I.          Political Participation (January 8th)

 

Why do some participate in politics and others do not? Do the rates of and explana­tions for different forms of political participation differ?  How can we account for rates of participation? Legal restrictions? Socioeconomic characteristics?  The efforts of parties to mobilize voters?  Political attitudes?  Why has the rate of electoral participation declined in the past twenty five years in the face of substantial increases in levels of education and affluence, both of which presumably encourage electoral turnout? How does the United States compare to other democratic societies?  Do differential rates of turnout have partisan conse­quences?  Does “negative” campaigning depress electoral turnout?

 

Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, "Beyond SES:  A Resource Model of Political Participation," 89 American Political Science Review 271 (1995).

 

Robert W. Jackman, "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democra­cies," 81 American Political Science Review 405 (1987).

 

Jack Nagel and John E. McNulty, “Partisan Effects of Voter Turnout in Senatorial and Gubernatorial Elections,” 90 American Political Science Review 780 (1996).

 

Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague, "Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization:  Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass," 86 American Political Science Review 70 (1992).

 

Stephen Ansolabehere, Shanto Iyengar, Adam Simon, and Nicholas Valentino, "Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?"  88 American Political Science Review 829 (1994).

 

 

II.         Gender and Politics (January 13th)

 

Do the political beliefs, values, and behaviors of men and women differ?  Do men and women in the mass public differ?  If so, do these differences carry over to political elites?  What accounts for gender differences in political behavior?  Does the impact of gender differ across types of political participation and engagement?  Does the balance of men and women in political institutions have consequences for the performance and outputs of those institu­tions?

 

Nancy Burns, Kay L. Schlozman, and Sidney Verba, “The Public Consequence of Private Inequality: Family Life and Citizen Participation,” 91 American Political Science Review 373 (1997).

 

Sidney Verba, Nancy Burns, and Kay L. Schlozman, “Knowing and Caring About Politics: Gender and Political Engagement,” 59 Journal of Politics 1051 (1997).

 

Susan B. Hansen, “Talking About Politics: Gender and Contextual Effects on Political Proselytization,” 59 Journal of Politics 73 (1997).

 

Lyn Kathlene, “Power and Influence in State Legislative Policymaking: The Interaction of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates,” 88 American Political Science Review 560 (1994).

 

 

III.       Public Support for Civil Liberties, Civil Rights (January 15^th, 20th)

 

Do Americans support the basic tenets of the Constitution?  Or do citizens apply rights differentially, depending upon the situation and the person exercising the right?  Why do some citizens manifest more support than do others?  Have political scientists constructed designs adequate to uncover patterns of support?  What if any consequences might a shallow level of support have for the operation of a constitutional democracy?  To what extent do racial views structure people’s evaluations of governmental programs such as affirmative action?  That is, does “racial prejudice” account for variations in support for governmental programs, or is it something else, perhaps a more general view toward the proper balance between individuals and government?   

 

John L. Sullivan, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus, "A Reconceptualization of Political Tolerance:  Illusory Increases, l950s‑1970s," 73 American Political Science Review 781 (1979).

 

James L. Gibson, "The Political Consequences of Intolerance:  Cultural Conformity and Political Freedom," 86 American Political Science Review 338 (1992).

 

Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee E. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley, “Media Framing of a Civil Liber­ties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance,” 91 American Political Science Review 567 (1997).

 

R. Michael Alvarez and John Brehm, “Are Americans Ambivalent Toward Racial Policies?” 41 American Journal of Political Science 345 (1977).

 

James H. Kuklinski, Paul M. Sniderman, Kathleen Knight, Thomas Piazza, Philip E. Tet­lock, Gordon R. Lawrence, and Barbara Mellers, “Racial Prejudice and Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action,” 41 American Journal of Political Science 375 (1997).

 

 

IV.        Media and Politics (January 22^nd, 27th)

 

Do the mass media influence political outcomes?  If so, how?  Of the various media, which ranks as the most influential?  How has the rise of television changed the nature of electoral and governmental politics in the United States?  Given present tools, can we ascer­tain the effects of the mass media with any degree of precision?   Do politicians manipulate the media, or does the causal arrow flow in the opposite direction?

 

Shanto Iyengar, Mark D. Peters, and Donald R. Kinder, "Experimental Demonstrations of the `Not‑So‑Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs," 76 American Political Science Review 848 (1982).

 

Shanto Iyengar, "Television News and Citizens' Explanations of National Affairs," 81 Ameri­can Political Science Review 815 (1987).

 

Jeffrey J. Mondak, "Newspapers and Political Awareness," 39 American Journal of Political Science 513 (1995).

 

Craig Leonard Brians and Martin P. Wattenberg, “Campaign Issue Knowledge and Salience:  Comparing Reception from TV Commercials, TV News and Newspapers,” 40 Ameri­can Journal of Political Science 172 (1996).

