Required reading

 

Fisher, Louis.  1990.  Is the Solicitor General an Executive or a Judicial Agent?  Caplan's Tenth Justice.  Law & Social Inquiry 15:305-320 (1990).

Schnapper, Eric.  1988.  Becket at the Bar--The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor General.  Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 21:1187-1271.

Dahl, Robert A.  1957.  Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker.  Journal of Public Law 6:279-295.

Casper, Jonathan D.  1976.  The Supreme Court and National Policy-Making.  American Political Science Review 70:50-63.

Gates, John B.  1987.  Partisan realignment, Unconstitutional State Policies, and the U.S. Supreme Court, 1837-1964.  American Journal of Political Science 31:259-280.

Hausegger, Lori, and Lawrence Baum.  Forthcoming 1999.  Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in_Statutory Interpretation  American Journal of Political Science  43, 1.

Meernik,, James, and Joseph Ignani.  1997.  Judicial Review and Coordinate Construction of the Constitution.  American Journal of Political Science 41:447-467.

 

 

Recommended reading

 

Eskridge, William N., Jr.  1991.  Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions.  Yale Law Journal 101:327-458.

Eskridge, William N., Jr.  1994.  Dynamic Statutory Interpretation.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Caplan, Lincoln.  1988.  The Tenth Justice.  New York:  Alfred A. Knopf.

Salokar, Rebecca.  1992.  The Solicitor General:  The Politics of Law.  Philadelphia:  Temple University Press.

Funston, Richard.  1975.  The Supreme Court and Critical Elections.  American Political Science Review 69:785-811.

Gates, John B.  1991.  The Supreme Court and Partisan Realignment: A Macro and Microlevel Perspective.  Westview Press.

Segal, Jeffrey A.  1990.  Courts, Executives, and Legislatures.  In John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson (eds.), The American Courts.  Pp. 373-397.

Adamany, David W.  1973.  Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court.  Wisconsin Law Review 1973:790-846.

Segal, Jeffrey A.  1988.  Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren and Burger Courts.  Western Political Quarterly 41:135-144.

Ducat, Craig, and Robert Dudley.  1989.  Federal District Judges and Presidential Power During the Postwar Era.  Journal of Politics 51:98-118.

Handberg, Roger, and Harold Hill.  1980.  Court Curbing, Court Reversals, and Judicial Review:  The Supreme Court Versus Congress.  Law & Society Review 14:309-322.

Henschen, Beth M.  1983.  Congressional Response to the Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court.  American Politics Quarterly 11:441-459.

Murphy, Walter F.  1962.  Congress and the Court.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

Schmidhauser, John, and Larry L. Berg.  1972.  Congress and the Supreme Court:  Conflict and Interaction, 1945-1968.  New York:  Free Press.

Note.  1958.  Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957. Harvard Law Review 71:1324-1337.

 

 


X          PUBLIC OPINION AND THE COURTS

 

What are the sources of public attitudes toward the Supreme Court?  Does the development and maintenance of support for the Court differ from that of other institutions?  Do the procedures of institutions contribute to public approval of them?  What is the relationship between perceptions of "procedural justice" and insitutional legitimacy?  How, and under what conditions, can the Supreme Court lead public opinion?

 

 

Required reading

 

Gibson, James L.  1989.  Understandings of Justice:  Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance.  Law & Society Review 23:469-496.

Tyler, Tom.  1988.  What is Procedural Justice?  Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures.  Law & Society Review 22:301-355.

Caldeira, Gregory A., and James L. Gibson.  1992.  The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court.  American Journal of Political Science 36:635-691 (1992).

Mondak, Jeffrey, and Shannon Smithey.  1997.  The Dynamics of Support for the Supreme Court.  Journal of Politics 59:1114-1143.

Franklin, Charles, and Liane Kosaki.  1989.  Republican Schoolmaster: The United States Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion.  American Political Science Review 83:751-771.

