

**Political Science 759: International Organization**  
Graduate Seminar

Winter 2006  
Monday 3:30-6:18  
Derby 2078

Prof. Alexander Thompson  
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Course Description

While the international system is often described as anarchic, international life is in fact organized to a significant degree. This course examines theoretically the sources of order in IR, ranging from informal norms and ordering principles to formal international organizations and law, with a variety of institutions in between. Beginning with the problem of collective action under anarchy, the readings cover such topics as international regimes, the influence of power and distributive conflict on institutions, explanations of institutional variation and design, compliance with international rules, the concept of legalization, and the interaction between international relations and theory and international law. Students are expected to have knowledge of international relations theory.

Course Requirements

The final grade will be based on the following components:

50% – A final paper, not to exceed 10 pages

30% – Two critical review papers, not to exceed 5 pages

20% – Class participation, including attendance, contribution to discussions, and in-class presentations

Readings

Readings are available in the course texts, in the course packet (available in the Reading Room, Derby 2174), and/or online through the library's OSCAR system, as indicated in parentheses. Students are expected to read all of the assigned readings. The required course texts are available at SBX.

*Course texts:*

David Baldwin, ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*. Columbia University Press, 1993.

Robert Keohane. *After Hegemony*. Princeton University Press, 1984.

Lisa Martin & Beth Simmons, eds. *International Institutions*. MIT Press, 2001.

Suggested: Mancur Olson. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Harvard University Press, 1965.

**Week 1 – Course Introduction; IO as a Field of Study**

J. Martin Rochester. 1986. The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study. *International Organization* 40 (4): 777-813. (online)

Alexander Thompson & Duncan Snidal. 2000. International Organization. In B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest, eds., *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*. (online: <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/9800book.pdf>)

**Week 2 – Collective Action and Anarchy**

Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, chaps. 1 & 2. (course packet)

Garrett Hardin. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science* 162 (December 13): 1243-48. (online)

Elinor Ostrom. 1990. *Governing the Commons*, chap. 1. (course packet)

Kenneth Waltz. 1979. Political Structures. *Theory of International Politics*, Chapter 5. (course packet)

Helen Milner. 1991. The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique. *Review of International Studies*. (In Baldwin)

**Week 3 – Theories of Cooperation and Regimes**

Kenneth Oye. 1985. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. *World Politics* 38: 1-24. (online)

Robert Keohane. 1984. *After Hegemony*, chaps. 3-6.

Paul Milgrom, Douglass North & Barry Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade. *Economics and Politics* 2: 1-23. (course packet)

**Week 4 – Institutional Variation**

Arthur Stein. 1982. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. *International Organization*. (In Baldwin)

Charles Lipson. 1984. International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs. *World Politics*. (In Baldwin)

John G. Ruggie. 1992. Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution. *International Organization* 46 (3). (online)

Lisa Martin. 1992. Interests, Power, and Multilateralism. *International Organization* (In Martin & Simmons)

**Week 5 – Power, Distribution, and Institutions** (*paper due*)

Joseph Grieco. 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. *International Organization* (In Baldwin)

Stephen Krasner. 1991. Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. *World Politics* (In Baldwin)

Lisa Martin. 1993. Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions. *World Politics* 45: 405-32. (online)

James Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization* 52(2): 269-305. (online)

Lloyd Gruber. 2000. Winners and Losers: The Case for a Theoretical Reorientation. *Ruling the World*, chap. 3. (course packet)

**Week 6 – Compliance with International Rules**

Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. (In Martin & Simmons)

Ronald Mitchell. 1994. Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. (In Martin & Simmons)

George Downs, David Rocke & Peter Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? (In Martin & Simmons)

Jeffrey Checkel. 2001. Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. *International Organization* 55: 553-588. (online)

Simmons, Beth. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 819-35. (online)

**Week 7 – Formal International Organizations**

Inis Claude. 1966. Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations. *International Organization* 20 (3): 367-79. (online)

Finnemore. 1993. International Organizations as Teachers of Norms. (In Martin & Simmons)

Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42: 3-32. (online)

Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. (In Martin & Simmons)

Alexander Thompson. 2006. Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. *International Organization* 60: 1-34. (online or course packet)

**Week 8 – The Rational Design of International Institutions**

David Lake. 1996. Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations. *International Organization* 50 (1): 1-33. (online)

Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4). (online)  
 -plus one empirical contribution to this special issue of your choosing

Warren Schwartz & Alan Sykes. 2002. The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization. *Journal of Legal Studies* 31 (Number 1, Part 2).  
 (online: <http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/journal/available.html>)

Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. Contracting around Uncertainty. *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 549-65. (online)

Alexander Thompson. 2006. The Rational *Choice* of International Institutions: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Climate Regime. Unpublished manuscript. (course packet)

**Week 9 – International Law and Legalization (paper due)**

Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley. 1993. International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda. *American Journal of International Law* 87: 205-39. (online)

Karen Alter. 1998. Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”? European Governments and the European Court of Justice. *International Organization* (In Martin & Simmons)

Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal. 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. *International Organization* 54 (3): 421-56. (online)

James Morrow. 2002. The Laws of War, Common Conjecture, and Legal Systems in International Politics. *Journal of Legal Studies* 31 (Number 1, Part 2).  
 (online: <http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/journal/available.html>)

Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner. 2002. Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective. *Journal of Legal Studies* 31 (Number 1, Part 2).

**March 15**

Final papers due in my office or mailbox by 4:00 p.m.