 

John R. Zaller, “Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: Evidence from the Gulf War,” pp. 186-209 in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz (eds.), Taken By Storm (Chicago: Univer­sity of Chicago Press, 1994).

 

Larry M. Bartels, “Politicians and the Press: Who Leads, Who Follows?” Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association.

 

 

V.         Money and Politics (January 29^th, February 3rd)

 

What effects does money have on elections? Can one "buy" an election? With what results has the government regulated money in elections? Would more stringent limitations on or regulation of finance have the desired consequences?  Do the large “war chests” incum­bent legislators often amass deter “high quality” challengers from running for office?  Do campaign contributions purchase influence in the legislative process? What impact do politi­cal action committees have on legislative voting? 

 

John R. Wright, "PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls:  An Organizational Perspective," 75 American Political Science Review 400 (1985).

 

Donald P. Green and Jonathan Krasno, "Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent:  Reestimat­ing the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections," 32 American Journal of Political Science 884 (1988).

 

Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections:  New Evidence for Old Arguments," 34 American Journal of Political Science 334, 363 (1990).

 

Janet Box-Steffensmeier, “A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy,” 40 American Journal of Political Science 352 (1996).

 

John R. Wright, "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U. S. House of Representatives," 84 American Political Science Review 417 (1990).

 

Richard Hall and Frank Wayman, "Buying Time:  Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," 84 American Political Science Review 797 (1990).

 

 

VI.            Persistence and Decline in Political Parties (February 5^th, 10th)

 

Are the political parties in decline?  What if any evidence do we have of such a deterioration? If so, when did the parties begin to unravel?  What forces caused the decline?  What, if any, consequences might the decline of parties have for the political process?  Why do we have political parties at all?  What roles do the parties today play in congressional and presidential politics?  What can political scientists do to gain a better understanding of the state of parties?

 

 James L. Gibson, Cornelius P. Cotter, John F. Bibby, Robert J. Huckshorn, "Assessing Party Organizational Strength," 27 American Journal of Political Science 193 (May 1983).

 

Joseph Schlesinger, "The New American Political Party," 79 American Political Science Review 1152 (December, 1985).

 

Paul S. Herrnson, "Do Parties Make a Difference?  The Role of Party Organizations in Congressional Elections," 48 Journal of Politics 589 (1986).

 

Paul Allen Beck, Russell J. Dalton, Audrey A. Haynes, and Robert Huckfeldt, “Presidential Campaigning at the Grass Roots,” 59 Journal of Politics 1001 (1997).

 

John H. Aldrich, Why Parties?  The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in Amer­ica (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 3-61.

 

 

VII.            Organized Interest Groups (February 12^th, 17th)

 

Why do interest groups rise and decline?  What functions do such groups perform in the political process?  Why do people join groups?  Why do they remain in groups?  Why are some more influential than are others?  Do interest groups improve or damage the health of American democracy?  Why, after so many years of productivity, did political scientists essentially stop the study of interest groups?  Why have we witnessed a renaissance of research on interest groups?  Can we use sophisticated methods of research on interest groups, or must we rely on case studies?  Do interest groups make a difference in the out­comes of the political process?  In particular, what if any difference does lobbying make in legislators?  Why?  Do interest groups tend to lobby their “friends,” fence-sitters, or do they lobby across the full range of the legislature? 

 

Jack L. Walker, "Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America," 77 American Political Science Review 390 (June 1983).

 

Lawrence S. Rothenberg, "Organizational Maintenance and the Retention Decision in Groups," 82 American Political Science Review 1129 (December 1988).

 

Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, “Lobbying for Justice:  Organized Interests, the Senate, and the Bork, Souter, and Thomas Nominations," 42 American Journal of Political Science (forthcoming 1998)

 

Kenneth Kollman, “Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Con­gressional Committees,” 41 American Journal of Political Science 519 (1997).

 

David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright, “Counteractive Lobbying,” 38 American Journal of Political Science 25 (1994).

 

Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, “The Multiple Ambiguities of ‘Counteractive Lobbying,’” 40 American Journal of Political Science 521 (1996).

 

David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright, “Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobby­ing,” 40 American Journal of Political Science 543 (1996).

 

VIII.     The Supreme Court and Policy‑Making (February 19^th, 24th)

 

From the defeat of FDR's "Court‑packing plan" in 1937 until very recently, most have thought of the Supreme Court as a defender of beleaguered minorities against oppressive majorities.  But some have called this conception into question as an empirical matter.  And, since the Court has no electoral base, a counter‑majoritarian role raises important normative issues.  Does the Supreme Court stake out a bold role as a leader?  Or does it function as an adjunct to the governing coalition?  Can minorities expect protection from the Court?  How can we account for the Court's decision-making?  Commentators often attribute considerable importance to interest groups in litigation.  Do interest groups enjoy advantages in litigation; and, if so, how, why, and under what conditions?  Does the Court in its decision-making take into account the preferences of other actors, including Congress?  Is the Court, in other words, a strategic political actor? 