Johnson, Timothy, and Andrew D. Martin.  1998.  The Public’s Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions.  American Political Science Review 92:299:309.

Hoekstra, Valerie, and Jeffrey Segal.  1996.  The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme Court and Lamb’s Chapel.  Journal of Politics 58:1079-1102.

 

 

Recommended reading

 

Franklin, Charles, and Liane Kosaki.  1991.  The Visibility of Supreme Court Decisions.  Presented at the 1991 Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Mishler, William, and Reginald Sheehan.  1992.  The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution?  The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions.  American Political Science Review 87:87-101.

Caldeira, Gregory A.  1990.  Courts and Public Opinion.  In John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson (eds.), The American Courts.  Pp. 303-334.

Mondak, Jeffrey J.  1991.  Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Supreme Court Decisions as Determinants of Institutional Approval.  American Politics Quarterly 19:174-188.

Caldeira, Gregory A.  1987.  Neither the Purse Nor the Sword:  Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court.  American Political Science Review 80:1209-1226.

Lehne, Richard, and John Reynolds.  1978.  The Impact of Judicial Activism on Public Opinion.  American Journal of Political Science 22:896-904.     

Baas, Larry, and Dan Thomas.  1984.  The Supreme Court and Policy Legitimation:  Experimental Tests.  American Politics Quarterly 12: 335-360.

Barnum, David.  1985.  The Supreme Court and Public Opinion:  Judicial Decision-Making in the Post-New Deal Period.  Journal of Politics 47:652-666.

Adamany, David, and Joel B. Grossman.  1983.  Support for the Supreme Court as a National Policymaker.  Law and Policy Quarterly 5:405-000.

Murphy, Walter F., Joseph Tanenhaus, and Daniel Kastner.  1973.  Public Evaluations of Constitutional Courts.  Beverly Hills:  Sage.

Tyler, Tom.  1984.  The Role of Perceived Injustice on Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experiences.  Law & Society Review 18:51-00.

Casey, Gregory.  1974.  The Supreme Court and Myth:  An Empirical Investigation.  Law & Society Review 8:385-419.

Dolbeare, Kenneth, and Phillip E. Hammond.  1968.  The Political Party Basis of Attitudes Toward the Supreme Court.  Public Opinion Quarterly 37:16-30.

Murphy, Walter F., and Joseph Tanenhaus.  1968.  Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court:  A Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes.  Law & Society Review 2:357-382.

Gibson, James L., and Gregory A. Caldeira.  1992.  Blacks and the United States Supreme Court:  Models of Diffuse Support.  Journal of Politics 54:1120-1148.

 

 

XI        HIGH COURTS IN TRANSNATIONAL SETTINGS

 

Until the last decade or two, few people took transnational courts seriously.  Transnational courts, the argument went, lack the ability to bring sovereign states into compliance, international law is voluntary and ineffectual, and important matters do not come before such fora.  For these reasons and others, international law dropped out of the curriculum in political science.  Today, however, scholars have begun to focus on transnational courts, especially the Court of Justice of the European Communities but also the European Court of Human Rights.  Are these courts important?  If these courts are consequential, why have they become so?  Do such courts merely express the preferences of states, or are they autonomous? 

 

Required reading

 

Mattli, Walter, and Anne-Marie Slaughter.  1998.  Revisiting the European Court of Justice.  International Organization 52:177-210.

Garrett, Geoffrey.  1995.  The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union.  International Organization 49:171-1181.

Garrett, Geoffrey, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz.  1998.  The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union.  International Organization 52:149-176.

Alter, Karen.  1998.  Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”?  European Governments and the European Court of Justice.  International Organization 52:121-148.

Stone-Sweet, Alec, and Thomas L. Brunell.  1998.  Constructing a Supranational Constitution:  Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community.  American Political Science Review 92:63-82.

 

Recommended reading

 

Weiler, Joseph H. H.  1991.  The Transformation of Europe.  Yale Law Journal 100:2403-2483.

Weiler, Joseph H. H.  1994.  A Quiet Revolution: The European Court and Its Interlocutors.  Comparative Political Studies 26:510-534.

Shapiro, Martin M.  1992.  The European Court of Justice.  In Albert Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics.  Washington:  Brookings Institution.

Goldstein, Leslie F.  1997.  State Resistance to Authority in Federal Unions: The Early United States (1790-1860) and the European Community (1958-1994).  Studies in American Political Development 11:149-189.

Burley, Anne-Marie, and Walter Mattli.  1993.  Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration.  International Organization 47:41-76.

Caldeira, Gregory A., and James L. Gibson.  1995.  The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union: Models of Institutional Support.  American Political Science Review 89:356-376.

Stein, Eric.  1981.  Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution.  American Journal of International Law 75:1-27.

Strasser, Sarah E.  1995/1996.  Evolution and Effort: Docket Control & Preliminary References in the European Court of Justice.  Columbia Journal of European Law 2:49-105.

 

 

XII       HIGH COURTS IN DOMESTIC POLITICS IN NON-U. S. SETTINGS

 

The globalization of both judicial review and judicial politics is one of the most important and interesting trend in this era of democratization.  Prior to the late 1970s, only a small number of democracies had judicial review and fewer had politically important courts.  In the late 1970s, Spain and Portugal created important high courts.  More or less at the same time, courts became politically consequential in a number of countries in which they had played little or no role.  Then, with the fall of Communism, founders in nearly all of the new democracies in Eastern European and the former-Soviet Union created courts to protect their new constitutions and to play various other  roles central to the political process.  How politically important are courts outside the United States?  If they are important, why has this changed?  Why do states create courts?  Why do they create powerful courts?

 

Required reading

 

Epp, Charles R.  1998.  The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tate, C. Neal, and Torbjorn Vallinder.  1995.  The Global Expansion of Judicial Power: The Judicialization of Politics. In C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder (eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power.  New York:  New York University.  Pp. 1-10.

Vallinder, Torbjorn.  1995.  Where the Courts Go Marching In.  In C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder (eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power.  New York:  New York University.  Pp. 13-26.

Tate, C. Neal.  1995.  Why the Expansion of Judicial Power?  In C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder (eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power.  New York:  New York University.  Pp. 27-38.

 

Recommended reading

 

Larkins, Christopher.  1996.  Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis.  American Journal of Comparative Law 44:605-626.

Larkins, Christopher.  1998.  The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina.  Comparative Politics 30:4230442.

Vanberg, George.  1998.  Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise.  Journal of Theoretical Politics 10:299-326.

Brzezinski, Mark.  1998.  The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Poland.  London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 

Stone, Alex.  1992.  The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective.  New York: Oxford University Press.

Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird.  1998.  On the Legitimacy of National High Courts.  American Political Science Review 92:343-358.

Jacob, Herbert, Erhard Blankenburg, Herbert M. Kritzer, Doris Marie Provine, and Joseph Sanders (eds.).  1996.  Courts, Law, and Politics in Comparative Perspective.  New Haven: Yale University Press (United States, England, France, and Japan).

Landfried, Christine.  1988.  Constitutional Review and Legislation: An International Comparison.  Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Kommers, Donald.  1989.  The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany.  Durham: Duke University Press.

Newburg, Paula R.  1995.  Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan.  New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gibson, James L., and Gregory A. Caldeira.  1996.  The Legal Cultures of Europe.  Law & Society Review 30:55-85.

Brewer-Carias, A. R.  1989.  Judicial Review in Comparative Law.  Cambridge: Cambridge University  Press.

Ramseyer, J. Mark, and Eric B. Rasmussen.  1997.  Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime:  The Evidence from Japan.  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13:xxx-xxx.

Ramseyer, J. Mark.  1994.  The Puzzling Independence of Courts: A Comparative Approach.  Journal of Legal Studies 23:721-747.

 

 

 

 


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