 

William Mishler and Reginald Sheehan, "The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution?  The Importance of Public Opinion in Supreme Court Decisions," 87 American Political Science Review 87 (1993).

 

Helmut Norpoth, Jeffrey A. Segal, William Mishler, and Reginald Sheehan, "Popular Influ­ence on Supreme Court Decisions." 88 American Political Science Review 711 (1994).

 

Roy B. Flemming and B. Dan Wood, “The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods,” 41 American Journal of Political Science 468 (1997).

 

James F. Spriggs, II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, “Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme Court,” 50 Political Research Quarterly 365 (1997).

 

Donald Songer and Reginald Sheehan, “Interest Group Success in the Courts: Amicus Partici­pation in the Supreme Court,” 46 Political Research Quarterly 339 (1993).

 

Jeffrey A. Segal, “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts,” 91 American Political Science Review 28 (1997).

 

 

IX.       The Presidency: Institutionalization, Leadership and Popularity (February 26^th, March 3rd)

 

Popularity, public standing, and prestige are some of the most important resources a president can claim.  Presidents and scholars alike recognize this fact.  Since the l94Os Gallup has monitored public responses to the president on a regular basis, and scholars have used these data to study the determinants of popularity.  What influences the president's approval among the public?  Have the determinants changed over time?  Does presidential popularity make any practical difference?  What can the president to do shape public perceptions?  Do the determinants of presidential approval differ across individuals and aggregates?  To what extent, and under what conditions, can the president influence shape outcomes in Congress?  Does his standing with the public help?  Has the presidency become an institution in the sense of a stable set of units and relationships able to deal with external actors such as Congress, the Court, interest groups, and the public?  If so, in what senses?  

 

Lyn Ragsdale, “The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924-1992,” 41 American Journal of Political Science 1280 (1997).

 

Michael B. MacKuen, Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson, "Peasants or Bankers?  The American Electorate and the Economy," 86 American Political Science Review 597 (1992).

 

Helmut Norpoth, “Presidents and the Prospective Voter,” 58 Journal of Politics 776 (1996).  See also Michael B. MacKuen, Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson, “Comment,” 58 Journal of Politics 793 (1996), and Norpoth, “Rejoinder,” 58 Journal of Politics 802 (1996).

 

Jon A. Krosnick and Laura A. Brannon, "The Impact of the Gulf War on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations:  Multiple Effects of Political Involvement," 87 American Political Science Review 963 (1993).

 

Terry Sullivan, "The Bank Account Presidency:  A New Measure and Evidence on the Tem­poral Path of Presidential Influence," 35 American Journal of Political Science 686, 724, 730 (1991).  Read Sullivan and Edwards together.

 

Terry Sullivan, “Bargaining with the President: A Simple Game and New Evidence,” 84 American Political Science Review 1167 (1990).

 

Nolan McCarty and Keith T. Poole, “Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961-1986,” 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 282 (1995).

 

 

X.            Representation in Legislatures (March 6^th, 10th)

 

Do representatives represent?  In what sense?  If they do not, why not?  On what kinds of issues do representatives most clearly mirror the views of constituents?  What difficulties does a representative face in attempting to do his job?  Have political scientists gone about studying representation properly, or should we adopt other methods and con­cepts?  To what extent does the membership of committees in Congress reflect the composi­tion of the legislature as a whole?  Are committees composed of outliers?  How do legislators decide to run for reelection, retire, or run for higher office?  Do attempts to create congressio­nal districts in which a minority candidate has a good chance of winning enhance or decrease the representation of the substantive interests of minority voters?  Of the tripartite institu­tions of the national government, which is the most responsive to public opinion?  How, if at all, does the nature of the connections between these institutions and the public differ?

 

Peter M. VanDoren, "Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll-Call Data," 15 Legislative Studies Quarterly 311 (1990).

 

William Bianco, David B. Spence, and John D. Wilkerson, “The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The Case of the Compensation Act of 1816,” 40 American Journal of Political Science 145 (1996).

 

Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel, “Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102^nd House,” 38 American Journal of Political Science 75 (1994).

 

James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson, "Dynamic Representation," 89 American Political Science Review 543 (1995).

 

Tim Groseclose, “Testing Committee Composition Hypotheses for the U. S. Congress,” 56 Journal of Politics 440 (1994).

 

Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” 90 American Political Science Review 794 (1996).

 

 

XI.       Classic Articles in American Politics

 

Since the publication of these classics, what have political scientists added?  Has subsequent research vindicated the authors?  What makes them classics?  Do the characteris­tics of classics instruct us at all about the makings of a good work?  Do classics facilitate or retard the growth of knowledge? (You may, if you wish, petition to substitute in your essay some other piece of research on which we can agree.)

 

 

Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," 57 American Political Science Review 45 (March 1963).